Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Aundre Moore was charged with first degree murder for the shooting death of Jamaica McClain. Moore pleaded not guilty and was awaiting trial. He claimed he acted in self-defense, and he intended to introduce evidence of his pre-existing mental illness to help show why he subjectively believed he was in imminent danger and needed to use deadly force to repel McClain. The prosecution moved to exclude evidence of Moore’s mental condition, arguing that it was inadmissible unless he plead not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”), an affirmative defense that Moore has said he doesn’t plan to invoke. The district court denied the prosecution’s motion, reasoning that Moore’s stated purpose in offering the mental condition evidence was to prove the subjective belief component of his self-defense claim, not to prove insanity. Therefore, the court ruled that it would allow, without an insanity plea, expert testimony by a psychologist and a forensic psychiatrist who examined Moore, so long as their testimony otherwise conformed to the rules of evidence. The prosecution petitioned for interlocutory review by the Colorado Supreme Court, which then concluded that absent an insanity plea, a trial court must exclude any evidence that is probative of insanity, as that term has been defined by the legislature, irrespective of the ostensible purpose for which it was offered. “This means that evidence of less-severe mental illness remains admissible, absent an insanity plea, if it otherwise conforms to the statutory requirements and the rules of evidence. The court must parse any proffered mental condition evidence, line by line if necessary, to distinguish what is probative of insanity under this exacting definition from what is not.” View "Colorado v. Moore" on Justia Law

Alma Vidauri was convicted of one count of theft and three counts of forgery in connection with filings she made with the Garfield County, Colorado Department of Human Services (“Department”) between 2009 and 2016 for medical assistance benefits. A division of the court of appeals concluded that the evidence was insufficient because the prosecution had not shown the difference in value between the total amount of certain public benefits Vidauri received and the amount for which she might have been eligible had she accurately reported her household income. Therefore, the division reversed the trial court and entered judgment for the lowest level of theft, a class 1 petty offense. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the division, finding the applicable theft statute placed no burden on the prosecution to establish that Vidauri would have been ineligible for any of the benefits she received. "Because an applicant is not entitled to, and so has no legally cognizable interest in, any benefits until she has submitted accurate information demonstrating as much, we conclude that all the benefits Vidauri received by submitting false information were obtained by deception. Therefore, the original judgment of conviction for a class 4 felony must be reinstated." View "Colorado v. Vidauri" on Justia Law

Delano Medina sought review of the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition by a district court magistrate. Because a district court magistrate was authorized to rule on a habeas corpus petition only when the parties consent to proceeding before the magistrate and Medina did not so consent here, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the dismissal order was entered without authority. Accordingly, the Court reversed that order, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to assign the petition to a district court judge for further proceedings. View "Medina v. Williams" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the court of appeals was correct in holding the trial court improperly admitted lay opinion testimony and, therefore, reversed Justine Murphy’s convictions for distributing methamphetamine and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and remanded the case for a new trial. Specifically, the Court considered whether the trial court properly admitted as lay opinion a police officer’s testimony regarding the conclusions he drew from his observations of a witness’s body language. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the police officer’s testimony regarding the witness’s body language constituted lay opinion testimony. Furthermore, the Court concluded the officer did not improperly comment on the credibility of another witness. Accordingly, the officer’s testimony was properly admitted, the appellate court's judgment was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Murphy" on Justia Law

After dating for a few weeks, Vincent Compos and his ex-girlfriend ended their relationship; the ex-girlfriend obtained a protection order prohibiting Compos from contacting her. Shortly after the relationship ended, Compos appeared at a Super Bowl party that the ex-girlfriend and her children were also attending. Later that evening, Compos arrived uninvited at the ex-girlfriend’s home and let himself inside. The two began arguing, and during this argument, Compos threatened to kill the ex-girlfriend and her family. Compos then pulled out a gun and pointed it at the ex-girlfriend and her son. The ex-girlfriend called police; police were given permission to enter her house. There, police found Compos , and took him into custody. One of the officers spoke with Compos outside a patrol car. The officer asked Compos his name, to which Compos falsely responded “John Rocha” and provided a birthdate. Although the officer was aware of at least one protection order restricting Compos’s activities, and although the officer also knew that Compos was on bond, he did not provide Miranda warnings before asking Compos his name. The issues presented for the Colorado Supreme Court were: (1) whether Compos’s Miranda rights were violated when, after taking him into custody but prior to providing him with Miranda warnings, the police asked him his name; and (2) whether the division below erred in establishing a “new crime exception” to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and applying it here. The Supreme Court concluded the question as to Compos’s name amounted to a custodial interrogation, but, on the facts presented here, Compos’s response was admissible at trial because the question was akin to the type of routine booking question that has been deemed to be excepted from Miranda’s reach. For this reason, the Court affirmed the judgment of the division below, albeit on other grounds, and in light of this determination, the Court did not consider, and thus vacated, the portion of the division’s judgment establishing, sua sponte, a new crime exception to Miranda. View "Compos v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Two detectives questioned defendant Jose Padilla about his involvement in a potential sexual assault. In response, Padilla stated that he did not have sex with the victim, J.M., and that J.M. was extremely intoxicated on the night in question. He later moved to suppress these statements, arguing they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The district court agreed and granted the motion to suppress, finding that Padilla was subjected to custodial interrogation without the required warnings. The State filed this interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s order. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded Padilla was not in custody for Miranda purposes, it reversed the portion of the district court’s order suppressing the statements, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Padilla" on Justia Law

