Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Angelo Montoya and his cousin were charged by grand jury indictment with extreme indifference murder in the shooting death of a young woman at a party. The two were tried together, and although both were acquitted of the charged offense of extreme indifference murder, they were each convicted of attempted extreme indifference murder, reckless manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and accessory to crime, all of which had been submitted to the jury as lesser offenses of the charged offense. Montoya was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of forty-eight years for attempted extreme indifference murder, the maximum sentence in the aggravated range for a class two felony, six years for reckless manslaughter, and three years for criminally negligent homicide, and to a consecutive term of six years for accessory to crime. He appealed, but because there was sufficient evidence to support Montoya’s conviction of attempted extreme indifference murder; because Montoya was barred from challenging on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for being an accessory to crime, a lesser non-included offense presented to the jury at his request; and because Montoya’s simultaneous convictions of reckless manslaughter and accessory to crime neither merged nor required concurrent sentences, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Montoya v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A trial court commits plain error when it fails to limit, sua sponte, a jury’s access to recorded statements during jury deliberations. A trial court abuses its discretion when it allows a police officer to testify as a lay witness about the concept of grooming in the context of sexual predation. The State charged Benjamin Romero with one count of sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse and two counts of sexual assault on a child. At trial, the court admitted two recorded exhibits and gave the jury unfettered access to those exhibits during deliberations. The first exhibit was a recording of a forensic interview with one of the victims, C.T., who testified at trial. The second exhibit was a recording, from a previous case, of Romero discussing previous acts of sexual predation he had committed (also involving friends’ daughters around fifteen years of age). The Colorado Supreme Court held that: (1) a trial court does not commit plain error when it does not limit a jury’s access to recorded statements without an objection and (2) a trial court abuses its discretion when it allows a witness to testify about grooming without qualifying that witness as an expert. The Court reversed defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "Colorado v. Romero" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Sandra Jacobson of vehicular homicide, driving under the influence, and other related charges arising from a collision between her truck and a taxi cab. The collision killed two of the passengers in the taxi. During the jury selection process, a prospective juror asked the trial court why the jury has to avoid media coverage of the trial. On the first day of trial, the trial court admonished the jury to avoid media coverage of the trial. Throughout the trial, the trial court reminded the jury daily of the need to avoid all coverage involving Jacobson or the case. At issue in this appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to poll the jury about whether jurors had seen a prejudicial news report that had aired the night before and been posted online. Because the trial court gave repeated, specific admonitions — including on the day of the newscast — to jurors to avoid “newscasts” and “newspaper sites,” and these were the only places on which the prejudicial report was available, the Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to poll jurors. Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed defendant’s conviction. View "Colorado v. Jacobson" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed for plain error a trial court’s decision to allow the jury unfettered access, during its deliberations, to the out-of-court statements of three child sexual assault victims. These statements were memorialized in three DVDs and three transcripts thereof, all of which had been admitted as exhibits in the criminal trial of petitioner Nerio Martinez. Martinez first raised the issue of jury access on direct appeal, arguing that allowing the jury unfettered access constituted reversible plain error. In a unanimous, unpublished opinion, a division of the court of appeals rejected this argument. Without deciding whether the trial court had abused its discretion, the division concluded that any error in not limiting the jury’s access to the exhibits during deliberations did not warrant reversal under the plain error standard. The Supreme Court agreed and therefore affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Martinez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case concerned the scope of a trial court’s discretion to permit, deny, or restrict the jury’s access during deliberations to a DVD containing the recorded statement of a child sexual assault victim, which DVD was admitted as an exhibit in a criminal trial. The State challenged the decision of a unanimous division of the court of appeals, which concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting the jury unrestricted access to such an exhibit and that the error required reversal and a new trial. The State argued the division misconstrued Colorado Supreme Court precedent, and the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion. The Supreme Court agreed with the division that the trial court did not employ the requisite caution to ensure that the DVD would not be used in such a manner as to create a likelihood that the jury would accord it undue weight or emphasis. By relying on an analysis that the Supreme Court later rejected, the trial court misapplied the law and abused its discretion. Moreover, because the nature of the DVD and its importance to the case’s resolution leave us with grave doubts as to the effect that unfettered access had on the verdict and the fairness of the proceedings, the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the third step of the analysis laid out in “Batson v. Kentucky,” (476 U.S. 79 (1986)), which required trial courts to determine whether a party raising a Batson objection proved by a preponderance of the evidence that opposing counsel exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse a potential juror on the basis of race or gender. Specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether the court of appeals erred in its review of the trial court’s Batson ruling by: (1) remanding for specific credibility findings of the prosecution’s non-demeanor-based reasons for its peremptory challenges, (2) refusing to credit the prosecution’s demeanor-based reasons because the trial court did not expressly find them to be credible, and (3) conducting flawed comparative juror analyses. After review, the Court concluded that the trial court here did not commit clear error in step three of its “Batson” analysis and that remand was unnecessary. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Colorado v. Beauvais" on Justia Law

