Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On November 18, 2022, Ashleigh Walthour drove her car off a snowy road into some trees. She ran the four or five blocks to her home and called the Aurora Police Department. When the police arrived at Walthour’s home to speak with her, she smelled like alcohol and had slurred speech, dilated pupils, and bloodshot eyes. She admitted to having consumed a shooter of Jack Daniels and was unable to perform voluntary roadside maneuvers. Walthour was arrested and taken to the Aurora City Jail, where she consented to a blood test. The police submitted Walthour’s blood sample to the CBI for processing on November 23. Walthour appeared in court for the first time on January 6, 2023. At that hearing, she notified the court that she would seek the assistance of the Public Defender’s Office. The court set a second hearing for February 6. However, at the second hearing, Walthour explained that she had not qualified for a public defender and would be representing herself. At the same hearing, the State said it had not yet received the blood test results from the CBI but that they “should” have the results “hopefully within the next week or two.” The court set a third pretrial conference for March 7 and directed the prosecution to disclose the test results by February 28 at 5 p.m. The prosecutor did not have any test results to disclose on that date. The trial court announced that it would suppress blood alcohol test results when no trial had been set and the prosecution had not yet received the results of the test from the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”). A day later, on March 8, the prosecutor received the blood test results from the CBI. The Colorado Supreme Court found Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(I)(b)(3), which required prosecutors to disclose the results of scientific exams such as blood alcohol tests to defendants “as soon as practicable but not later than [thirty-five] days before trial,” did not support the trial court's preemptive suppression. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Walthour" on Justia Law

The “rule of Martin,” applied to state agencies, political subdivisions, and officials acting in their official capacity, was a judicially created rule that precluded standing to challenge a government entity’s decision when: (1) the state agency, political subdivision, or official seeking review is subordinate to the government entity whose action is challenged; and (2) no statutory or constitutional provision expressly authorizes the subordinate party to seek judicial review of the superior government entity’s action. The Colorado State Board of Education (“the State Board”) invoked this doctrine in successfully moving to dismiss claims brought by Adams County School District 14 (“Adams 14”) challenging the State Board’s decision to remove its accreditation and order its reorganization. Adams 14 challenged the district court’s dismissal of its claims and the political subdivision doctrine itself, contending that the doctrine has become unmoored from its jurisprudential origins and results in the unfair denial of judicial relief to public entities that have been injured by state agencies and statutes. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the political subdivision doctrine and its articulation in the rule of Martin generated unnecessary confusion and were ultimately duplicative of the two-part test for standing set forth in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1977). The Court therefore abandoned the doctrine and the rule of Martin and instead hold that Wimberly supplied the sole test for determining whether a party has standing in Colorado. Evaluating each of Adams 14’s claims under Wimberly, the Court further held that all were correctly dismissed for lack of standing. View "Colo. State Bd. of Educ. v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. 14" on Justia Law

The Weld County Colorado Board of County Commissioners (“Weld County”) sought review of rules adopted by the Colorado Air Quality Control Commission (the “Commission”) to minimize emissions of certain pollutants from oil and gas wells. A Colorado court of appeals applied a specialized political subdivision standing test and concluded that Weld County did not have standing to pursue its claims. In Colorado State Board of Education v. Adams County School District 14, 2023 CO 52, __ P.3d __, the Colorado Supreme Court abandoned the political subdivision test because it generated unnecessary confusion, and that a political subdivision, just like any other plaintiff, had to satisfy only the standing test developed in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1977). Applying that holding here, the Court examined whether Weld County has suffered (1) an injury in fact (2) to a legally protected interest. To this, the Court concluded that, although Weld County had a legally protected interest, it could not demonstrate an injury to that interest. Accordingly, Weld County lacked standing to pursue the claims raised here. We thus affirm the division’s judgment, albeit on different grounds. View "Weld County v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Two months after an apparent arson left five people dead, the Denver Police Department (“DPD”) had no suspects. They employed an unconventional investigative technique: a “reverse-keyword warrant.” Google disclosed to DPD a list that included five Colorado internet protocol (“IP”) addresses associated with devices that had searched for the location of the fire in a roughly two-week period before it occurred. Based in part on this information, law enforcement eventually charged Gavin Seymour and two others with multiple counts of first degree murder. Seymour moved to suppress the fruit of the warrant, arguing that it lacked probable cause and particularity. The trial court denied Seymour’s suppression motion. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, finding: (1) under the Colorado Constitution, Seymour had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his Google search history even when revealed only in connection with his IP address and not his name and that, under both the Colorado Constitution and the Fourth Amendment, he also had a constitutionally protected possessory interest in that same history; (2) Seymour’s Google search history implicated his right to freedom of expression; (3) the warrant at issue adequately particularized the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (4) the warrant required individualized probable cause and that its absence here rendered the warrant constitutionally defective; and (5) law enforcement obtained and executed the warrant in good faith, so the evidence shouldn’t be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. "At every step, law enforcement acted reasonably to carry out a novel search in a constitutional manner. Suppressing the evidence here wouldn’t deter police misconduct." View "Colorado v. Seymour" on Justia Law