In 2019, several parole officers approached a home that they believed was the residence of Susan Damico. Damico was a parolee whose parole agreement allowed officers to search “her person, residence, and/or vehicle” without a warrant as a condition of parole. When the officers arrived at the home, they found Damico in the front yard getting into her car. The officers identified themselves, informed Damico that they were conducting a parole visit, obtained a house key from her, and asked whether there was anyone inside the home. Damico told the officers that defendant-appellant Aaron Peluso was inside in bed. While the other officers entered the home, Damico's parole officer, Brook Hathaway, remained outside with Damico for several minutes. The officers who first entered the home found Peluso in bed and informed him of the purpose of their visit. After Peluso got dressed and out of bed, officers searched the room and found methamphetamine, THC, glass pipes, rolling papers, and a digital scale. Officers arrested Peluso and then searched his wallet, which contained additional methamphetamine. During the drive to jail, Peluso told officers that he had been using methamphetamine. Peluso was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. He moved to suppress both the evidence recovered from his home and the statements he made after his arrest, arguing that the warrantless search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. At the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that Damico did not actually live at Peluso's home at the time of the search, and Hathaway could have done more to verify Damico's address. The court further found that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether Peluso might have objected to the search once the officers entered his home. The State moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court incorrectly analyzed Damico’s actual, not apparent, authority to consent to the search. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence and reversed the order. "Because parole officers reasonably believed Damico had authority to consent to a search of Peluso’s residence, her apparent authority was sufficient to validate the warrantless search, and Peluso’s motion to suppress should have been denied." View "Colorado v. Peluso" on Justia Law

The State challenged the trial court's order suppressing evidence seized from Defendant Asha Thompson's cell phone on Fourth Amendment grounds. Lakewood, Colorado police were dispatched to the Blue Sky Motel in response to a shooting. Upon their arrival, they found the victim, B.T., unresponsive in a motel room with a gunshot wound to her head. She was transported to the hospital but died a short time later. A witness to the shooting subsequently identified Thompson, who was known to Lakewood police, as the shooter, and the county court issued a warrant for Thompson’s arrest. police received an anonymous tip that Thompson was staying at a specified room in a different motel. They found and arrested Thompson there and then obtained a search warrant to allow them to search the room in which Thompson was arrested. As pertinent here, the warrant authorized the police to seize, among other things, cell phones and other electronic devices and provided that any seized cell phones “may be downloaded and examined either manually or forensically.” Based on this warrant, the police ultimately seized Thompson’s cell phone and sent it to a forensic laboratory where technicians subsequently unlocked it and downloaded all of the data on it. The State contended the independent source doctrine applied to the circumstances of this case, and therefore suppression was unwarranted. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the State did not present sufficient evidence to establish the applicability of the independent source doctrine, the trial court's suppression order was affirmed. View "Colorado v. Thompson" on Justia Law

After Marcus Perez led police on a "lengthy foot pursuit," officers found two live shotgun shells in Perez's pocket. Without giving Perez Miranda warnings, the officer asked him, “Where’s the gun?” Perez answered that he had thrown the gun away. At a suppression hearing, Perez argued that his answer should have been suppressed because he was not Mirandized before the officer questioned him. The trial court disagreed, finding that the public safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applied. A jury convicted Perez of second-degree assault on a peace officer and four counts of possession of a dangerous weapon by a previous offender (“POWPO”). Perez appealed, contending that the public safety exception did not apply. The court of appeals agreed but deemed the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the convictions. Under the facts of this case, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the public safety exception applied, and the arresting officer was not required to give Miranda warnings before inquiring about the gun's location. View "Perez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In two cases consolidated for review, the common issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a a criminal defendant who was unable to post bond on a class 4 felony charge was “in custody” and therefore entitled to a preliminary hearing on that charge under section 16-5-301(1)(b)(II), C.R.S. (2020), and Crim. P. 7(h)(1), even if that defendant was also in custody for separate, unrelated offenses. While serving sentences in the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) for unrelated offenses, David Subjack and Darryl Lynch were each arrested and charged with possession of contraband in the first degree, which is a class 4 felony. In both cases, the court set cash-only bonds, which neither defendant posted. Subjack and Lynch each requested a preliminary hearing pursuant to section 16-5-301(1)(b)(II) and Crim. P. 7(h)(1). The district court denied their requests, reasoning that the current charges did not form the “primary basis” of their custody. The Supreme Court concluded defendants were “in custody for the offense for which the preliminary hearing is requested” and therefore entitled to a preliminary hearing on their current charges. View "In re Colorado v. Subjack" on Justia Law