Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jesse Lipschuetz lived next door to Open Door Ministries. Lipschuetz filed claims against the City of Denver and Open Door looking to revoke a rooming and boarding permit the City granted to Open Door. The trial court concluded the City should not have issued the permit, but stayed revocation until Open Door's cross-claims were resolved. Several months later, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Open Door on those cross-claims. On appeal, Lipscheutz argued Open Door's cross-claims against the City were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act because they "could lie in tort." Therefore, Lipscheutz argued, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the cross-claims. The court of appeals agreed with that reasoning, and reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act did not apply to Open Door's request for prospective relief to prevent future injury. Because Open Door had not suffered an injury before it filed its cross-claims, the Act did not bar those claims seeking prospective relief from future injury. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction over those cross-claims. View "Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a property titled in the name of a judgment debtor's co-settled revocable trust was subject to a judgment lien against the debtor. Petitioners were co-settlors and co-trustees of a revocable trust that held title to some Colorado property. Respondent obtained two judgments, and filed a quiet title action for a decree of foreclosure. Petitioner moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that respondent's complaint was barred by the statute of limitations in 13-80-101(1)(k), C.R.S. (2015). The trial court denied the motion. After granting certiorari review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that as a settlor of a revocable trust, petitioner held an ownership interest in the trust's assets. Respondent could properly seek to enforce its judgment against petitioner, and the action was not barred by the statute of limitations. View "Pandy v. Independent Bank" on Justia Law

Petitioner Salynda E. Fleury brought a negligence and wrongful death suit against respondent IntraWest Winter Park Operations Corporation (“Winter Park”) after her husband was killed in an in-bounds avalanche at its resort. Fleury claimed that, although Winter Park knew that avalanches were likely to occur in the area where her husband was skiing that day, it neither warned skiers about this risk nor closed the area. Winter Park filed a motion for a determination of law under C.R.C.P. 56(h) and for judgment on the pleadings under C.R.C.P. 12(c), arguing that in-bounds avalanches were an inherent risk of skiing as defined in the Ski Safety Act of 1979 (SSA) and that the SSA therefore precluded the lawsuit. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action pursuant to section 33-44-112. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal in a split decision. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed: the definition of “inherent dangers and risks of skiing” in section 33-44-103(3.5), C.R.S. (2015), specifically included “snow conditions as they exist or may change.” This phrase encompassed an in-bounds avalanche, "which is, at its core, the movement, or changing condition, of snow." View "Fleury v. IntraWest Winter Park Operations Corp." on Justia Law

The Cordells were the record owners of a tract of land in La Plata County (Tract1), and Mr. Cordell was also the record owner of an adjoining tract that had been deeded to him by his grandmother (Tract2). After the Cordells failed to pay the taxes owed on these properties for three successive years, Brenda Heller purchased tax liens for each tract and later assigned these liens to Bradley Klingsheim. Thereafter, Klingsheim requested deeds for the properties from the Treasurer. The question this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review principally required the Court to determine the scope of a county treasurer’s duty of diligent inquiry, pursuant to section 39-11-128(1), C.R.S. (2015), in attempting to notify a taxpayer that his or her land may be sold to satisfy a tax lien. The Cordells contended that the deeds were void because the La Plata County Treasurer’s Office had not fulfilled its statutory duty of diligent inquiry in attempting to notify the Cordells that it would be issuing a tax deed for the Cordells’ properties. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that a county treasurer had an initial duty to serve notice of a pending tax sale on every person in actual possession or occupancy of the property at issue, as well as on the person in whose name the property was taxed or specially assessed, if upon diligent inquiry, such persons can be found in the county or if their residences outside the county are known. In addition, we hold that a treasurer owed a duty of further diligent inquiry after an initial notice has been sent only when the facts known to the treasurer show that the taxpayer could not have received the notice of the pending tax sale. The Court concluded the Treasurer satisfied its duty of diligent inquiry. In addition, the Court concluded that the notice that the Treasurer provided in this case satisfied due process requirements. View "Klingsheim v. Cordell" on Justia Law

