Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a defendant who was charged with sexual assault by one in a position of trust and aggravated incest against his two minor children, N.L. and A.L. After their initial interviews with a social worker failed to produce accusations, both children later alleged sexual abuse by their father during forensic interviews with Kim Grimm. The defense’s theory was that the children’s maternal grandmother, who wanted to keep custody, had coached them to fabricate or form false memories of abuse. Throughout the trial, the defense repeatedly raised this coaching theory, supporting it with evidence and argument.After the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, he appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals. The division concluded that the expert’s testimony—that she perceived no indication of coaching during her interviews with the children—was inadmissible, as it amounted to improper vouching for the children’s credibility. However, the division upheld the trial court’s decision to allow this testimony under the “opening the door” doctrine, finding that the defense had clearly intended to suggest to the jury that the grandmother coached the children, thus permitting the otherwise inadmissible testimony for context.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case on the narrow question of whether the defense had “opened the door” to the challenged expert testimony. The court assumed, without deciding, that the testimony was otherwise inadmissible. It held that the defense’s persistent introduction of the coaching theory throughout trial opened the door to Grimm’s expert opinion that she saw no indication of coaching. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Lopez v. People" on Justia Law

The case concerns a daycare provider who was charged with child abuse and operating a childcare facility without a license after allegations arose regarding inappropriate conduct by her teenage son toward children in her care. During the investigation, the provider voluntarily gave a recorded interview to police. Before trial, the county court suppressed part of the interview video, finding a Miranda violation during the latter portion of questioning. The prosecution appealed this suppression order under the applicable procedure and the district court reversed, holding there was no Miranda violation.After remand, as trial approached, the prosecution sought to introduce the entire interview video. The county court excluded portions of the video, not on constitutional grounds but as inadmissible under the Colorado Rules of Evidence due to concerns about relevance, prejudice, and cumulativeness. The prosecution attempted another pretrial interlocutory appeal, claiming the evidentiary ruling was a suppression of evidence. The district court dismissed this second appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ruling the order was strictly evidentiary, not a suppression ruling as required for an interlocutory appeal.After being convicted at trial, the defendant argued on appeal to the district court that her statutory speedy trial right was violated because the prosecution’s second pretrial appeal was not a proper interlocutory appeal and did not toll the statutory speedy trial deadline. The district court affirmed, finding the prosecution acted in good faith and their appeal had arguable merit.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the prosecution’s second pretrial appeal lacked arguable merit as an interlocutory appeal because it challenged an evidentiary ruling, not a suppression of evidence in the constitutional sense. Therefore, the speedy trial deadline was not tolled, and the defendant’s statutory right was violated. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction and dismiss the charges with prejudice. View "Phillips v. People" on Justia Law

Late one night, the defendant called 911 to report his motel roommate was unconscious due to a possible overdose. When police and emergency medical personnel arrived, the roommate died, but the defendant was not initially considered a suspect. The police took his statement and released him. The following day, after the autopsy, police suspected a disturbance had occurred and brought the defendant to the station for further questioning. He was handcuffed during transport per department policy but was not under arrest. At the station, he waited in the lobby, was taken to an interview room, and was not restrained. During the interview, the detective began to read a Miranda advisement, at which point the defendant stated he wanted a lawyer. The detective agreed, and the defendant prepared to leave. Shortly afterward, police decided to arrest him, and upon being informed of his arrest for murder, the defendant indicated he would speak without a lawyer. He was then given a Miranda advisement, waived his rights, and made incriminating statements.The District Court for the City and County of Denver held a suppression hearing. The court, noting that both the prosecution and defense conceded the defendant was not in custody at the time he invoked his right to counsel, nonetheless ruled that his invocation was effective because a Miranda advisement had been attempted. The court suppressed the subsequent statements under Edwards v. Arizona, finding the police had not honored the defendant’s request for counsel by reinitiating questioning.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case. It concluded that the district court erred by applying Miranda and Edwards protections when the defendant was not in custody at the time he requested an attorney. The court held that an invocation of the right to counsel outside custodial interrogation is not effective, even when law enforcement attempts a Miranda advisement. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Lulei" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who struck and killed her boyfriend with her car, then left the scene. She claimed the incident was accidental, while the prosecution charged her with second degree murder and related offenses. A central issue at trial was her mental state at the time of the offense. The defendant wished to present expert testimony regarding her mental illness and the potential impact of not taking prescribed antipsychotic medication in the days leading up to the incident, as it might have influenced whether she acted knowingly, the mens rea for the charged offense.The District Court of Lake County denied her request to present this expert testimony, reasoning that she had not completed a required court-ordered mental-condition examination due to her lack of cooperation. However, during the relevant period, the defendant had been found incompetent to proceed, which affected her ability to cooperate with the examination process. Despite repeated efforts and court orders spanning several years, no mental-condition examination was completed while she was competent. The trial court excluded her expert's mental-condition evidence and the jury convicted her on all counts.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the convictions on all counts where culpability was at issue. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by faulting the defendant for failing to cooperate with the examination while she was incompetent and by excluding all of her expert's testimony without distinguishing between evidence probative of insanity and evidence relevant to other defenses.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, holding that a defendant must be competent before undergoing a mental-condition examination under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court concluded that it was improper to penalize the defendant for noncooperation while incompetent and that the trial court erred in excluding all mental-condition evidence on that basis. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "People v. Day" on Justia Law

