Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (“the Commission”) recommended public censure and thirty-day unpaid suspension of former district court Judge Mark Thompson of the Fifth Judicial District. These sanctions stemmed from former Judge Thompson’s guilty plea to a reduced charge of disorderly conduct in Summit County District Court. Former Judge Thompson’s plea reflected his admission to having “recklessly” displayed an AR-15 style assault rifle during a dispute with his adult stepson. View "In the Matter of: Former Judge Mark D. Thompson" on Justia Law

Front Range Feedlots, LLC challenged certain orders issued by the Colorado State Engineer, and the District Court for Water Division 1 (the “water court”). Specifically, Front Range challenged the State Engineer’s authority to issue an Order to Comply with a February 4, 2020 substitute water supply plan issued to Front Range (the “2020 SWSP”). Front Range further contended that the water court abused its discretion in several ways when it issued its Order Granting Mandatory Injunction, requiring Front Range to comply with the 2020 SWSP and the Order to Comply. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded: (1) under the plain language of the applicable statutes, the State Engineer had the authority to issue the Order to Comply; (2) the State Engineer had the authority to enforce the terms and conditions of the 2020 SWSP after the expiration of that SWSP and Front Range’s withdrawal of its related water court application; (3) the State Engineer properly attached the 2020 SWSP terms and conditions to Front Range, rather than to the water rights at issue; (4) the State Engineer had jurisdiction to require the replacement of depletions from pre-application pumping; and (5) the water court properly exercised its discretion in ordering Front Range to acquire additional replacement sources. View "Front Range Feedlots v. Rein et al." on Justia Law

After defense counsel raised concerns regarding seventeen-year-old A.T.C.’s competency, the magistrate ordered a competency evaluation. A psychologist from the Office of Behavioral Health (“OBH”) subsequently evaluated A.T.C. and determined that he was incompetent but restorable. Shortly thereafter, based on OBH’s evaluation, the magistrate entered a preliminary finding that A.T.C. was incompetent but restorable. The State moved for a second competency evaluation, asking the magistrate to allow a psychologist of the State's choosing to evaluate A.T.C. Over defense counsel’s objection, the magistrate granted the motion. The psychologist retained by the State evaluated A.T.C. and concluded that he was competent to proceed. Following a contested hearing at which OBH’s psychologist, the psychologist retained by the State, and a third psychologist all testified, the magistrate found that A.T.C. was competent to proceed. Defense counsel timely petitioned the juvenile court for review, but was unsuccessful. Counsel then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court. Addressing whether a juvenile in a delinquency case could seek interlocutory review of a magistrate’s competency finding in the juvenile court as a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court concluded a magistrate’s finding of competency pursuant to section 19-1-108(3)(a.5), C.R.S. (2022), was subject to review in the juvenile court under section 19-1-108(5.5). View "Colorado in the interest of: A.T.C." on Justia Law

The named victim in this sexual assault case availed herself of her constitutional and statutory right to attend the preliminary hearing held by the county court. After the State rested their case at the hearing, the defense called the named victim to the stand, even though it had not subpoenaed her. The named victim exited the courtroom, but the court prevented her from leaving the courthouse, ordered her to return to the courtroom, and eventually required her to testify. Although the State objected based on the Victim Rights Act (“VRA”) and Colorado case law, the court overruled their objection. In so doing, the court, like defense counsel, relied on the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in McDonald v. District Court, 576 P.2d 169 (Colo. 1978). The State then obtained a stay and petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the county court's order. Given the state of the record at the preliminary hearing, the Supreme Court concluded the county court erred by applying McDonald. "And, in any event, McDonald preceded the VRA, which was a game changer. Reading McDonald with the gloss supplied by the VRA, we hold that defense counsel may not call to the witness stand an unsubpoenaed victim who happens to be in attendance at a preliminary hearing." View "Colorado v. Platteel" on Justia Law

