Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Gerald Lewis appealed his convictions and sentences for a number of offenses including three counts each of kidnapping and sexually assaulting his kidnap victims. The trial court sentenced Defendant for sexual assault and separately sentenced him for the second degree kidnapping of each victim, elevated to the level of a class two felony. Among its other holdings, the court of appeals rejected Defendant's contention that "People v. Henderson" should be overruled because of subsequent United States Supreme Court case law, and it affirmed each of his separate convictions and sentences. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether "Henderson" was still good law. Upon review, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, holding that the federal Court's case law "neither undermine [the Colorado Court's] prior assessment of legislative intent in 'Henderson' nor in any way diminish[es] the dispositive impact of legislative intent on Lewis's double jeopardy and merger claims." View "Lewis v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this case, the District Court for Jefferson County dismissed a condemnation petition for a private way of necessity because the developer of the allegedly landlocked parcel did not sufficiently define the scope of and necessity for the proposed condemnation. Evidence showed that the development might vary from one to thirty residential dwellings which prevented the court from entering a condemnation order that would minimize the burden to be placed upon condemnee’s property. The court of appeals ruled that the condemnation could proceed based only upon the zoning of the condemnor’s property. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, and reinstated the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that, when a petitioner seeks to condemn a private way of necessity for access to property it wishes to develop in the future, it must demonstrate a purpose for the condemnation that enables the trial court to examine both the scope of and necessity for the proposed condemnation, so that the burden to be imposed upon the condemnee’s property may be ascertained and circumscribed through the trial court’s condemnation order. The record in this case supported the trial court’s dismissal of the condemnation petition. View "The Glenelk Ass'n, Inc. v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted David Wood of manslaughter for fatally shooting someone in his apartment during a drug transaction. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial request for immunity from prosecution under Colorado's "Make My Day" statute. Following its review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court found that Defendant could have sought immediate review of the trial court's order by invoking the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction before the verdict was handed down, but "Make My Day" immunity may not be reviewed on appeal after trial. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Wood v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Court of Appeals reversed Defendant Gonzalo Santana's conviction for distribution of a controlled substance, concluding that the prosecution had violated his constitutional rights by shifting the burden of proof to him at trial. According to the appellate court, the prosecutor shifted the burden by cross-examining the defense expert about his ability to perform conclusive tests which established that the expert could have run such tests. The prosecution then emphasized that testimony in its closing argument. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court concluded that the prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. The Court found that defense counsel "opened the door" by questioning the expert about his ability to conduct conclusive tests. In light of the whole record, the Court reasoned that the prosecutor's questions and comments were "likely not meant to shift the burden of proof, but to highlight the strength of the prosecution's case." View "Colorado v. Santana" on Justia Law

Both Defendant Tremaine Speer and the State challenged the Court of Appeals' judgment that reversed Defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated robbery. The State contended that the district court erred by denying Defendant's requested jury instruction on the affirmative defense of "duress" which resulted in the reversal of his conviction. Defendant cross-petitioned, asserting that even if the Supreme Court disagreed that the omission of the instruction was "reversible error," he would nevertheless be entitled to a new trial because the district court erred in rejecting his challenges for cause on two prospective jurors who worked in “security.” Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's "duress" jury instruction. It was undisputed that Defendant had a gun and drove himself to the scene of the crime. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could consider that Defendant acted under duress. Furthermore, the Court found that technically neither of the prospective jurors worked in "security," despite their employers being the Department of Homeland Security. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the district court's judgment. View "Colorado v. Speer" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a child custody dispute between a divorced mother and father. The children lived in Colorado with their mother and step-father. The father, who lived in New York, filed a custody action in New York to modify the initial child custody determination. A New York Supreme Court entered its determination awarding sole custody to the father. The mother objected to New York's exercise of jurisdiction over the case and filed her own custody action in Colorado. The father asked a Colorado district court to enforce the New York court's award of custody. Upon consideration, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the New York Supreme Court failed to exercise jurisdiction consistent with New York law and with the requirements of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 U.S.C. 1738A, "PKPA") and as such, Colorado was not required to give that order full faith and credit. The Court remanded the case to the Colorado district court for further proceedings. View "In re the Marriage of Dedie and Springston" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a child custody dispute between a divorced mother and father. The child lived in Colorado with her mother. The father, who lived in Nebraska, filed a custody action in Nebraska. A Nebraska district court entered an initial child custody determination awarding custody to the father. The mother objected to Nebraska's exercise of jurisdiction over the case and filed her own custody action in Colorado. A Colorado district court refused to recognize the Nebraska court order and awarded custody to the mother. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the Colorado district court order, holding that though Nebraska did not have jurisdiction over the custody action, Colorado must nevertheless grant it "full faith and credit." Upon consideration, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the Nebraska district court failed to exercise jurisdiction consistent with the requirements of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 U.S.C. 1738A, "PKPA") and as such, Colorado was not required to give that order full faith and credit. Therefore, the Court reversed the Colorado appellate court's decision, and reinstated the Colorado trial court's order. View "In re the Parental Responsibilities of L.S" on Justia Law

