Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Dina Marshall was charged with driving under the influence of drugs, careless driving, and possession of drug paraphernalia after lab urinalysis results revealed she had methamphetamine in her system when she caused a car accident. At trial, the State sought to admit the lab result showing that Marshall had methamphetamine in her urine; over Marshall's objection, the trial court admitted the lab report without the testimony of the lab technician who actually performed the test. Marshall appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that the admission of the report did not violate Marshall's right to confront witnesses. The Court found that there was no evidence presented at trial that Marshall possessed drug paraphernalia. Therefore, the Court found that the trial court erroneously denied Marshall's motion for judgment of acquittal on this charge, and reversed the district court's judgment with respect to that charge.View "Marshall v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Kathleen Hopkins retired from the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment. During her period of employment, the Department made contributions to her retirement fund, and once she retired, she began taking retirement payments from that fund. Later, she went to work for the Department again. When she was laid off from this second period of employment, she applied for and was awarded unemployment benefits. Benefits were discontinued and she was issued a notice of overpayment. She appealed the notice and a hearing officer restored her benefits. The Department appealed, and a panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO) reversed the hearing officer's decision, reasoning that Hopkins was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because her retirement income exceeded the amount of the unemployment. Hopkins appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the offset provision applied only when the employer contributed to the claimant's retirement fund during the base period of employment that made her eligible for unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court and reversed, finding that the offset provision applied any time the employer has contributed to the retirement fund from which the claimant received payments, regardless of when the contributions were made. View "Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Colorado Dept. of Labor & Employment" on Justia Law

Defendant Carlos Gallegos pled guilty to attempted sexual assault on a child after admitting to sexually assaulting his live-in-girlfriend's six-year-old daughter. The trial court found that defendant met the relationship criterion of the sexually violent predator (SVP) statute because he established a relationship with the victim primarily to sexually assaulting her. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was the interpretation of "established a relationship" and "promoted a relationship" in the SVP statute. Applying the definition of these phrases to defendant's case, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to reverse defendant's SVP designation because he had not "established a relationship" with the victim primarily for the purpose of assaulting her because he lived with her and treated her as a stepdaughter preceding the assault.View "Colorado v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

Defendant James Hunter was designated as a sexually violent predator (SVP) following his conviction of second-degree burglary, sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, and a crime of violence. The court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction, but reversed the SVP designation, and remanded the case back to the trial court for specific findings on whether either of defendant's victims were strangers to him, or whether he had established or promoted a relationship with either. On remand, defendant argued he was not a stranger. The trial court found that he was, and designated him an SVP. The issue before the Supreme Court turns on the interpretation of "stranger" in the SVP statute. Upon review, the Court held that "stranger" meant that the offender did not know the victim, or the victim did not know the offender at the time of the offense. On application of "stranger" in the SVP statute to this case, the Court held that the appellate court erred when it reversed the trial court's ruling designating defendant an SVP.View "Colorado v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Defendant David Uribe-Sanchez was charged with four felonies and two crimes-of-violence sentence enhancers for the sexual assault of a girl who referred to him as "dad." He would be sentenced to 34 years imprisonment and designated a sexually violent predator (SVP). To conclude that defendant satisfied the relationship criteria of the SVP statute, the trial court concluded defendant "promoted" his relationship with the victim primarily to victimize her. The appellate court affirmed. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts in this case erred by concluding defendant "promoted a relationship" with the victim when he assaulted her. The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for a determination of whether the SVP designation was proper under the SVP statute.View "Uribe-Sanchez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In 1989, Alva Hickerson signed a ten-year promissory note payable to Vessels Oil and Gas Company. Under the terms of the note, the debt was due for full payment in 1999. The holder of the note sued in 2009 for collection of the full, unpaid amount of the debt, plus interest. The six-year statute of limitations would have barred suit after 2005, but the unpaid balance was restarted because a partial payment was deemed a promise to repay the remaining debt. The trial court allowed the laches defense, but the Court of Appeals ruled that Colorado's separation of powers doctrine prohibited a court form applying laches to shorten the filing period. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the separation of powers doctrine did not bar a laches defense to a debt collection action filed within the original or restarted limitations period because laches does not conflict with the statute of limitation. View "Hickerson v. Vessels" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether accrued vacation and sick leave may be considered marital property subject to division under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA). The trial court entered an order dividing the value of the husband's accrued vacation and sick leave as part of the marital estate. The husband appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that where a spouse has an enforceable right to be paid for accrued vacation or sick leave, such leave earned during the marriage is marital property for the purposes of the UDMA. Where the value of the leave can be ascertained at the time of dissolution, a trial court should consider such value when equitably dividing the marital estate. In this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in considering the value of the husband's accrued leave because no competent evidence was presented to establish he had an enforceable right to payment for such leave. View "In re the Marriage of Cardona and Castro" on Justia Law

A Jefferson County Sheriff Deputy was transporting two juveniles from a court hearing. The two were seated in the rear of the transport van, handcuffed. En route, another driver allegedly turned into an intersection without yielding and collided with the transport van. As a result of the collision, the juveniles sustained multiple injuries. The juveniles sued the County, alleging the deputy transporting them was negligent. The County claimed it was immune from suit. The trial court denied the County's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. Upon review of the County's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in finding allegations of negligence alone were sufficient to overcome the statutory grant of immunity and the presumption of good faith afforded to law enforcement. The Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Young v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

The parties appealed the water court's decision that holdover directors of a water conservancy district could not continue to act on behalf of the district a year after the expiration of their term. The Supreme Court held that the holdover provision in the Water Conservancy Act allowed for a holdover director to continue to serve as a de jure officer, and did not impose a temporal limit on that director's authority to act on behalf of the district. View "Yellow Jacket Water Conservancy District v. Livingston" on Justia Law

The State challenged the trial court's suppression of evidence taken from defendant Jesse Lee Cunningham's home pursuant to warrant. The trial court ruled that pursuant to Crim. P. 41(e), defendant's motion to suppress required the State to initially go forward with evidence that the seizure was performed pursuant to a facially valid warrant, and that the warrant was legally executed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in that analysis. "Whether a search or seizure is performed pursuant to a warrant or is warrantless, defendant under Crim. P. 41(e) bears the burden of going forward to show that the search or seizure violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights." View "Colorado v. Cunningham" on Justia Law