Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A woman gave birth to a child in the back of an ambulance and immediately informed hospital staff that she did not want or have the means to care for the baby, expressing her intent to relinquish the child for adoption. The Morgan County Department of Human Services (MCDHS) initiated a dependency or neglect proceeding, treating the matter as a typical abandonment case. MCDHS investigated the mother’s identity, contacted her family members to explore placement options, and took steps to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, after learning the mother might be a member of a Canadian tribe.The Morgan County District Court, upon learning of MCDHS’s actions, intervened by issuing an order that recognized the birth mother’s right to anonymity and confidentiality under Colorado’s Safe Haven Law. The court directed MCDHS to halt its investigation into the mother’s identity and to cease contacting her family members, reasoning that the Safe Haven Law protected the mother’s privacy. The court also sealed records containing the mother’s name and refused to consider information derived from confidential sources. MCDHS challenged these orders through a C.A.R. 21 petition.Reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that, although Colorado’s Safe Haven Law does not expressly guarantee anonymity and confidentiality, its structure, related statutory provisions, and underlying purpose imply such protections for parents who properly relinquish newborns under its terms. The Court concluded that county departments cannot pursue the identity of relinquishing parents or investigate their families for placement options. Once a newborn is surrendered pursuant to the Safe Haven Law, the county department must promptly seek adoptive placement and move to terminate parental rights while maintaining the parent’s anonymity and confidentiality. The Supreme Court of Colorado discharged its order to show cause and remanded for proceedings consistent with this holding. View "People ex rel. G.D.M." on Justia Law

The case involves a father who was the primary caregiver of his minor child in Colorado. After expressing difficulty parenting alone and requesting assistance from the county department, the father set a deadline for the department to locate the child's mother. Following a concerning home visit, where the department observed possible neglect and suspected substance use, the department sought and received a verbal removal order. The child was placed in the temporary custody of the department and later moved to Kansas to live with her mother, after a magistrate granted the department's request. The father objected and sought review of the temporary custody order.While the father’s request for review was pending, the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services moved to dismiss the dependency and neglect petition, asserting the child was now with a safe caregiver and no longer at risk. The District Court for Arapahoe County granted the dismissal, terminated its jurisdiction over the child, and found the father’s request for review moot. The father appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the dismissal was not a final, appealable order since it did not determine the merits of the petition and the department was the sole authority to prosecute such cases.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that, under these circumstances, the dismissal order was a final, appealable order. The dismissal and the termination of jurisdiction effectively made the temporary custody order permanent, depriving the father of parental rights and preventing further proceedings regarding the child’s placement. Because the dismissal adversely affected the father's fundamental rights and locked in the change of custody, the court concluded it was appealable. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "T.L.P. v. People" on Justia Law

A mother and father, following their divorce, entered into a memorandum of understanding regarding parenting time with their young child. This agreement was approved by the district court and became part of the final divorce decree, allocating 205 overnights per year to the mother and 160 to the father. Less than eighteen months later, the father’s work schedule changed, requiring frequent overnight absences more than 100 miles from the child’s primary residence. The father moved to modify the parenting time to accommodate his new schedule, proposing a change that would maintain his total number of overnights. The mother objected but suggested an alternative adjustment. After a hearing, the district court modified the schedule, ultimately reducing the father’s parenting time by 45 overnights per year—a 28.1% reduction—without eliminating his parenting time or imposing new qualitative constraints.The father appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, arguing that this substantial reduction should be considered a restriction of parenting time, requiring the court to find that his parenting time would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development before making such a change. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that only the elimination of parenting time or the imposition of qualitative constraints (such as supervision or restrictions on location or overnight visits) constitutes a restriction triggering the heightened standard.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that a purely quantitative reduction in parenting time, however substantial, is a modification, not a restriction, unless it reduces parenting time to zero or imposes qualitative constraints on how parenting time is exercised. Therefore, the district court properly applied the best-interests-of-the-child standard rather than the endanger/impair standard. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Dale" on Justia Law

