Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

E.B., an adult with cognitive and physical disabilities, regularly used a taxi service operated by MKBS, LLC, with Jesus Manuel Ortiz as her driver for several months. E.B. alleged that Ortiz sexually assaulted her during one of these rides. J.B., E.B.'s legal guardian, filed suit against both Ortiz and MKBS, asserting various claims including intentional torts against Ortiz and negligence and respondeat superior liability against MKBS. MKBS timely denied the allegations, but Ortiz failed to respond, resulting in a clerk’s entry of default against him.After Ortiz’s default, the district court stayed the civil action pending resolution of Ortiz’s related criminal trial, which ended in his acquittal. During the subsequent civil trial against MKBS, Ortiz was called by MKBS to testify and denied the alleged assault. J.B. unsuccessfully sought to prevent Ortiz from testifying contrary to the facts deemed admitted by his default. The jury found for MKBS, concluding that Ortiz did not assault E.B. and that E.B. suffered no damages. J.B. later moved for default judgment against Ortiz, which the court initially granted. Ortiz, acting pro se, moved to set aside the default judgment, and the court found excusable neglect and vacated the default. After further proceedings, the district court entered judgment in Ortiz’s favor, relying on the jury verdict from MKBS’s trial.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The Court held that a defaulting defendant may testify at a non-defaulting codefendant’s trial, even contrary to facts admitted by default, if not prohibited by other law. The Court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment against Ortiz for excusable neglect and in entering judgment in his favor to avoid inconsistent judgments. View "J.B. v. MKBS, LLC" on Justia Law

Danielle Nicola suffered severe brain trauma after being struck by a car while crossing a street at night in Grand Junction, Colorado. She remained unconscious and died nineteen days after the accident. No conservator or guardian was appointed for her during the period between the accident and her death. Nearly two years after Danielle’s death, her father, John Nicola, acting as the personal representative of her estate, filed survival claims against the City of Grand Junction and Public Service Company of Colorado, alleging negligence and premises liability due to faulty street lighting and inadequate signage at the accident site.The District Court for Mesa County dismissed Nicola’s claims, determining they were untimely under section 13-81-103(1)(b), which requires survival claims for persons under disability to be brought within one year of their death. Nicola appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that subsection (1)(b) applied only when a person under disability had a legal representative and died after the expiration of the statute of limitations but less than two years after the representative was appointed. The Court of Appeals concluded that, since Danielle had no legal representative, the one-year limitation did not apply, and Nicola’s claims were timely under the general limitations provision for survival actions.The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court held that section 13-81-103(1)(b) applies regardless of whether a legal representative was appointed, and that the phrase “the expiration of the period of limitation in [subsection (1)(a)]” refers to the applicable statute of limitations or any extended period if a legal representative was appointed. Because Nicola filed the claims almost two years after Danielle’s death, the claims were barred by the one-year limitation in subsection (1)(b). The Supreme Court remanded the case for reinstatement of the district court’s dismissal and determination of attorney fees. View "City of Grand Junction & Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Nicola" on Justia Law

While driving in Colorado Springs, the petitioner approached an intersection where his northbound traffic signal was unilluminated and inoperative. After stopping at the intersection and treating it as a four-way stop, the petitioner proceeded, unaware that the eastbound traffic signal was functioning and showing a green light to cross traffic. A collision occurred when an eastbound driver, who had the green light, entered the intersection and struck the petitioner’s vehicle.The petitioner brought a negligence claim against the City of Colorado Springs, arguing that the city’s failure to repair the traffic signal created a dangerous condition and that the city had waived its sovereign immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). The District Court denied the city’s motion to dismiss, finding that the malfunctioning signal and the operative signal provided conflicting directions to drivers, triggering the statutory waiver of immunity. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the signals were not “conflicting” because each driver faced clear, but different, instructions under the traffic code—one to stop and yield, the other to proceed on green—and thus the statutory waiver did not apply.The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari and concluded that, under these circumstances, the traffic signals did display “conflicting directions” by presenting incompatible instructions to drivers in perpendicular lanes, creating a dangerous and unpredictable condition not resolved by existing traffic laws. The court found that this situation fell within the CGIA’s waiver of immunity for governmental entities. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sandoval v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

