Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was Election Rule 10.7.5, promulgated as a temporary or emergency rule on the evening of the November 5, 2013 election. Plaintiffs were registered electors of the Adams 12 Five Star School District who sued seeking judicial review of the Secretary of State's authority to promulgate the rule, and for an order to direct the Clerk and Recorder of Adams County to finish counting votes and to certify the vote tally for all candidates in the school district director election. The district court ruled that the Secretary acted in excess of his authority in promulgating the emergency rule, and ordered all defendants to complete and certify the vote count for all candidates in the Adams 12 director district 4 election. The Secretary petitioned the Supreme Court for review of whether the district court erred in holding "Rule 10.7.5 [was] contrary to and in conflict with existing election statutes." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rule 10.7.5 indeed "contravene[d] the election code by permitting a designated election official to usurp the courts' express authority to resolve . . . issues." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court only in holding that Rule 10.7.5 conflicted with existing election rules. View "Hanlen v. Gessler" on Justia Law

The Colorado Division of Insurance initiated an investigation into Milton Trujillo's application to renew as a insurance producer license with bail bond authority. It later denied the application based on a complaint it received. The Division charged Trujillo with twelve counts of violating the insurance code, professions and occupations code, and Division regulations. The ALJ revoked the license; the Commissioner of Insurance adopted the ALJ's decision. The court of appeals affirmed the Commissioner's action, determining that Trujillo violated a fiduciary duty prescribed by 10-2-704(a). The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals erred in applying section 10-2-704(1)(a) to this case: "[w]hile there are unappealed findings of fact upon which the Commissioner on remand could uphold the sanction it ordered, it is not clear [to the Court] whether, absent the agency's construction of 10-2-704(1)(a), the Commissioner would have exercised his authority to revoke Trujillo's license and deny his renewal application." The case was therefore remanded for redetermination by the Commissioner the appropriate sanction for Trujillo's conduct. View "Trujillo v. Colorado Division of Insurance" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of first impression: whether a proposed amendment to the fire department's disciplinary system was subject to collective bargaining under the Charter of the City and County of Denver. Upon review of the Charter, and construing its plain language as a "harmonious and sensible whole," the Supreme Court concluded that Denver had the authority to both draft and implement disciplinary rules, and that that authority was not limited by the firefighters' right to collectively bargain. The court of appeals held that discipline was a term and condition of employment under the Charter and not subject to collective bargaining. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "City & County of Denver v. Denver Firefighters" on Justia Law

Following an election recount in the Town of Center, Maurice Jones and Citizen Center filed suit seeking to set aside the results of the recount. Jones argued that voters' right to ballot secrecy had been violated. The district court set aside the results and ordered a new recall election. The three officials who had been elected in the recall petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the district court's decision. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred as a matter of law in setting aside the recall results and ordering a new election. As such, the Court reversed the district court and enter judgment in favor of the newly elected officials. View "In re Jones v. Samora" on Justia Law

This case centered on the contested March 19, 2013 election in Center, Colorado. The district court set aside the results of the recall, ordered a new recall election, and allowed the recalled officials to continue until the new election was conducted. The recalled officials challenged the district court's decision, arguing that court erred in setting aside the recall and ordering a new election, and erred in determining that there were flaws in how the votes were counted. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law in setting aside the recall and ordering a new recall election. Accordingly, the Court returned the case back to the district court with directions that judgment be entered that the replacement officials were duly elected. View "In re Jones v. Samora" on Justia Law

Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. appealed the appellate court's decision to reverse an Industrial Claim Appeals Office decision disallowing respondent Elaine Loofbourrow's award of temporary disability benefits. The ICAO concluded that once respondent's treating physician placed her at maximum medical improvement, temporary total disability benefits could not be awarded for the injury for which she was initially treated. The appellate court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, such an independent medical exam was not a prerequisite to temporary total disability benefits. After its review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court was correct in its decision: because a determination of maximum medical improvement has no statutory significance with regard to injuries resulting in loss of no more than three days (or shifts) of work time, respondent's award of temporary total disability benefits was not barred by her failure to first seek a division-sponsored independent medical examination. View "Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. v. Loofbourrow" on Justia Law

A Jefferson County Sheriff Deputy was transporting two juveniles from a court hearing. The two were seated in the rear of the transport van, handcuffed. En route, another driver allegedly turned into an intersection without yielding and collided with the transport van. As a result of the collision, the juveniles sustained multiple injuries. The juveniles sued the County, alleging the deputy transporting them was negligent. The County claimed it was immune from suit. The trial court denied the County's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. Upon review of the County's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in finding allegations of negligence alone were sufficient to overcome the statutory grant of immunity and the presumption of good faith afforded to law enforcement. The Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Young v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

The parties appealed the water court's decision that holdover directors of a water conservancy district could not continue to act on behalf of the district a year after the expiration of their term. The Supreme Court held that the holdover provision in the Water Conservancy Act allowed for a holdover director to continue to serve as a de jure officer, and did not impose a temporal limit on that director's authority to act on behalf of the district. View "Yellow Jacket Water Conservancy District v. Livingston" on Justia Law

This case was an appeal of a final water court order which voided a rule promulgated by the Office of the State Engineer regarding nontributary ground water extracted in the course of coalbed methane (CBM) production and other oil and gas development. The final rules were challenged by owners of vested water rights and citizen groups whose members owned vested water rights. After extensive briefing by the parties, the water court upheld the Final Rules in their entirety except for the "Fruitland Rule," which it invalidated. The water court held that although H.B. 1303 granted authority to the State Engineer to promulgate the Fruitland Rule, the Tribal Rule essentially divested the State Engineer of that authority. The water court also found that the State Engineer had issued an improper "advisory" rule, and thus could not promulgate the Fruitland Rule unless he first obtained a judicial determination of his authority over nontributary ground water underlying the Reservation. The State Engineer, the Tribe, and several Intervenors appealed the water court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule based on the Tribal Rule. The Court concluded the Tribal Rule did not divest the State Engineer of this authority: it stated on its face that the Final Rules themselves do not form the basis of or "establish" the State Engineer's authority to administer the nontributary ground water within Reservation boundaries. Because the Tribal Rule did not divest the State Engineer of his authority, the water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule on that ground. Furthermore, the water court also erred in labeling the Fruitland Rule an "advisory" rule and in requiring the State Engineer to obtain a judicial determination that he had authority to administer nontributary ground water within the boundaries of the Reservation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the water court’s invalidation of the Fruitland Rule and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dick Wolfe v. Pawnee Well Users, Inc." on Justia Law

In June 2013, in Pueblo and El Paso County citizens certified petitions to recall State Senator Angela Giron and State Senator John Morse. A month later, the Governor set a September 10 recall election for both Senate seats. This recall election was the first in Colorado's history for members of the General Assembly. The Governor then submitted an Interrogatory to the Supreme Court pursuant to Article VI, section 3,of the Colorado Constitution to ask whether the prior participation requirement in Article XXI, section 3, of the Colorado Constitution conflicted with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Colorado Court issued an Order holding that the prior participation requirement in Article XXI, section 3, conflicted with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. View "In re Interrogatory Propounded by Governor Hickenlooper" on Justia Law