In 2006, Respondent Jerome Silvernagel took out a second mortgage on a home. He agreed to make monthly payments to pay down the principal and 10% annual interest, with any remaining balance due in 2036. Silvernagel alone signed the promissory note, agreeing to repay the underlying loan. But both he and Respondent Dan Wu signed the deed of trust securing payment of the note. The deed of trust contained an acceleration clause, giving the lender the power to declare the entire loan immediately due and payable upon default. When exercised, acceleration authorized the lender to foreclose on the property to satisfy the outstanding debt and any related fees. In 2012, a bankruptcy court discharged Silvernagel’s personal liability on the mortgage under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Silvernagel had stopped making payments on the note before the discharge and made no payments since. The discharge prohibited creditors from attempting to collect the debt from Silvernagel directly, but it did not extinguish “the right to enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest, against the debtor’s property after the bankruptcy.” In 2019, US Bank allegedly threatened to foreclose on the property if Silvernagel did not make payments on his mortgage. Silvernagel and Wu (hereinafter collectively, “Silvernagel”) filed this case in response, requesting declaratory relief to prevent US Bank’s enforcement of the deed of trust. He argued that US Bank’s interest was extinguished by the six-year statute of limitations on debt collection. Alternatively, he asserted that the doctrine of laches prevented enforcement of the agreement. The trial court dismissed the case, determining that US Bank’s claim had not accrued (meaning that the six-year limitation period hadn’t even commenced). A division of the court of appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run upon Silvernagel’s 2012 bankruptcy discharge, barring US Bank’s claim. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals: when there is no evidence that the lender accelerated payment on the mortgage agreement, a claim for any future payment doesn’t accrue until that payment is missed under the agreement’s original terms. View "US Bank, N.A. v. Silvernagel, et al." on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court convened a Special Tribunal for the imposition of discipline to Judge Lance Timbreza, formerly of the Mesa County District Court. The Special Tribunal was convened because the Supreme Court had to recuse itself in this matter under Rule 41(b) of the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline (“RJD”). Before the entry of the First Stipulation, Judge Timbreza resigned his position. As part of the First Stipulation, Judge Timbreza also stipulated to the entry of a public censure. He and the Commission further agreed that the issue of whether any additional sanctions should be imposed; ultimately the Special Tribunal recommended Judge Timbreza pay attorney fees and costs to the State of Colorado. Discipline was recommended for the Judge's violation of Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct Canon Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 2.3 following an encounter with a young attorney at a Colorado Bar Association Conference/retreat. The Special Tribunal adopted the recommendations. View "In the Matter of: Lance P. Timbreza, a Judge" on Justia Law

On April 20, 2017, defendant William Davis was charged with vehicular eluding, reckless driving, and driving under restraint after failing to yield to a Parks and Wildlife officer at Golden Gate Canyon State Park. The court appointed Garen Gervey as Davis’s public defender and set the trial for November 20, 2017. On October 30, 2017, Davis, through counsel, moved for a continuance because: (1) Gervey had another trial set for the same day; and (2) due to a scheduling misunderstanding, investigation was still being completed in the case. The court denied the motion after a hearing in which it emphasized the scheduling difficulties it was having in trying to set a trial date and stated that because this case was “essentially a traffic case,” it would likely be straightforward enough to be tried in a single day. In denying the motion, the court also observed, quoting from Colorado v. Coria, 937 P.2d 386 (Colo. 1997), that the “substitution of one public defender with another does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, absent evidence of prejudice.” The court explained that it perceived no prejudice because it would not take an attorney “of any competence any time to prepare,” and therefore denied Davis’s motion. On the morning of trial, Davis, through newly substituted counsel, again moved for a continuance. The court denied the motion, and trial proceeded. The jury convicted Davis of vehicular eluding, reckless driving, and driving under restraint. The appellate court adopted the holding from Colorado v. Rainey, 2021 COA 35, 491 P.3d 531, that indigent defendants had a constitutional right to continued representation by appointed counsel and district courts had to apply the factors announced in Colorado v. Brown, 322 P.3d 214 when considering a continuance to enable continued representation by appointed counsel. The conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding the trial court correctly considered whether defendant would have been prejudiced if his appointed counsel was replaced by a different public defender, and concluded that he would not be. View "Colorado v. Davis" on Justia Law

