Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In an interlocutory appeal, the State appealed a trial court order to suppress certain statements made by defendant Luis Carrion during a custodial interrogation. Officers gave Carrion an oral Miranda advisement and provided him an English language written advisement on a waiver form, which he later signed. After finding the oral Miranda advisement deficient and that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence Carrion was able to read English, the trial court suppressed the statements made during the interrogation. The prosecution argued that the trial court erred because the factual findings were not supported by the record. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's factual findings were indeed supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Colorado v. Carrion" on Justia Law

Petitioner Eric Doyle appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm his conviction for violating a condition of his bail bond. At the request of the prosecution, the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that petitioner failed to appear in court on a particular day, as mandated by the bond. Upon review, the Supreme Court found, however, that the trial court had not instructed the jury that the judicially noticed fact was not subject to reasonable dispute and had already been accepted as true by the court. The Court found this error was not harmless, notwithstanding proper admission into evidence of a court record reflecting the court's earlier finding to that effect. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "Doyle v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State sought the Supreme Court's review of a trial court order suppressing marijuana that police discovered in a car registered to and driven by defendant-appellee Ramiro Munoz-Gutierrez. The trial court found that the State did not establish that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his car. After review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard, and held that defendant indeed voluntarily consented to the search. Under the totality of the circumstances, the police's conduct did not overbear defendant's exercise of free will. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Munoz-Gutierrez" on Justia Law

During 2002 and 2003, a Colorado state public defender with the Mesa County Regional Office represented defendant Thomas West after the victim's mother, D.S., informed police that she discovered West lying in bed next to her six-year-old daughter with his genitals exposed. D.S. and her ex-husband, D.E.S., both testified at trial for the prosecution. Colorado public defenders had represented D.S. approximately 23 times over the eight years preceding West's case. Although West's trial counsel had never himself represented D.S., the Mesa County Office represented her seven times between 1998 and 2001. D.S. was also a client of the El Paso County Regional Office, where she had an open case during West's trial at issue here. In addition, the Mesa County Office represented D.S.'s ex-husband, D.E.S., five times between 1999 and 2002. West's trial counsel had filed an entry of appearance in one of these cases, although the prosecution dismissed that case four days after that entry of appearance. West's trial counsel did not inform West or the trial court about these possible conflicts of interest. There was no record regarding the conflict at trial. The jury convicted West of sexual assault on a child. Following his trial, West filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, alleging that his trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest. The trial court found no conflict and denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that an actual conflict of interest arose from the public defender's dual role as prior and current counsel for D.S. and as prior counsel for D.E.S. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the analytical framework a trial court should use to resolve a criminal defendant's post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on alleged conflicts of interest arising from concurrent or successive representation of witnesses against the defendant. The Court shared petitioners' contention that, under "Colorado v. Castro," (657 P.2d 932 (Colo. 1983)), they should not be required to demonstrate a separate "adverse effect" in addition to a conflict of interest in order to receive new trials. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated on trial counsel's alleged conflict of interest arising from concurrent or successive representation of trial witnesses against a defendant, the Court held that a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence both a conflict of interest and an adverse effect resulting from that conflict. View "West v. People" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Blagg was convicted by jury of first degree murder for the death of his wife, for which he received a life sentence without parole. Years later, the trial court granted Blagg a new trial based on revelations of juror misconduct. After setting a new bond hearing, but before that hearing occurred, the court reinstated the bod amount it had set before Blagg's first trial. Because the trial court dispensed with the hearing, neither party had the change to argue changed circumstances and the alleged victim's family did not have the opportunity to be heard. The district attorney argued that this violated the Victims' Rights Act (VRA), and moved for an emergency stay of the trial court's order. The trial court denied the motion, and the district attorney petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in dispensing the hearing, which was indeed, in violation of the VRA. View "Colorado v. Blagg" on Justia Law