Brandon and Amanda Sullivan, the biological parents of three young children, passed away, leaving the children in the care of Amanda's parents, Suzanne and August Nicolas. The Nicolases were appointed as the children's emergency and then permanent guardians. Subsequently, they adopted the children. After the adoption, Brandon's parents, Jayne Mecque and Daniel Francis Sullivan, sought and were granted grandparent visitation rights. The Nicolases later moved to vacate this visitation order, arguing that the Sullivans lacked standing to seek visitation post-adoption.The domestic relations court denied the Nicolases' motion, finding that the Sullivans had standing to seek grandparent visitation. The Nicolases appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Sullivans retained their standing to seek visitation despite the adoption. The Nicolases then sought review from the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and determined that under section 19-1-103(70)(a), C.R.S. (2021), grandparent standing is limited to those who are currently the parents of a child's father or mother. The court held that following an adoption, the parents of a child's former mother or father are no longer considered "grandparents" under the statute. Therefore, the Sullivans lacked standing to seek grandparent visitation after the Nicolases adopted the children. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re The Parental Responsibilities Concerning Children K.M.S." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between ex-spouses Amanda Wynell Conners and Andrew Brian Conners over child support payments. The mother filed a motion for contempt of court, alleging that the father had not made the required payments. The district court issued a citation to show cause, and after unsuccessful attempts to personally serve the father, the mother requested permission to serve the contempt materials via email.The district court allowed the email service, which the father contested, arguing that it was inconsistent with the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, which governs contempt proceedings in civil cases. The father then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, challenging the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, as amended in 1995, does not permit a party to serve process for indirect contempt by email. The court further held that substituted service under Rule 4(f) is not permitted in contempt proceedings. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court clarified that Rule 107 governs all contempt proceedings, whether punitive or remedial, that arise out of an underlying case that is civil in nature. The court also held that email service does not satisfy Rule 107(c)’s requirements for physical service directly on the specific individual accused of contempt without any intermediate intervention. View "In Re the Marriage of Conners" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the dissolution of a marriage between Barbara Henderson Green and Jeffry Howard Green. The couple was married in Connecticut in 1982 and lived in Nebraska for most of their marriage. In 2018, Mrs. Green moved to Colorado to assist their pregnant daughter, while Mr. Green remained in Nebraska. The Greens purchased two houses in Denver, one for themselves and one for their daughter. Mr. Green financially supported Mrs. Green from Nebraska and listed one of the Denver houses as an asset on his personal financial statements. In 2021, Mr. Green took out a loan secured by a mortgage on their Denver house, stating that his Nebraska home was his former residence and the Denver house was his primary residence. However, he continued to live in Nebraska. In 2022, both Mr. and Mrs. Green filed for divorce in separate jurisdictions—Mrs. Green in Colorado and Mr. Green in Nebraska.The Colorado trial court found that Mr. Green had the requisite minimum contacts to be subject to general personal jurisdiction in Colorado. This decision was largely based on Mr. Green's assertion that the Denver house was his primary residence when he applied for a loan. The court concluded that Mr. Green's continuing financial obligations in Colorado meant that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there, and thus it denied his motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reviewed the case and held that for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over an individual, the individual must be domiciled within the state. The court found that Mr. Green was not domiciled in Colorado and therefore was not subject to general personal jurisdiction there. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re the Marriage of Green" on Justia Law

The Washington County Department of Human Services (“WCDHS”) and the Board of County Commissioners of Washington County (“the Board”)—collectively, Washington County, contended a Colorado district court erred when it failed to adhere to Colorado v. Madera, 112 P.3d 688 (Colo. 2005) in granting Father’s request for an in camera review of documents that were allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district court and Father countered that Madera was inapposite and that the challenged ruling was free of error because it is consistent with the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Alcon v. Spicer, 113 P.3d 735 (Colo. 2005). The issue this case presented was whether Madera or Alcon, issued six days apart in the spring of 2005, controlled in this case. Here, in response to a subpoena duces tecum served by Father, Washington County provided a privilege log listing documents allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege. After reviewing the log, Father insisted the privilege did not apply, and the parties were unable to resolve their dispute informally. Consequently, Father asked the district court to conduct an in camera inspection of the documents identified in the log. Because the log provided vague descriptions of the withheld documents, the district court could not assess Washington County’s claim of privilege. It thus granted Father’s request for an in camera review. In doing so, the district court neither made Madera’s required findings nor employed Madera’s analytical framework. Washington County argued the district court’s failure to conform to Madera rendered the in camera order faulty. But the district court and Father responded that Madera didn't apply. Instead, they maintained, Alcon applied. The Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly followed Alcon, not Madera, in this case. And the Court further concluded that, consistent with Alcon, the court correctly granted Father’s request for an in camera review because Washington County’s log did not permit an assessment of the claim of privilege. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re Colorado in interest of children and concerning J.L.M. and J.P." on Justia Law

