Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Juvenile Law
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In this dependency and neglect proceeding, the juvenile court found that K.L.W. ("Father") waived his statutory right to a jury trial by failing to appear for the trial in 2021. The court then incorrectly adjudicated Father's five children as dependent or neglected by default. In 2023, the juvenile court vacated the default judgment and scheduled a new adjudicatory trial, again finding that Father had waived his right to a jury trial by failing to appear in 2021. Father did not demand a jury trial during the twenty days before the bench trial and acknowledged the bench trial in a pretrial pleading. On the morning of the 2023 trial, Father objected to the waiver finding, but the court proceeded with the bench trial and adjudicated the children dependent or neglected.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's adjudicatory judgment, concluding that Father's 2021 waiver of a jury trial did not extend to the 2023 proceeding. The appellate court held that the 2023 trial was a new trial, and since Father appeared, he did not waive his right to a jury trial for the 2023 proceeding.The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that even if the 2021 waiver was not binding for the 2023 trial, Father failed to demand a jury trial as required by statute and rule. The court found that Father's objection on the morning of the 2023 trial was not a valid or timely demand for a jury trial. The court emphasized that granting Father's objection would have delayed the proceedings, contrary to the children's best interests and the orderly administration of justice. Therefore, the juvenile court correctly conducted a bench trial, and the appellate court erred in reversing the adjudicatory judgment. View "People ex rel. Kay. W. v. K.L.W." on Justia Law

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A child, B.C.B., was born in a car where his parents were living. After being transported to a hospital, both B.C.B. and his mother tested positive for methamphetamine. The El Paso County Department of Human Services conducted a safety assessment and took temporary custody of B.C.B. due to the positive drug test. The Department filed a petition alleging that B.C.B. was dependent or neglected under Colorado law.The El Paso County District Court held an adjudicatory trial, where evidence was presented that B.C.B. had difficulty latching to breastfeed and exhibited symptoms potentially related to methamphetamine exposure. Three pediatricians testified about the potential long-term risks of methamphetamine exposure, although they could not definitively link the symptoms to the drug exposure. The jury found that B.C.B. was born affected by substance exposure and that his health or welfare was threatened by substance use. The trial court adjudicated B.C.B. as dependent or neglected and ordered continued custody with the Department.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's adjudication, concluding that the Department had not provided sufficient evidence to show that B.C.B. was adversely affected by substance exposure at birth. The majority held that a positive drug test alone was insufficient to establish dependency or neglect under the amended statute.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that a positive drug test at birth satisfies the first prong of the statute, indicating that the child was affected by substance exposure. The Court also found that the Department provided sufficient evidence to show that B.C.B.'s health or welfare was threatened by substance use, either directly or due to the mother's inability to care for the child properly. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and upheld the jury's finding that B.C.B. was dependent or neglected. View "People ex rel. B.C.B. v. A.B." on Justia Law

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J.D., a juvenile defendant, faced multiple charges and challenged his competency to proceed. The juvenile court ordered the Department of Human Services (the "Department") to conduct an in-custody competency evaluation, which found J.D. incompetent but restorable. The court then ordered outpatient restoration services. Subsequently, J.D. was charged with additional delinquent acts, and the court extended its incompetency finding to all cases, ordering the Department to oversee inpatient restoration services and provide periodic status reports.The Department later reassessed J.D.'s competency without a court order and concluded that he had been restored to competency. J.D. moved to strike the Department's report, arguing that the Department lacked the authority to conduct the evaluation without a court order under section 19-2.5-704(2)(c). The juvenile court denied the motion, finding that the Department had the authority to conduct restoration evaluations as part of its responsibility to provide restoration services.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the Department's responsibility to provide restoration services under section 19-2.5-704(2)(b) includes the authority to perform restoration evaluations without a court order. The court concluded that restoration evaluations are part of the "services necessary to competency restoration." Therefore, the juvenile court properly accepted and considered the Department's evaluation in finding J.D. restored to competency. The order to show cause was discharged. View "In re People ex rel. J.D." on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a defendant who was convicted for enticement of a child. The defendant had approached a ten-year-old girl, A.W., while she was walking her dog. He drove into the opposing lane of traffic to pull his truck up beside her, asked her personal questions, and made inappropriate comments. Based on these events and evidence of the defendant’s previous behavior with a five-year-old girl in Louisiana, a jury convicted the defendant of enticement of a child.The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove the offense of enticement. The court of appeals agreed with the defendant's argument, vacating his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had attempted to invite or persuade A.W. to enter his truck, or that he intended to commit unlawful sexual contact.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of the term "attempt" in the child enticement statute. The Supreme Court held that the term "attempt" in the statute should be interpreted according to its plain meaning, not as referring to the inchoate crime of "attempt" defined in another statute. The Supreme Court found that the defendant's words and actions, taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, constituted sufficient evidence for a reasonable person to conclude that the defendant attempted to invite or persuade the victim to enter his vehicle with the intent to commit unlawful sexual contact upon her. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision vacating the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case to the court of appeals to address his remaining appellate arguments. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

