Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Criminal Law
Colorado in Interest of J.D.
The State sought review of an appellate court's judgment reversing a district court order voiding a juvenile magistrate's ruling. The district court found that the juvenile magistrate lacked jurisdiction to grant J.D.’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, further, that J.D.’s sole remedy for a failure of his counsel to render effective assistance in advising him concerning his deferred adjudication was to file a petition with the court for reinstatement of his review rights nunc pro tunc. By contrast, the court of appeals found that the juvenile magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain J.D.’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was a motion in a delinquency case the magistrate had been appointed to hear, and it was not a motion seeking review of any prior order of the magistrate. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction over the juvenile’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although on different grounds, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Colorado in Interest of J.D." on Justia Law
Halaseh v. Colorado
Petitioner John Halaseh petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to review a court of appeals' remand order to his underlying appeal, which directed the district court to enter four convictions for class 4 felony theft in place of the single conviction of class 3 felony theft that was reflected in the charge and jury verdict. The appellate court reversed the class 3 felony on grounds that when the statutory authorization for aggregating separate acts of theft was properly applied, there was insufficient evidence to support a single conviction for theft of $20,000 or more. It also found, however, that there was sufficient evidence to support four separate convictions for aggregated thefts with values qualifying as class 4 felonies, and that substituting these four class 4 felony convictions for the vacated class 3 felony conviction was necessary to fulfill what it understood to be its obligation to maximize the effect of the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court disapproved of the appellate court's judgment, finding no theft offense required the aggregation of two or more separate instances of theft, whether that aggregation were to be based on commission within a period of six months or on commission as a single course of conduct, was a lesser included offense of the class 3 felony of which Halaseh was actually charged and convicted. Further, no such offense was implicitly found by the jury, and therefore none could be entered in lieu of the reversed conviction without depriving the defendant of his right to a jury trial. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Halaseh v. Colorado" on Justia Law
Richardson v. Colorado
Gary Richardson was convicted by jury of multiple crimes. The jury venir included the trial judge's wife ("Juror 25"). During trial, the judge at times "casually tossed a spotlight" on his relationship to Juror 25: He joked about what was for dinner and forcing his wife to spend more time with him. He also told counsel that he thought his wife would be a “fine juror” and at another point asked them to “[b]e nice” to her. However well-intentioned, the Colorado Supreme Court surmised the fanfare around Juror 25 created "fairly predictable questions" on appeal: had the judge at least inadvertently conferred a special status on his wife to which defense counsel and the other jurors were expected to defer? Should the judge have excused his wife or himself, even without being asked to do so? The Supreme Court concluded that by failing to object, Richardson waived his challenge to Juror 25. The Supreme Court also concluded the trial judge did not have a duty to excuse Juror 25 from the jury or recuse himself in the absence of any contemporaneous objection. "While the trial judge could have handled this unusual situation in a more restrained manner, his failure to do so did not create reversible error." View "Richardson v. Colorado" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Colorado in Interest of R.D.
The issue this case case, which stemmed from a late-night argument on Twitter among several high school students, presented to the Colorado Supreme Court centered on the applicable framework for distinguishing a true threat from constitutionally protected speech in the "cyber arena." R.D., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for harassment by communication based on those tweets directed at another student that took place in the wake of a local school shooting. Put differently, the question was whether R.D.'s statements were "true threats." The Supreme Court held a true threat is a statement that, considered in context and under the totality of the circumstances, an intended or foreseeable recipient would reasonably perceive as a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. In determining whether a statement is a true threat, a reviewing court must examine the words used, but it must also consider the context in which the statement was made. Particularly where the alleged threat is communicated online, the contextual factors courts should consider include, but are not limited to: (1) the statement’s role in a broader exchange, if any, including surrounding events; (2) the medium or platform through which the statement was communicated, including any distinctive conventions or architectural features; (3) the manner in which the statement was conveyed (e.g., anonymously or not, privately or publicly); (4) the relationship between the speaker and recipient(s); and (5) the subjective reaction of the statement’s intended or foreseeable recipient(s). Because neither the juvenile court nor the court of appeals had the benefit of the framework announced by this case, the Supreme Court reversed judgment and remanded for reconsideration. View "Colorado in Interest of R.D." on Justia Law
Colorado v. Jones
Andre Jones was convicted by jury of shooting and killing his estranged and pregnant wife. Although she died, medical personnel managed to deliver her severely injured baby. The jury found Jones guilty of many crimes related to the shooting, including first degree murder of his wife and child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury. The court of appeals reversed, determining: (1) the trial court erred by excluding Jones’s parents from the courtroom during the testimony of two witnesses; and (2) in a split decision, Jones could not be retried for child abused because an unborn fetus, even if later born alive, was not a "person" under the child abuse statute. The division reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court on both issues, but on slightly different grounds with respect to the child abuse issue. The Court concurred the trial court's exclusion of Jones' parents constituted a partial closure of the courtroom that violated Jones' Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Because that error was structural, Jones was entitled to a new trial. With regard to the child abuse issue, the Court could not discern the legislature's intent regarding a defendant's liability under the child abuse statute. Under the rule of lenity, the Court vacated Jones' conviction and concluded he could not be retried on that charge. View "Colorado v. Jones" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Colorado v. Espinoza
