Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Applicants-appellants Tom McKenna and McKenna Ranch challenged a water court decision regarding the abandonment list of three of its water rights. The Division Engineer placed applicants' three Sanchez Ditch water rights on the decennial abandonment list because the ditch had not diverted water for several decades. After a hearing in 2013, the water court determined that the Sanchez Ditch water rights had not been applied to beneficial use for the statutory abandonment period, and found applicants had failed to rebut the resultant presumption of intent to abandon the rights. Applicants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the water court's judgment was improper because the Division Engineer missed the statutory deadline to prepare the abandonment list by several days, which they claim divested the water court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed: the deadline to prepare the list under 37-92-401(1)(a), C.R.S. (2014), was directional and not a jurisdictional mandate. Thus the Division Engineer's failure to prepare the list by the statutory deadline did not divest the water court of jurisdiction. Furthermore, because the record supported the water court's conclusion that applicants intended to permanently discontinue using the Sanchez Ditch water rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court's judgment of abandonment. View "McKenna v. Witte" on Justia Law

The Tip Jackwater right was originally decreed to service the Tip Jack Ditch, which is part of a 4,000-acre ranch now owned and operated by the Jim Hutton Educational Foundation. The State and Division 1 Engineers added the Tip Jack water right to the 2010 Revised Decennial Abandonment List for Water Division One because they found that the Foundation had abandoned the right. The Foundation challenged the listing. After trial, the water court concluded that the Engineers had not established by a preponderance that Jim Hutton or the Foundation had failed to use the Tip Jack water right, and even if they had, the Foundation had rebutted the presumption of abandonment. The Engineers appealed. The issue this case presented on appeal for the Supreme Court's review was one of first impression: how the presumption of abandonment applied when the water right holder continued to put decreed water to the use for which it was decreed, but nevertheless failed to divert water from the decreed diversion point for a period of ten years or more. The Supreme Court held that hold that when the Engineers prove that the water right holder has not used the decreed point of diversion for ten years or more, the Engineers trigger the rebuttable presumption of abandonment under C.R.S. section 37-92-402(11).Once triggered, the burden shifts to the water right holder to demonstrate a lack of intent to abandon. Because the water court erroneously believed that proof of nonuse at the decreed point of diversion was insufficient to raise the presumption, it failed to require evidence excusing such nonuse in order to rebut the presumption. The Court therefore reverse the water court’s judgment and remand for reconsideration of whether the Foundation met its burden of rebutting the presumption of abandonment. View "Wolfe v. Jim Hutton Educational Foundation" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a series of contracts surrounding the construction of a custom home. Petitioners are soil engineering corporations that subcontracted with developer Sun Mountain Enterprises, LLC to perform soil analysis and soil engineering related to the construction of the home. SK Peightal Engineers, LTD entered an oral contract with general contractor Shannon Custom Homes. Petitioner Hepworth-Pawlak Geotechnical, Inc. entered into a written contract with Sun Mountain containing a duty of care provision. It was unclear whether SK Peightal's oral contact contained the same duty of care requirement. Sun Mountain planned on selling the completed home on the open market, but due to the economic downturn, the house sat until the construction loan contract matured and came due, at which point Sun Mountain and its lender entered into an "Agreement for Deed-in-Lieu of Foreclosure. Sun Mountain was thereby absolved of personal liability for the loan, and the bank took ownership of the house. After the lender took possession, large cracks formed in the walls of the home due to a settling of the soil beneath the home's foundation. The lender sued petitioner soils engineers for negligence. Petitioners moved for summary judgment under the economic loss rule, asserting that the lender was contractually interrelated through the deed-in-lieu and the loan contract to the duty provisions contained in petitioners' contracts with Sun Mountain, and thus the lender was barred from asserting a negligence claim for economic loss. The trial court rejected petitioners' motion. Petitioners then appealed. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the appellate court misinterpreted the case law authority pertaining to this case. View "S K Peightal Engineers, LTD v. Mid Valley Real Estate Solutions V" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, applicants sought to change their use of an absolute water right. Applicants conducted a historical consumptive use (HCU) analysis to determine the amount of water previously used in accordance with its decreed right. Applicants performed the analysis on acreage not contemplated by the original appropriation nor any subsequent decree. The water court rejected the HCU. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether applicant could conduct an HCU on acreage not associated with the relevant water right. After review of the parties' arguments in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that a HCU on acreage beyond its associated water right is impermissible. The Court affirmed the water court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Widefield Water v. Witte" on Justia Law

