Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Juvenile Law
by
After defense counsel raised concerns regarding seventeen-year-old A.T.C.’s competency, the magistrate ordered a competency evaluation. A psychologist from the Office of Behavioral Health (“OBH”) subsequently evaluated A.T.C. and determined that he was incompetent but restorable. Shortly thereafter, based on OBH’s evaluation, the magistrate entered a preliminary finding that A.T.C. was incompetent but restorable. The State moved for a second competency evaluation, asking the magistrate to allow a psychologist of the State's choosing to evaluate A.T.C. Over defense counsel’s objection, the magistrate granted the motion. The psychologist retained by the State evaluated A.T.C. and concluded that he was competent to proceed. Following a contested hearing at which OBH’s psychologist, the psychologist retained by the State, and a third psychologist all testified, the magistrate found that A.T.C. was competent to proceed. Defense counsel timely petitioned the juvenile court for review, but was unsuccessful. Counsel then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court. Addressing whether a juvenile in a delinquency case could seek interlocutory review of a magistrate’s competency finding in the juvenile court as a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court concluded a magistrate’s finding of competency pursuant to section 19-1-108(3)(a.5), C.R.S. (2022), was subject to review in the juvenile court under section 19-1-108(5.5). View "Colorado in the interest of: A.T.C." on Justia Law

by
The State of Colorado filed a petition in delinquency against A.C. A.C.’s counsel moved for a competency evaluation, noting that A.C. had trouble paying attention and was on an individualized education plan at school due to his Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”). The magistrate granted the motion and ordered the Colorado Department of Human Services (“CDHS”) to perform a competency evaluation. Based on his evaluation, a doctor concluded that A.C. did not have the ability to (1) factually and rationally understand the proceedings or (2) assist in the defense. Ultimately, the doctor concluded A.C. was incompetent to proceed but that the “prognosis for restoring [A.C.] to competency . . . [was] fair to good.” The magistrate found A.C. incompetent to proceed, stayed the proceedings, and ordered CDHS to provide restoration services. Almost six months later, the magistrate held a hearing to determine whether A.C. had been restored to competency. The evaluating doctor and A.C.’s restoration services provider testified at the hearing, but neither opined as to whether A.C. had been “restored to competency.” The Colorado Supreme Court granted review in this case to consider whether the Juvenile Justice Code authorized a magistrate to order a juvenile found incompetent to proceed to undergo a “reassessment evaluation” as part of the restoration review or restoration hearing procedures outlined in sections 19-2.5-704 to -706, C.R.S. (2022), to determine whether the juvenile has been restored to competency. A.C. argued that such an evaluation was prohibited by Colorado in Interest of B.B.A.M., 453 P.3d 1161. The Supreme Court concluded that the juvenile court had the authority to order a reassessment evaluation after determining that a juvenile remains incompetent and that this type of evaluation was distinct from the second competency evaluation at issue in B.B.A.M. View " People v. A.C. " on Justia Law

Posted in: Juvenile Law
by
Following a preliminary hearing, a magistrate determined that probable cause existed to believe that A.S.M. had committed the delinquent acts alleged. A.S.M. timely sought review of the magistrate’s probable cause determination. But the juvenile court declined to review the matter on the merits, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding did not constitute a final order. A.S.M. then invoked the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause. After review, the Supreme Court held that while only a district court magistrate’s final orders or judgments namely, those fully resolving an issue or claim were reviewable under C.R.M. 7(a)(3), the preliminary hearing statute in the Children’s Code, section 19-2.5-609(3), C.R.S. (2022), specifically permitted review of a magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding. "Therefore, we need not get in the middle of the parties’ tug-of-war over whether the magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding in this case constituted a final order. Instead, we hold that section 19-2.5-609(3) entitles prosecutors and juveniles alike to ask a juvenile court to review a magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding in a delinquency proceeding." View "In re Interest of A.S.M." on Justia Law

by
T.B. committed two sexual offenses as a minor: the first when he was eleven years old and the second when he was fifteen. Because he was twice adjudicated delinquent for unlawful sexual behavior, the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (“CSORA”), required T.B. to register as a sex offender for the remainder of his natural life. Now an adult, T.B. sought review of the juvenile court’s denial of his petition to deregister, arguing that CSORA’s mandatory lifetime sex offender registration requirement for offenders with multiple juvenile adjudications violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. To this, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed: "Mandatory lifetime sex offender registration brands juveniles as irredeemably depraved based on acts committed before reaching adulthood. But a wealth of social science and jurisprudence confirms what common sense suggests: Juveniles are different. Minors have a tremendous capacity to change and reform. As such, mandating lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles without providing a mechanism for individualized assessment or an opportunity to deregister upon a showing of rehabilitation is excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment." The matter was remanded for further proceedings on T.B.'s petition to deregister. View "Colorado in Int. of T.B." on Justia Law

by
Several boys broke into two homes, one of which was owned by a man old enough to be considered an “at-risk” victim. When that man returned home, he happened upon one of the boys holding the "spoils of an ill-conceived, juvenile burglary." The others, including B.D., remained outside, oblivious to the elderly man’s arrival. All the boys quickly fled. By this opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the scope of complicitor liability for a fact that aggravates the punishment for theft; namely, an at-risk victim’s presence. Based on the plain language of the controlling statutes, the Supreme Court concluded that a complicitor need not be aware that an at-risk victim was present because it was a strict liability sentence enhancer and not an element of the offense. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for the district court to reinstate the adjudication and sentence. View "Colorado in the Interest of B.D." on Justia Law

