Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Colorado Division of Insurance initiated an investigation into Milton Trujillo's application to renew as a insurance producer license with bail bond authority. It later denied the application based on a complaint it received. The Division charged Trujillo with twelve counts of violating the insurance code, professions and occupations code, and Division regulations. The ALJ revoked the license; the Commissioner of Insurance adopted the ALJ's decision. The court of appeals affirmed the Commissioner's action, determining that Trujillo violated a fiduciary duty prescribed by 10-2-704(a). The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals erred in applying section 10-2-704(1)(a) to this case: "[w]hile there are unappealed findings of fact upon which the Commissioner on remand could uphold the sanction it ordered, it is not clear [to the Court] whether, absent the agency's construction of 10-2-704(1)(a), the Commissioner would have exercised his authority to revoke Trujillo's license and deny his renewal application." The case was therefore remanded for redetermination by the Commissioner the appropriate sanction for Trujillo's conduct. View "Trujillo v. Colorado Division of Insurance" on Justia Law

Respondent Helen Rodriguez injured herself after falling down a flight of stairs at work. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether an "unexplained" fall satisfied the "arising out of" employment requirement of the Workers' Compensation Act. The Court agreed with the appellate court that respondent's unexplained fall was compensable, but it disagreed with the reasoning. The Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred when it agreed with respondent's view that her injuries arose out of employment, and held that an unexplained fall necessarily stemmed from a "neutral" risk attributable to neither the employment nor the employee. "Under our longstanding 'but-for' test, such an unexplained fall 'arises out of' employment if the fall would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of employment placed the employee in a position where he or she was injured." View "City of Brighton v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. appealed the appellate court's decision to reverse an Industrial Claim Appeals Office decision disallowing respondent Elaine Loofbourrow's award of temporary disability benefits. The ICAO concluded that once respondent's treating physician placed her at maximum medical improvement, temporary total disability benefits could not be awarded for the injury for which she was initially treated. The appellate court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, such an independent medical exam was not a prerequisite to temporary total disability benefits. After its review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court was correct in its decision: because a determination of maximum medical improvement has no statutory significance with regard to injuries resulting in loss of no more than three days (or shifts) of work time, respondent's award of temporary total disability benefits was not barred by her failure to first seek a division-sponsored independent medical examination. View "Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. v. Loofbourrow" on Justia Law

Steven Pham represented the estate of a driver of a car involved in a traffic accident. He appealed (along with the driver's parents and the five passengers in the car at the time of the accident) the court of appeals' judgment which affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurer, State Farm, on the grounds that plaintiffs' claims were bound by the statute of limitations governing underinsured motorist claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs failed to file their action or demand arbitration of their underinsured motorist claims within either three years of the accrual of their cause or within two years after receiving payment of a settlement or judgment on an underlying bodily injury liability claim preserved as prescribed by the applicable statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Pham v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Respondents Christopher Roinestad and Gerald Fitz-Gerald were overcome by poisonous gases while cleaning a grease clog in a sewer near the Hog's Breath Saloon & Restaurant. The district court concluded that Hog's Breath caused respondents' injuries by dumping substantial amounts of cooking grease into the sewer thereby creating the clog and consequent build up of the gas. On summary judgment, the district court found the saloon liable under theories of negligence and off-premises liability and granted respondents damages. The saloon carried a commercial general liability policy issued by Petitioner Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company which sought a ruling it had no duty to indemnify Hog's Breath. The district court agreed that under the terms of the policy, the insurer had no duty under a pollution exclusion clause. The appellate court reversed the ruling in favor of the insurer, finding the pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous and that its application to cooking grease (a common waste product) could lead to absurd results and negate essential coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the saloon released enough grease to amount to a discharge of a pollutant, and that the insurance policy pollution exclusion clause barred coverage in this case. View "Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company v. Roinestad" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Lego admitted his wife to Porter Hospital's emergency room. She stayed there for approximately two months. The Legos' insurance provider notified Respondent in writing that it would stop covering Mrs. Lego's hospital care after six weeks. Respondent disputed the insurer's position and refused to discharge his wife from the hospital after six weeks. The hospital followed the insurer in notifying Respondent the insurance coverage for Mrs. Lego would end, and that the Legos would be responsible for any uncovered charges. In an effort to recoup those charges Respondent refused to pay, the hospital sued on the grounds of unjust enrichment with recovery in quantum meruit. Respondent moved to dismiss, arguing that the action was barred by a general statute of limitations codified in section 13-80-103.5(1)(a) C.R.S. (2011). The trial court denied the motion; the appellate court reversed, finding the trial court erred in determining the amount the insurance company did not pay was liquidated or determinable damages within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, interpreting section 13-80-103.5(1)(a) C.R.S. (2011) to mean its six-year limitations period applied in this case, particularly when the amount owed was ascertainable either by reference to the agreement, or by simple computation using extrinsic evidence. View "Portercare Adventist Health System v. Lego" on Justia Law