A-J.A.B. tested positive at birth for methamphetamine. H.J.B. (“Mother”) admitted methamphetamine use during her pregnancy. In March 2020, less than a month after A-J.A.B.’s birth, the Adams County Human Services Department (“the Department”) filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning A-J.A.B. The Department’s petition noted that it had no information indicating that A-J.A.B. was an Indian child or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe, although the petition did not identify what efforts, if any, the Department took to determine whether A-J.A.B. was an Indian child. At the shelter hearing, Mother’s counsel informed the court that Mother may have “some Cherokee and Lakota Sioux [heritage] through [A-J.A.B.’s maternal great-grandmother].” However, Mother was uncertain if anyone in her family was actually registered with a tribe and acknowledged that she “probably [wouldn’t] qualify” for any tribal membership herself. The juvenile court ordered Mother to “fill out the ICWA paperwork,” but the court did not direct the Department to exercise its due diligence obligation under section 19-1-126(3). At the next hearing, Mother, who had not filled out the ICWA paperwork, again stated that she had “Native American heritage” through A-J.A.B.’s maternal great-grandmother. Because of these assertions, the juvenile court found that the case “‘may’ be an ICWA case.” By December 2020, the Department moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights. At the pretrial conference, Mother’s attorney informed the court that she spoke with A-J.A.B.’s maternal grandmother, who stated that she “thought that the heritage may be Lakota.” Mother’s attorney told the court “it doesn’t sound like there’s a reason to believe that ICWA would apply” and acknowledged that neither Mother nor A-J.A.B. were enrolled members of any tribe. The juvenile court subsequently concluded that “there [was] no reason to believe that this case [was] governed by [ICWA].” The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred in finding that ICWA did not apply because the court had a reason to know that A-J.A.B. was an Indian child. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the Department satisfied its statutory due diligence obligation under section19-1-126(3), and affirmed in different grounds. View "Colorado in interest of H.J.B." on Justia Law

G.L.A. (“Mother”) brought L.S., who was one year old at the time, to the hospital for medical treatment. Hospital staff conducted a skeletal survey, which revealed that L.S. had a broken tibia; two additional fractures that were healing; severe bruising and swelling to his groin; and significant bruising on his back, face, and genitals. The hospital sent a referral to the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services, and the state filed a petition for dependent or neglected children in district court, alleging that Mother had physically abused L.S. The district court adjudicated L.S. dependent or neglected. About a month later, the court found that an appropriate treatment plan couldn’t be devised for Mother based on L.S.’s serious bodily injury(“SBI”), and Mother appealed. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the State satisfies its burden of proving that an appropriate treatment plan can’t be devised for a respondent parent in a dependency and neglect case when the State establishes by a preponderance of evidence a single incident resulting in serious bodily injury to the child. To this, the Court concluded that it did: the district court erred by imposing a clear and convincing burden of proof on the State at the dispositional hearing. Because there was no dispute L.S. sustained a serious bodily injury, the district court’s order granting Mother’s motion for directed verdict was reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "In Re Colorado in the interest of L.S." on Justia Law

In a dependency and neglect case, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether respondent R.B.’s (“Father’s”) due process rights were violated when a juvenile court denied his request for a continuance of a parental-rights termination hearing. Although his counsel was present, technical difficulties prevented Father’s virtual attendance at the hearing. Because Father failed to show actual prejudice, the Supreme Court concluded his claim fails. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, vacated its opinion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "People in interest of Minor Child E.B." on Justia Law