Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2006, a jury convicted Alejandro Estrada-Huerta of second-degree kidnapping and sexual assault. Estrada-Huerta was seventeen at the time he was charged, and he was tried as an adult. The trial court sentenced Estrada-Huerta to twenty-four years for the kidnapping conviction and sixteen years to life for each count of sexual assault. The sexual assault sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to the kidnapping sentence, resulting in an aggregate sentence of forty years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Estrada-Huerta moved to vacate his sentences, arguing his aggregate term-of-years sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and was therefore unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, because Estrada-Huerta would be eligible for parole at age fifty-eight, he had a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, therefore his sentence complied with “Graham” and the subsequent case of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s result, though on different grounds. The Court found that “Graham” and “Miller” did not apply in this matter; Estrada-Huerta was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole: he received consecutive terms for three separate convictions. View "Estrada-Huerta v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Just after midnight on September 6, 2015, Officer Luke Bishard responded to a report of a vehicle driving erratically. Officer Bishard observed defendant Melissa King’s eyes were glassy and her speech was slurred. King admitted to having stopped for a drink on her way home from work. She attempted but failed to successfully perform voluntary roadside maneuvers. Officer Bishard arrested King for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). After the arrest, he read her an advisement consistent with Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, section 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. (2016). King refused to submit to a either a blood or breath test. Before trial, King filed a motion to declare section 42-4-1301(6)(d) unconstitutional as applied. The Colorado Supreme Court held that per Fitzgerald v. Colorado, 2017 CO 26 (2017), the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Given the holding in “Fitzgerald,” King’s as-applied challenge to the statute failed, and the trial court’s order reversed. View "Colorado v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant Alan Sewick was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). The arresting officer began to read Sewick an advisement consistent with Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, section 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. (2016), but the officer could not complete the advisement because Sewick became belligerent, yelling at the officer and telling him to stop reading. The officer asked Sewick whether he would consent to a blood test or a breath test, and Sewick refused to do so. Before trial, Sewick filed a motion asking the trial court to declare section 42-4-1301(6)(d) unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The trial court rejected Sewick’s facial challenge, but it granted Sewick’s motion with respect to the as-applied challenge. The Colorado Supreme Court held that per Fitzgerald v. Colorado, 2017 CO 26 (2017), the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Given the holding in “Fitzgerald,” Sewick’s as-applied challenge to the statute failed, and the trial court’s order reversed. View "Colorado v. Sewick" on Justia Law

Officer Carlos Wilkendorf was patrolling near Lowry Park in the early hours of April 25, 2015, when he saw a black SUV parked in the parking lot despite the park being closed. He approached the vehicle and found defendant Depree Maxwell asleep in the driver’s seat, with a female passenger also in the car. The passenger explained that they had pulled into the park because Maxwell was too drunk to drive. Maxwell told Officer Wilkendorf he had consumed a few beers. Another officer, Officer Ryan Marker, arrived on the scene and continued the investigation. Maxwell agreed to perform voluntary roadside sobriety maneuvers, but failed. Officer Marker arrested Maxwell for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). After the arrest, Officer Marker read Maxwell an advisement consistent with Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, section 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. (2016); Maxwell refused to submit to a either a blood or breath test. Before trial, Maxwell filed a motion to declare section 42-4-1301(6)(d) unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The trial court rejected Maxwell’s facial challenge, but it granted Maxwell’s motion with respect to the as-applied challenge, essentially precluding the State from introducing evidence of Maxwell’s refusal to consent to the blood or breath test in order to establish guilt. The Colorado Supreme Court held that per Fitzgerald v. Colorado, 2017 CO 26 (2017), the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Given the holding in “Fitzgerald,” Maxwell’s as-applied challenge to the statute failed, and the trial court’s order reversed. View "Colorado v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

In 2015, defendant Depree Maxwell was involved in a car crash. Responding police officers observed that Maxwell appeared to be intoxicated. Maxwell was unable to provide his driver’s license or proof of insurance, and he admitted to having consumed a few shots of vodka prior to the crash. He attempted to perform voluntary roadside sobriety maneuvers, but failed. One of the officers arrested Maxwell for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). Maxwell refused to submit to either a blood or breath test as required by the Expressed Consent Statute, 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. (2016). Before trial, Maxwell filed a motion to declare section 42-4-1301(6)(d) unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The trial court rejected Maxwell’s facial challenge, but it granted Maxwell’s motion with respect to the as-applied challenge, essentially precluding the State from introducing evidence of Maxwell’s refusal to consent to the blood or breath test in order to establish guilt. The Colorado Supreme Court held that per Fitzgerald v. Colorado, 2017 CO 26 (2017), the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Given