After her criminal charge for false reporting was dismissed, Rebeca Hinds filed a civil complaint in county court against Corrine Foreman, alleging that Foreman knowingly made false and defamatory statements to law enforcement, which led to Hinds being charged. Foreman responded by filing a special motion to dismiss under Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that her statements to police were protected as they related to a public issue and were made in an official proceeding. The county court found that while Hinds met her burden to show the statements’ falsity, she failed to provide sufficient evidence of actual malice. The court granted Foreman's motion to dismiss, entered a final judgment dismissing the case with prejudice, and awarded Foreman fees and costs.Hinds appealed the county court’s judgment to the Colorado Court of Appeals, relying on statutory provisions that appeared to authorize appeals of anti-SLAPP dismissals directly to that court. The Court of Appeals noted a jurisdictional issue because the Colorado Constitution and relevant statutes generally require appeals from county courts’ final judgments to be made to the district court or the Colorado Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals. The division requested a determination of jurisdiction from the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the statutes authorizing the Court of Appeals to review final judgments from county courts in anti-SLAPP cases are unconstitutional to the extent they conflict with article VI, section 17 of the Colorado Constitution. The court ruled that appellate review of a county court’s final judgment must be by the district court or the Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and granted Hinds leave to refile her appeal out of time in district court. View "Hinds v. Foreman" on Justia Law

Alexander Rudnicki suffered permanent brain damage at birth due to Dr. Peter Bianco’s negligent use of a vacuum extractor, resulting in lifelong medical needs and disabilities. Nine years after the injury, Rudnicki’s parents filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Bianco on his behalf. Their individual claims were dismissed as time-barred, but the claim for Alexander proceeded. A jury found Bianco liable and awarded $4 million in damages. The trial court found good cause to exceed Colorado’s Health Care Availability Act ("HCAA") $1 million damages cap, citing the unfairness of limiting recovery given Rudnicki’s extensive care requirements. The court reduced the award by $391,000, excluding pre-majority medical expenses based on then-existing precedent. On appeal, this reduction was reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court, which reinstated the $391,000 in damages.After remand, the trial court reinstated the previously excluded damages and awarded prejudgment interest, including $319,120 in prefiling interest, resulting in a total judgment of about $1,357,000. The court maintained its finding of good cause and awarded the full amount, holding that the statutory cap did not limit the inclusion of prejudgment interest. Bianco appealed, arguing that prefiling interest could only be awarded up to $1 million, even if the good cause exception applied. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, interpreting the HCAA to treat prefiling interest as part of economic damages, subject to the cap and the good cause exception.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the statutory language and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It held that prefiling interest accruing on economic damages is part of the economic damages award and thus falls within the good cause exception to the HCAA’s $1 million cap. The Court clarified that prefiling interest is not a separate category of damages and overruled conflicting precedent. View "Bianco v. Rudnicki" on Justia Law

Chance and Erin Gresser sued Banner Health on behalf of their minor daughter, C.G., alleging medical malpractice during labor, delivery, and postpartum care that resulted in severe, permanent injuries to C.G., including neurological damage and cerebral palsy. The jury found Banner Health negligent and awarded the Gressers over $27 million in economic damages, including past and future medical expenses and lost wages. Given Colorado’s Health Care Availability Act (HCAA) generally imposes a $1 million cap on such damages, the Gressers moved to exceed the cap based on good cause and unfairness, while Banner Health sought to reduce the award to the statutory limit.The Weld County District Court determined that imposing the statutory cap would be unfair under the circumstances and found good cause to exceed it. The court concluded its role was limited to a binary choice: either impose the cap or allow the full jury award, subject only to challenges for insufficient evidence or excessive damages. After finding the evidence supported the jury’s award and that the amount was not manifestly excessive or based on improper motives, the court entered judgment for the full amount, nearly $40 million with interest. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, though it reasoned the trial court retained some discretion in determining damages after finding good cause to exceed the cap.On certiorari review, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that, once a trial court finds good cause and unfairness under section 13-64-302(1)(b) of the HCAA to exceed the damages cap, the amount of damages is governed by common law. The jury retains authority to determine the amount of damages, subject only to remittitur and sufficiency-of-evidence review by the court. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the full judgment awarded to the Gressers. View "Health v. Gresser" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Kathleen Keaten and her daughter Delaney Keaten, lived in a Section 8 housing complex managed by the defendants, Terra Management Group, LLC, and Littleton Main Street LLC. They complained about physical ailments due to suspected methamphetamine fumes from the apartment below. The defendants evicted the tenant in the lower unit but failed to preserve evidence from the apartment. The Keatens later filed a lawsuit under the Colorado Premises Liability Act, alleging permanent injuries from the fumes.The Arapahoe County District Court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the Keatens, awarding significant damages. The court found that the chemical fumes from the lower unit caused the Keatens' injuries, relying on expert testimony and meth residue levels. The court also drew an adverse inference against the defendants for failing to preserve evidence from the lower unit.The defendants appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the defendants should have known about their potential liability and upheld the adverse inference sanction. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado for certiorari review.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that a duty to preserve evidence arises when a party knows or should know that litigation is pending or reasonably foreseeable. The court concluded that any error in the trial court's adverse inference sanction was harmless because the causation finding was based on independent evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Terra Mgmt. Grp. v. Keaten" on Justia Law

