Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider an issue of first impression: whether under the state premises liability statute, the attractive nuisance doctrine applied only to trespassing children but not to licensees or invitees. The Court held that the doctrine permits all children, regardless of classification, to bring a claim for attractive nuisance. This case was remanded for the trial court to consider the merits of the plaintiff's attractive nuisance claim. View "S.W. ex rel. Wacker v. Towers Boat Club, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court considered a reformulated certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: whether Colorado’s premises liability statute applied as a matter of law only to activities and circumstances directly or inherently are related to the land. The Supreme Court held that the statute is not restricted solely to activities and circumstances that are directly or inherently related to the land. Instead, the Court held that the premises liability statute applied to conditions, activities, and circumstances on the property that the landowner is liable for in its legal capacity as a landowner. View "Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P." on Justia Law

In a case involving breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of trade secrets claims, the plaintiffs sought to inspect personal and business computers, smartphones, and other electronic storage devices belonging to the lead defendant and his wife, who was not a party to the case. The plaintiffs also requested discovery of approximately three years of the defendants' telephone records. After the defendants refused to permit the inspection the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel. Over the defendants' objection on privacy grounds and in a brief order concerning this and other discovery matters, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion and ordered the defendants to permit inspection of the requested items and records. The trial court also awarded attorneys' fees associated with the discovery dispute to the plaintiffs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a motion to compel discovery without making findings of fact balancing defendants' asserted privacy interest with plaintiffs' need for the information sought. Accordingly, the Court vacated the portion of the trial court's order compelling the discovery, and remanded the case to the trial court. View "In re Gateway Logistics, Inc. v. Smay" on Justia Law

Steven Pham represented the estate of a driver of a car involved in a traffic accident. He appealed (along with the driver's parents and the five passengers in the car at the time of the accident) the court of appeals' judgment which affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurer, State Farm, on the grounds that plaintiffs' claims were bound by the statute of limitations governing underinsured motorist claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs failed to file their action or demand arbitration of their underinsured motorist claims within either three years of the accrual of their cause or within two years after receiving payment of a settlement or judgment on an underlying bodily injury liability claim preserved as prescribed by the applicable statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Pham v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Respondents Christopher Roinestad and Gerald Fitz-Gerald were overcome by poisonous gases while cleaning a grease clog in a sewer near the Hog's Breath Saloon & Restaurant. The district court concluded that Hog's Breath caused respondents' injuries by dumping substantial amounts of cooking grease into the sewer thereby creating the clog and consequent build up of the gas. On summary judgment, the district court found the saloon liable under theories of negligence and off-premises liability and granted respondents damages. The saloon carried a commercial general liability policy issued by Petitioner Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company which sought a ruling it had no duty to indemnify Hog's Breath. The district court agreed that under the terms of the policy, the insurer had no duty under a pollution exclusion clause. The appellate court reversed the ruling in favor of the insurer, finding the pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous and that its application to cooking grease (a common waste product) could lead to absurd results and negate essential coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the saloon released enough grease to amount to a discharge of a pollutant, and that the insurance policy pollution exclusion clause barred coverage in this case. View "Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company v. Roinestad" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court court ordered a new trial for a man who sued after he was hit by a car that skidded across an icy patch in the road near Telluride in 2004. The jury ruled in favor of Michael Johnson, who skidded into a car driven by Richard Bedor. Bedor was injured and filed a negligence lawsuit. The Supreme Court concluded jurors may have been confused after they were told a person confronted by a sudden emergency could be expected to respond normally. The Court abolished the "sudden emergency" doctrine entirely, saying the potential to mislead a jury outweighed the benefits. View "Bedor v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a trial court's order striking the testimony of plaintiff's rebuttal expert witness, and portions of two of plaintiff's previously disclosed expert witnesses. The underlying case centered on a medical malpractice claim brought by the parents of a minor child against a hospital, its management and the doctor that delivered the child. The minor was allegedly injured at birth after his umbilical cord wrapped around his neck, depriving his brain of oxygen. The parties disputed the cause of the child's injuries: Plaintiffs argued the child was injured by preventable intrapartum events (namely Defendants' alleged negligence); defendants argued the injuries occurred days, or possibly weeks prior to birth. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded plaintiff's expert's rebuttal testimony because her testimony properly refuted a central theory of the defendants' case. The trial court also abused its discretion when it excluded the disclosed experts' testimony because the late disclosure of their testimony did not harm the defendants, as required for sanctions under Rule 37. Accordingly, the Court made the rule absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Warden v. Exempla" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued General Steel, Discount Steel, and those companies' presidents for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy, based on their filing an arbitration complaint against him. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by (1) refusing to include additional elements reflecting the heightened standard in Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court (POME) in the jury instruction for Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims; and (2) trebling an exemplary damages award against Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) POME does not apply where, as here, the underlying alleged petitioning activity was the filing of an arbitration complaint that led to a purely private dispute; (2) therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to include additional elements reflecting POME's heightened standard in the jury instruction for Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims; and (3) the trial court did not err by trebling the exemplary damages award against Defendants. View "Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Bacheller" on Justia Law

Judith Koenig rented a car from a car rental company and was involved in an accident. PurCo sued Koenig to collect damages related to the incident, including damages for loss of the vehicle's use during the time it was being repaired. PurCo sought to measure loss of use damages by using the reasonable rental value of a substitute vehicle. Koenig filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted, holding that PurCo could prevail on its loss of use damages claim only if it suffered actual lost profits. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment ruling and remanded the case. It agreed with the trial court's conclusion that, in general, the appropriate measure of loss of use damages in a commercial setting is actual lost profits, but concluded the rental agreement in this case altered the measure of loss of use damages and held that PurCo was required to show certain loss prerequisites. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals judgment on different grounds, holding that loss of use damages in a commercial setting may be measured either by actual lost profits or by reasonable rental value. PurCo was entitled to recover loss of use damages irrespective of its actual lost profits. Accordingly, this case was remanded for calculation of the reasonable rental value of a substitute vehicle. View "Koenig v. PurCo Fleet Services, Inc." on Justia Law

An overhead garage door struck Respondent Larry Crossgrove in the head while he made a delivery to a Wal-Mart store in Trinidad. Respondent required medical treatment for injuries suffered in the accident. His healthcare providers billed almost $250,000 for their services. Respondent's insurer however, paid the providers $40,000 in full satisfaction of the bills. Respondent subsequently filed suit against Wal-Mart. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appellate court erred when it held that the trial court incorrectly admitted evidence of the amount paid by the insurer for Respondent's medical expenses as a result of Wal-Mart's negligence. Upon review, the Court held that the court of appeal correctly held that the trial court correctly held that the trial court should have excluded evidence of the amounts paid because of the common law evidentiary component of the collateral source doctrine required the exclusion. View "Wal-Mart v. Crossgrove" on Justia Law