Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether defendant Vernon Vanness had a right to demand and receive a preliminary hearing in light of: (1) he was charged with a level 4 drug felony not eligible for a preliminary hearing; (2) he was separately charged with a special offender count; and (3) he would stand convicted of a level 1 drug felony eligible for a preliminary hearing if the State proved both counts beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. The Court following Colorado v. Tafoya, 434 P.3d 1193 (2019) and held that he did have such right. View "Colorado v. Vanness" on Justia Law

While searching Tony Ashford for weapons in the course of an investigatory stop, a police officer felt a pill bottle in Ashford’s pocket and asked him, “I know this is a pill bottle, what is it?” Ashford took the bottle out of his pocket, and the officer could see that it contained baggies of methamphetamine. Ashford was arrested, and after a more thorough search, he was charged with several drug-related offenses, as well as six habitual offender counts. Ashford moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop. The district court granted Ashford’s motion, finding that the officer’s question about the pill bottle exceeded the scope of the stop. The State appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the officer’s question did not measurably extend the stop of Ashford, thus holding that the question about the pill bottle did not exceed the scope of the investigatory stop. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the district court’s suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Ashford" on Justia Law

Nevik Howard, when sixteen years old, was convicted of first-degree assault (a crime of violence) and first-degree criminal trespass after his case was transferred from juvenile court to district court. During the sentencing hearing, Howard argued that he was subject to a more severe penalty for a crime of violence conviction under the transfer statute than he would be if this were a direct-file case because direct-filed juveniles were exempted “from the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in [the crime of violence statute],” whereas transferred juveniles were not. To address that equal protection concern, the district court determined that the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute would not apply in this transfer proceeding, just as they would not have applied in a direct-file proceeding. The court further determined, however, that this ruling did not make Howard eligible for probation. Instead, the court concluded that the statutory scheme only allowed either: (1) a youth offender services (“YOS”) sentence with a suspended Department of Corrections (“DOC”) sentence; or (2) a DOC sentence. The court ultimately sentenced Howard to six years in YOS with a suspended fifteen-year DOC sentence. Howard, appealed, arguing the district court erred in its reasoning. The court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court granted review, affirming the court of appeals, but on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that under the facts of this case, there was no equal protection violation because neither direct-filed juveniles nor transferred juveniles convicted of crimes of violence were eligible for probation, and the district court did not apply the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute. Hence, Howard was treated the same as a direct-filed juvenile would have been with regard to probation and the applicable sentencing range. View "Howard v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In 2014, William Berry, who was at the time a deputy of the Lake County Sheriff’s Office, obtained several firearms from the office evidence locker, gave one away, attempted to sell another, and kept two for himself. For this, Berry was convicted of embezzlement of public property in violation of section 18-8-407, C.R.S. (2019), and first-degree official misconduct in violation of section 18-8-404, C.R.S. (2019). The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was one of first impression for each of these statutory provisions: (1) does “public property” include property that is in the government’s possession but not owned by the government?; and (2) what is an act “relating to [an official’s] office” for purposes of the crime of official misconduct? The Supreme Court held the statute prohibiting embezzlement of public property criminalized only the embezzlement of property that was owned by the government. Furthermore, the Court concluded the prohibition on official misconduct should be broadly construed to include circumstances, like those in this case, in which an official used the opportunities presented by his or her office to engage in improper conduct. View "Colorado v. Berry" on Justia Law

