Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In June 2002, Codiejo Apodaca and her stepsister (the Insureds) were injured in an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, the Insureds were covered as resident relatives under an auto policy and a personal umbrella policy both issued by Respondent Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). The policy included uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in addition to bodily injury coverage. The umbrella policy provided excess liability for "occurrences" arising out of, among other things, "occupancy of a land vehicle by an insured for personal transportation." Allstate did not offer separate UM/UIM coverage in connection with the umbrella policy. The Insureds brought suit against Allstate for reformation of the umbrella policy to include UM/UIM coverage. In their view, Colorado law required Allstate to offer UM/UIM coverage in connection with the umbrella policy because the policy included automobile liability coverage. As such, the Insureds contended that UM/UIM coverage should have been incorporated into the umbrella policy as a matter of law. The trial court granted Allstate's motion to dismiss the suit, finding that only liability policies expressly linked to a specific, licensed Colorado vehicle were required to include mandatory UM/UIM insurance. The appellate court affirmed the trial court, and on appeal, the Insureds argued that both the trial and appellate courts misread both the policy and Colorado law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that an umbrella policy is not an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy" as specified by Colorado law. Therefore, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Apodaca v. Allstate Ins. Co" on Justia Law

Respondent Michael Strauch was stabbed by an intoxicated person outside of Eden Nightclub on New Year's Eve. Eden is owned by Petitioner Build It and They Will Drink, Inc. (Build It). Mr. Strauch filed a number of claims against Build It, including general negligence, premises liability claims and a "dram shop" claim for his injuries after the stabbing. The trial court dismissed all claims after determining that the attack was not foreseeable, and that Build It had no duty to insure Mr. Strauch's safety once he left the nightclub. The Court of Appeals reversed only the dram shop liability claim, holding that Colorado law does not require consideration of "foreseeability" in assessing liability against a club that serves alcohol. Build It appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the plain language of Colorado Dram-Shop Statute defined the criteria for liability without mentioning "foreseeability." The Court held that an injury does not have to be foreseeable after the sale or service of alcohol. The Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment that held Build It liable for Respondent's injuries. View "Build It and They Will Drink, Inc. v. Strauch" on Justia Law

Petitioner Loretta Day was referred to Respondent Dr. Bruce Johnson, M.D., for treatment for hypothyroidism. Dr. Johnson determined that surgery was needed to remove both lobes of the thyroid. A few weeks later, Mrs. Day's vocal cords stopped working, and she suffered a permanent speaking disability that she alleged was caused by the surgery. Mrs. Day and her husband sued Dr. Johnson for negligence, asserting that the Doctor incorrectly assessed Mrs. Day's condition, recommended inappropriate treatment, and improperly removed part of her thyroid. The trial court submitted the issue of Dr. Johnson's negligence to the jury which included a jury instruction that mirrored the language of a pattern jury instruction pertaining to negligence. The Days objected to the court's use of this instruction, arguing that the instruction included a misstatement of Colorado law. The court overruled the objection. The jury found that Dr. Johnson was not negligent. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's use of the instruction. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Days argued that both the trial and appellate courts erred by using the instruction. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the portion of the pattern jury instructions accurately stated Colorado law.

Respondent and former employee Andrew Blood suffered severe and permanent injuries while working on a wood utility pole owned by Petitioner Qwest Services Corporation (Qwest). Blood sued Qwest for negligence, asserting that Quest failed to implement a routine inspection program that would have detected the rotting that caused the pole to collapse on top of him. A jury awarded Respondent close to $30 million, finding Qwest 100% at fault. Qwest appealed the verdict and award, and the appeals court affirmed the trial courtâs decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Qwest argued that the âexemplary damagesâ awarded to Respondent violated its due process rights. Furthermore, Qwest challenged whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support âexemplary damagesâ and the juryâs subsequent award. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions, finding that Qwestsâs due process rights were not violated by the trial courtâs decision. Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Qwestâs failure to implement an inspection program for 46-years prior to Respondentâs accident to support the exemplary damage award handed down by the trial court.

Respondent Lincoln General Insurance Companyâs insured drove a rental car under the influence of methamphetamines, and led police on a high-sped car chase that ended when he struck a vehicle containing Petitioner Julie Bailey and her son. Her son was killed. The insured pled guilty to five felonies, including second-degree murder. The insured assigned his rights to Petitioner to collect on a $1 million excess-insurance policy issued by Lincoln General. Lincoln General denied coverage for damages caused by the insured, relying on an exclusion in the rental agreement that voided coverage if the car was used to commit a crime that could be charged as a felony. The trial court and the court of appeals held that the criminal-acts exclusion of the policy was enforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions to uphold the criminal-acts exclusion of the insurance policy, finding that Lincoln Generalâs use of the exclusion was a proper exercise of its freedom to contract and provide coverage or damages caused by fortuitous events instead of for damages caused by intentionally criminal acts.

The Supreme Court reviewed the appellate courtâs decision against Plaintiffs Jack and Danette Steele. In their claim, Plaintiffs alleged that attorney Katherine Allen gave them incorrect information about a statute of limitations, which led to missing a filing deadline in a negligence suit. The trial court dismissed both their claims of negligent misrepresentation and professional negligence. Plaintiffs only appealed the dismissal of their negligent misrepresentation claim. The appellate court held that Plaintiffs had a claim against the attorney. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Plaintiffsâ evidence was not sufficient to support their claim. The Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

At trial, a jury found that Defendant Holly Pippin was not negligent in causing an accident in which her car hit that of the Plaintiff, Cheryl Kendrick. The main issue at trial was whether the driving conditions on the day of the accident were âexpected.â Driving conditions were icy, and Ms. Pippin testified that she knew it had been raining the night before to cause potentially icy roads the next morning. Ms. Kendrick challenged Ms. Pippinâs argument that the icy roads were âunexpected,â therefore her attempt to avoid hitting Ms. Kendrickâs car was actually just negligent driving. Ms. Kendrick appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming the trial court made three mistakes: (1) the court should have instructed the jury to consider a âsudden emergency;â (2) that it should not have instructed the jury on âres ipsa loquitur;â and (3) there should have been a new trial because of alleged juror misconduct. The Supreme Court reviewed the lower courts' decisions, and agreed with the appellate court on two of the three issues presented. The Court held that Ms. Pippin failed to present evidence that she was confronted with a âsudden emergencyâ from the road conditions. The Court agreed with the appellate court's dismissal of the jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur. The Court did not find the allegation of juror misconduct credible. The Court therefore reversed the appellate courtâs decision and remanded the case for a new trial.