Charles Dorsey was convicted in 1997 of criminal attempt to commit sexual assault in the second degree. As a result, Dorsey was required to register as a sex offender, which he did. Dorsey was obligated to re-register as a sex offender every year. In 2010, Dorsey was charged with a class 6 felony for failure to register as a sex offender. He ultimately pled guilty to a class 1 misdemeanor failure-to-register offense. Dorsey failed to re-register as a sex offender for a second time in 2017. This time, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The trial court reasoned the prior-conviction provision of subsection (2)(a) was a sentence enhancer that could be proved to the judge in the event of a conviction, not an element of the offense that had to be proved to the jury. After the jury found Dorsey guilty of the substantive charge, the trial court ruled, at the sentencing hearing, that the State had proved the fact of his prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence. Consequently, it entered a judgment of conviction on a class 5 felony. The Colorado Supreme Court concurred that the legislature intended to make the fact of a prior conviction a sentence enhancer, and that the Constitution did not require the fact of a prior conviction to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Dorsey v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a request from Lakewood Animal Control, a deputy with the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office (“LCSO”), conducted a welfare check on the animals at Constance Caswell’s residential property in Limon, Colorado, on March 15, 2016. Approximately two weeks later, LCSO deputies executed a search warrant at Caswell’s property. Based on the deputies’ search, the State filed a complaint charging Caswell with forty-three class 6 felony counts of cruelty to animals. Cruelty to animals was generally a class 1 misdemeanor, § 18-9-202(2)(a), but pursuant to subsection (2)(b)(I) of the statute, it was a class 6 felony if the defendant had a prior conviction for that crime. Each of the counts brought against Caswell identified her prior cruelty-to-animals conviction as a fact that elevated the classification of the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony and enhanced the applicable sentence. Before trial, defense counsel moved for bifurcation to prevent the jury from hearing about his client’s prior conviction for cruelty to animals. The trial court denied the motion as moot, however, ruling that the fact of a prior conviction was a sentence enhancer, not an element of the crime, which meant that it didn’t have to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Caswell guilty of all forty-three counts. During the sentencing hearing, Caswell conceded that she had previously been convicted of cruelty to animals. The trial court accordingly entered forty-three class 6 felony convictions. It then sentenced Caswell to eight years of probation, forty-three days in jail, and forty-seven days of in-home detention. The Colorado Supreme Court held that where, as was here, a cruelty-to-animals (second or subsequent offense) case (1) includes notice in the charging document of the prior conviction for cruelty to animals and (2) is treated as a felony throughout the proceedings—including in terms of its prosecution in district court (not county court), the right to a preliminary hearing (if eligible), the number of peremptory challenges, and the number of jurors - the Sixth Amendment doesn’t require that the misdemeanor - felony transforming fact in subsection (2)(b)(I) be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. "In sum, there was no error, much less plain error, here. Caswell’s right to a jury trial under the Colorado Constitution was not violated." View "Caswell v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue before the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter was a trial court’s order denying immunity to Defendant New Century Hospice, Inc. and its subsidiaries, Defendants Legacy Hospice, LLC, d/b/a New Century Hospice of Denver, LLC, and Legacy Hospice of Colorado Springs, LLC (collectively, “New Century”). New Century argued it was entitled to immunity under four different statutes. Tana Edwards filed suit against New Century (her former employer) and Kathleen Johnson, the Director of Operations for New Century Castle Rock (collectively, “Defendants”). As part of her employment with New Century, Edwards provided in-home care to an elderly patient. In December 2019, Johnson began to suspect that Edwards was diverting pain medications from the patient. Defendants reported the suspected drug diversion to the Castle Rock Police Department and the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (“CDPHE”). Defendants also lodged a complaint against Edwards’s nursing license with the Colorado Board of Nursing (“the Board”). After investigations, no criminal charges were filed and no formal disciplinary actions were taken against Edwards. Edwards subsequently brought this action against Defendants, alleging claims for negligent supervision and negligent hiring against New Century, as well as claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against New Century and Johnson. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion as to Edwards’s claims for negligent hiring, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding that the claims were either time-barred or could not be proven. Three of the statutes New Century cited for its immunity claim, 12-20-402(1), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Professions Act”), 12-255-123(2), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Nurse Practice Act”), and 18-6.5-108(3), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Mandatory Reporter statute”), only authorized immunity for a “person.” Relying on the plain meaning of “person,” the Supreme Court held that New Century was not entitled to immunity under these three statutes because it was a corporation, not a person. The fourth statute, 18-8-115, C.R.S. (2022) (“the Duty to Report statute”), explicitly entitled corporations to immunity, but only if certain conditions were met. Applying the plain language of the statute, the Supreme Court held that New Century was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of immunity under this statute because it did not carry its burden of demonstrating that all such conditions were met. View "In re Edwards v. New Century Hospice" on Justia Law