After unlawfully entering his ex-wife’s home in violation of a court-issued protection order, the defendant was charged with second degree burglary and additional offenses. The protection order, issued under Colorado law, specifically prohibited the defendant from contacting his ex-wife or entering her residence. During the incident, the defendant jumped a fence, damaged property, and entered the home despite his ex-wife’s objections, prompting her to lock herself in the bathroom and call the police. Officers arrived to find the defendant leaving the property, and he was subsequently taken into custody.The Weld County District Court held a preliminary hearing on the burglary charge. The prosecution presented evidence of the defendant’s violation of the protection order. The defendant did not dispute the factual allegations but argued that his conduct did not amount to a “crime against another person or property” under the second degree burglary statute. The District Court, relying on the Supreme Court of Colorado’s decision in People v. Rhorer, concluded that violating a protection order is a predicate crime for second degree burglary because it constitutes a crime against a person or property. The court found probable cause and set the charge for trial.The Supreme Court of Colorado exercised its original jurisdiction to review the District Court’s ruling. The court affirmed the trial court’s interpretation of the law, holding that a criminal violation of a protection order under section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S., categorically qualifies as a “crime against another person or property” for purposes of the second degree burglary statute. Therefore, such a violation may properly serve as the predicate offense for second degree burglary. The Supreme Court discharged the order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Dilka" on Justia Law

Two individuals confronted a man outside a liquor store over an alleged debt. Surveillance footage showed the three men walking into an alley, after which one of the confrontors reemerged, followed by a flash of light and another man running away. The victim was later found in the alley, having suffered fatal gunshot wounds. The prosecution charged one of the confrontors with first degree murder and added crime of violence sentence enhancers, alleging he caused the victim’s death as the shooter.At trial in the Denver District Court, the prosecution was permitted to discuss complicity during jury selection, but the court later rejected a complicity instruction for lack of evidentiary support. The jury convicted the defendant of the lesser included offense of second degree murder, and answered special interrogatories: it found he did not use or possess and threaten to use a deadly weapon, but did cause serious bodily injury or death. The defendant moved to vacate the verdict, arguing the interrogatory responses were inconsistent with the conviction. The trial court denied the motion, finding no logical or legal inconsistency, as use of a deadly weapon was not an element of second degree murder.On appeal, a split panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals vacated the conviction, concluding that the jury’s findings were inconsistent and negated the elements of identity and causation, rendering the verdict infirm. The majority relied on precedent and structural error principles, while a dissenting judge argued the interrogatory did not negate any element, but agreed the verdicts were logically inconsistent absent a complicity instruction.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the jury’s finding regarding deadly weapon use did not negate any element of second degree murder and that the verdict reflected the jury’s unambiguous intent. Finding no legal or logical inconsistency, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for consideration of any unresolved issues. View "People v. Shockey" on Justia Law

In June 2013, a masked individual robbed a bank in Aurora, Colorado, taking cash and using a bank bag containing a GPS device. The GPS led police to a car belonging to the estranged wife of Jamale D. Townsell. Evidence collected included clothing, shoes, and a mask, many of which were forensically tested and matched Townsell’s DNA. Cell phone records also placed Townsell near the scene. At trial, Townsell’s defense relied on the mistaken belief that only one piece of evidence—the pantyhose—had been tested for DNA, leading to a trial strategy that did not address the full extent of the DNA evidence. The jury convicted Townsell, and he was sentenced to thirty-two years in prison.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed Townsell’s conviction on direct appeal. Townsell subsequently filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(c), arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to adequately investigate DNA evidence and to seek further testing of untested items. The postconviction court denied the motion without appointing counsel, finding Townsell had failed to allege facts sufficient to show prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Townsell did not explain how additional DNA testing would have overcome the evidence against him or how a DNA expert would have aided his defense.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The court held that, to warrant appointment of postconviction counsel based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must allege with some factual basis how counsel’s deficiency caused prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. Because Townsell’s allegations regarding prejudice were conclusory and lacked supporting facts, his claim was deemed wholly unfounded, and the postconviction court did not err in denying his request for counsel. View "Townsell v. People" on Justia Law

