Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a stop and inventory search of his car, Therrold Quick was charged with possession of a weapon by a previous offender, violation of a protection order, driving under restraint, and violation of a traffic control signal. He moved to suppress a gun discovered during the search as the product of an unconstitutional seizure of his car. The State brought an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order granting Quick’s motion to suppress the gun. The district court initially denied the motion, upon reconsideration in light of the court of appeals’ opinion in Colorado v. Brown, 2016 COA 150, __ P.3d __, it found that where Quick was merely cited, and not actually arrested, for driving with a suspended license, and where the only justification offered for seizing his car was instead the likelihood that he would continue to drive and thereby endanger public safety, the initial seizure of his car did not fall within the community caretaking exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Because compliance with a departmental policy or procedure is insufficient in and of itself to bring the seizure of a vehicle within an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, and because seizing a vehicle to prevent the driver from continuing to drive with a suspended license does not fall within the specific community caretaking exception, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Quick" on Justia Law

Carl Brown was charged with and convicted of possession with intent to distribute a schedule II controlled substance, stemming from the discovery of crack cocaine during an inventory search of his vehicle. He was sentenced to ten years in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections. The State petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment reversing Brown’s drug-related conviction on the ground that his motion to suppress should have been granted. The district court found that the contraband in question was discovered during an inventory search of the defendant’s vehicle, the conduct of which was within the officers’ discretion according to the policies and procedures of the Aurora Police Department, even though they had already decided to issue a summons rather than arrest the defendant for driving with a suspended license. The court of appeals found that in the absence of an arrest, seizing the defendant’s vehicle so as to provoke an inventory of its contents could not be justified as an exercise of the police caretaking function, and in the absence of any other recognized exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment, violated its prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Colorado Supreme Court found the trial court record failed to demonstrate that seizure of the defendant’s vehicle was justified as an exercise of the police caretaking function or was otherwise reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of local ordinances or police policies and procedures broad enough to grant the officers discretion to impound the vehicle of a driver merely summoned rather than arrested for driving with a suspended license, the judgment of the court of appeals thus affirmed. View "Colorado v. Brown" on Justia Law

The State sought review of a court of appeals judgment that reversed an amended restitution order that substantially increased defendant Franck Belibi after he was convicted. Following the acceptance of Belibi’s guilty plea, the imposition of a sentence to probation, including a stipulation to $4,728 restitution, and the entry of judgment, the district court amended its restitution order to require the payment of an additional $302,022 in restitution. The court of appeals held that in the absence of anything in the court’s written or oral pronouncements reserving a final determination of the amount of restitution, the initial restitution order had become final and could not be amended. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed: because a judgment of conviction, absent a statutorily authorized order reserving a determination of the final amount of restitution due, finalizes any specific amount already set, the sentencing court lacked the power to increase restitution beyond the previously set amount of $4,728. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore affirmed. View "Colorado v. Belibi" on Justia Law