Judith Koenig rented a car from a car rental company and was involved in an accident. PurCo sued Koenig to collect damages related to the incident, including damages for loss of the vehicle's use during the time it was being repaired. PurCo sought to measure loss of use damages by using the reasonable rental value of a substitute vehicle. Koenig filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted, holding that PurCo could prevail on its loss of use damages claim only if it suffered actual lost profits. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment ruling and remanded the case. It agreed with the trial court's conclusion that, in general, the appropriate measure of loss of use damages in a commercial setting is actual lost profits, but concluded the rental agreement in this case altered the measure of loss of use damages and held that PurCo was required to show certain loss prerequisites. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals judgment on different grounds, holding that loss of use damages in a commercial setting may be measured either by actual lost profits or by reasonable rental value. PurCo was entitled to recover loss of use damages irrespective of its actual lost profits. Accordingly, this case was remanded for calculation of the reasonable rental value of a substitute vehicle. View "Koenig v. PurCo Fleet Services, Inc." on Justia Law

An overhead garage door struck Respondent Larry Crossgrove in the head while he made a delivery to a Wal-Mart store in Trinidad. Respondent required medical treatment for injuries suffered in the accident. His healthcare providers billed almost $250,000 for their services. Respondent's insurer however, paid the providers $40,000 in full satisfaction of the bills. Respondent subsequently filed suit against Wal-Mart. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appellate court erred when it held that the trial court incorrectly admitted evidence of the amount paid by the insurer for Respondent's medical expenses as a result of Wal-Mart's negligence. Upon review, the Court held that the court of appeal correctly held that the trial court correctly held that the trial court should have excluded evidence of the amounts paid because of the common law evidentiary component of the collateral source doctrine required the exclusion. View "Wal-Mart v. Crossgrove" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed an unpublished appeallate court decision to determine whether: the court of appeals erred under Colorado's collateral source doctrine when it admitted evidence of the amounts paid by Respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for medical expenses that Petitioner Jack Sunahara incurred as a result of a car accident; and whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's ruling that portions of State Farm's claim file and information used by the company to generate reserves and settlement authority were not discoverable. The Court held that the appellate court erred in affirming the admission of evidence of the amounts paid for Petitioner's medical expenses because the pre-verdict evidentiary component of Colorado's collateral source rule prohibits the admission. The Court affirmed the appellate court in excluding portions of State Farm's claim file from admission. View "Sunahara v. State Farm" on Justia Law

This case arose from the negligence action Plaintiff Donald Smith filed against Defendant Michael Jeppsen after the parties were involved in a car accident. Plaintiff sought to recover, among other things, the cost of past and future medical expenses resulting from the crash. Defendant admitted liability, and the parties agreed that the proper measure of Plaintiff's medical expense damages should be the necessary and reasonable value of the medical services rendered. However the parties disagreed as to whether the trial court, in determining reasonable value, could consider evidence of the amounts billed to and paid by Plaintiff's insurance company (a collateral source). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court was correct in applying 10-1-135 C.R.S. (2011) in this case because the statute pertained to cases pending recovery as of August 11, 2010. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court correctly excluded from evidence the amount of the insurance company's payments because section 10-1-135(10)(a) codifies the common law pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule and unambiguously required the exclusion. View "In re Smith v. Jeppsen" on Justia Law