Krista Dozier slipped and fell on an unmarked puddle of water in the Jefferson County courthouse. She filed a tort action against Jefferson County, which moved to dismiss the case, claiming immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). Dozier argued that the spill was a "dangerous condition" of a public building, an exception to CGIA immunity. The district court found the County's response to the spill reasonable and dismissed Dozier's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the reasonableness of the County's response was irrelevant to jurisdiction and that the County had waived CGIA immunity under the dangerous-condition exception.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that when disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of the existence of the facts necessary to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. Additionally, the plaintiff must show that a public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the condition in question for the dangerous-condition exception to apply. The district court had found the County's response to the spill reasonable, concluding that Dozier failed to establish the spill as a "dangerous condition" and thus lacked jurisdiction over her claims.The Supreme Court of Colorado reinstated the district court's order dismissing Dozier's complaint, emphasizing that the plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood that the public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the dangerous condition to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. View "Jefferson Cnty. v. Dozier" on Justia Law

Ashley Hushen and Alexandra Weary, along with their mothers, reported allegations of sexual harassment by a classmate, Benjamin Gonzales, to their high school administrators. The school conducted a Title IX investigation, resulting in Benjamin's three-day suspension and subsequent juvenile charges for unlawful sexual contact. Benjamin was acquitted of all charges, and the school reopened the investigation, ultimately concluding that Benjamin had not violated school policies. The students involved felt traumatized by the process, and by the time the proceedings concluded, they had graduated.Benjamin later sued Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on statements made during the Title IX investigations. The defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their statements were absolutely privileged as they were made during a quasi-judicial proceeding. Both the trial court and the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that the Title IX proceedings were not quasi-judicial due to procedural shortcomings, allowing Benjamin's lawsuit to proceed.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and clarified that the determination of whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial is separate from whether it offers sufficient due process. The court held that a proceeding is quasi-judicial if it involves determining the interests, rights, or duties of specific individuals and applying current law or policy to past or present facts. The court concluded that the Title IX investigation met these criteria and was therefore quasi-judicial. Consequently, the statements made during the investigation were protected by absolute privilege, and the lawsuit against Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers could not proceed. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hushen v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

Late one afternoon, Eugene Jennings was driving a tractor-trailer truck for his employer, All State Enterprise, Inc., in Custer County. As he negotiated a curve on Highway 69, his truck flipped over and crushed the vehicle in the oncoming lane driven by Timothy Trenshaw, killing him instantly. Jennings reported injuries and was transported to Parkview Hospital, where he discussed how he was injured with an emergency department physician. The physician documented these statements in Jennings's medical records.The district attorney's office for the Eleventh Judicial District charged Jennings with vehicular homicide and careless driving resulting in injury. Trenshaw's sister and son sued Jennings and All State in a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs obtained a police report containing a screenshot of Jennings's medical records, which included his description of the collision. Jennings filed a motion for a protective order, which the district court granted, prohibiting Plaintiffs from possessing or further disclosing Jennings's medical records. However, the district court later reviewed the screenshot in camera and ruled that five sentences describing the collision were not privileged, dissolving the protective order and requiring Jennings to disclose those sentences.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that medical records containing information provided by a patient to a physician during treatment are protected by the physician-patient privilege. The court concluded that the district court erred in reviewing the screenshot and conducting a sentence-by-sentence analysis. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause, emphasizing that the proper method for Plaintiffs to learn about the facts of the collision is through discovery directed at Jennings, not by accessing his privileged medical records. View "Gardne v. Jennings" on Justia Law