Alfredo Juarez appealed the denial of his motion for postconviction relief. In 2012, Juarez pleaded guilty to one class 1 misdemeanor count of possessing a schedule V controlled substance, in exchange for the dismissal of a charge of felony possession. As stipulated in the plea agreement, he received a sentence to two years of drug court probation. At the time of his offense and plea, the defendant was a citizen of Mexico and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. A month after his sentencing, the defendant violated the conditions of his probation, received a suspended two-day jail sentence, and two weeks later, after violating the conditions of that suspension, served those two days in jail. After he received an additional three-day jail sentence for again violating his probation, federal Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) officers began removal proceedings. Defendant was eventually deported to Mexico. In October 2012 and January 2013, defendant filed motions for postconviction relief, challenging the effectiveness of his plea counsel’s representation and, as a result, the constitutional validity of his guilty plea. Over a period of three days, the district court heard these motions, including the testimony of defendant, taken by video over the internet; the testimony of his plea counsel; and the testimony of an immigration attorney retained by him in 2011, prior to his acceptance of the plea agreement. With regard to his challenge to the effectiveness of his counsel, the district court found both that defense counsel adequately advised his client concerning the immigration consequences of his plea of guilty to misdemeanor drug possession and that, in any event, there was no reasonable probability Juarez would not have taken the plea. The intermediate appellate court similarly found that counsel’s advice fell within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, but as a result of that finding, the appellate court considered it unnecessary to address the question whether counsel’s performance prejudiced Juarez. The Colorado Supreme Court thus concluded that because Juarez conceded he was advised and understood that the misdemeanor offense to which he pleaded guilty would make him “deportable,” defense counsel’s advice concerning the immigration consequences of his plea correctly informed him of the controlling law and therefore did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness required for effective assistance concerning immigration advice. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore affirmed. View "Juarez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The district court in this case sua sponte ordered the parties to exchange exhibits thirty days before trial. The State charged Joshua Kilgore with two counts of felony sexual assault. In the minute order it issued following the arraignment, the court indicated, among other things, that “exhibits [were] to be exchanged 30 days before trial” (“disclosure requirement” or “disclosure order”). The disclosure requirement was not prompted by a party’s request and appeared to have been part of the court’s standard case-management practice. A couple of months later, Kilgore filed an objection, arguing that the disclosure requirement violated his attorney’s confidentiality obligations, the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine, and his due process rights (including his right to make the prosecution meet its burden of proof, his right to a fair trial, and his right to the effective assistance of counsel). Furthermore, Kilgore argued Rule 16 neither required him to disclose, nor entitled the prosecution to receive, his exhibits before trial. The court overruled Kilgore’s objection, reasoning that requiring Kilgore to disclose his exhibits prior to trial would “foster[] efficiency and allow[] for a fair trial” without running afoul of his rights. Any exhibits not disclosed before trial, warned the court, would “not be used at trial.” Kilgore sought reconsideration of this ruling, but the court declined to alter it. Thereafter, Kilgore submitted a sealed motion detailing the specific reasons he opposed disclosing a particular exhibit. Despite having this additional information, though, the court stood by its earlier ruling. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded a district court could not rely on its case-management discretion to order disclosures that exceed the discovery authorized by Rule 16 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor could a court require disclosures that infringe on an accused’s constitutional rights. In this instance, the district court erred in ordering Kilgore to disclose his exhibits before trial. View "In re Colorado v. Kilgore" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to Driving While Ability Impaired, Quinten Martinez was sentenced to jail and probation under section 42-4-1307, C.R.S. (2019). The county court twice revoked his probation and resentenced him. Martinez has served 608 days in jail related to this offense, of which 458 stem from probation violations. Martinez appealed, asserting that the maximum jail sentence the court could impose was ten days. Martinez had moved for a stay of execution, which the trial court granted. By the time the stay entered, Martinez had already served 103 days of his 365-day sentence on the second revocation. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that when a defendant is sentenced to probation as part of his sentence for a second or subsequent DUI offense and then violates the terms of that probation, the sentencing court may impose all or part of the suspended 365-day jail sentence but can impose no more than 365 days cumulative jail time for all probation violations. View "Martinez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In February 2018, plaintiff-appellant Jimmie Graham’s parole officer filed a complaint alleging that Graham had violated three conditions of his parole: changing his residence without permission; failing to report to the parole office as directed; and committing a new felony - escape. The allegation related to the commission of a new felony was dismissed after the escape case was dismissed. Graham then pled not guilty to the two remaining allegations. The issue his petition for habeas corpus presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review the parole board’s order confining Graham for more than ninety days as a result of his parole violations. The Supreme Court concluded the parole board exceeded its statutory authority, and that the district court subsequently erred in denying Graham’s habeas petition. Thus, the district court’s order was reversed. Because Graham has been confined well beyond the ninety days authorized by the version of the parole revocation statute in effect at the time of Graham’s parole revocation, the Supreme Court remanded to the district court with directions to grant the writ of habeas corpus, make the writ permanent, and order the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections and the Warden of Sterling Correctional Facility (collectively, “DOC”) to immediately release Graham to parole. View "Graham v. Executive Director of Colorado Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

After Kirk Williams returned home from a trip to North Dakota, his wife went through his overnight travel bag and discovered what she believed to be drugs and paraphernalia. She took the contraband items, placed them inside a soap dish, and hid the soap dish in the garage of their home. Mrs. Williams later called the Police Department and met with one of its officers at her church. She told him that she wanted the police to collect the drugs and paraphernalia she had taken from her husband’s travel bag and stored in the garage. The officer requested assistance, and two more officers responded. The three officers then accompanied Mrs. Williams home. Upon arriving, Mrs. Williams provided consent and allowed the officers to enter so they could take possession of the drugs and paraphernalia. At Mrs. Williams’s request, one officer followed her through the house to the garage. There, Mrs. Williams retrieved the soap dish she had stashed away and handed it to him. Meanwhile, another officer continued walking down the entrance hallway for about ten feet, at which point he saw the kitchen, the living room, and an open space dividing the two. He headed toward the living room because he saw Mr. Williams there, sitting on a couch, eating a bowl of cereal, and watching television. When the officer entered the living room, he advised Mr. Williams that officers were conducting a “civil standby” and told him to remain seated. At some point, Mr. Williams told the officers to leave his home. At issue in this case was whether Mrs. Williams could offer consent to the officers to search her home while her husband was present. The Colorado Supreme Court determined that although Mr. Williams was physically present on the premises, he did not object as his wife allowed the officers inside. His subsequent objection, after the officers had already entered his home and were in the process of taking possession of the drugs and paraphernalia, could not vitiate her previously given consent. Therefore, the officers were not required to heed his request to leave, and thus the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence collected inside his home. View "Williams v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Respondent Abdu-Latif Kazembe Abu-Nantambu-El forced his way into the apartment of an acquaintance, where he fatally stabbed a visitor and forced the acquaintance to clean up evidence of the crime. The prosecution subsequently charged Abu-Nantambu-El with numerous offenses, including first degree murder (after deliberation), first degree murder (felony murder), second degree murder, and two counts of first degree burglary. Abu-Nantambu-El proceeded to trial on a self- defense theory. The Colorado Supreme Court determined this case presented a question left unanswered by its holding in Colorado v. Novotny, 320 P.3d 1194: What standard of reversal applied where a trial court erroneously denies a challenge for cause, the defendant exhausts his peremptory challenges, and the challenged juror ultimately serves on the jury? "It is clear that the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause amounts to structural error if it results in an actually biased juror serving on a jury." Consistent with that principle, the Court concluded the erroneous seating of an impliedly biased juror was also structural error and required reversal. "[S]uch an error is not amenable to analysis under a harmless error standard, regardless of the juror's actual bias." View "Colorado v. Abu-Nantambu-El" on Justia Law