Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Geri David was attacked in the parking lot of a grocery store in 2004 by a man she later identified as Defendant Michael O'Shaughnessy. She was approached from behind by Defendant who was brandishing a six-inch hunting knife with a serrated blade. He held the knife to her face and ordered her into her car. She sat in the driver's seat with her feet outside of the car and kicked at her assailant to ward off the attack. As she lashed out at him, he stabbed her with the knife, causing injury to the right and left sides of her neck and throat, to her left thigh, and to her hand. Defendant demanded her money. David told him she did not have any money and turned toward the floor of the passenger seat to look for her purse. When she turned back, Defendant was gone. He did not reach for or take the purse. A jury convicted Defendant of attempted first degree murder with a deadly weapon, attempted aggravated robbery, second degree assault, false imprisonment, reckless endangerment, and a violent crime sentence enhancer. During the course of the trial, Defendant requested a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of abandonment. The trial court denied the request. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment and held that to present an affirmative defense of abandonment of an attempt crime for jury consideration, the defendant must present "some credible evidence" on the issue, and in this case, Defendant did not present such "credible evidence." Furthermore, the Court held that having injured the victim does not necessarily foreclose the affirmative defense of abandonment. View "O'Shaughnessy v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the General Assembly had not classified firearms as per se deadly weapons for the purposes of the first degree burglary statute. The legislature did not intend theft of a firearm from a building to constitute first degree burglary regardless of the manner the burglar used or intended to use the firearm. The General Assembly superseded earlier decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court which held that firearms were per se deadly weapons. In 2005, Defendant Mark Montez broke through a window of a home in Lakewood, Colorado, entered and ransacked the home, took about $150 and a gun case containing two unloaded shotguns before leaving left. A jury convicted Defendant on two counts of first degree burglary (one for each shotgun), as well as two counts of possession of a weapon by a previous offender, one theft count, and six habitual criminal counts based on prior convictions. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, but merged the two convictions for first degree burglary into one. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the statutory construction at issue in this case. Upon review, the Court held that the term "intended to be used" in the deadly weapon definition of section 18-1-901(3)(e) refers to the defendant's, not the manufacturer’s intent. The statute does not classify a firearm as a deadly weapon per se. In this case, the prosecution conceded that, if its argument that a firearm is per se a deadly weapon did not prevail, Defendant's could not stand. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction. View "Montez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

M.T. was charged in 2004 with sexual assault on a child. He pled guilty under terms of a deferred judgment to attempted sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. Four years later, M.T. successfully completed the terms of the deferred judgment and withdrew his guilty plea. Pursuant to the deferred judgment, prosecutors dismissed the charge of attempted sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. Thereafter, M.T. filed a civil petition to seal the criminal records associated with his case, pursuant to section 24-72-308(1), C.R.S. (2011). Over the prosecution’s objection, the district court granted the petition. That court reasoned that the exception contained in section 24-72-308(3)(c), which prohibits the sealing of "records pertaining to a conviction of an offense for which the factual basis involved unlawful sexual behavior," does not apply to a successfully-completed and dismissed deferred judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The majority held that files in a case dismissed after a deferred judgment contain records pertaining to a conviction and therefore the statutory exception precluded the sealing of M.T.'s records. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the court of appeals. View "M.T. v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Lucero was convicted of crimes connected to several break-ins in August and September 2000, including three counts of theft and one count of first degree burglary. In review of this case, the Supreme Court applied several of its earlier decisions, and merged the three theft convictions into one, and vacated the first degree burglary conviction. As the Court held in "Roberts v. People," the General Assembly required all thefts committed by the same person within a six-month period prior to 2009 to be joined and prosecuted as a single theft. The court therefore corrected Defendant's sentence. Furthermore, the Court applied its holding in "Montez v. Colorado," holding that the General Assembly has provided that a firearm is not a deadly weapon per se for the purposes of the first degree burglary statute. As in "Montez," the prosecution in this case conceded that if firearms are not per se deadly weapons, Defendant's conviction could not stand. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's first degree burglary conviction. View "Lucero v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Revoal was charged with one count of possession with intent to manufacture or distribute marijuana in an amount less than five pounds after an investigatory stop and "Terry" frisk revealed marijuana and a scale containing marijuana residue. At the time of the stop, the police were aware that: (1) it was 11:30 p.m.; (2) robberies had recently occurred in the area; (3) Defendant was standing on the side of a closed sandwich shop; (4) Defendant walked to the side of an open liquor store, then walked toward the back of the liquor store, where it was dark; and (5) Defendant turned and walked away from the investigating officer when he saw the patrol vehicle. The trial court suppressed the marijuana evidence on the basis that these facts did not give the investigating officer reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that the facts and circumstances the officer knew at the time of the intrusion, viewed either individually or in conjunction with each other, did not amount under the "totality of the circumstances" to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the officer's investigatory stop. View "Colorado v. Revoal" on Justia Law

