Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the District Court's suppression of Defendant Khaled Zadran's statements, which were obtained through a custodial interrogation. The police arrested and interrogated Zadran in the course of an investigation of a suspected drug dealer. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether the police officer who interrogated Zadran engaged in coercive conduct sufficient to render Zadran's inculpatory statements involuntary. The trial court found that the interrogating officer made improper implied promises and had a generally coercive demeanor. Thus, the trial court concluded that all of Zadran's statements were involuntary and inadmissible. The Court held that under the totality of the circumstances, that the interrogation was not coercive and the statements were voluntary. View "Colorado v. Zadran" on Justia Law

This case was an appeal of a final water court order which voided a rule promulgated by the Office of the State Engineer regarding nontributary ground water extracted in the course of coalbed methane (CBM) production and other oil and gas development. The final rules were challenged by owners of vested water rights and citizen groups whose members owned vested water rights. After extensive briefing by the parties, the water court upheld the Final Rules in their entirety except for the "Fruitland Rule," which it invalidated. The water court held that although H.B. 1303 granted authority to the State Engineer to promulgate the Fruitland Rule, the Tribal Rule essentially divested the State Engineer of that authority. The water court also found that the State Engineer had issued an improper "advisory" rule, and thus could not promulgate the Fruitland Rule unless he first obtained a judicial determination of his authority over nontributary ground water underlying the Reservation. The State Engineer, the Tribe, and several Intervenors appealed the water court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule based on the Tribal Rule. The Court concluded the Tribal Rule did not divest the State Engineer of this authority: it stated on its face that the Final Rules themselves do not form the basis of or "establish" the State Engineer's authority to administer the nontributary ground water within Reservation boundaries. Because the Tribal Rule did not divest the State Engineer of his authority, the water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule on that ground. Furthermore, the water court also erred in labeling the Fruitland Rule an "advisory" rule and in requiring the State Engineer to obtain a judicial determination that he had authority to administer nontributary ground water within the boundaries of the Reservation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the water court’s invalidation of the Fruitland Rule and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dick Wolfe v. Pawnee Well Users, Inc." on Justia Law

The State petitioned for relief from an in limine ruling of the juvenile court allowing the introduction of testimony by the juvenile’s psychological expert without regard for the court-ordered examination mandated by section 16-8-107, C.R.S. (2013). The juvenile court reasoned that in the absence of any provision of the Criminal Procedure Code specifying otherwise, the requirements of section 16-8-107 did not apply to delinquency proceedings. Finding no error in the juvenile court's analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Colorado in the Interest of A.A." on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the trial court's suppression of evidence discovered in a vehicle search incident to the arrest of defendant Shaun Crum. Police officers observed Crum standing near the open rear driver-side door of a SUV late at night in a commercial area known for high levels of drug activity. The officers approached Crum to speak with him, ran a wants and warrants check, and discovered an outstanding warrant for Crum's arrest. As Crum was being placed under arrest, he dropped a fast food wrapper and stepped on it, attempting to crush it with his feet. The officers retrieved the wrapper, which was found to hold a baggie containing two Oxycodone pills packaged in a manner consistent with a possible intent to distribute. The officers then searched the vehicle, finding various items in the passenger compartment that led to additional drug charges. Crum moved to suppress, but the trial court ruled that although the officers had probable cause to arrest Crum for possession of a controlled substance, they lacked sufficient reason to believe that the vehicle contained further evidence of possession. Consequently, the court suppressed the evidence discovered in the search. Because the officers saw Crum reaching into the vehicle, apparently retrieving the pills that he later attempted to conceal, the Supreme Court concluded it was reasonable for them to suspect that additional pills might be found in the vehicle. Under these circumstances, the Court found sufficient connection between the contraband in Crum’s possession and the vehicle to give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that additional contraband might be located in the vehicle. Therefore the suppression order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Crum" on Justia Law

Defendant sought the return of $11,200 that was forfeited, distributed and spent by the receiving agencies three-and-a-half years before his criminal conviction was dismissed. The trial court granted defendant's motion. The State appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's order. After its review, the Supreme Court held that section 16-13-307(1.6), C.R.S. (2013) of the public nuisance statute did not apply where the underlying criminal case was dismissed following a reversal of the related criminal conviction on appeal when forfeiture judgment already entered. Accordingly, the appellate court was reversed. View "Colorado v. $11,200.00 U.S. Currency" on Justia Law

A.S. was sentenced as an aggravated juvenile offender to two years' commitment to the Department of Human Services, suspended on condition of successful completion of two years' probation. The district court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that 19-2-601 C.R.S. (2013) authorized only commitment to DHS, and did not grant a court discretion to grant probation. Upon review of the applicable statute, the Supreme Court concluded 19-2-601 does indeed grant a sentencing court discretion. View "A.S. v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In June 2013, in Pueblo and El Paso County citizens certified petitions to recall State Senator Angela Giron and State Senator John Morse. A month later, the Governor set a September 10 recall election for both Senate seats. This recall election was the first in Colorado's history for members of the General Assembly. The Governor then submitted an Interrogatory to the Supreme Court pursuant to Article VI, section 3,of the Colorado Constitution to ask whether the prior participation requirement in Article XXI, section 3, of the Colorado Constitution conflicted with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Colorado Court issued an Order holding that the prior participation requirement in Article XXI, section 3, conflicted with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. View "In re Interrogatory Propounded by Governor Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

Paul Voth was arrested after firing several gunshots in a rural subdivision where he lived. He was taken to Denver Health Medical Center. Denver Health reported that Voth was disoriented when he arrived at the hospital due to visual and auditory hallucinations. Voth's delirium began to subside around about a month later. Although Denver Health suspected that viral encephalitis was the source of Voth's psychotic episode, it did not reach a definitive diagnosis. Voth was ultimately charged with several crimes; he entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the trial court's oral order allowing Voth, to assert involuntary intoxication as an affirmative defense under section 18-1-804, C.R.S. (2013).The Court found the trial court abused its discretion when it found that a virus qualified as a "substance" that could result in intoxication under the statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Voth" on Justia Law

Defendant met his victim "ML" while standing in line at a store. A few days later, he and ML went out for dinner and drinks. Instead of driving ML to her car at the end of the date, defendant drove ML to a secluded location and sexually assaulted her. A jury would convict defendant of felonious sexual assault for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight years to life, and designated as an SVP. Defendant appealed his conviction, sentence, and SVP designation to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the sexual assault conviction, but held that the trial court erred when it designated defendant as an SVP without making the factual findings required by the SVP statute. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to make the factual findings of whether defendant was an SVP. Defendant took issue with the trial court's finding that he "established a relationship" with the victim with the intent of assaulting her to satisfy that criterion of the SVP statute. After applying its interpretation of the relationship criterion to the record in this case, the Court held that the trial court made the appropriate specific findings and correctly designated defendant as a SVP. View "Candelaria v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the appellate court erred including that where reasonable attorney fees were provided for in a contract, and the judgment based on that contract was reduced by a counterclaim arising out of the transaction, the trial court must apportion the fees according to the amount recovered on the contract less the amount received in the counterclaim. The Court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, determining whether and how to apportion fees between the parties is within the trial court's discretion, and can only be overturned by an abuse of that discretion. View "Planning Partners Int'l, LLC v. QED, Inc." on Justia Law