Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed a court of appeals' opinion in "Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder," whereby the underlying civil action involved claims brought by Professor Ward Churchill pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 after his tenured employment was terminated by the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado. Churchill alleged that the Regents violated his constitutionally protected free speech rights by initiating an investigation into his academic integrity and by terminating his tenured employment in retaliation for his publication of a controversial essay. Churchill sought both compensatory and equitable relief. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Churchill's termination claim on grounds that the Regents' quasi-judicial actions were entitled to absolute immunity. It also affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Churchill's claim for equitable remedies because it concluded that such remedies were not available in a Section 1983 action against quasi-judicial officials. Lastly, based on its determination that allegedly retaliatory employment investigations are not actionable under Section 1983, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the University on Churchill's bad faith investigation claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds: (1) the Court held that the Regents' decision to terminate Churchill's employment was a quasi-judicial action functionally comparable to a judicial process, and that the Regents were entitled to absolute immunity concerning their decision; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Churchill was not entitled to the equitable remedies of reinstatement and front pay; and (3) Churchill’s bad faith investigation claim was barred by qualified immunity because the Regents' investigation into Churchill's academic record does not implicate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right or law. View "Churchill v. University of Colorado at Boulder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine, whether an attorney owes fiduciary duties to third parties who are entitled to funds from Colorado Lawyer Trust Account Foundation (COLTAF) trust accounts. The court of appeals reversed a trial court judgment and held that an attorney did not owe fiduciary duties to a group of medical service providers who were owed funds held in the attorney's COLTAF account. The Providers and the attorney, David J. Mintz,had an extensive and often contentious personal and business relationship over several years. Typically, Mintz would refer an uninsured victim of a motor vehicle accident to the Providers for medical services, paying himself and his clients' medical costs out of proceeds he secured after negotiating insurance settlements for the clients. The relationship turned sour due to a dispute about costs of a joint advertising arrangement, and, for reasons disputed by the parties, Mintz began withholding funds owed to the Providers for his clients' medical costs. Mintz eventually initiated an interpleader action for the withheld funds, naming as defendants his clients and the Providers. The Providers answered with several counterclaims, including breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court bifurcated the action and first determined that the Providers were entitled to the specific amount withheld in Mintz's COLTAF account but no more. In the second trial, the trial court found for the Providers on their abuse of process and breach of fiduciary duty counterclaims.The court of appeals reversed the trial court's holdings for the Providers in the second trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals and affirmed judgment: "the Providers may not maintain a breach of fiduciary duty tort action against Mintz based on his obligations as trustee of his COLTAF account. The attorney-client relationship creates fiduciary obligations with corresponding liabilities on the part of the attorney to the client, not to third parties such as the medical providers in this case. Although Mintz may have had ethical or contractual obligations to disburse money that clients owed to the Providers out of insurance settlement proceeds placed into his COLTAF account, Mintz did not owe the Providers the duties of a fiduciary that give rise to tort liability." View "Accident & Injury Medical Specialists., P.C. v. Mintz" on Justia Law

Grand Valley Citizens' Alliance filed a complaint alleging that it was entitled to a hearing on an application for permit to drill pursuant to section 34-60-108(7), C.R.S. (2011), of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that under subsection 108(7), Grand Valley Citizens were entitled to a hearing because it had a filed a petition on a matter within the jurisdiction of the Commission. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals judgment, holding that section 34-60-108(7) requires a hearing only for rules, regulations, and orders. Permits are governed by section 34-60-106(1)(f), which grants the Oil and Gas Commission broad authority to promulgate rules governing the permitting process, including the authority to determine who may request a hearing. View "Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission" on Justia Law

The People brought an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2011),and C.A.R. 4.1, challenging the district court's suppression of statements made by Defendant Erick Figueroa-Ortega to a police detective. Defendant was charged with burglary, criminal mischief, and theft, in connection with a break-in at the restaurant where he worked as a cook. The district court found that the statements in question were the product of custodial interrogation, without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Because the Supreme Court determined that the defendant was not in custody at the time he made the statements in question, the district court erred, and its suppression order was reversed. View "Colorado v. Figueroa-Ortega" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court accepted certiorari on a statutory construction issue involving the definition of the word "victim" within the criminal case restitution statute, sections 18-1.3-601 to -603, C.R.S. (2011). Under that statute, the general assembly defined "victim" as "any person aggrieved by the conduct of an offender." The prosecution argued that the El Paso County Department of Human Services (DHS) was a victim entitled to restitution from Defendant Nicolette Chris Padilla-Lopez because it was required to expend funds to provide foster care for her children as a result of her guilty plea to misdemeanor child abuse. The court of appeals held that DHS could not be considered a victim for purposes of the criminal case restitution statute because the elements of the underlying crime of child abuse pertained to wrongful conduct against the child and do not include a wrong against DHS. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed: "the existing criminal case restitution statute does not classify DHS as a 'victim' for the purpose of recovering costs it has expended in the course of fulfilling its statutorily mandated duty to provide necessary care to dependent and neglected children." View "Colorado v. Padilla-Lopez" on Justia Law

