Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Charles McLaughlin was arrested for driving under the influence after police responded to a call and located him in a parking lot near his truck. McLaughlin’s defense was that he had not been driving. At trial, the State introduced a video of the interaction between LcLaughlin and the arresting officer. The video was edited to omit statements LcLaughlin made to the officer alleging that an unidentified woman was driving the vehicle. McLaughlin sought to introduce these statements under the rule of completeness, arguing that the redacted video created a misleading impression. The trial court ruled that McLaughlin’s statements were self-serving hearsay, and therefore, inadmissible under the rule of completeness. The court further concluded that McLaughlin’s statements about the unidentified woman were not admissible unless he testified, which would subject him to impeachment with his prior felony convictions. McLaughlin declined to testify and as a result, his statements about the woman were never admitted. A jury found him guilty. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that: (1) self-serving hearsay is admissible under the rule of completeness; and (2) statements from a defendant-declarant admitted under that rule were not subject to impeachment. To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. View "Colorado v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Trevor Pellegrin and the victim began dating, moved in together shortly thereafter, and later became engaged. During the parties’ relationship, Pellegrin took private, intimate photos of the victim in various stages of undress. The relationship subsequently ended, but several months after it did, Pellegrin and the victim spent three or four days together. At about that time, Pellegrin learned that the victim had started seeing someone else. This information upset Pellegrin, and over the next few days, he repeatedly called and texted the victim. In the course of these communications, Pellegrin called the victim names, sent nude photos of her that he had taken during their relationship, and threatened to post the nude photos online and send them to her younger brother. The victim received over one hundred text messages and photos from strangers, including messages with photos of naked men, messages saying that unknown people were driving by her home, and messages soliciting sex. At some point, the victim learned that these text messages were in response to two Craigslist advertisements that Pellegrin had placed. Upon becoming aware of these advertisements, the victim contacted the police, who arrested Pellegrin at his home. The State subsequently charged Pellegrin with, as pertinent here, one count of stalking, two counts of posting a private image for harassment (one count for the Facebook posting and one for the Craigslist posting), and one count of harassment. The case ultimately proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted Pellegrin on all counts. He was sentenced to jail time, probation and participation in a domestic violence evaluation, and compliance with that evaluation's recommendations. Pellegrin appealed, arguing that harassment was a lesser included offense of stalking, so the two crimes should have merged. Pellegrin further argued that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not the trial judge, to determine whether the crimes for which he was convicted included an act of domestic violence. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected Pellegrin's arguments on appeal and affirmed his sentence. View "Pellegrin v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A man was found dead in Thornton, Colorado, and police suspected homicide. Thornton detectives identified defendant Thorvyn Bullcalf Evan Smiley as the sole suspect and, after tracking him down in New Mexico, brought him to a police station there to collect certain samples from him pursuant to a court order. Seeing Smiley’s obvious concern, they repeatedly reassured him that he wasn’t in trouble and that he’d be leaving the police station that day. The detectives then advised Smiley of his Miranda rights. Smiley signed a waiver and agreed to speak with the detectives. During the subsequent interrogation, Smiley confessed to killing the alleged victim. One of the questions before the trial court was whether the prosecution had proved that Smiley voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court concluded the answer was no, and it suppressed the statement. The Colorado Supreme Court found no reversible error in that judgment and affirmed. View "Colorado v. Smiley" on Justia Law

The State of Colorado charged Dennis Chirinos-Raudales with, among other crimes, sexual assault on a child (“SAOC”) by one in a position of trust, which prohibits sexual contact with persons under eighteen, but whose penalty escalates from a class 4 felony to a class 3 felony if the victim is under fifteen. The question presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the “subject of the action” was the subsection that applied when the child is under eighteen or the subsection that applies when the child is under fifteen. To this, the Court held that the “subject of the action” for SAOC by one in a position of trust was the substantive offense rather than the sentence enhancer. Therefore, because the substantive offense applies when the child is under eighteen and the victim was under eighteen at the time she made the statements in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly admitted them under the child hearsay statute. View "Chirinos-Raudales v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Jose Leonel Orellana-Leon sexually abused his girlfriend’s daughter, L.V., from the time she was seven or eight years old until she was fifteen. When L.V. was fifteen years old, she told her father and stepmother about the abuse; as a result, a forensic interview was conducted. The State subsequently charged Orellana-Leon with sexual assault on a child (“SAOC”) by one in a position of trust. Before trial, the State gave notice it intended to admit statements L.V. made to her father, stepmother, and the forensic interviewer under the child hearsay statute. Over the defense’s objection, the trial court granted the State's request. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on what happens when a defendant is charged under a statute that references two different ages. In the companion case, Chirinos-Raudales v. Colorado, 2023 CO 33, ¶ 21, __ P.3d __, the Court concluded that the “subject of the action” for SAOC by one in a position of trust was the substantive offense, which applied when the child was under eighteen, rather than the sentence enhancer, which applied when the child is under fifteen. Applying that holding to this case, the Court concluded that because the victim was under eighteen at the time she made the statements in question, the trial court properly admitted them under the child hearsay statute. View "Orellana-Leon v. Colorado" on Justia Law

