Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After years of unsuccessful negotiation and several years of contentious litigation, this case came before the Colorado Supreme Court to resolve a dispute over the placement of an irrigation ditch and maintenance obligations related to that ditch. Instead of proceeding as a straightforward determination of these issues under the standards established in Roaring Fork Club v. St. Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2001), the case was made complex by plaintiffs’ repeated assertions of unsubstantiated factual allegations and multiple legal claims lacking substantial justification. In the end, after ruling against plaintiffs on the merits, the water court took the rare step of awarding attorney fees to defendants because of the “frivolous, vexatious, and litigious” nature of many of the plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the water court lacked jurisdiction over the case, notwithstanding their vigorous assertion the court did have jurisdiction throughout proceedings at the trial level. Further, plaintiffs argued the water court made numerous errors on the merits of the case. Reviewing these arguments, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the water court did have jurisdiction to hear this case; (2) the court’s conclusions on the merits of the various claims were correct; and (3) the court’s decision to award attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court. View "Glover v. Resource Land Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding filed to the Colorado Supreme Court, at issue were the final legislative redistricting plans for the Colorado Senate and House of Representatives, adopted and submitted to the Court by the Colorado Independent Legislative Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”). Under article V, section 48.3, the Court's jurisdiction was limited to whether the Plans complied with the criteria listed in section 48.1 of article V, and the Court had to approve those Plans unless the it concluded the Commission abused its discretion in applying or failing to apply those criteria in light of the record before it. Finding no such abuse of discretion here, the Colorado Court approved the Plans and ordered the Commission to file those Plans with the Colorado Secretary of State as required by article V, section 48.3(5). View "In re Colo. Indep. Legis. Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the state's final congressional redistricting plan adopted by the Colorado Independent Congressional Redistricting Commission pursuant to article V, section 44.5 of the Colorado Constitution. The Court concluded the Commission did not abuse its discretion in applying the criteria in article V, section 44.3 in adopting the Plan on the record before it. The Court therefore approved the Plan for Colorado’s congressional districts for the ensuing decade, and ordered the Commission to file the Plan with the Colorado Secretary of State no later than December 15, 2021, as required by article V, section 44.5(5). View "In re Colo. Indep. Cong. Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was a district court’s order requiring the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office (“EPCSO”) to give Regina Sprinkle access to internal investigation files about two of its deputies. EPCSO asked the Supreme Court to vacate the order and remand with instructions to quash the subpoena duces tecum (“SDT”) that prompted this action. The Court declined to do so, concluding the district court properly exercised its subject matter jurisdiction in resolving this controversy through a hearing to show cause, as provided under the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act (“CCJRA”), section 24-72-303, C.R.S. (2020), and correctly interpreted the CCJRA as requiring release of the records. View "In re Colorado v. Sprinkle" on Justia Law

In 2018, Colorado voters Amendments Y and Z to the state constitution that vested the authority to draw congressional and legislative districts with new, independent commissions made up of ordinary voters. The Amendments laid out instructions for how the commissions should draw district maps, including criteria to be considered in determining boundaries and detailed timetables that require public feedback and judicial review of the final plans. The cascading deadlines set out in Amendments Y and Z were based on an assumption that the United States Census Bureau would release its decennial census data in a timely fashion, as required by federal law. Delays caused by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, however, mean that the Census Bureau was operating months behind schedule and did not yet to release crucial redistricting data to which the redistricting commissions expected to already have access. This delay has thrown into question the feasibility of complying with the timelines established by Amendments Y and Z. To address the resulting uncertainty, the General Assembly introduced Senate Bill 21-247 (“SB 21-247”). Among other things, the bill would amend a recently enacted statutory definition of “necessary census data” to allow the commissions’ work to move forward based on preliminary census data and any other state or federal demographic data the commissions see fit to consult. The General Assembly petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and answer two interrogatories about Amendments Y and Z. The Court determined the Amendments did not require the exclusive use of final census data as the commissions and their nonpartisan staff begin their work; the commissions wer thus free to consult other reliable sources of population data, such as preliminary census data and interim data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. However, the Court determined the General Assembly did not have the power to compel the independent commissions or their nonpartisan staff to consider a particular source of population data or take any action beyond what Amendments Y and Z already required. “The Amendments were expressly intended to remove the General Assembly from the redistricting process, instead vesting all authority to draw district maps with independent commissions. Under this new scheme, the General Assembly has a discrete and limited role in appropriating funds for the commissions and nominating a limited number of applicants for consideration as commission members.” View "In re Interrogatories on Senate Bill 21-247 Submitted by the Colorado General Assembly" on Justia Law

