Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court considered a reformulated certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: whether Colorado’s premises liability statute applied as a matter of law only to activities and circumstances directly or inherently are related to the land. The Supreme Court held that the statute is not restricted solely to activities and circumstances that are directly or inherently related to the land. Instead, the Court held that the premises liability statute applied to conditions, activities, and circumstances on the property that the landowner is liable for in its legal capacity as a landowner. View "Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P." on Justia Law

This adverse possession dispute between neighbors was appealed to the Supreme Court after a remand. The case below concerned legal interests in water and easement rights for three ditches diverting water from the Huerfano River. After conducting additional evidentiary proceedings as directed in the Court's first decision in this case, the water court found that Defendant Theodore Gomez had adversely possessed Plaintiff Ralph Archuleta's deeded legal interests in the Archuleta Ditch and Manzanares Ditch No. 1, but it also found that Gomez had not adversely possessed Archuleta's deeded legal interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2. The water court ordered payment of costs in favor of Gomez but denied Gomez's request for a partial award of attorney fees. The water court enjoined Gomez from interfering with Archuleta's interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2, and, in an order entered after the time for amending the water court's judgment had run, the water court provided additional details for the injunction, ordering Gomez to reconstruct Manzanares Ditch No. 2 across the northern part of Gomez’s lower parcel to Archuleta's property. Upon review of the case from remand, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the water court in part, concluding that Gomez adversely possessed Archuleta's legal interests in the Archuleta Ditch and Manzanares Ditch No. 1. The Court reversed the water court's judgment in part, ordering it to enter an injunction for reconstruction of Manzanares Ditch No. 2 and an easement across the northern part of Gomez's lower parcel to Archuleta’s adjoining parcel, so that Archuleta will receive the flow of water his legal interest in this ditch entitles him to divert. View "Archuleta v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Prior to a foreclosure sale, Petitioner Betty Amos and her late husband, Thomas Righetti, owned a condominium unit in Aspen. Amos borrowed approximately $1.6 million from Equitable Bank securing the loan with a Deed of Trust on the condominium unit in favor of Equitable Bank and granted by Amos and Righetti. In September 2002, Righetti died. Amos and Righetti's daughter, Brandy Righetti, were named as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Thomas Righetti. The loan fell into default and Equitable Bank decided to foreclose on the property. Equitable Bank filed a Rule 120 Motion for Order Authorizing Sale and sent notice of the proceeding to Amos in her individual capacity. Equitable Bank did not send notice of the Rule 120 proceeding to the Estate or to Brandy Righetti. Neither Amos nor the Estate opposed the order authorizing sale. The public trustee held a foreclosure sale in early 2007. Neither Amos nor the Estate submitted a bid. After Equitable Bank bid the amount of its debt, three individuals Respondent Aspen Alps 123, LLC was the successful bidder. The public trustee issued the deed quieting title in the property to Aspen Alps. Amos then brought this action against the public trustee and Equitable Bank to enjoin the issuance of the deed to Aspen Alps, and to compel the trustee to allow her to redeem. Concurrently, she filed a notice of lis pendens. When the trial court refused to grant a preliminary injunction in Amos' favor, she filed a second notice of lis pendens. Amos then amended her complaint to include a claim that Equitable Bank failed to strictly comply with the notice requirements of Rule 120. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the parties received actual notice which afforded them an opportunity to present their objections and no prejudice resulted. Accordingly, the Court refused to disturb the completed foreclosure sale. View "Amos v. Aspen Alps 123, LLC Real Property" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court was asked to respond to a certified question posed by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. The question arose out of an adversary proceeding in which the plaintiff, in his capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee, sought to assert his "strong arm" powers under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) to avoid the defendants' security interest in the debtor's property and to recover the property for the benefit of the estate. At the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, the defendants' security interest was documented in a deed of trust that was recorded and properly indexed in the City and County of Denver, where the encumbered property is located. The recorded deed identified the encumbered property by a correct and complete street address and expressly referred to an attached legal description of the property. The recorded deed, however, omitted the referenced attachment. The Trustee contended that because the recorded deed of trust did not contain a legal description of the encumbered property, it failed to provide sufficient notice of the defendants' security interest to a subsequent purchaser of the property under sections 38-35-109(1) and 38-35-122, C.R.S. (2011). The Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances of this case, actual knowledge could not be imputed to the trustee, and the deed of trust did not otherwise provide sufficient notice of the defendant's security interest in the debtor's property. The supreme court answered the certified question in the negative and returned the case to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado for further proceedings. View "Sender v. Cygan" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 38-5-105 C.R.S. (2011) granted condemnation authority to a company for the construction of a petroleum pipeline. Upon review, the Court concluded that the General Assembly did not grant expressly or implication, the power of eminent domain to companies for the construction of pipelines conveying petroleum. Therefore, section 38-5-105 did not grant that authority to Respondent Sinclair Transportation Company for its proposed pipeline project. The Court reversed the court of appeals' opinion that upheld the trial court's order granting Sinclair immediate possession of the property belonging to Petitioners Ivar and Donna Larson and Lauren and Kay Sandberg. View "Larson v. Sinclair Transp. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jesse Reynolds and the owners of several other ditches that divert water from La Jara Creek appealed an order of the Water Court that denied their claim for declaratory relief. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that their appropriative rights to creek water were not limited to water flowing into the creek from the San Luis Valley Drain Ditch. Without directly addressing the merits of their claim, the water court granted summary judgment in favor of the State and Division Engineers (as well as other defendants) on the grounds that substantially the same issue had been litigated and decided against Plaintiffs in a prior declaratory action. The court concluded that all of the water rights of the parties in La Jara Creek were not only at issue, but were finally determined in that prior litigation, and therefore Plaintiffs’ claims were precluded. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiffs' claims had not been determined in the prior litigation (either expressly or by implication), and that the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate. The Court reversed the water court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reynolds v. Cotten" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Town of Minturn enacted annexation ordinances for nine parcels of property in response to annexation petitions filed in 2005, which claimed that Ginn (petitioner in this action) was the 100% owner of the land proposed to be annexed. Ginn and Respondent Sensible Housing Co. were involved in a quiet title action concerning portions of the annexed property, which commenced before Ginn filed the annexation petitions. Sensible sought judicial review of the annexation pursuant to section 31-12-116, C.R.S. (2011), asserting that Minturn exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion by approving the annexation of the property without an election, due to the ongoing dispute as to the property’s title. The court of appeals agreed and applied the "priority rule" to the annexation proceedings, which states that "when more than one court can exercise jurisdiction over a matter, 'the court first acquiring jurisdiction [over] the parties and the subject matter has exclusive jurisdiction.'" Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the priority rule could not be applied to municipal annexation proceedings because those proceedings are a legislative function. View "Town of Minturn v. Sensible Housing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2003, Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that Defendant BP America Production Company (BP) improperly deducted postproduction costs from royalty payments due between January 1986 and December 1997. To toll the applicable six-year statute of limitations, Plaintiffs claimed that BP fraudulently concealed material facts which gave rise to their claims. The trial court certified the class, and the appellate court affirmed. BP then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) proof of fraudulent concealment was inherently individualized, and not amenable to resolution on a class basis; and, (2) the class time period was overly broad and as a result, includes members who had no costs deducted under the "netback" methodology. BP thus argued that the trial court erred in certifying the class. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with either of BP's arguments, and affirmed the trial court's certification of the class. View "BP America Prod. Co. v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case pertained to the standards a trial court applies when it decides whether to certify a class pursuant to C.R.C.P. 23. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' rulings: that the trial court must apply a "preponderance of the evidence" standard to C.R.C.P. 23's requirements, that the trial court must resolve factual or legal disputes dispositive of class certification regardless of any overlap with the merits, and that the trial court must resolve expert disputes regardless of any overlap with the merits. The Court also concluded that the trial court rigorously analyzed the evidence in determining that Plaintiffs in this case established an identifiable class and satisfied C.R.C.P. 23(b)(3)'s "predominance" requirement. View "Jackson v. Unocal Corp" on Justia Law

In this case, the District Court for Jefferson County dismissed a condemnation petition for a private way of necessity because the developer of the allegedly landlocked parcel did not sufficiently define the scope of and necessity for the proposed condemnation. Evidence showed that the development might vary from one to thirty residential dwellings which prevented the court from entering a condemnation order that would minimize the burden to be placed upon condemnee’s property. The court of appeals ruled that the condemnation could proceed based only upon the zoning of the condemnor’s property. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, and reinstated the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that, when a petitioner seeks to condemn a private way of necessity for access to property it wishes to develop in the future, it must demonstrate a purpose for the condemnation that enables the trial court to examine both the scope of and necessity for the proposed condemnation, so that the burden to be imposed upon the condemnee’s property may be ascertained and circumscribed through the trial court’s condemnation order. The record in this case supported the trial court’s dismissal of the condemnation petition. View "The Glenelk Ass'n, Inc. v. Lewis" on Justia Law