In 2011, In 2011, Regional Transportation District (“RTD”) filed a petition in condemnation against 750 West 48th Avenue, LLC (“Landowner”) to acquire approximately the approximately 1.6 acre property a light rail project. Landowner was leasing the property to a commercial waterproofing business ("Tenant"). Over the years, Landowner made several luxury improvements to the property, including adding a steam room, fitness room, atrium, ceramic and cherry-wood flooring, and marble and granite finishes. The parties stipulated to every condemnation issue except the property's reasonable market value. Landowner elected to litigate the property's value through a commission trial. RTD established the value at $1.8 million; Landowner thought the property was worth $2.57 million. Landowner's calculations focused solely on the cost of replacement; RTD based its estimation on a "superadequacy" theory, asserting that many of the luxury improvements that Landowner made to an industrial property would not fetch a price on the open market commensurate with the cost of replacement. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the interplay between the respective authorities of the supervising judge and the commission to make evidentiary rulings in eminent domain valuation hearings. Specifically, the Court considered: (1) whether a commission could alter a supervising judge's ruling in limine regarding admissibility, and (2) whether the supervising judge could instruct the commission to disregard as irrelevant evidence that the commission had previously admitted. The Supreme Court held that judicial evidentiary rulings controlled in valuation hearings. Thus, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment insofar as it approved the supervising judge instructing the commission to disregard previously admitted evidence as irrelevant. The Court reversed that portion of the appellate court's opinion permitting the commission to alter the judge's evidentiary ruling in limine. View "RTD v. 750 West 48th Ave., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, Regional Transportation District ("RTD") filed a petition in condemnation against 750 West 48th Ave., LLC ("Landowner") to acquire the property for development of a light rail project. Landowner was leasing the property to a commercial waterproofing business. Over the years, Landowner had made several luxury improvements to the property, including adding a steam room, a fitness room, an atrium, ceramic and cherry-wood flooring, and marble and granite finishes. The parties stipulated to every condemnation issue except the property's reasonable market value. Landowner elected to litigate the property's value through a commission trial, in which a trial judge appointed three independent freeholders to determine the value of a condemned property under a judge's supervision. RTD estimated the reasonable market value of the condemned property at $1,800,000. Landowner proffered a reasonable market value of $2,570,000. While Landowner's calculations focused solely on the cost of replacement, RTD based its estimation on a "superadequacy" theory, asserting that many of the luxury improvements that Landowner had made to the industrial property would not fetch a price on the open market commensurate with their costs of replacement. To bolster its theory, RTD sought to introduce the two pieces of evidence central to this appeal: (1) testimony from expert witness Steve Serenyi regarding alternate approaches to calculating the value, including comparable property values and an income-based approach; and (2) evidence regarding the value of the property to which Landowner relocated its business. The Colorado Supreme Court surmised that the overarching issue in this case centered on the interplay between the respective authorities of the supervising judge and the commission to make evidentiary rulings in eminent domain valuation hearings. Specifically, at issue was: (1) whether a commission may alter a supervising judge's ruling in limine regarding admissibility; and (2) whether the supervising judge may instruct the commission to disregard as irrelevant evidence that the commission had previously admitted. The Court held that judicial evidentiary rulings controlled in valuation hearings. Thus, the Court affirmed the court of appeals 'judgment insofar as it approved of the supervising judge instructing the commission to disregard previously admitted evidence as irrelevant and reverse that portion of the court of appeals opinion permitting the commission to alter the judge's evidentiary ruling in limine. View "RTD v. 750 West 48th Ave., LLC" on Justia Law

The Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Management District appealed a water court order that interpreted an earlier stipulated decree to which it and Cherokee Metropolitan District were parties, concerning Cherokee's rights to deliver wastewater returns back to the Upper Black Squirrel Basin for recharge of the aquafier. Upper Black Squirrel District sought a declaration that the stipulation bar Cherokee and Meridian (another metropolitan district with which Cherokee had entered into an intergovernmental agreement) from claiming credit for the wastewater returns as replacement water, for purposes of acquiring the right to additional pumping from Cherokee's wells in the basin. The water court ruled instead that nothing in the stipulation implied abandonment or forfeiture of any right Cherokee might otherwise have to claim future credits with the Ground Water Commission. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the water court properly interpreted the stipulation, it affirmed the order. View "Up. Black Squirrel Creek Grnd Water Mgmt Dist v. Cherokee Metro. Dist." on Justia Law

This water case involving neighboring property owners in Saguache County presented an issue of first impression for the Supreme Court: may the land owner whose property is burdened by an easement across his or her property for a water ditch obtain a junior conditional water right at the headgate of that ditch for non-consumptive hydropower use of water that the neighbor is diverting from the stream under a senior water right for irrigation use through that headgate? Applying the no material injury, water availability, and maximum beneficial use principles of Colorado water law, in conjunction the decision in "Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude’s Co.," (36P.3d 1229 (2001)), the District Court for Water Division No. 3 issued a declaratory judgment and a conditional water right decree in the amount of 0.41 cubic feet per second ("cfs") with a 2010 priority for hydropower use to Charles and Barbara Tidd for diversion from Garner Creek at the headgate of Garner Creek Ditch No. 1. The Plaintiffs–Appellants, David L. Frees, George A. Frees, Delmer E. Frees, and Shirley A. Frees, asserted that the water court lacked authority to decree this water right over their objection. After review, the Supreme Court deferred to the water court's findings of fact and upheld its conclusions of law. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court held that the water court did not err in issuing a conditional decree for a non-consumptive hydropower use water right with a 2010 priority for 0.41 cfs diverted from Garner Creek through the headgate of Garner Creek Ditch No. 1. View "Frees v. Tidd" on Justia Law

Petitioner Barbara Jordan sued respondent Panorama Orthopedics and Spine Center, PC for negligence and premises liability. After receiving medical treatment at the Center, Jordan tripped over uneven sidewalk slabs near Panorama's main entrance. She fell and suffered a concussion and an orbital fracture. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Colorado pRemises Liability Act (PLA) applied to a commercial tenant defendant for injuries plaintiff sustained in a common area. Specifically, the case turned on whether the tenant qualified as a "landowner" under the PLA. A jury ultimately found in favor of petitioner. The clinic appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court, concluding that because the clinic neither was in possession of the sidewalk where petitioner fell, it was not legally responsible for the condition of the sidewalk or for the activities conducted or circumstances existing there, so it was not a landowner as defined by the PLA. View "Jordan v. Panorama Orthopedics & Spine Ctr., PC" on Justia Law

Applicants-appellants Tom McKenna and McKenna Ranch challenged a water court decision regarding the abandonment list of three of its water rights. The Division Engineer placed applicants' three Sanchez Ditch water rights on the decennial abandonment list because the ditch had not diverted water for several decades. After a hearing in 2013, the water court determined that the Sanchez Ditch water rights had not been applied to beneficial use for the statutory abandonment period, and found applicants had failed to rebut the resultant presumption of intent to abandon the rights. Applicants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the water court's judgment was improper because the Division Engineer missed the statutory deadline to prepare the abandonment list by several days, which they claim divested the water court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed: the deadline to prepare the list under 37-92-401(1)(a), C.R.S. (2014), was directional and not a jurisdictional mandate. Thus the Division Engineer's failure to prepare the list by the statutory deadline did not divest the water court of jurisdiction. Furthermore, because the record supported the water court's conclusion that applicants intended to permanently discontinue using the Sanchez Ditch water rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court's judgment of abandonment. View "McKenna v. Witte" on Justia Law