Carlos Meza pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to the Class A Traffic Infraction of “Limitations on backing.” Although defendant was present at the providency hearing, his guilty plea consisted merely of acknowledging his reading, understanding, and signing a standardized advisement and plea form, which was presented to the court by the prosecutor, along with an unsigned order for restitution in the amount of $150. The court accepted the plea, fined the defendant $100, ordered restitution, and signed both the completed advisement and plea form and the restitution order. Shortly thereafter, the State filed a motion for additional restitution, which was opposed by the defendant. In addition to legal argument before the trial court, both counsel made a number of further factual allegations concerning the incident, the reasons for the victim’s belief that his full damages would be, but were not, paid by defendant’s insurance company, and the plea negotiations. The county court ordered the requested additional amount of restitution, finding that the victim had suffered a loss of $936.85 that was not known to the State or the court at sentencing, when restitution was initially, but not finally, set at $150. On appeal, the district court, sitting as the court of direct appellate review (pursuant to the simplified procedure for county court convictions) found that the annotation “RR” on the form guilty plea was sufficient to reserve the final amount of restitution and that the record supported the county court’s finding of an additional loss not known at sentencing; it therefore affirmed the increase as having been sanctioned by section 18-1.3-603(3)(a) of the revised statutes. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. Because a judgment of conviction, absent a statutorily authorized order reserving a determination of the final amount of restitution, finalizes any specific amount already set, and because the court ordered no reservation in this case, it lacked the power to increase the amount of restitution it had previously set. View "Meza v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Alfred Sandoval was charged with first degree assault (a class three felony), and possession of a weapon by a previous offender (a class five felony). Sandoval entered into a plea agreement to the reduced charge of felony menacing (a class five felony) in exchange for dismissal of the original charges. The plea agreement also provided that Sandoval would not be sentenced to the Department of Corrections (“DOC”). It did not include any stipulation to judicial fact-finding at sentencing. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the trial court plainly erred when it sentenced Sandoval to an aggravated community corrections sentence based on judicial fact-finding to which Sandoval did not stipulate. The Supreme Court found that it did: in affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), applied to a direct sentence to community corrections. Furthermore, the Court held it was plain error for the trial court to sentence the defendant to an aggravated sentence to community corrections without meeting Blakely’s requirements. View "Colorado v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant James Washam, III was charged by information with twelve counts of sexual assault on a child. A portion of the charged date range fell outside of the applicable statute of limitations. After trial began, the prosecution successfully moved to amend the information, narrowing the date range so that it fell completely within the statute. Ultimately, Washam was convicted on all twelve counts. He appealed, arguing that under Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(e), the amendment to the date rate was a substantive amendment, and thus the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the change once trial began. A majority of the Court of Appeals agreed and vacated the convictions, further ordering the charges be dismissed with prejudice. The State appealed. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that because the amendment simply narrowed the date range in the information (and did not add an essential element to the offense or raise issues of inadequate notice), the amendment to the information was one of form and not substance. Furthermore, the Court found Washam’s substantial rights were not prejudiced, nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing the amendment after trial began. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Washam" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nathan Ybanez petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming his conviction of first degree murder and directing that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole be modified only to the extent of permitting the possibility of parole after forty years. The appellate court rejected Ybanez’s assertions: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by failing to sua sponte appoint a guardian ad litem; (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel both because his counsel’s performance was adversely affected by a non-waivable conflict of interest under which that counsel labored and because he was prejudiced by a deficient performance by his counsel; and (3) that he was entitled to an individualized determination regarding the length of his sentence rather than merely the possibility of parole after forty years. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded: (1) Ybanez lacked any constitutional right to a guardian ad litem and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing one as permitted by statute; (2) Ybanez failed to demonstrate either an adverse effect resulting from an actual conflict of interest, even if his counsel actually labored under a conflict, or that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance, even if it actually fell below the required standard of competent representation; and (3) because Ybanez was constitutionally and statutorily entitled only to an individualized determination whether life without the possibility of parole or life with the possibility of parole after forty years was the appropriate sentence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals is affirmed, and the case remanded with directions to return it to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. View "Ybanez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Christopher Pernell of several charges, including burglary, kidnapping, and sexual assault. The prosecution alleged that Pernell showed up at his ex-wife’s house uninvited; forced his way into her home; threatened her and her boyfriend at gunpoint; forced her to have sexual intercourse; and prevented her from fleeing. At trial, the prosecution presented multiple witnesses, including the ex-wife, the boyfriend, and a police officer who investigated the incident, as well as corroborating physical evidence. Pernell did not testify or present evidence at trial. His theory of defense was that the ex-wife and the boyfriend fabricated the story of the incident. Consistent with this theory, defense counsel told the jury during opening statements that the incident, as described by the ex-wife and the boyfriend, “didn’t happen” and that the ex-wife and the boyfriend “concoct[ed] their story to get [Pernell] out of their lives.” An officer who testified at trial recounted the ex-wife’s description of the incident to him. Pernell objected to this testimony, arguing that the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements to the officer constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial court admitted these statements as excited utterances. On appeal, Pernell argued, among other things, that the trial court had reversibly erred in admitting the ex-wife’s statements. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that defense counsel’s opening statement that the ex-wife fabricated her story opened the door for the admission of her out-of-court statements. However, upon review of the trial record, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded any error in the admission of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of these statements contributed to Pernell’s conviction. The Court declined to address whether defense counsel’s opening statement opened the door to the admission of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements, affirming on difference grounds as the appellate court. View "Pernell v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case arose from a grand jury investigation of petitioner M.W. and his company, I.I. The State suspected that I.I. was manufacturing and distributing a cigarette product illegally sprayed with synthetic cannabinoids. As part of the grand jury investigation, the State issued a subpoena duces tecum to I.I’s attorney Amy Brimah, ordering her to produce all materials related to any representation by her of I.I. and M.W. The State also requested a hearing, outside the presence of the grand jury and before a judge. Brimah and M.W. moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the materials were protected by the attorney–client privilege. The State asserted that the crime–fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege applied. The district court denied Brimah’s and M.W.’s motions, declining to review the documents individually, and ordered Brimah to produce the requested materials. Brimah and M.W. petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court held that a two-step process applies when a party seeks disclosure of attorney–client-privileged documents under the crime–fraud exception: (1) before a court may review the privileged documents in camera, it must “require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that wrongful conduct sufficient to invoke the crime or fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege has occurred;” and (2) the court may strip a communication of privilege only upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the client was committing, or attempting to commit, a crime or fraud and the communication was made in furtherance of the putative crime or fraud. Because the State failed to make such a showing here, the district court abused its discretion in stripping the documents of privilege. Brimah and M.W. also argued the district court should have required the State to disclose the applications and authorizations for the intercepts on which it premised its subpoena under Colorado’s wiretap statute, specifically section 16-15-102(9), C.R.S. (2017). On the facts of this case the Supreme Court agreed. The district court was reversed on this point too. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re 2015-2016 Jefferson County Grand Jury" on Justia Law

Respondent Isidore Griego was charged with attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault arising out of two incidents in which Griego drove drunk, but due to traffic conditions at the time of the incidents, did not ultimately put any particular persons at risk. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the requirement in the attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault statutes that a defendant place “another person” at risk of death or serious bodily injury necessitates that an actual, discernible person be placed at risk, or if “another person” can refer to the public at large. The Court concluded the statutes at issue required a showing of a risk to an actual, discernible person and that a risk to the public at large was insufficient. “Holding otherwise would leave the statutes without a clear limiting principle and would raise equal protection concerns.” Accordingly, the Court held the court of appeals correctly determined that the evidence did not support Griego’s convictions for attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault. View "Colorado v. Griego" on Justia Law