With the approval of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), in 2005 the Public Service Company of Colorado (Xcel) began constructing a coal-fired electric power unit known as "Comanche 3." When Xcel sought to recover a portion of its construction costs nearly four years later in a rate proceeding, Petitioner Leslie Glustrom intervened. Petitioner sought to introduce testimony that Xcel acted improperly and, consequently, should not recover its costs. The PUC excluded most of her testimony, a ruling that Petitioner challenged. Petitioner separately challenged the depreciation rate and the possibility that Comanche 3 might not be "used and useful" at the time rates went into effect. The PUC denied her challenges, and the district court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the PUC did not abuse its discretion when it struck substantial portions of Petitioner's testimony pursuant to the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Further, the depreciation rate approved by the PUC was established pursuant to law and in accordance with the evidence. Lastly, the PUC was free to exercise its discretion in departing from a strict application of the "used and useful" principle. Petitioner failed to meet her burden in showing why such a departure here would result in a rate that is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences. View "Glustrom v. Colorado Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Pierson sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed his various convictions of felony sexual assault on a child and indecent exposure. The district court denied Defendant's pre-trial motion to admit evidence of the child's similar victimization by a teenage cousin, during substantially the same time period. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling, finding both that the proffered evidence of prior sexual contact did not fall within the rape shield exception for the source of semen, pregnancy, disease, or similar evidence of sexual intercourse, and that it was not relevant for any of the other purposes offered by the Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding that because the proffered evidence amounted to evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual activity, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence. View "Pierson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal seeking the Supreme Court's review of a trial court order that suppressed evidence seized by police following an inventory search after a traffic stop. The trial court ruled that the traffic stop was pretextual and thus invalid. The court reasoned that, pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, contraband (heroin and drug paraphernalia) seized from the car during the inventory search had to be suppressed as evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that, irrespective of the officers' pretextual or subjective reason for stopping the vehicle, the officers possessed an independent and objective basis to make this traffic stop (the Defendant ran a red light). Having ruled that the stop was invalid, the trial court did not consider the State's argument that the search of the car was a valid inventory search and that the seizure of contraband from the car was therefore admissible. Hence, the Court reversed the trial court's order of suppression but remanded the case to the trial court with directions to make factual findings and conclusions of law concerning the validity of the inventory search consistent with our holding in "Pineda v. People," (230 P.3d 1181 (Colo. 2010)). View "Colorado v. Vissarriagas" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenged an order suppressing incriminating statements made by Defendant Michael Lynn while in custody. The trial court held that the statements came after Defendant's unambiguous request for counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and held that Defendant's question, "When can I talk to a lawyer?" was an unambiguous request for counsel. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the trial court suppressing Defendant's statements. View "Colorado v. Lynn" on Justia Law

This original proceeding before the Supreme Court arose from a divorce and parenting case in its third year of post-dissolution decree litigation. Mother's petition challenged the district court's summary denial of her motion for a protective order and sanctions concerning the acquisition by Father's attorney of Mother's entire employment file from Mother's former employer by subpoena. The Court accepted jurisdiction to determine whether Father's attorney violated C.R.C.P. 45 when she made arrangements with Mother's former employer for the production of Mother's employment file without Mother's consent and before Mother had notice of the existence of the subpoena. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "[The Court] interpret[ed] Rule 45 to require that, unless the subpoenaed witness and other parties consent to an alternate arrangement or by other court order, subpoenaed documents are to be produced only at the deposition, hearing, or trial specified in the subpoena and hold that the conduct of Father's attorney in this case violated Rule 45." Furthermore, the Court held that Father's attorney frustrated the purpose of Rule 45 by depriving Mother of the opportunity to object to the subpoena before the documents were produced. The Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions that Father and Father's attorney identify and recover, and then return or destroy all physical and electronic copies of the documents produced by Mother's former employer pursuant to the subpoena issued by Father's attorney, including Mother's entire employment file. The Court also directed the trial court to determine whether sanctions should be awarded to Mother against Father's attorney for the rule violation. View "In re Marriage of Wiggins" on Justia Law