Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Dennis Sanchez appealed the court of appeals' judgment affirming his conviction for sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for a class 3 felony on "Sexual Assault on a Child - Pattern of Abuse", notwithstanding the jury's verdict of "not guilty" on the charge entitled "Sexual Assault on a Child," based on a separate finding of two of six enumerated touching incidents presented on a verdict form entitled "Sexual Assault on a Child - Pattern of Abuse." A majority of the appeals court concluded defendant had been adequately charged in a single count and that the jury's instructions did not make its finding of a pattern of abuse contingent upon first finding the defendant's guilt of the separately charged crime of "Sexual Assault of a Child." The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that because the verdict form the jury used never offered the jury the opportunity to find that defendant committed the elements of sexual assault on a child, and instead reflected at most, the jury's factual finding of two different incidents of sexual contact. The trial court erred in entering judgment for a class 3 felony and as such, the court of appeals' judgment affirming the trial court was error. View "Sanchez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

J.R. was sexually assaulted by a man who offered her a ride as she was walking home at 2:00 A.M. one winter morning in 2005. J.R. was taken to the hospital for examination; she complained of neck and jaw pain stemming from when her assailant held her mouth shut. A presence of semen later implicated Respondent Michael Jones as J.R.'s assailant. The State charged respondent with numerous offenses. Prior to trial, he moved the trial court to bar the State from introducing evidence that he allegedly sexually assaulted two other women in two other states. The trial court denied the motion, finding the evidence of the two other alleged assaults under the four-part "Spoto" admissibility test allowed the evidence's admissibility to show respondent's "common plan, scheme, or design" and to rebut respondent's defense of consent (Colorado v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (1990)). A jury ultimately convicted respondent, but the appellate court reversed, finding that evidence of the two out-of-state assaults were not sufficiently similar to the Colorado assault. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that trial courts have no obligation to determine that evidence of other acts offered under the Colorado Rules of Evidence satisfy the doctrine of chances, and to also satisfy the second and third prongs of the Spoto admissibility test. Though the doctrine of chances provides one theory pursuant to which other-act evidence may satisfy components of the Spoto analysis, trial courts have discretion to assess the relevance of other-act evidence under Spoto apart from the doctrine. The court of appeals therefore erred when it effectively held that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the other-act evidence without conducting a doctrine of chances analysis.View "Colorado v. Jones" on Justia Law

Police arrested Jeffrey Knedler for allegedly assaulting two people. Days after the assault, officers contacted Knedler at a hair salon where he occasionally stayed. As they approached the salon, the officers observed Knedler drinking from what appeared to be a liquor bottle. He also took a long drink from an alcoholic beverage before officers handcuffed him and placed him in a police car. Knedler agreed to speak with an investigator, but he did not want to talk in the police car, so he was taken to police headquarters. Upon arriving at headquarters, Knedler was presented with a written Miranda advisement, and it was read aloud to him. Knedler stated he did not have his glasses with him to read the advisement and waiver, but he initialed by each of the numbered rights, signed the advisement and waiver and stated "I know my rights." After questioning, Knedler admitted to beating both victims and made numerous incriminating statements. The State sought reversal of the trial court's order that suppressed videotaped statements Knedler made after he signed the written waiver of his Miranda rights. Based on Knedler's extremely high blood alcohol contend at the time of the waiver, the trial court found the waiver was invalid. Because Knedler's waiver was nonetheless knowing and intelligent, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order. View "Colorado v. Knedler" on Justia Law

Ascension Baez-Lopez, Jose Soto-Lopez and Juan Cantu-Bojorquez were indicted on counts of violating the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act, and counts of conspiracy to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance. The issue before the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter centered on he trial court’s order suppressing evidence from interceptions of oral and wire communications in these three cases. The trial court suppressed the “wiretap” recordings on grounds that they had not been sealed in compliance with state law and no satisfactory explanation for the absence of the seal given. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the suppression motions because the sealing procedure indeed complied with the applicable state law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order. View "Colorado v. Baez-Lopez" on Justia Law