In September 2007, Respondent Michael McKimmy was arrested for new offenses while on parole and was incarcerated. Respondent was charged in two separate cases, with second-degree burglary, theft, identity theft, and a habitual burglary offender count. In 2008, the State filed complaints against respondent in two new cases, including charges for second-degree burglary, theft, identity theft, aggravated motor vehicle theft, and criminal mischief. Unbeknownst to his public defender, respondent sent a pro-se letter in one of the cases to the Chief Judge of the County Court, "formally request[ing] protection under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act." In the letter’s footer, respondent wrote, "CC: Deputy District Attorney [Prosecutor Name]." In all four cases, respondent sent pro-se letters without his attorney’s knowledge to Jefferson County’s Chief Judge formally requesting the protections of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), and all four letters included a footer purporting to copy the letter to the prosecutor of that particular case. Neither the trial court nor the prosecution, however, initially became aware of the requests in the 2007 cases. The trial court ignored the letters without reading them pursuant to its policy of refusing to acknowledge pro-se letters sent by represented parties, while the prosecution received the 2007 letters but inadvertently misfiled them. Crucially, the record was inconclusive whether the prosecution became immediately aware of the 2008 letters when respondent sent them in March 2008. On February 4, 2008, defendant pled not guilty in the 2007 cases, and insisted that he did not wish to waive his "speedy trial rights." The trial court, under the impression that respondent was referring to his rights as defined in section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. (2014), made certain that the trial dates fell within six months from the date of respondent's not-guilty pleas, and it set the trials. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the process for invoking one’s rights under the UMDDA. When prisoners strictly comply with the UMDDA’s procedural requirements, the Act mandates that they be brought to trial on pending charges within 182 days of their request. Even when prisoners do not strictly comply with the UMDDA’s requirements, the Court has previously determined that they nevertheless invoke their rights under the Act if: (1) their request substantially complies with the Act’s requirements; and (2) the prosecution receives “actual notice” of their request. Respondent did not strictly comply with the Act; rather, he attempted to invoke his UMDDA rights by mailing multiple letters to the prosecution and the trial court. But, while the prosecution received the defendant’s initial requests, it failed to actually become aware of them until well later in the proceedings. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution’s receipt of such a letter did not constitute "actual notice" sufficient to invoke respondent's rights under the UMDDA. View "Colorado v. McKimmy" on Justia Law

A state trooper pulled over the defendant while she was driving a rental car that she was not authorized to drive. While impounding the car at rental company’s request, the trooper who stopped her discovered three suspicious gift-wrapped packages, one on the back seat and two in trunk. At the tow yard, a K-9 police dog alerted alerted the trooper that the trunk contained drugs. The trooper used this positive dog sniff to obtain a warrant, the execution of which revealed 57 pounds of marijuana. The trial court suppressed this marijuana evidence because the packages had been detained for an unreasonable amount of time before the dog alerted and the trooper thus obtained probable cause to continue the search. The State challenged the suppression, arguing that defendant did not have standing to contest the detention and search of the packages because she was not authorized to drive the rental car. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the packages that were detained. Therefore, she had standing to challenge the search of those packages even though she was not authorized to drive the car. Consequently, the Court affirmed the suppression order. View "Colorado v. Sotelo" on Justia Law

A police officer observed a traffic violation. Upon stopping the car, the officer discovered that the driver, defendant Christopher Vaughn, was driving under a suspended license. The officer decided to arrest defendant, ordered him out of the car, and began an inventory search of the vehicle prior to having the vehicle impounded. The officer found one big bag filled with smaller individual bags of crack cocaine in the glove compartment. Defendant appealed his ultimate conviction on drug trafficking charges, arguing the drug evidence should have been suppressed because the traffic stop was not enough probable cause to have defendant arrested. The Supreme Court held that the drug evidence was properly seized as the result of a valid inventory search, reversing the trial court's suppression order. View "Colorado v. Vaughn" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped the vehicle defendant Ari Liggett was driving, and upon asking dispatch to scan the license plate, determined that it was associated with both a missing person (defendant's mother) and an armed-and-dangerous person (defendant himself). After police ordered defendant to turn off the car and place both hands through the window, defendant opted to speed off. A chase ensued. Defendant spun out and hit a concrete wall. Defendant was later chased on foot, ultimately surrendered, and was arrested. In an interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether statements defendant made to investigators while the investigators "were talking among themselves" and other unsolicited statements should have been suppressed at defendant's trial for murder, crime of violence and vehicular eluding. The statements defendant made were given prior to a reading of his Miranda rights. The trial court suppressed a majority of the defendant's statements, finding that they were involuntary. The Supreme Court held, however, that considering the totality of the circumstances, investigators never overbore defendant's will, and the statements were voluntary. The trial court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Liggett" on Justia Law

Petitioners Conley Hoskins and Jane Medicals, LLC, sought to vacate a trial court's order disqualifying the Peters Mair Wilcox (PMW) law firm as their counsel. The trial court disqualified the firm on the grounds that the firm previously represented another party, All Care Wellness, LLC, in the same matter for which PWM represented petitioners. Furthermore, the trial court concluded that All Care and petitioners had materially adverse interests. Petitioners argued on appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioners' retained counsel of choice. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court record was insufficient to support the finding that the interests of petitioners and All Care were materially adverse to one another. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court indeed abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioners' counsel. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Colorado v. Hoskins" on Justia Law