Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Anthony Riley challenged the court of appeals' affirmance of his convictions for attempted reckless manslaughter, reckless second degree assault, and a crime of violence sentence enhancer. Defendant was charged stemming from a verbal confrontation at a store in early 2006 with Nisa Peelman, after Peelman allegedly touched Defendant in an inappropriate way. Defendant left the store. Shortly thereafter, Peelman and her brother, Gabriel Velasquez, walked out. Velasquez and Defendant exchanged words and began physically wrestling when the argument became more hostile. During the tussle, Velasquez told Peelman to "grab the heat from the truck." Defendant believed that the term "heat" meant a gun. He then pulled out a small knife from his pocket and "swung it" at Velasquez, hitting Velasquez in the neck, but failing to damage any vital structures. The court of appeals, relying on its interpretation of "People v. Jones," (675 P.2d 9 (Colo. 1984)), concluded that the trial court erred when it declined to submit Defendant's suggested "multiple assailants" instruction to the jury. The court of appeals determined, however, that the error was harmless. It thus affirmed Defendant's convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err when it rejected Defendant's "multiple assailants" instruction because "Jones" did not require the instruction in this instance. View "Riley v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This appeal came from a judgment and decree of the water court and the Alamosa County District Court in two consolidated cases. The combination of the two involved an amended plan for water management adopted by Special Improvement District No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District (Subdistrict). Several parties objected to the approval of the Subdistrict's plan for ground water management. After two trials, the trial court determined the Plan to be "conceptually compatible" with the legal requirements of ground water management plans and the intent of the legislature in enacting SB 04-222. Among a series of findings, it found that (1) the Plan properly sought to stabilize the storage level of the unconfined aquifer at a "sustainable" level; and (2) the strategies proposed to meet that goal were reasonable and supported by the evidence. However, the trial court sent the Plan back to the Subdistrict board of managers and District board of directors for "further consideration and amendment because it lack[ed] detail, grant[ed] discretion with no guidance, fail[ed] to acknowledge the replacement of injurious depletions as a priority, and simply is not a 'comprehensive and detailed plan'" as required by statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Plan as approved and decreed, adequately addressed the replacement of well depletions that injure adjudicated senior surface water rights, along with restoring and maintaining sustainable aquifer levels in accordance with the applicable statutes. "The Subdistrict bears the burden of going forward and the burden of proof to demonstrate that annual replacement plans prevent material injury to adjudicated senior surface water rights caused by ongoing and past well depletions that have future impact." The Court affirmed the water court and Alamosa County District Court's decisions. View "In re Subdistrict No. 1" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' determination that Thomas Banner's assignment of his voting rights and right to receive distributions to Plaintiff Elizabeth Condo was ineffective because it violated an anti-assignment clause in the "Hut at Avon, LLC’s" (Hut Group) operating agreement. Plaintiff brought a tort action against the other members of the Hut Group, Thomas Conners and George Roberts, and the attorney who allegedly assisted them in purchasing Banner's membership interest in the Hut Group. She claimed that Defendants' purchase of Banner's membership interest tortiously interfered with his prior assignment to her and that that interference amounted to civil conspiracy because it was intended to destroy the value of her assignment. The Supreme Court held that the attempted assignment of the member's right to receive distributions and effective transfer of voting rights was invalid because it was made without the consent of the other members of the LLC, in violation of the anti-assignment clause in the operating agreement. Furthermore, because the Colorado LLC statute evinced a preference for the freedom of contract, the Court held that the anti-assignment clause at issue here rendered each LLC member powerless to make an assignment without the consent of all members and therefore was without any legal effect. View "Condo v. Conners" on Justia Law

Colorado’s sexual assault statutes authorize the possibility of greater punishments for sexual crimes against children that are committed "as a part of a pattern of sexual abuse." Two cases, "Colorado v. Simon" and "Colorado v. Tillery" were consolidated for the Supreme Court's review in that they both involve interpretation of Section C.R.S. 18-3-405.3. The common issue presented by these cases was whether the statutory provisions and principles of double jeopardy permit only one class 3 felony conviction and sentence for a single "pattern" of abuse that comprises two or more incidents of sexual assault, or whether each separate act of sexual assault that composes a single "pattern" of abuse which may be elevated to a class 3 felony. In "Simon," one division of the court of appeals held that section 18-3-405.3(2)(b) and double jeopardy principles prohibit the trial court from entering multiple class 3 convictions and sentences for Simon’s ten counts of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, where those acts composed a single pattern of abuse against one victim. In "Tillery," a different division of the appellate court disagreed with the reasoning in "Simon." Finding no double jeopardy violation, the court upheld Tillery's class 3 convictions under 18-3-405(2)(d). Upon review, the Supreme Court held that these statutes unambiguously allow each separately charged incident of sexual assault to be elevated to a class 3 felony, where each incident is committed as part of a pattern of sexual abuse. Furthermore, the Court held that these statutes, construed according to their plain language, do not violate the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments under either the U.S. or the Colorado Constitution. View "Colorado v. Simon" on Justia Law