The State petitioned for review the court of appeals' judgment reversing a trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences for respondent Martin Espinoza's ten convictions of attempted first degree murder of ten different people. Espinoza was charged with first degree arson, third degree assault, and attempted first degree murder (extreme indifference), with corresponding crime-of-violence counts, arising out of an incident in which a fire raged through his mother’s apartment. Respondent started a fire on the balcony of his mother’s apartment, which spread throughout the apartment building and to a neighboring building. The ten people who were named victims of the attempted murder counts were inside the defendant’s mother’s apartment building during the fire but were able to escape and survive. Reasoning that Espinoza’s ten attempted murder convictions were separate crimes of violence, the trial court considered itself bound by statute to impose consecutive sentences. The intermediate appellate court, however, found that because the ten convictions were premised on a “single act of fire-setting,” they were supported by identical evidence, notwithstanding the fact that each conviction required proof that the defendant attempted to kill a different person. Further concluding that convictions for multiple crimes of violence that were supported by identical evidence did not fall within the statutory mandate to sentence consecutively, the intermediate appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing. The Colorado Supreme Court found that because offenses defined in terms of their victimization of another and committed against different victims were not capable of being proved by identical evidence within the contemplation of section 18-1-408(3), C.R.S. (2019), and because even according to the appellate court’s understanding of the term “separate crimes of violence,” Espinoza’s convictions therefore required consecutive sentences pursuant to section 18-1.3-406(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019), the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Colorado v. Espinoza" on Justia Law
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In re Colorado v. Huckabay
The Colorado Supreme Court has previously held a defendant was entitled to a preliminary hearing if charged with driving under the influence (DUI), a class four felony, where the defendant is held in custody on that charge. The issue this case presented for the Court's review centered on whether such a defendant entitled to demand and receive a preliminary hearing if not placed in custody, but the offense requires "mandatory sentencing." The Court concluded that indeed a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing whenever he is charged with a class four, five, or six felony and the charge requires the imposition of mandatory sentencing. Further, by its plain meaning, “mandatory sentencing” involved any period of incarceration required by law. Applying these principles to this case, the Court held Donald Huckabay was entitled to a preliminary hearing because he was charged with felony DUI - a class four felony that carried mandatory sentencing. View "In re Colorado v. Huckabay" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
McCulley v. Colorado
In 2000, as part of a plea agreement, Brian Keith McCulley pled guilty to one count of second degree sexual assault under section 18-3-403(1)(a), C.R.S. (2000) (a class 4 felony), pursuant to a four-year deferred judgment and sentence. Under the agreement, McCulley also pled guilty to one count of third degree sexual assault in violation of section 18-3-404(1)(c), C.R.S. (2000) (a class 1 misdemeanor). Accepting the plea agreement, the district court entered a judgment of conviction on the misdemeanor and sentenced McCulley to sixty days in jail and two years probation. The only condition of probation was that McCulley comply with the terms of the deferred judgment. As a condition of his deferred judgment, McCulley was required to register as a sex offender, which he did. In 2004, McCulley successfully completed the terms of his deferred judgment and sentence. The district court ordered McCulley’s guilty plea withdrawn and dismissed the felony charge. Thus, only a single judgment of conviction ultimately entered in McCulley’s case—on the misdemeanor. McCulley continued to register as a sex offender. The question in this case is whether a defendant who has successfully completed a deferred judgment nonetheless still “has [a] conviction” for purposes of the bar in section 16-22-113(3)(c), C.R.S. (2019). The Colorado Supreme Court concluded we conclude that a “conviction” for purposes of the bar in section 16-22-113(3)(c) did not include a successfully completed deferred judgment. Because the defendant in this case successfully completed his deferred judgment, he no longer “has more than one conviction” for purposes of section 16-22-113(3)(c) and was therefore eligible to petition the court to discontinue his duty to register. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent. View "McCulley v. Colorado" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Waddell v. Colorado
David Waddell pled guilty to: possession of a controlled substance, a level 1 drug felony; attempted aggravated robbery, a class 4 felony; and vehicular eluding, a class 5 felony. At Waddell’s combined sentencing hearing, the trial court failed to impose the following surcharges: drug offender; rural alcohol and substance abuse; restorative justice; offender identification fund (“genetic testing"); victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund (“victims assistance”); and crime victim compensation fund (“victim compensation”). After the sentencing hearing, however, the court included these surcharges on Waddell’s mittimuses. Waddell appealed his sentences. As relevant here, he argued that the late imposition of the surcharges violated his federal and state constitutional rights against double jeopardy. In an unpublished decision, a unanimous division of the court of appeals disagreed. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held the drug offender surcharge, which was long ago declared a form of punishment, was statutorily mandated and, thus, the trial court’s failure to order it in open court rendered Waddell’s sentence on his level 1 drug felony conviction illegal and subject to correction at any time pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a). Therefore, the trial court’s imposition of that surcharge after the sentencing hearing did not violate Waddell’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. The trial court's imposition of the other five surcharges after the sentencing hearing also did not infringe Waddell's constitutional rights: they were statutorily mandated and subject to correction at any time pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a). The Supreme Court remanded this case to give Waddell an opportunity to request a waiver of the surcharges assessed. View "Waddell v. Colorado" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Yeadon v. Colorado
Gerald Yeadon was convicted by jury of several charges, including possession of less than two grams of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a class 6 felony at the time. At his sentencing hearing, the trial court failed to impose the drug offender surcharge as a component of the sentence on the class 6 felony drug conviction. After the sentencing hearing, however, the court added the $1,250 drug offender surcharge on Yeadon’s mittimus. Relevant here, Yeadon argued on appeal of his conviction and sentence that the late imposition of the drug offender surcharge violated his federal and state constitutional rights against double jeopardy. In a unanimous, published decision, a division of the court of appeals disagreed, finding that the surcharge was statutorily mandated, and not illegal when the trial court corrected the sentence pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a). Thus it was not a double jeopardy violation when the court subsequently imposed the surcharge by including it on the mittimus. The Colorado Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court's reasoning; the Court did remand to the trial court to allow Yeadon an opportunity to request a waiver of the surcharge assessed. View "Yeadon v. Colorado" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law