Robert Rainey was charged with nine criminal counts related to domestic violence in July 2016. The trial court appointed a public defender as Rainey’s counsel and set trial for January 9, 2017. The night before trial, a storm damaged the courthouse, and the trial was reset to the following day. The State was granted a number of continuances Rainey’s objection because witnesses were unavailable. Trial was ultimately continued to March 6, 2017—the day before the expiration of the speedy-trial deadline. The public defender confirmed that the date would work for trial and agreed to appear for the pretrial readiness conference set for March 3. At the conference, defense counsel raised for the first time that he would not in fact be available on March 6 for trial because of pre-existing vacation plans. Counsel's request for a continuance was denied, with the trial court observing that Rainey’s case was factually simple, and counsel would not need a substantial amount of time to prepare. Counsel conceded that he could not think of any reason why another public defender could not adequately prepare for the trial over the weekend. Trial took place on March 6 after Rainey’s two new attorneys announced that they were ready to proceed. The jury convicted Rainey on two of the nine counts—second degree kidnapping and criminal mischief—with a further finding that both crimes constituted acts of domestic violence. Rainey appealed his convictions, arguing the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to continued representation of appointed counsel when it denied his request for a continuance and forced him to proceed with the public defenders who had a weekend to prepare his case. The Colorado Supreme Court determined a defendant did not have a right to continued representation by a particular appointed lawyer: the right to continued representation by a particular attorney flows from the right to choose that attorney, which does not apply when counsel is appointed. "Still, if a defendant represented by an appointed attorney can show that denying a continuance and replacing that appointed attorney would prejudice their case, due process requires that the defendant be given a continuance so the attorney can continue the representation." View "Colorado v. Rainey" on Justia Law

This matter arose out of disputes between Antero Resources Corporation (“Antero”) and Airport Land Partners, Ltd (“Airport Land”) and other royalty owners (collectively, “Royalty Owners”) over whether Antero could deduct certain post-production costs from royalty payments under the applicable leases’ royalty clauses. Royalty Owners alleged that Antero has underpaid royalties in violation of their respective lease contracts. Royalty Owners filed individual breach-of-contract suits against Antero for dates between December 2016 and April 2017. Antero moved to dismiss the suits, arguing that the claims should have been brought before the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (“COGCC” or “the Commission”) in the first instance. Statutorily, COGCC lacked jurisdiction under section 34-60-118.5(5), C.R.S. (2022), to engage in contract interpretation to resolve a bona fide dispute between parties under an oil and gas lease. But in 2017, without any intervening change to explain the shift, two district courts changed course, asserting that COGCC had responsibility for resolving contract disputes on the theory either that the contract terms were unambiguous or that settled law compelled a certain interpretation. The Colorado Supreme Court returned to the longstanding statutory mandate that COGCC lacked jurisdiction to resolve bona fide disputes of contract interpretation and held that such a dispute exists where the parties disagree in good faith about the meaning or application of a relevant contract term. View "Antero Resources v. Airport Land Partners" on Justia Law

In 2011, Respondent Theodore Madrid was charged with one count of first degree murder and two counts of child abuse resulting in death. During jury selection, the prosecution excused prospective juror J.T., a Black man who indicated on his juror questionnaire that he was sixty-eight years old, married with children, and a retired customer-service specialist. The court gave each side a total of five minutes to question the prospective jurors, including J.T. The prosecution asked J.T. if he had any concerns about potentially having to look at autopsy pictures in the case, to which J.T. responded, "no." The prosecution then asked J.T., "Do you have a good joke?" J.T. responded, "I'm the joke." Thereafter, the prosecution used its ninth peremptory challenge to excuse J.T. Madrid raised a Batson challenge to this, arguing the excuse was race-neutral: "the real problem is we don’t know very much about him. He has a hearing issue it appears and he’s sort of completely nonresponsive. We have very little information on him from the questionnaire and no time to really have a very detailed conversation with him." The trial court accepted this reason and excused the juror. After a nine-day trial, the jury convicted Madrid on all counts. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review on whether a party could, on remand, raise a new race-neutral reason to justify a peremptory strike made at trial. The Supreme Court responded in the negative: when a party has been provided with an adequate opportunity to present its race-neutral justifications at trial, it is barred from introducing new race-neutral justifications on remand. The Court's application of that holding to the facts here prompted the Court to affirm the court of appeals' judgment, which meant that Madrid was entitled to a new trial. View "Colorado v. Madrid" on Justia Law