Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether accrued vacation and sick leave may be considered marital property subject to division under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA). The trial court entered an order dividing the value of the husband's accrued vacation and sick leave as part of the marital estate. The husband appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that where a spouse has an enforceable right to be paid for accrued vacation or sick leave, such leave earned during the marriage is marital property for the purposes of the UDMA. Where the value of the leave can be ascertained at the time of dissolution, a trial court should consider such value when equitably dividing the marital estate. In this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in considering the value of the husband's accrued leave because no competent evidence was presented to establish he had an enforceable right to payment for such leave. View "In re the Marriage of Cardona and Castro" on Justia Law

The Denver Department of Human Services placed "A.C." in foster care when he was two days old. Before his first birthday, the juvenile court terminated his biological parents' rights, which made him available for adoption. The issue in this case centered on whether the prospective adoptive parents' due process rights were violated when the Department removed the child from their home without prior notice. At the time of the removal, the prospective parents had not yet initiated the adoption process. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that preadoptive foster patents do not possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest, and therefore, no due process violation occurred. View "M.S. v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court stemmed from a dependency and neglect case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of the father's parental rights and reversed the termination of the mother's parental rights on grounds that the trial court erred in allowing the foster parents to intervene and participate fully in the termination hearing. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court construed C.R.S. section 19-3-507(5)(a) and concluded that foster parents who properly intervened are afforded the same degree of participation as all other parties at a termination hearing. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the parents' due process rights are not impacted by the participation of the foster parents who properly intervene. View "A.M. v. A.C." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether foster parents who intervene in a dependency and neglect action possess limited rights to participate in a hearing on a motion to terminate parental rights. The Court construed C.R.S. 19-3-507(5)(a) and concluded that foster parents who have properly intervened are afforded the same degree of participation as all other parties at a termination hearing. Furthermore, the Court concluded that parents' due process rights are not impacted by the full participation of foster parents in the termination hearing. View "A.M. v. A.C." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Colorado law recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege between a guardian ad litem and a minor child with respect to a dependency and neglect proceeding. The Court held that a guardian ad litem holds a minor child's psychotherapist-patient privilege when: (1) the child is too young or otherwise incompetent to hold the privilege; (2) the child's interests are adverse to those of his or her parent(s); and (3) section 19-3-311 C.R.S. (2012) does not abrogate the privilege. In this case, the Court found that the guardian ad litem partially waived the child's privilege when she disseminated a letter from the child's therapist to the juvenile court and to all parties. The Court remanded the case to the juvenile court for a determination of the scope of that waiver. View "L.A.N. et al. v. L.M.B." on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, Mother sought review of an order of the district court determining that it had jurisdiction to enter initial orders in a dispute concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities for Child. The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause to decide whether the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction to make initial child custody determinations in this matter based on the parties' intent to indefinitely change their residence to Colorado rather than based on the analysis required under the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order, holding that the court applied the incorrect legal standard when it concluded that jurisdiction was proper in Colorado and, rather, should have applied the jurisdictional test required under the UCCJEA. View "In re Madrone" on Justia Law

This original proceeding before the Supreme Court arose from a divorce and parenting case in its third year of post-dissolution decree litigation. Mother's petition challenged the district court's summary denial of her motion for a protective order and sanctions concerning the acquisition by Father's attorney of Mother's entire employment file from Mother's former employer by subpoena. The Court accepted jurisdiction to determine whether Father's attorney violated C.R.C.P. 45 when she made arrangements with Mother's former employer for the production of Mother's employment file without Mother's consent and before Mother had notice of the existence of the subpoena. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "[The Court] interpret[ed] Rule 45 to require that, unless the subpoenaed witness and other parties consent to an alternate arrangement or by other court order, subpoenaed documents are to be produced only at the deposition, hearing, or trial specified in the subpoena and hold that the conduct of Father's attorney in this case violated Rule 45." Furthermore, the Court held that Father's attorney frustrated the purpose of Rule 45 by depriving Mother of the opportunity to object to the subpoena before the documents were produced. The Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions that Father and Father's attorney identify and recover, and then return or destroy all physical and electronic copies of the documents produced by Mother's former employer pursuant to the subpoena issued by Father's attorney, including Mother's entire employment file. The Court also directed the trial court to determine whether sanctions should be awarded to Mother against Father's attorney for the rule violation. View "In re Marriage of Wiggins" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court came from an unpublished opinion by the court of appeals reversing the trial court's allocation of primary parental responsibilities to the half-sister of a minor child on grounds that the sister lacked standing to petition for an allocation of parental responsibilities. The court of appeals construed sections14-10-123(1)(b) and (1)(c), C.R.S. (2011), as requiring that, in order to establish standing to petition for an allocation of parental responsibilities, a nonparent must show that the child's parents voluntarily permitted the nonparent to assume responsibility for or share in the child's care. The Court held that parental consent is not required for nonparent standing. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of the remaining issues raised on appeal. View "In the Interest of Child: B.B.O." on Justia Law

Acting on a petition filed by the child's father, the Arapahoe County District Court assumed jurisdiction to modify a Maryland child custody order on the grounds that neither the child nor the child's parents "currently resided" in Maryland. Petitioner George Brandt and his child lived in Colorado, and Respondent Christine Brandt lived in Texas. Respondent sought relief from the Colorado court order. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the district court failed to apply the appropriate standard of review when assuming jurisdiction to modify the Maryland child custody order. The operative statutory term "presently reside" is not equivalent to "currently reside" or "physical presence." Accordingly, the Court reversed and vacated the district court's order assuming jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Brandt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed a judge disqualification issue raised by the appellate court's decision to reverse and remand an order that terminated the parental rights of Respondent, C.M. (Mother). In its review of the termination hearing, the court of appeals held that the trial judge should have recused himself on the grounds that his clerk was the mother of a material witness in the case. Although the court of appeals held that the judge should have been disqualified, Mother’s lateness in filing the motion for disqualification prompted the court to conclude that Mother may have waived her right to move for disqualification. According to the court of appeals, the question of whether Mother had waived the disqualification issue turned on whether her counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file the motion for disqualification. Reasoning that Mother could not be bound by waiver if she had in fact received ineffective assistance of counsel, the court of appeals remanded for additional findings about counsel’s performance. The court then directed the chief judge of the district to transfer the case to himself or to a senior judge for the proceedings on remand. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and vacated the transfer: "[w]ithout deciding what is required to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the supreme court acknowledges that, at the least, an allegation of prejudice is necessary. Moreover, the court holds that when an ineffective assistance claim is premised on counsel’s failure to file a motion for disqualification, the prejudice element cannot be satisfied without an allegation that the judge was actually biased. Because the respondent’s motion for disqualification was entirely based on an appearance of impropriety, rather than a claim of actual bias, it failed to satisfy the prejudice element." The Court held that Mother's motion was untimely and should not have been granted. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado ex rel. A.G" on Justia Law