There was no reason to believe defendant Nora Hilda Rios-Vargas did not commit the burglary with which she was charged: at trial, she argued the crime was committed by a nonparty alternate suspect, Sylvia Villalobos, who knew when the owner would be away, knew the location of the items that were stolen, had unique reasons for wanting those items, and had a motive for framing Rios-Vargas. Even the victim suspected Villalobos. Despite the strength of the connection between Villalobos and the burglary, and even though Rios-Vargas’s defense hinged on this connection, the jury was not allowed to see or hear from Villalobos. The trial court accepted Villalobos’s blanket invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and ruled that Rios-Vargas could not call her to the stand. It further prohibited defense counsel from informing the jury why Villalobos did not testify. As a result, the prosecution was able to tell two conflicting narratives. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review to decide whether a defendant could call to the witness stand a nonparty alternate suspect who intended to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and if not, what the jury may be told about the alternate suspect’s failure to appear. The Court held that a defendant is entitled to question a nonparty alternate suspect in the jury’s presence under the circumstances and procedures set forth in this opinion. Because the trial court erred in accepting Villalobos’s blanket Fifth Amendment invocation without holding a hearing outside the presence of the jury, and because that error was not harmless, the Supreme Court reversed Rios-Vargas’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "Rios-Vargas v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Noelle Kelley was taken by ambulance to the hospital after she was involved in a car accident in which another person was injured. At the hospital, an officer investigating the accident asked Kelley if she would release her medical records to the police. She refused. After Kelley was charged with vehicular assault, careless driving, and driving under the influence, she pled not guilty and endorsed the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. The State moved the trial court to conclude that Kelley’s endorsement of involuntary intoxication as an affirmative defense constituted an implied waiver of her physician-patient privilege and thus the State was entitled to the disclosure of her medical records. They further asked the court to determine that Kelley’s refusal to release her medical records was admissible at trial. The trial court granted the State's motion as to both issues. Kelley then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction for review. Kelly argued: (1) when she endorsed the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication, she did not impliedly waive her physician-patient privilege; and (2) even if she did waive the privilege, the trial court’s order requiring the release of her medical records was too broad. Kelley also argued that her refusal to release her medical records was inadmissible because she cannot be penalized for exercising her Fourth Amendment right to refuse a warrantless search. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) a party impliedly waives the physician-patient privilege when they assert the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication, limited to those medical records related to the affirmative defense; and (2) the trial court’s disclosure order here was not overbroad because it was carefully limited to those medical records that related to Kelley’s endorsement of the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. Because the parties did not have the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of the admissibility of Kelley's refusal to release the records, the Supreme Court declined to address it. View "Colorado v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Defendant Cristobal Garcia, was found guilty of one count of attempted extreme-indifference murder, a form of first degree murder that requires that the defendant “evidenc[e] an attitude of universal malice manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life generally.” Garcia argued on appeal that the court of appeals erred by holding that the trial court wasn’t required to define “universal malice” for the jury. Finding no reversible error, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court. View "Garcia v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Jacob Woodside committed two alcohol-related offenses in relatively quick succession. First, he pled guilty to the later-committed offense, which was sentenced as his first despite having occurred second in time. Afterward, he pled guilty to the earlier-committed offense and argued that it too should be sentenced as his first. The trial court disagreed, finding that Woodside’s prior conviction subjected him to second-offense penalties because “at the time of sentencing” he had a relevant “prior conviction,” despite the order in which the offenses occurred. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the plain language of section 42-4-1307(5)(a) C.R.S. (2022) imposed second-offense penalties when a defendant has a relevant prior conviction; it did not require that conduct underlying a second-offense sentence pre-date conduct underlying the first-offense sentence. The Court concluded the trial court properly determined that Woodside’s Weld County DWAI, though based on conduct pre-dating his Grand County DWAI, was a second offense subject to the penalties laid out in section 42-4-1307(5)(a). View "Colorado v. Woodside" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ari Liggett was charged with the first degree murder of his mother. Although Liggett pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”), he was ultimately convicted. On appeal, Liggett argued: (1) the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by ruling that the State could use psychiatric evidence derived from Liggett’s voluntary custodial statements to “rebut any evidence presented that [he] was insane at the time of the alleged offense,” even though police obtained those statements in violation of his Miranda rights; and (2) the trial court erred by permitting the State to subpoena and present privileged information from his nonphysician medical providers. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding that when a defendant presents psychiatric evidence supporting their insanity defense, they can open the door to the admission of psychiatric evidence rebutting that defense, even if the evidence includes the defendant’s voluntary but non-Miranda-compliant statements. Additionally, the Court held that § 16-8-103.6(2)(a), C.R.S. (2022)’s waiver of privilege as to “communications made by the defendant to a physician or psychologist” includes communications made to a physician’s or psychologist’s agents. Because the nonphysician medical providers who testified at Liggett’s trial made their observations as agents of Liggett’s physicians, the Court concluded Liggett waived the statutory privileges he shared with those providers. View "Liggett v. Colorado" on Justia Law