Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case were two water court rulings upholding the Special Improvement District No. 1 (“Subdistrict”) of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District’s (“District”) and the State Engineer’s approval of the 2012 Annual Replacement Plan (“ARP”) developed pursuant to the Subdistrict’s decreed Plan of Water Management (“Amended Plan”). In "San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association v. Special Improvement District No. 1" (“San Antonio”), (270 P.3d 927 (Colo. 2011)), the Supreme Court affirmed the water court’s May 2010 Decree that approved the Subdistrict’s Amended Plan and imposed additional decree conditions on that Plan. The 2012 ARP under review here was the first ARP prepared pursuant to the Subdistrict’s Amended Plan. Water levels in the unconfined aquifer within the Subdistrict declined significantly due to increased groundwater consumption and sustained drought. The Amended Plan required the Subdistrict to prepare, and obtain the State Engineer’s approval of, an ARP that prevented injury to senior water rights. Objectors San Antonio, Los Pinos and Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association Save Our Senior Water Rights, LLC, Richard Ramstetter, and Costilla Ditch Company were senior surface water right holders on the Rio Grande River and its tributaries. They appealed two pretrial rulings as well as a judgment and decree upholding the 2012 ARP. Upon review of the objections, the Supreme Court concluded that the 2012 ARP complied with the Amended Plan and 2010 Decree, and protected against injury. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's pretrial orders, judgment and decree pertaining to the 2012 ARP. View "San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Preservation" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a change of water rights filed by applicants East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation District and Colorado Water Network, Inc. (collectively, East Cherry Creek). East Cherry Creek submitted an application for change of water right involving shares it owned in the Greeley Irrigation Company (GIC) for use in its system. The Poudre Prairie Decree employed a ditch-wide analysis for calculating the amount of historical consumptive use ascribable to each GIC share. Subsequent decrees relied on the ditch-wide historical consumptive use determination made in the Poudre Decree. In making its application, East Cherry Creek asserted its ability to use the same Poudre pro-rata allocation of consumptive use water to its shares as occurred for previously changed shares in the ditch system. East Cherry Creek sought an order from the water court entering the court's denial of its Rule 56(h) motion as a final judgment, and the State and Division Engineers opposed the motion. The order was made final, and East Cherry Creek appealed denial of its Rule 54(b) motion to the Supreme Court. After review, the Court agreed with the Engineers that the water court's order did not constitute a final judgment on any claim for relief in the underlying change case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's certification order, dismissed the appeal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "East Cherry Creek Valley v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

This water case involving neighboring property owners in Saguache County presented an issue of first impression for the Supreme Court: may the land owner whose property is burdened by an easement across his or her property for a water ditch obtain a junior conditional water right at the headgate of that ditch for non-consumptive hydropower use of water that the neighbor is diverting from the stream under a senior water right for irrigation use through that headgate? Applying the no material injury, water availability, and maximum beneficial use principles of Colorado water law, in conjunction the decision in "Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude’s Co.," (36P.3d 1229 (2001)), the District Court for Water Division No. 3 issued a declaratory judgment and a conditional water right decree in the amount of 0.41 cubic feet per second ("cfs") with a 2010 priority for hydropower use to Charles and Barbara Tidd for diversion from Garner Creek at the headgate of Garner Creek Ditch No. 1. The Plaintiffs–Appellants, David L. Frees, George A. Frees, Delmer E. Frees, and Shirley A. Frees, asserted that the water court lacked authority to decree this water right over their objection. After review, the Supreme Court deferred to the water court's findings of fact and upheld its conclusions of law. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court held that the water court did not err in issuing a conditional decree for a non-consumptive hydropower use water right with a 2010 priority for 0.41 cfs diverted from Garner Creek through the headgate of Garner Creek Ditch No. 1. View "Frees v. Tidd" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a change-of-water-rights application filed by East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District and the Colorado Water Network, Inc. (collectively, East Cherry Creek). East Cherry Creek submitted its application involving shares it owned in the Greeley Irrigation Company (GIC) for use in its water system. The "Poudre Prairie Decree" used a ditch-wide analysis for calculating the amount of historical consumptive use ascribable to each GIC share. East Cherry Creek asserted its ability to use the same Poudre Prairie pro-rata allocation of consumptive use water to its shares as occurred for previously changed shares in the ditch system. The water court denied East Cherry Creek's C.R.C.P. 56(h) motion. East Cherry Creek then sought an order entering the denial as a final judgment. The State and Division Engineers opposed the motion, but was overruled. East Cherry Creek then appealed its Rule 56(h) motion denial (raising three issues), and the Engineers cross-appealed (raising two issues). The Supreme Court agreed with the Engineers: that the trial court did not enter a final judgment on any claim for relief in this litigation. The water court's certification order was reversed, the appeal dismissed, and the case remanded for further proceedings at the water court. View "East Cherry Creek Valley v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the historical beneficial consumptive use calculation of an 1872 irrigation right in a change of water right and