In the spring of 2015, a severe three-day storm deluged an eastern Colorado area with over six inches of rain. Two inches of water fell within thirty minutes on the first day, “a once-in-a-half-century occurrence.” During the storm, a mixture of wastewater and rainwater overflowed from one of the wastewater containment ponds in a cattle feedlot operated by 5 Star Feedlot, Inc. (“5 Star”). That water crossed several miles of land and ultimately found its way to the South Fork of the Republican River, killing an estimated 15,000 fish and giving rise to this litigation. Pursuant to section 33-6-110(1), C.R.S. (2020), the State initiated a civil action against 5 Star seeking to recover the value of the deceased fish based on 5 Star’s alleged violation of three predicate statutory provisions (“taking statutory provisions”) which, with some exceptions not pertinent here, made it unlawful for any person to “take” (i.e., to kill or otherwise acquire possession of or control over) certain wildlife. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The district court denied 5 Star’s motion, granted the State’s motion, and, following a bench trial on damages, ordered 5 Star to pay the State $625,755. 5 Star then appealed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the taking statutory provisions required the State to prove that 5 Star acted knowingly or, at minimum, performed an unlawful voluntary act. To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concurred, finding the district court erred both in entering summary judgment against 5 Star and in denying 5 Star’s cross- motion. “Since the State failed to formally allege, never mind present proof, that 5 Star’s lawful, years-long operation of wastewater containment ponds killed or otherwise acquired possession of or control over the fish, it could not satisfy the voluntary act or actus reus requirement of the taking statutory provisions.” View "Dep't of Nat. Res. v. 5 Star Feedlot, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether uploading the text of a bill to multiple computers and using automated software to simultaneously give voice to different portions of the bill at a speed of about 650 words per minute, complied with the the Colorado Constitution, article V, section 22: “Every bill shall be read by title when introduced, and at length on two different days in each house; provided, however, any reading at length may be dispensed with upon unanimous consent of the members present.” The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the software solution was not constitutional: "There are unquestionably different ways by which the legislature may comply with the reading requirement. But the cacophony generated by the computers here isn’t one of them. And while we have no business dictating the specifics of how the legislature might comply with the reading requirement, it is our prerogative and responsibility to declare that the legislature did not comply with that requirement in this case." The Court concurred with the district court's determination that the "unintelligible" sounds produced by the computers did not fulfill the reading requirement. But the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part because it concluded it was not within the district court's domain to dictate the form or manner by which the legislature may comply with the reading requirement. "By prescribing how the legislature must comply with the reading requirement, the district court trespassed upon the separation-of-powers tenet so essential to our constitutional system of government." View "Markwell v. Cooke" on Justia Law

In a case brought in the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, Governor Jared Polis sought a declaration he was not a proper named defendant in a suit challenging the implementation of Colorado law and policy by the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”), an executive agency over which he had ultimate authority. The underlying suit challenged the treatment of transgender women in CDOC custody. The named plaintiffs representing the class were seven transgender women who were confined in CDOC correctional facilities. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint named the Governor, the CDOC, the CDOC Executive Director, and multiple current and former CDOC employees as defendants. The amended complaint alleged Defendants’ policies and practices discriminated against transgender women by refusing to recognize them as women and thus subjecting them to unreasonable risks of violence, failing to provide necessary accommodations, and offering inadequate medical and mental health care. The Governor argued that after the Supreme Court's decision in Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008), he should have no longer been named as a defendant if there was an identifiable agency, official, or employee responsible for administering a challenged law. Here, he argued the CDOC and its employees were the only appropriate defendants. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed: Developmental Pathways did not alter the longstanding rule that the Governor was an appropriate defendant in cases involving “his constitutional responsibility to uphold the laws of the state and to oversee Colorado’s executive agencies.” View "In re Raven v. Polis" on Justia Law

The water court that issued the decision at the heart of this appeal conducted a four-day trial with thousands of pages of exhibits and testimony of experts to decide the meaning of a decree finalized in April 1933. The court "seized" upon a 1936 photograph to declare the decree ambiguous. To cure the ambiguity, the court consulted additional evidence extrinsic to the original proceedings. Ultimately, the court found the water was decreed to a ditch at issue in the appeal. The parties challenged the water court's reliance on the 1936 photograph and extrinsic evidence. After review of the water court's order, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, finding that there existed a conflict in Colorado case law as to which materials a court could rely on to decide whether a decree of water rights was ambiguous. "While future litigation may require us to reconcile these cases . . . [e]ach method leads to the same result here: The creek water at issue is not decreed to the ditch." Since the photograph was extrinsic to the proceedings that birthed the decree, the water court erred by relying on it to characterize the decree as ambiguous. "Under any of the three interpretive approaches, evidence extrinsic to the underlying proceedings is admissible only after a finding of ambiguity, not to create the ambiguity." View "Mike & Jim Kruse P'ship v. Cotten" on Justia Law

Between the date he was hired and June 2015, Mark Stiles had some difficulties with punctuality and managing his paid leave balance, but he was never subject to corrective or disciplinary action and his evaluations consistently rated him as a competent Department of Corrections ("DOC") employee. Stiles was fired by the DOC for using marijuana outside of work hours. After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) acting on behalf of the Colorado State Personnel Board issued an initial decision reinstating Stiles and imposing a less severe sanction. The Board then adopted that initial decision, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed the Board’s ruling. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed to take DOC’s appeal in the hopes of shedding light on the standard of review that governed an appeal to the Board by a certified state employee following an appointing authority’s disciplinary action. The Supreme Court held that, while an ALJ conducting a hearing on behalf of the Board must afford the disciplined employee an opportunity to present evidence and must then make findings of fact, the ALJ’s review of the appointing authority’s disciplinary action was governed by the statutorily mandated “arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to rule or law” standard, not de novo review. Because the appellate division misapprehended the standard of review that controlled hearings held by or on behalf of the Board, and because the Supreme Court couldn't discern whether the ALJ applied the arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to rule or law standard or de novo review, the Court reversed the division’s judgment and remand with instructions to return the case to the ALJ for further proceedings. View "DOC v. Stiles" on Justia Law