In this joint opinion, the Supreme Court addressed two direct appeals from the same water court proceedings. Meridian Service Metropolitan District's motion to intervene in a declaratory judgment action between Cherokee Metropolitan District and Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Management District (UBS) was denied by the water court. Meridian appealed the water court’s ruling to the Supreme Court. However, while Meridian’s appeal was pending, the declaratory judgment proceedings continued without Meridian’s participation, and the water court entered an order granting UBS's motion for declaratory judgment. Cherokee then appealed that order to the Supreme Court. The underlying water action began in 1998 as litigation between Cherokee and UBS over Cherokee’s water rights in the UBS basin. In 1999, Cherokee and UBS settled the litigation by entering a Stipulation and Release. In 2003, Cherokee and Meridian entered into an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) to build a new wastewater treatment facility. According to the IGA, wastewater from both Cherokee and Meridian would be treated at the facility, and the return flows would go back into the UBS basin. Upon learning of the Cherokee/Meridian Replacement Plan Application in late 2008, UBS filed a statement of objection with the Colorado Ground Water Commission and moved to dismiss the Replacement Plan Application. Meridian moved to intervene as of right in the underlying water action between UBS and Cherokee to challenge both the preliminary injunction and the motion for declaratory judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the water court’s order denying Meridian’s motion to intervene, and vacated the water court's order granting declaratory judgment. View "Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist." on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge a district court's suppression of evidence seized from the trunk of the Defendant Brittney Coates' vehicle. Upon discovering a bindle and single prescription pill in the driver's pants pocket, the police arrested the driver, placed him in their patrol car, and searched the vehicle. The district court found that the police lacked any reasonable and articulable basis to search Defendant's trunk incident to the arrest of the driver in accordance with "Arizona v. Gant," (556 U.S. 332 (2009)), and that they also lacked probable cause for a warrantless search of the vehicle's trunk pursuant to the automobile exception. The Supreme Court affirmed. It held, however, that because the evidence for which suppression was sought was not seized from the passenger compartment of Defendant's vehicle, the search-incident-to-arrest exception could not justify its seizure under any circumstances. Instead, the Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that it was able to determine from the district court's findings of fact that the police lacked probable cause to search Defendant's vehicle, whether or not they would have been justified in searching the passenger compartment on less than probable cause. View "Colorado v. Coates" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court involved orders of the District Court for Water Division No. 2 regarding the administration of water on Alvarado Creek in Custer County. Applicants-Appellants Catherine and Peter LoPresti and Opposers-Appellants City of Fountain and Widefield Water and Sanitation District claimed the water court erred in voiding a rotational no-call agreement titled the "Beardsley Decree." Opposers-Appellees John Brandenburg, Douglas and Nancy Brandon, Dilley Family Trust, James D. Hood, Ronald Keyston, Arlie Riggs, Schneider Enterprises, Inc., Dr. Charles Schneider, and Mund Shaikly argued that the Beardsley Decree was an improperly noticed change in water rights, and as such the water court correctly declared it void. The Supreme Court held that the Beardsley Decree was a valid rotational no-call agreement because, and by its plain language, it did not sanction a change in water rights. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the water court. View "LoPresti v. Brandenburg" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a claim under Colorado law for civil theft of a copyrightable work required a trial court to instruct the jury on principles of federal copyright law. Petitioner Steward Software hired Respondent Richard Kopcho to develop and market a new software program. Steward never entered into a written agreement governing the ownership of the software with Holonyx, Inc. (one of Respondent's multiple corporate entities) or Respondent. By the time the software was ready for testing, the relationship between the parties had become strained. Steward refused to make further payments and under Respondent's direction, Holonyx locked Steward out of the software code and refused to turn it over. Holonyx then filed a copyright registration for the software with the U.S. Copyright Office, listing the software's author a new corporation Respondent controlled called Ruffdogs Software, Inc. Steward sued Respondent for breach of contract and civil theft. Before trial, the parties tendered proposed jury instructions; one of Steward's proposed instructions pertained to the ownership and registration of copyrightable works. The trial court determined that copyright law did not pertain to Steward's civil theft claim and rejected the tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that ownership of the copyright in the code was irrelevant. The Court thus concluded the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on the principles of copyright law. The court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's opinion. View "Steward Software Co. v. Kopcho" on Justia Law

Petitioner Monica Vickery sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed a district court's reduction of exemplary damages in her defamation suit against the mother and sister of her deceased husband in "Vickery v. Vickery," (2010 WL 963204 (Colo. App. March 18, 2010)). Both the district court and court of appeals understood section 13-21-102 C.R.S. (2011) to limit Petitioner's exemplary damages to an amount equal to the compensatory damages figure returned by the jury, before any adjustment for prejudgment interest. But the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, disagreeing with its interpretation of section 13-21-102. The Supreme Court found that "the amount of the actual damages awarded," to which "reasonable exemplary damages" are statutorily limited, refers not to the jury's assessment of total compensatory damages but to the compensatory damages awarded against the defendant as the direct result of that assessment, which necessarily includes statutorily mandated prejudgment interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vickery v. Evans" on Justia Law

This case arose from a pending medical malpractice case from the Denver district court. Plaintiff Ernest Ortega sued Defendants Dr. David Lieuwen and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado (Kaiser) alleging negligent medical treatment given to him in 2007. Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his request for a protective order to cover his electronic medical records encompassing a ten-year period preceding the incident underlying this case. The trial court determined that Plaintiff's electronic medical records were not protected by the physician-patient privilege and that the records were relevant to prepare a defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Plaintiff's medical records were not protected as privileged and that Defendants could use unredacted copies of all of Plaintiff's medical records. View "Ortega v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado" on Justia Law