the holding in “Fitzgerald,” Maxwell’s as-applied challenge to the statute failed, and the trial court’s order reversed. View "Colorado v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Angelo Montoya and his cousin were charged by grand jury indictment with extreme indifference murder in the shooting death of a young woman at a party. The two were tried together, and although both were acquitted of the charged offense of extreme indifference murder, they were each convicted of attempted extreme indifference murder, reckless manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and accessory to crime, all of which had been submitted to the jury as lesser offenses of the charged offense. Montoya was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of forty-eight years for attempted extreme indifference murder, the maximum sentence in the aggravated range for a class two felony, six years for reckless manslaughter, and three years for criminally negligent homicide, and to a consecutive term of six years for accessory to crime. He appealed, but because there was sufficient evidence to support Montoya’s conviction of attempted extreme indifference murder; because Montoya was barred from challenging on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for being an accessory to crime, a lesser non-included offense presented to the jury at his request; and because Montoya’s simultaneous convictions of reckless manslaughter and accessory to crime neither merged nor required concurrent sentences, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Montoya v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A trial court commits plain error when it fails to limit, sua sponte, a jury’s access to recorded statements during jury deliberations. A trial court abuses its discretion when it allows a police officer to testify as a lay witness about the concept of grooming in the context of sexual predation. The State charged Benjamin Romero with one count of sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse and two counts of sexual assault on a child. At trial, the court admitted two recorded exhibits and gave the jury unfettered access to those exhibits during deliberations. The first exhibit was a recording of a forensic interview with one of the victims, C.T., who testified at trial. The second exhibit was a recording, from a previous case, of Romero discussing previous acts of sexual predation he had committed (also involving friends’ daughters around fifteen years of age). The Colorado Supreme Court held that: (1) a trial court does not commit plain error when it does not limit a jury’s access to recorded statements without an objection and (2) a trial court abuses its discretion when it allows a witness to testify about grooming without qualifying that witness as an expert. The Court reversed defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "Colorado v. Romero" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Sandra Jacobson of vehicular homicide, driving under the influence, and other related charges arising from a collision between her truck and a taxi cab. The collision killed two of the passengers in the taxi. During the jury selection process, a prospective juror asked the trial court why the jury has to avoid media coverage of the trial. On the first day of trial, the trial court admonished the jury to avoid media coverage of the trial. Throughout the trial, the trial court reminded the jury daily of the need to avoid all coverage involving Jacobson or the case. At issue in this appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to poll the jury about whether jurors had seen a prejudicial news report that had aired the night before and been posted online. Because the trial court gave repeated, specific admonitions — including on the day of the newscast — to jurors to avoid “newscasts” and “newspaper sites,” and these were the only places on which the prejudicial report was available, the Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to poll jurors. Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed defendant’s conviction. View "Colorado v. Jacobson" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed for plain error a trial court’s decision to allow the jury unfettered access, during its deliberations, to the out-of-court statements of three child sexual assault victims. These statements were memorialized in three DVDs and three transcripts thereof, all of which had been admitted as exhibits in the criminal trial of petitioner Nerio Martinez. Martinez first raised the issue of jury access on direct appeal, arguing that allowing the jury unfettered access constituted reversible plain error. In a unanimous, unpublished opinion, a division of the court of appeals rejected this argument. Without deciding whether the trial court had abused its discretion, the division concluded that any error in not limiting the jury’s access to the exhibits during deliberations did not warrant reversal under the plain error standard. The Supreme Court agreed and therefore affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Martinez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case concerned the scope of a trial court’s discretion to permit, deny, or restrict the jury’s access during deliberations to a DVD containing the recorded statement of a child sexual assault victim, which DVD was admitted as an exhibit in a criminal trial. The State challenged the decision of a unanimous division of the court of appeals, which concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting the jury unrestricted access to such an exhibit and that the error required reversal and a new trial. The State argued the division misconstrued Colorado Supreme Court precedent, and the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion. The Supreme Court agreed with the division that the trial court did not employ the requisite caution to ensure that the DVD would not be used in such a manner as to create a likelihood that the jury would accord it undue weight or emphasis. By relying on an analysis that the Supreme Court later rejected, the trial court misapplied the law and abused its discretion. Moreover, because the nature of the DVD and its importance to the case’s resolution leave us with grave doubts as to the effect that unfettered access had on the verdict and the fairness of the proceedings, the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Jefferson" on Justia Law