augmentation plan proceeding. Sedalia Water and Sanitation District was the owner of a portion of that water right which it acquired from Owens Brothers Concrete Company. When the company owned its portion of the appropriation, it obtained a change of water right decree quantifying an annual average of 13 acre-feet of water available for use as augmentation plan credit for replacement of out-of-priority tributary groundwater depletions from a well. Having acquired the concrete company's interest, Sedalia claimed a right to the same amount of historical consumptive use water for its well augmentation plan in this case. On competing motions for summary judgment, the water court ruled that the doctrine of issue preclusion prohibited the State and Division Engineers from relitigating the quantification question (because they had been parties to the concrete company's 1986 augmentation plan case). The court held that the Engineers could raise the issue of abandonment at trial if they chose to. The Engineers argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Court should adopt a comprehensive rule that every change case triggered requantification of a water right. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: issue preclusion applied to prevent relitigation of the historical beneficial consumptive use quantification; issue preclusion did not prevent the water court from inquiring into the alleged 24-year post-1986 non-use the Engineers alleged. View "Wolfe v. Sedalia" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, applicants sought to change their use of an absolute water right. Applicants conducted a historical consumptive use (HCU) analysis to determine the amount of water previously used in accordance with its decreed right. Applicants performed the analysis on acreage not contemplated by the original appropriation nor any subsequent decree. The water court rejected the HCU. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether applicant could conduct an HCU on acreage not associated with the relevant water right. After review of the parties' arguments in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that a HCU on acreage beyond its associated water right is impermissible. The Court affirmed the water court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Widefield Water v. Witte" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Special District Act (SDA) gave special districts the power to assign to a private party the right to receive development fees. Cherry Creek South Metropolitan District 1 assigned to a predecessor-in-interest of petitioner SDI, Inc. the right to receive fees the District assessed on developers within its boundaries to finance development of municipal infrastructure. The District increased the fees by about four percent each of the years prior to the assignment. SDI increased the fees it collected, but at a rate of eight percent per year. SDI sued Pivotal Parker Commercial, LLC to recover unpaid development fees, and requested a declaratory judgment that it could raise annual fees in the future. The trial court held that SDI was entitled to receive the fees as increased annually. Pivotal argued on appeal that the fee increase was an improper delegation of legislative authority. The appellate court reversed the trial court, which found that the District had no right to assign the fees. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding that the appellate court's reasoning was contrary to the SDA itself. As such, the Supreme Court held that the District's assignment of the right to collect fees was a lawful exercise of its statutory authority. The case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of other issues Pivotal raised on appeal. View "SDI, Inc. v. Pivotal Parker, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Town of Dillon enacted two municipal ordinances: one authorized a local road improvement project, and another concerning parking enforcement on a public right-of-way. Owners of the Yacht Club Condominiums challenged the ordinances, arguing, among other things, that the ordinances were an unreasonable exercise of the Town's police power because they eliminated the ability of the owners' guests to use the Town's rights-of-way as overflow parking. The trial court concluded the Town's exercise of its police power was unreasonable. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Town appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the ordinances were within the Town's police power to regulate matters of public health, safety and welfare, and reasonably related to the Town's objectives of improving traffic safety and improving water drainage. View "Town of Dillon v. Yacht Club Condominiums Home Owners Association" on Justia Law

The Board of Commissioners of the County of Teller filed a petition seeking the district court's review of the City of Woodland Park's annexation of certain real property. Upon review of the petition and the district court's order denying the City's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order: the district court indeed did not have jurisdiction to review the County's petition under 31-12-116 C.R.S. (2013). View "County of Teller Bd. of County Comm'rs v. City of Woodland Park" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jesse Reynolds and the owners of several other ditches that divert water from La Jara Creek appealed an order of the Water Court that denied their claim for declaratory relief. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that their appropriative rights to creek water were not limited to water flowing into the creek from the San Luis Valley Drain Ditch. Without directly addressing the merits of their claim, the water court granted summary judgment in favor of the State and Division Engineers (as well as other defendants) on the grounds that substantially the same issue had been litigated and decided against Plaintiffs in a prior declaratory action. The court concluded that all of the water rights of the parties in La Jara Creek were not only at issue, but were finally determined in that prior litigation, and therefore Plaintiffs’ claims were precluded. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiffs' claims had not been determined in the prior litigation (either expressly or by implication), and that the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate. The Court reversed the water court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reynolds v. Cotten" on Justia Law