A-J.A.B. tested positive at birth for methamphetamine. H.J.B. (“Mother”) admitted methamphetamine use during her pregnancy. In March 2020, less than a month after A-J.A.B.’s birth, the Adams County Human Services Department (“the Department”) filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning A-J.A.B. The Department’s petition noted that it had no information indicating that A-J.A.B. was an Indian child or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe, although the petition did not identify what efforts, if any, the Department took to determine whether A-J.A.B. was an Indian child. At the shelter hearing, Mother’s counsel informed the court that Mother may have “some Cherokee and Lakota Sioux [heritage] through [A-J.A.B.’s maternal great-grandmother].” However, Mother was uncertain if anyone in her family was actually registered with a tribe and acknowledged that she “probably [wouldn’t] qualify” for any tribal membership herself. The juvenile court ordered Mother to “fill out the ICWA paperwork,” but the court did not direct the Department to exercise its due diligence obligation under section 19-1-126(3). At the next hearing, Mother, who had not filled out the ICWA paperwork, again stated that she had “Native American heritage” through A-J.A.B.’s maternal great-grandmother. Because of these assertions, the juvenile court found that the case “‘may’ be an ICWA case.” By December 2020, the Department moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights. At the pretrial conference, Mother’s attorney informed the court that she spoke with A-J.A.B.’s maternal grandmother, who stated that she “thought that the heritage may be Lakota.” Mother’s attorney told the court “it doesn’t sound like there’s a reason to believe that ICWA would apply” and acknowledged that neither Mother nor A-J.A.B. were enrolled members of any tribe. The juvenile court subsequently concluded that “there [was] no reason to believe that this case [was] governed by [ICWA].” The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred in finding that ICWA did not apply because the court had a reason to know that A-J.A.B. was an Indian child. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the Department satisfied its statutory due diligence obligation under section19-1-126(3), and affirmed in different grounds. View "Colorado in interest of H.J.B." on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted review in this case to consider whether the common law litigation privilege for party-generated publicity in pending class action litigation excluded situations in which the identities of class members were ascertainable through discovery. In 2018, two law firms, Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP and Towards Justice (collectively, along with attorney Mari Newman of Killmer, Lane & Newman, “the attorneys”), filed on behalf of former employee and nail technician Lisa Miles and those similarly situated a federal class action lawsuit. This lawsuit named as defendants BKP, Inc.; Ella Bliss Beauty Bar LLC; Ella Bliss Beauty Bar-2, LLC; and Ella Bliss Beauty Bar-3, LLC (collectively, “the employer”), among others. The employer operated three beauty bars in the Denver metropolitan area. Pertinent here, the class action complaint alleged that the employer’s business operation was “founded on the exploitation of its workers.” The complaint alleged that the employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Colorado Wage Claim Act by not paying service technicians for hours spent performing janitorial work, electing to forgo hiring a janitorial service. The Supreme Court concluded the division erred in conditioning the applicability of the litigation privilege in pending class action litigation on whether the identities of class members were ascertainable through discovery. The Court reached this conclusion for two reasons: (1) ascertainability was generally a requirement in class action litigation, and imposing such a condition would unduly limit the privilege in this kind of case; and (2) the eventual identification of class members by way of documents obtained during discovery was not a substitute for reaching absent class members and witnesses in the beginning stages of litigation. The Court found the litigation privilege applied in this case: five allegedly defamatory statements at issue "merely repeated, summarized, or paraphrased the allegations made in the class action complaint, and which served the purpose of notifying the public, absent class members, and witnesses about the litigation, were absolutely privileged." View "Killmer, Lane & Newman v. B.K.P., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Delano Medina pleaded guilty to felony menacing even though he maintained his innocence of that charge. He did so in exchange for the dismissal of several other criminal cases. The trial court found that Medina’s plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. But because Medina agreed to waive the establishment of a factual basis for menacing under Crim. P. 11(b)(6), the trial court did not make a finding as to whether strong evidence of Medina’s actual guilt existed. Medina later moved to withdraw his plea as violative of due process, arguing that a defendant cannot waive proof of a factual basis when entering an "Alford" plea. The postconviction court denied his motion, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether an Alford plea required a trial court to make a finding of strong evidence of actual guilt to pass constitutional muster. The Court found no such requirement, rather, holding that the establishment of a factual basis for the charge under Crim. P. 11(b)(6), provided that the plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Court therefore affirmed the division’s judgment, albeit on slightly different grounds. View "Medina v. Colorado" on Justia Law