Prosecutors alleged defendant Ricky Hoang instigated a home invasion robbery involving three others stealing jewelry and cash at gunpoint. Defendant was restrained with leg shackles during his jury trial over his repeated objections. The issues this case presented to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the trial court erred by requiring defendant to be tried with the shackles without a finding of specific need; and (2) whether defendant’s claims of delays and deficiencies in producing the record violated his rights to a meaningful and speedy appeal. The Supreme Court held that “When the record does not show the restrains were plainly visible, the defendant must point to something in the record justifying an appellate court’s reasonable inference that at least one juror saw or heard them. If defendant fails to meet that burden, then the constitutional harmless error standard . . . does not apply.” Furthermore, the Court concluded that defendant’s rights to a meaningful and speedy appeal were not violated. View "Hoang v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christopher Marquez was convicted at a single trial of attempted aggravated robbery (a statutorily designated crime of violence); second degree assault (found by the jury to have been committed as a crime of violence under the circumstances of this case); and two counts of felony menacing. Petitioner was also found to be an habitual criminal requiring sentences to triple the maximum of the presumptive range for each of his crimes. The district court sentenced petitioner to concurrent terms of imprisonment for his felony menacing convictions, which it also ordered to be served concurrently with his crime-of-violence sentences, but it ordered petitioner's two crime-of-violence sentences to be served consecutively. After concluding that both crimes of violence were committed as part of a single "crime spree," the district court felt compelled to impose consecutive 48-year sentences. Petitioner sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed the district court's imposition of consecutive sentences for two crime-of-violence convictions. Because the phrase "arising out of the same incident," as appearing in section 18-1.3-406, C.R.S. (2013), is a reference to, and has the same meaning as, the phrase "arising from the same criminal episode," in section 18-1-408(2), C.R.S. (2013), and because the record in this case established that the crimes of violence of which petitioner was convicted were not "based on the same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode," as previously construed in the latter statute, the Supreme Court concluded the district court was not required to impose consecutive sentences. Rather, it was not only permitted, but in fact, required to exercise its discretion concerning the imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore reversed, and the case was remanded for resentencing.View "Marquez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue for the Supreme Court's consideration in this case was the balance between a defendant's Sixth Amendment constitutional right to counsel of his or her choice and the public's interest in the fairness and efficiency of the judicial system. The Court of appeals developed a balancing test for a trial court to use when deciding whether to grant or deny a defendant's request for a continuance so that s/he may change counsel. The appellate court applied its test to the facts of this case and determined that the trial court abused its discretion and violated the defendant's constitutional rights to counsel of choice when it denied a request for a continuance. As a result, the appellate court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed that outcome. While the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the decision whether to grant a continuance is a fact-based question best decided by the trial court, it declined to adopt the appellate court's test because it did not adequately reflect longstanding precedent requiring consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" when deciding on whether to grant a continuance. The Court concluded that the trial court record in this case was inadequate to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the continuance. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case back to the trial court for additional findings and conclusions. View "Colorado v. Brown" on Justia Law

The State appealed the Court of Appeals' reversal of defendant's convictions for first degree assault and first degree burglary, and his sentence of 28 years' imprisonment. The appellate court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying a challenge for cause on the grounds of juror bias, and that the defendant removed the juror in question with a peremptory challenge, and then exhausted his remaining peremptory challenges. The appellate court reversed noting the Supreme Court's rule of automatic reversal, as explained in "Colorado v. Macrander" (828 P.2d 234 (1992)). The State petitioned the Supreme Court solely to request reconsideration of automatic reversal under these circumstances. The Supreme Court overruled the automatic reversal requirement of "Macrander." Because the Court of Appeals relied on the bright-line automatic reversal rule of "Macrander," rather than evaluating the likely effect of the trial court's error on the outcome of the specific case in which it occurred, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this holding. View "Colorado v. Montero-Romero" on Justia Law

The State appealed the Court of Appeals' reversal of defendant's convictions for theft by receiving and his sentence to three years' probation. The appellate court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying a challenge for cause on the grounds of juror bias, and that defendant removed the juror with a peremptory challenge and then exhausted his remaining peremptory challenges. The appellate court reversed noting the Supreme Court's rule of automatic reversal, as explained in "Colorado v. Macrander" (828 P.2d 234 (1992)). The State petitioned the Supreme Court solely to request reconsideration of automatic reversal under these circumstances. Because the Court of Appeals relied on the bright-line automatic reversal rule of "Macrander," rather than evaluating the likely effect of the trial court's error on the outcome of the specific case in which it occurred, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this holding. View "Colorado v. Roldan" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cameron Davis was driving his girlfriend's car while a man in the passenger seat shot and killed a bystander. At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on testimony from three witnesses: Davis' girlfriend, his mother, and one of his friends. The appeal concerned the testimony of two detectives who testified about their interviews with these three witnesses. The record in this case indicated that the testimony from law enforcement officials regarding a witness' credibility was offered to provide context for the detectives' interrogation tactics and investigative decisions. The Supreme Court concluded that this kind of evidence was properly admitted.View "Davis v. Colorado " on Justia Law