Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A.S. was sentenced as an aggravated juvenile offender to two years' commitment to the Department of Human Services, suspended on condition of successful completion of two years' probation. The district court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that 19-2-601 C.R.S. (2013) authorized only commitment to DHS, and did not grant a court discretion to grant probation. Upon review of the applicable statute, the Supreme Court concluded 19-2-601 does indeed grant a sentencing court discretion. View "A.S. v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this juvenile delinquency case, the prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal seeking the Supreme Court's review of a magistrate's order suppressing certain statements made by the juvenile during a police interrogation. Because the magistrate's suppression order was never reviewed and adopted (with or without modification) by the district court before the appeal was filed, the Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction, and accordingly dismissed the appeal. View "Colorado v. S.X.G." on Justia Law

The juvenile court found that Respondent J.L.B. (Father) had abandoned A.B. (Child) and that therefore the Child was available for adoption by Petitioner D.P.H. (Stepfather). The juvenile court also determined that the fact that Father had filed parenting-time motions in the dissolution court did not outweigh overwhelming evidence of abandonment, including the fact that Father had not seen the Child in the twenty-one months prior to the filing of the adoption proceeding. Father appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed. The court determined that a finding of abandonment was precluded by the fact that Father had filed motions for parenting time in the dissolution court. The court also concluded that the juvenile court should have delayed the adoption determination until the parenting-time motions were resolved. Upon review of the case by the Supreme Court, the Court concluded that the "[i]t is the trial court's responsibility to consider the totality of the circumstances and to make this factual determination, which is to be disturbed only if it is clearly erroneous. ...It was therefore error for the court of appeals to determine that a single circumstance (the father's filing of a parenting-time motion) precluded a finding of intent to abandon, essentially as a matter of law." In addition, the Court found it was unnecessary for a trial court to delay adoption proceedings until a parenting-time motion in another court is resolved, so long as the trial court adequately considered the parenting-time motion in making its abandonment determination. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "D.P.H. v. J.L.B" on Justia Law

Colorado state law makes it a felony for a person to have unlawful sexual contact with a child while occupying a "position of trust." Petitioner Mark Pellman appealed an order of the Court of Appeals that found that he was in a position of trust at the time of the unlawful contact between himself and his child victim. Petitioner was a friend of the victim's family, and from 2000-2005, visited with the family, attended the same church, and babysat the victim. In 2005, Petitioner chaperoned a trip to an amusement park when the alleged contact took place. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that he was only in a position of trust at specific times, the last of which was when he chaperoned the amusement park trip. The appellate court rejected this argument, and after review, the Supreme Court rejected it as well. The Supreme Court found that under the language of the applicable statute, a defendant might be in a position of trust through an ongoing a continuous supervisory relationship with the victim, regardless of whether or not the defendant was performing a specific supervisory task at the time of the unlawful contact. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the appellate court and affirmed its decision. View "Pellman v. Colorado" on Justia Law