The Board of Commissioners of the County of Teller filed a petition seeking the district court's review of the City of Woodland Park's annexation of certain real property. Upon review of the petition and the district court's order denying the City's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order: the district court indeed did not have jurisdiction to review the County's petition under 31-12-116 C.R.S. (2013). View "County of Teller Bd. of County Comm'rs v. City of Woodland Park" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case called for a determination of whether section 15-11-1106(2) C.R.S. (2013) required a court to reform a revocable option that was negotiated as part of a commercial contract entered into before the effective date of the statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act. In Colorado, the Act superseded the common law rule for nonvested property interests created after May 31, 1991. The common rule still applied to nonvested property interests created prior to that date. Under the Act, all donative transfers after that date were valid so long as the property interest created vested or terminated within ninety years of its creation. With regard to the specifics of this case, the trial court concluded that the revocable option at issue violated the common law rule against perpetuities. The Court then inserted a savings clause pursuant to statute, to prevent the option from being voided by the common law rule, and ruled that the option holder was entitled to specific performance of the reformed option. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the option did not violate the common law rule, and therefore no reformation by the trial court was necessary. View "Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Whiting Oil and Gas Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on two water rights cases involving Raftopoulos Brothers (Raftopoulos) and Vermillion Ranch Limited Partnership (Vermillion). In Case No. 11SA86, the Court vacated the portions of the water court’s order interpreting the phrase "all other beneficial uses" in a 1974 change decree regarding Raftopoulos’s absolute water rights and whether Raftopoulos had abandoned any right to use the decreed water for commercial or industrial purposes. The Court reversed the portion of the water court’s order decreeing Raftopoulos’s requested new conditional water storage rights to the extent the decree permits the water to be used for industrial and commercial purposes. In Case No. 11SA124, the Court reversed the water court’s order granting Vermillion’s application for a finding of reasonable diligence for previously decreed conditional water storage rights and granting Vermillion’s application for a new conditional water storage right. View "Vermillion Ranch Limited Partnership v. Raftopoulos Brothers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dennis Shaw and First Horizon Home Loan Corporation challenged an appellate court's ruling that "constructive fraud" was sufficient to void a request for release of a deed of trust, arguing that actual fraud is required under CRS 38-39-102(8). The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the statute creates a narrow exception that voids the public trustee’s release of a deed of trust only when proof of actual fraud is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Shaw v. 17 West Mill St." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court considered a reformulated certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: whether Colorado’s premises liability statute applied as a matter of law only to activities and circumstances directly or inherently are related to the land. The Supreme Court held that the statute is not restricted solely to activities and circumstances that are directly or inherently related to the land. Instead, the Court held that the premises liability statute applied to conditions, activities, and circumstances on the property that the landowner is liable for in its legal capacity as a landowner. View "Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P." on Justia Law

This adverse possession dispute between neighbors was appealed to the Supreme Court after a remand. The case below concerned legal interests in water and easement rights for three ditches diverting water from the Huerfano River. After conducting additional evidentiary proceedings as directed in the Court's first decision in this case, the water court found that Defendant Theodore Gomez had adversely possessed Plaintiff Ralph Archuleta's deeded legal interests in the Archuleta Ditch and Manzanares Ditch No. 1, but it also found that Gomez had not adversely possessed Archuleta's deeded legal interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2. The water court ordered payment of costs in favor of Gomez but denied Gomez's request for a partial award of attorney fees. The water court enjoined Gomez from interfering with Archuleta's interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2, and, in an order entered after the time for amending the water court's judgment had run, the water court provided additional details for the injunction, ordering Gomez to reconstruct Manzanares Ditch No. 2 across the northern part of Gomez’s lower parcel to Archuleta's property. Upon review of the case from remand, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the water court in part, concluding that Gomez adversely possessed Archuleta's legal interests in the Archuleta Ditch and Manzanares Ditch No. 1. The Court reversed the water court's judgment in part, ordering it to enter an injunction for reconstruction of Manzanares Ditch No. 2 and an easement across the northern part of Gomez's lower parcel to Archuleta’s adjoining parcel, so that Archuleta will receive the flow of water his legal interest in this ditch entitles him to divert. View "Archuleta v. Gomez" on Justia Law