In this juvenile delinquency case, the prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal seeking the Supreme Court's review of a magistrate's order suppressing certain statements made by the juvenile during a police interrogation. Because the magistrate's suppression order was never reviewed and adopted (with or without modification) by the district court before the appeal was filed, the Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction, and accordingly dismissed the appeal. View "Colorado v. S.X.G." on Justia Law

In an arbitration proceeding between Respondent SunOpta Grains and Foods Inc. (SunOpta) and Colorado Mills, LLC, an arbitrator, at SunOpta's request, issued subpoenas to petitioners SK Food International and Adams Vegetable Oil, Inc. SK Food and Adams were not parties to the underlying arbitration. Neither company was incorporated in Colorado, was registered as a foreign corporation in Colorado, or maintained a principal office in Colorado. The subpoenas, which requested business records, were served on SK Food and Adams at their places of business in California and North Dakota. When SK Food and Adams refused to comply with the arbitration subpoenas, SunOpta asked the district court to enforce them. The district court issued an order enforcing the subpoenas.In response, SK Food and Adams filed a petition for a rule to show cause, which the Supreme Court issued. The nonparties appealed the district court's order enforcing the subpoenas. The Supreme Court held that Colorado courts, as a matter of state sovereignty, have no authority to enforce civil subpoenas against out-of-state nonparties. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's enforcement order, and remanded case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Colorado Mills, LLC v. SunOpta Grains and Foods Inc." on Justia Law

Acting on a petition filed by the child's father, the Arapahoe County District Court assumed jurisdiction to modify a Maryland child custody order on the grounds that neither the child nor the child's parents "currently resided" in Maryland. Petitioner George Brandt and his child lived in Colorado, and Respondent Christine Brandt lived in Texas. Respondent sought relief from the Colorado court order. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the district court failed to apply the appropriate standard of review when assuming jurisdiction to modify the Maryland child custody order. The operative statutory term "presently reside" is not equivalent to "currently reside" or "physical presence." Accordingly, the Court reversed and vacated the district court's order assuming jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Brandt" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant Christopher Strimple with possession of an explosive or incendiary device and other crimes after a police search of the home he shared with his common law wife. Police responded to the home when Gabriele Thompson complained of domestic abuse. When police arrived, Defendant refused to let them in, threatened to kill officers if they entered, and engaged officers in a tense stand-off for nearly forty-five minutes. He ultimately surrendered peacefully, and police took him into custody. Thompson consented to an additional search during which the police discovered knives, a pipe bomb and drug paraphernalia. The trial court suppressed this evidence on the basis that, during the stand-off, Defendant had refused consent for entry into the home. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Thompson validly gave her consent to the second warrantless search because Defendant was no longer physically present and the police did not remove him from the scene in order to avoid his objection to the search. View "Colorado v. Strimple" on Justia Law

Defendant Andrew Mumford challenged his conviction for possession of one gram or less of cocaine, arguing, among other things, that an incriminating statement he made to a law enforcement officer should have been suppressed because it was obtained without proper warnings under "Miranda v. Arizona" (384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of "Miranda" at the time he made the statements. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances at the time he made the incriminating statement, a reasonable person in Defendant's position would not have felt deprived of his freedom of action to a degree associated with a formal arrest. View "Mumford v. Colorado" on Justia Law