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After defense counsel raised concerns regarding seventeen-year-old A.T.C.’s competency, the magistrate ordered a competency evaluation. A psychologist from the Office of Behavioral Health (“OBH”) subsequently evaluated A.T.C. and determined that he was incompetent but restorable. Shortly thereafter, based on OBH’s evaluation, the magistrate entered a preliminary finding that A.T.C. was incompetent but restorable. The State moved for a second competency evaluation, asking the magistrate to allow a psychologist of the State's choosing to evaluate A.T.C. Over defense counsel’s objection, the magistrate granted the motion. The psychologist retained by the State evaluated A.T.C. and concluded that he was competent to proceed. Following a contested hearing at which OBH’s psychologist, the psychologist retained by the State, and a third psychologist all testified, the magistrate found that A.T.C. was competent to proceed. Defense counsel timely petitioned the juvenile court for review, but was unsuccessful. Counsel then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court. Addressing whether a juvenile in a delinquency case could seek interlocutory review of a magistrate’s competency finding in the juvenile court as a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court concluded a magistrate’s finding of competency pursuant to section 19-1-108(3)(a.5), C.R.S. (2022), was subject to review in the juvenile court under section 19-1-108(5.5). View "Colorado in the interest of: A.T.C." on Justia Law

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The State of Colorado filed a petition in delinquency against A.C. A.C.’s counsel moved for a competency evaluation, noting that A.C. had trouble paying attention and was on an individualized education plan at school due to his Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”). The magistrate granted the motion and ordered the Colorado Department of Human Services (“CDHS”) to perform a competency evaluation. Based on his evaluation, a doctor concluded that A.C. did not have the ability to (1) factually and rationally understand the proceedings or (2) assist in the defense. Ultimately, the doctor concluded A.C. was incompetent to proceed but that the “prognosis for restoring [A.C.] to competency . . . [was] fair to good.” The magistrate found A.C. incompetent to proceed, stayed the proceedings, and ordered CDHS to provide restoration services. Almost six months later, the magistrate held a hearing to determine whether A.C. had been restored to competency. The evaluating doctor and A.C.’s restoration services provider testified at the hearing, but neither opined as to whether A.C. had been “restored to competency.” The Colorado Supreme Court granted review in this case to consider whether the Juvenile Justice Code authorized a magistrate to order a juvenile found incompetent to proceed to undergo a “reassessment evaluation” as part of the restoration review or restoration hearing procedures outlined in sections 19-2.5-704 to -706, C.R.S. (2022), to determine whether the juvenile has been restored to competency. A.C. argued that such an evaluation was prohibited by Colorado in Interest of B.B.A.M., 453 P.3d 1161. The Supreme Court concluded that the juvenile court had the authority to order a reassessment evaluation after determining that a juvenile remains incompetent and that this type of evaluation was distinct from the second competency evaluation at issue in B.B.A.M. View " People v. A.C. " on Justia Law

Posted in: Juvenile Law
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Following a preliminary hearing, a magistrate determined that probable cause existed to believe that A.S.M. had committed the delinquent acts alleged. A.S.M. timely sought review of the magistrate’s probable cause determination. But the juvenile court declined to review the matter on the merits, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding did not constitute a final order. A.S.M. then invoked the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause. After review, the Supreme Court held that while only a district court magistrate’s final orders or judgments namely, those fully resolving an issue or claim were reviewable under C.R.M. 7(a)(3), the preliminary hearing statute in the Children’s Code, section 19-2.5-609(3), C.R.S. (2022), specifically permitted review of a magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding. "Therefore, we need not get in the middle of the parties’ tug-of-war over whether the magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding in this case constituted a final order. Instead, we hold that section 19-2.5-609(3) entitles prosecutors and juveniles alike to ask a juvenile court to review a magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding in a delinquency proceeding." View "In re Interest of A.S.M." on Justia Law

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T.B. committed two sexual offenses as a minor: the first when he was eleven years old and the second when he was fifteen. Because he was twice adjudicated delinquent for unlawful sexual behavior, the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (“CSORA”), required T.B. to register as a sex offender for the remainder of his natural life. Now an adult, T.B. sought review of the juvenile court’s denial of his petition to deregister, arguing that CSORA’s mandatory lifetime sex offender registration requirement for offenders with multiple juvenile adjudications violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. To this, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed: "Mandatory lifetime sex offender registration brands juveniles as irredeemably depraved based on acts committed before reaching adulthood. But a wealth of social science and jurisprudence confirms what common sense suggests: Juveniles are different. Minors have a tremendous capacity to change and reform. As such, mandating lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles without providing a mechanism for individualized assessment or an opportunity to deregister upon a showing of rehabilitation is excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment." The matter was remanded for further proceedings on T.B.'s petition to deregister. View "Colorado in Int. of T.B." on Justia Law

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Several boys broke into two homes, one of which was owned by a man old enough to be considered an “at-risk” victim. When that man returned home, he happened upon one of the boys holding the "spoils of an ill-conceived, juvenile burglary." The others, including B.D., remained outside, oblivious to the elderly man’s arrival. All the boys quickly fled. By this opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the scope of complicitor liability for a fact that aggravates the punishment for theft; namely, an at-risk victim’s presence. Based on the plain language of the controlling statutes, the Supreme Court concluded that a complicitor need not be aware that an at-risk victim was present because it was a strict liability sentence enhancer and not an element of the offense. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for the district court to reinstate the adjudication and sentence. View "Colorado in the Interest of B.D." on Justia Law

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The State sought review of an appellate court's judgment reversing a district court order voiding a juvenile magistrate's ruling. The district court found that the juvenile magistrate lacked jurisdiction to grant J.D.’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, further, that J.D.’s sole remedy for a failure of his counsel to render effective assistance in advising him concerning his deferred adjudication was to file a petition with the court for reinstatement of his review rights nunc pro tunc. By contrast, the court of appeals found that the juvenile magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain J.D.’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was a motion in a delinquency case the magistrate had been appointed to hear, and it was not a motion seeking review of any prior order of the magistrate. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction over the juvenile’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although on different grounds, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Colorado in Interest of J.D." on Justia Law