A discovery dispute arose out of claims for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty brought by Moreland/Manoogian, LLC and Tamsen Investments, LLC (collectively "M/M"). Richard Judd, Stephen Waters and their firm Robinson Waters & O'Dorisio, PC (RWO) represented M/M in a real estate development deal. Cedar Street Venture, LLC and M/M sought to solidify their partnership, but in the final phases of the deal, Cedar Street's attorney withdrew. RWO continued to represent M/M in the transaction but at times also advised and acted on behalf of Cedar Street. Because of these actions, Cedar Street viewed RWO as its attorney. Eventually the relationship between M/M and Cedar Street soured, and the parties went to arbitration to settle their differences. The basis of M/M and Cedar Street's complaints pertained to RWO's fees. During discovery, M/M sought RWO's financial records. RWO refused to turn them over. With minimal explanation, the trial court found that these documents were directly relevant to the case. In its holding, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to set the framework that trial courts should use when deciding on discovery requests that implicate the right to privacy: (1) the party requesting the information must prove the information is relevant to case; (2) the party opposing the request must show that the materials are confidential and will not otherwise be disclosed; (3) if the court determines there is a legitimate expectation of privacy in the materials, the requesting party must prove disclosure serves a compelling interest; and (4) if successful, the requesting party must show that the information is not available through other sources. View "In Re: Moreland/Manoogian v. Judd" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Upper Yampa Water Conservancy District (District) filed an application for absolute water rights, based on their conditional water rights on "Four Counties Ditch Number 3." The State Engineers opposed the application and moved for summary judgment. The water court denied the Engineers' motion, but ruled as a matter of law that in order to perfect a conditional water storage right, the District needed to show that “it diverted and put to beneficial use water in excess of its existing absolute decrees.” Upon careful consideration of the water court's record, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "Upper Yampa Water Conservancy District v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

In June 2002, Codiejo Apodaca and her stepsister (the Insureds) were injured in an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, the Insureds were covered as resident relatives under an auto policy and a personal umbrella policy both issued by Respondent Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). The policy included uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in addition to bodily injury coverage. The umbrella policy provided excess liability for "occurrences" arising out of, among other things, "occupancy of a land vehicle by an insured for personal transportation." Allstate did not offer separate UM/UIM coverage in connection with the umbrella policy. The Insureds brought suit against Allstate for reformation of the umbrella policy to include UM/UIM coverage. In their view, Colorado law required Allstate to offer UM/UIM coverage in connection with the umbrella policy because the policy included automobile liability coverage. As such, the Insureds contended that UM/UIM coverage should have been incorporated into the umbrella policy as a matter of law. The trial court granted Allstate's motion to dismiss the suit, finding that only liability policies expressly linked to a specific, licensed Colorado vehicle were required to include mandatory UM/UIM insurance. The appellate court affirmed the trial court, and on appeal, the Insureds argued that both the trial and appellate courts misread both the policy and Colorado law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that an umbrella policy is not an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy" as specified by Colorado law. Therefore, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Apodaca v. Allstate Ins. Co" on Justia Law