by
The State sought review of an appellate court's judgment reversing a district court order voiding a juvenile magistrate's ruling. The district court found that the juvenile magistrate lacked jurisdiction to grant J.D.’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, further, that J.D.’s sole remedy for a failure of his counsel to render effective assistance in advising him concerning his deferred adjudication was to file a petition with the court for reinstatement of his review rights nunc pro tunc. By contrast, the court of appeals found that the juvenile magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain J.D.’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was a motion in a delinquency case the magistrate had been appointed to hear, and it was not a motion seeking review of any prior order of the magistrate. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction over the juvenile’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although on different grounds, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Colorado in Interest of J.D." on Justia Law

by
The issue this case case, which stemmed from a late-night argument on Twitter among several high school students, presented to the Colorado Supreme Court centered on the applicable framework for distinguishing a true threat from constitutionally protected speech in the "cyber arena." R.D., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for harassment by communication based on those tweets directed at another student that took place in the wake of a local school shooting. Put differently, the question was whether R.D.'s statements were "true threats." The Supreme Court held a true threat is a statement that, considered in context and under the totality of the circumstances, an intended or foreseeable recipient would reasonably perceive as a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. In determining whether a statement is a true threat, a reviewing court must examine the words used, but it must also consider the context in which the statement was made. Particularly where the alleged threat is communicated online, the contextual factors courts should consider include, but are not limited to: (1) the statement’s role in a broader exchange, if any, including surrounding events; (2) the medium or platform through which the statement was communicated, including any distinctive conventions or architectural features; (3) the manner in which the statement was conveyed (e.g., anonymously or not, privately or publicly); (4) the relationship between the speaker and recipient(s); and (5) the subjective reaction of the statement’s intended or foreseeable recipient(s). Because neither the juvenile court nor the court of appeals had the benefit of the framework announced by this case, the Supreme Court reversed judgment and remanded for reconsideration. View "Colorado in Interest of R.D." on Justia Law

by
After being charged, fourteen-year-old G.S.S. was detained for more than three months without bail, even though he had not entered a plea and had not been tried on the charges against him. At that point, G.S.S.’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that G.S.S.’s “right to a speedy trial” had been violated under section 19-2-509(4)(b), C.R.S. (2019). The trial court agreed and dismissed the case against G.S.S. with prejudice, and the court of appeals affirmed in Colorado in Interest of G.S.S., 2019 COA 4M, __ P.3d __. The Colorado Supreme Court then granted certiorari to determine the proper remedy for a violation of the sixty-day limit in section 19-2-509(4)(b). The Supreme Court determined the remedy for a section 19-2-509(4)(b) violation was for the trial court to immediately hold a bail hearing and order the juvenile's release. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed. View "Colorado In Interest of G.S.S." on Justia Law

by
Nevik Howard, when sixteen years old, was convicted of first-degree assault (a crime of violence) and first-degree criminal trespass after his case was transferred from juvenile court to district court. During the sentencing hearing, Howard argued that he was subject to a more severe penalty for a crime of violence conviction under the transfer statute than he would be if this were a direct-file case because direct-filed juveniles were exempted “from the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in [the crime of violence statute],” whereas transferred juveniles were not. To address that equal protection concern, the district court determined that the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute would not apply in this transfer proceeding, just as they would not have applied in a direct-file proceeding. The court further determined, however, that this ruling did not make Howard eligible for probation. Instead, the court concluded that the statutory scheme only allowed either: (1) a youth offender services (“YOS”) sentence with a suspended Department of Corrections (“DOC”) sentence; or (2) a DOC sentence. The court ultimately sentenced Howard to six years in YOS with a suspended fifteen-year DOC sentence. Howard, appealed, arguing the district court erred in its reasoning. The court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court granted review, affirming the court of appeals, but on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that under the facts of this case, there was no equal protection violation because neither direct-filed juveniles nor transferred juveniles convicted of crimes of violence were eligible for probation, and the district court did not apply the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute. Hence, Howard was treated the same as a direct-filed juvenile would have been with regard to probation and the applicable sentencing range. View "Howard v. Colorado" on Justia Law

by
The State of Colorado filed a delinquency petition against B.B.A.M., charging him with one count of third degree burglary and three counts of criminal mischief. B.B.A.M.’s counsel filed a motion to determine competency. Because the court felt it lacked adequate information to make a preliminary finding regarding B.B.A.M.’s competency, it ordered the Colorado Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to conduct an outpatient competency evaluation. The competency evaluator filed a report in which she concluded B.B.A.M. was incompetent to proceed, determined there was a likelihood of restoring him to competency, and recommended the restoration services she deemed appropriate. Based on the evaluator’s report, the court made a preliminary finding of incompetency. Since neither party requested a competency hearing within ten days, the court made the preliminary finding of incompetency a final determination. Proceedings were suspended, and B.B.A.M. was ordered to receive outpatient services designed to restore him to competency. Following the provision of those services, the court ordered, over his objection, a second competency evaluation to determine whether he had been restored to competency. B.B.A.M. appealed, but the district court upheld the juvenile court’s order. The Colorado Supreme Court determined the relevant statutes did not permit a juvenile court to order a second competency evaluation to determine whether a juvenile has been restored to competency; the district court erred in affirming the juvenile court’s order. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to return the case to the juvenile court for a restoration review or a restoration hearing. View "In re Colorado v. B.B.A.M." on Justia Law