Defendant Emmett Larsen was the father of S.L. and the grandfather of S.L.’s children, A.H. and K.H. S.L., along with A.H. and K.H., moved to Colorado to live with Larsen. While in Colorado, K.H. told a therapist that her uncle, T.J., had sexually abused her. A Department of Human Services (DHS) caseworker interviewed both A.H. and K.H. During the interview, K.H. said T.J. had abused her but did not accuse Larsen of abusing her. A.H., on the other hand, told the caseworker that Larsen had touched her breasts and vaginal area. In a follow-up interview, A.H. again accused Larsen of abusing her. K.H. again stated that Larsen had never touched her inappropriately. Larsen was arrested, and the State charged Larsen with one count of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust as part of a pattern of abuse and two counts of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. This case called on the Colorado Supreme Court to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to poll the jury about whether jurors had seen a news report about the case that had been posted online and ran in a local newspaper. Here, the trial court gave repeated admonitions not to seek out news about the case — including just before the newspaper released the story. The Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to poll the jury after a newspaper published a prejudicial news report with limited distribution. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the defendant’s conviction. View "Colorado v. Larsen" on Justia Law

Around 11:30 p.m., a concerned citizen (“the caller”) called law enforcement after witnessing a possible break-in in a partially developed residential neighborhood. The caller said he saw a person, later identified as Defendant Gonzalo Reyes-Valenzuela, enter several unfinished houses, leave one of the houses carrying a black bag, and use a light-colored, boxy van to travel between houses. The issue this interlocutory appeal presented for the Supreme Court’s review centered on whether an officer, with a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal behavior was afoot, had to consider the possible innocent explanations for otherwise suspicious behavior before conducting an investigatory stop. Specifically, when an officer is aware that a person is driving around late at night, going in and out of unfinished houses in an area where there had been recent break-ins of unfinished houses, and carrying a black bag, is that officer required to consider possible innocent explanations before conducting an investigatory stop of that person? The Supreme Court held that, because Colorado and United States Supreme Court precedent does not require an officer to consider every possible innocent explanation for criminal behavior, the officers in this case justifiably performed an investigatory stop on the defendant based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Reyes-Valenzuela" on Justia Law

Defendant Oliver Hyde was involved in a single-vehicle accident that left him unconscious. The police suspected that he might have been driving under the influence of alcohol. Hyde was transported to the hospital, and, in accordance with Colorado law, a sample of his blood was taken to establish his blood-alcohol concentration. Hyde was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). He sought to have the result of the blood test suppressed as evidence obtained through an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court granted his motion to suppress, and the State filed an interlocutory appeal. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court found that by driving in Colorado, Hyde consented to the terms of the Expressed Consent Statute, including its requirement that he submit to blood-alcohol testing under the circumstances present here. Hyde’s statutory consent satisfied the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The Court therefore concluded that in the circumstances presented here, the blood draw was constitutional. View "Colorado v. Hyde" on Justia Law

Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute provided that any motorist who drives on the roads of the state has consented to take a blood or breath test when requested to do so by a law enforcement officer with probable cause to suspect the motorist of driving under the influence. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the trial court’s ruling that an advisement accurately informing defendant William Simpson of this law amounted to coercion that rendered his consent to a blood test involuntary and required suppression of the test result. By driving in Colorado, Simpson consented to the terms of the Expressed Consent Statute, including its requirement that he submit to a blood draw under the circumstances presented here. "That prior statutory consent eliminated the need for the trial court to assess the voluntariness of Simpson’s consent at the time of his interaction with law enforcement. Simpson’s prior statutory consent satisfies the consent exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the blood draw at issue here was constitutional." View "Colorado v. Simpson" on Justia Law