Police officers discovered two debit cards in Garry Allen Hudson’s possession during a contact at a motel room and subsequent arrest. Each card was issued in a different person’s name, and Hudson denied knowing either individual. The detective who testified at trial was unable to determine whether the cards were active, whether Hudson knew the named individuals, or whether there was any money in the accounts. At least one of the cards had not been reported stolen in Colorado.Hudson was charged with criminal possession of two or more financial devices. At trial in the District Court, the jury convicted him of one count of criminal possession of a financial device, but did not specify which card formed the basis for conviction. The trial court sentenced Hudson to eighteen months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals, in a divided unpublished opinion, vacated Hudson’s conviction and sentence for criminal possession of a financial device. The majority held that the prosecution was required to prove the debit card could be used to obtain a thing of value at the time Hudson possessed it and found the evidence insufficient on that point.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, under sections 18-5-903(1) and 18-5-901(6), the prosecution is not required to prove that a debit card was capable of use at the time of possession to support a conviction for criminal possession of a financial device. The Court concluded that the statutory inclusion of debit cards as financial devices is sufficient and no further qualification regarding usability is required. The case was remanded to reinstate Hudson’s conviction. View "People v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers from a drug task force conducted several undercover drug transactions with a defendant, exchanging cash (“buy money”) for controlled substances over the course of nearly a year. After the defendant’s eventual arrest, officers were unable to recover any of the buy money used in these operations. The defendant was charged in multiple cases and ultimately pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of a controlled substance. The district court sentenced him to prison and, following a restitution hearing, ordered him to pay $1,640 in restitution to the drug task force for the unrecovered buy money.On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals vacated the restitution order. The appellate court reasoned that the buy money was not “money advanced by law enforcement agencies” within the meaning of Colorado’s restitution statute, since the agency was not a statutory “victim” and did not suffer a pecuniary loss in the relevant sense. The court also found that the buy money did not qualify as “extraordinary direct public investigative costs,” because such expenditures are routine, budgeted expenses for law enforcement, not unusual or irregular costs. The division explicitly declined to follow a prior decision, People v. Juanda, which had permitted restitution for buy money under similar circumstances.The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari to resolve whether law enforcement is entitled to restitution for unrecovered buy money under the relevant statute. The court held that buy money used in undercover drug transactions is neither “money advanced by law enforcement agencies” nor “extraordinary direct public investigative costs” as defined by statute. Therefore, law enforcement agencies cannot recover buy money as restitution from defendants in these circumstances. The judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals vacating the district court’s restitution order was affirmed. View "People v. Hollis" on Justia Law

Andrew Burgess Gregg was charged with aggravated robbery, attempt to influence a public servant, false reporting, and four habitual criminal counts in Mesa County, Colorado. After a jury convicted him of the substantive offenses, the trial court discharged the jury and scheduled a hearing to determine his habitual criminal status under Colorado’s prior sentencing statute, which required the judge to make such findings. Before that hearing, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Erlinger v. United States, holding that facts increasing a sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act—specifically, whether prior convictions arose from separate criminal episodes—must be determined by a jury, not solely by a judge.Gregg moved to dismiss the habitual criminal counts, arguing that Erlinger rendered Colorado’s statute unconstitutional and that empaneling a new jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The People opposed, asserting that jeopardy had not yet attached to the habitual counts and that a second jury could properly decide the matter. The Mesa County District Court granted Gregg’s motion, finding it could not empanel a new jury for the habitual counts because jeopardy had attached.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case in an original proceeding. The court held that Colorado’s former habitual criminal sentencing statute is not facially unconstitutional and can be constitutionally applied by allowing a jury to determine whether prior convictions arose out of separate and distinct episodes, with a judge then reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence. The court also held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar empaneling a second jury to decide habitual criminal counts when the first jury was discharged after adjudicating only the substantive offenses. The Supreme Court made the order to show cause absolute and reinstated Gregg’s habitual criminal charges for jury assessment. View "People v. Gregg" on Justia Law