Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Respondent Jerome Silvernagel took out a second mortgage on a home. He agreed to make monthly payments to pay down the principal and 10% annual interest, with any remaining balance due in 2036. Silvernagel alone signed the promissory note, agreeing to repay the underlying loan. But both he and Respondent Dan Wu signed the deed of trust securing payment of the note. The deed of trust contained an acceleration clause, giving the lender the power to declare the entire loan immediately due and payable upon default. When exercised, acceleration authorized the lender to foreclose on the property to satisfy the outstanding debt and any related fees. In 2012, a bankruptcy court discharged Silvernagel’s personal liability on the mortgage under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Silvernagel had stopped making payments on the note before the discharge and made no payments since. The discharge prohibited creditors from attempting to collect the debt from Silvernagel directly, but it did not extinguish “the right to enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest, against the debtor’s property after the bankruptcy.” In 2019, US Bank allegedly threatened to foreclose on the property if Silvernagel did not make payments on his mortgage. Silvernagel and Wu (hereinafter collectively, “Silvernagel”) filed this case in response, requesting declaratory relief to prevent US Bank’s enforcement of the deed of trust. He argued that US Bank’s interest was extinguished by the six-year statute of limitations on debt collection. Alternatively, he asserted that the doctrine of laches prevented enforcement of the agreement. The trial court dismissed the case, determining that US Bank’s claim had not accrued (meaning that the six-year limitation period hadn’t even commenced). A division of the court of appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run upon Silvernagel’s 2012 bankruptcy discharge, barring US Bank’s claim. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals: when there is no evidence that the lender accelerated payment on the mortgage agreement, a claim for any future payment doesn’t accrue until that payment is missed under the agreement’s original terms. View "US Bank, N.A. v. Silvernagel, et al." on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court convened a Special Tribunal for the imposition of discipline to Judge Lance Timbreza, formerly of the Mesa County District Court. The Special Tribunal was convened because the Supreme Court had to recuse itself in this matter under Rule 41(b) of the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline (“RJD”). Before the entry of the First Stipulation, Judge Timbreza resigned his position. As part of the First Stipulation, Judge Timbreza also stipulated to the entry of a public censure. He and the Commission further agreed that the issue of whether any additional sanctions should be imposed; ultimately the Special Tribunal recommended Judge Timbreza pay attorney fees and costs to the State of Colorado. Discipline was recommended for the Judge's violation of Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct Canon Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 2.3 following an encounter with a young attorney at a Colorado Bar Association Conference/retreat. The Special Tribunal adopted the recommendations. View "In the Matter of: Lance P. Timbreza, a Judge" on Justia Law

On April 20, 2017, defendant William Davis was charged with vehicular eluding, reckless driving, and driving under restraint after failing to yield to a Parks and Wildlife officer at Golden Gate Canyon State Park. The court appointed Garen Gervey as Davis’s public defender and set the trial for November 20, 2017. On October 30, 2017, Davis, through counsel, moved for a continuance because: (1) Gervey had another trial set for the same day; and (2) due to a scheduling misunderstanding, investigation was still being completed in the case. The court denied the motion after a hearing in which it emphasized the scheduling difficulties it was having in trying to set a trial date and stated that because this case was “essentially a traffic case,” it would likely be straightforward enough to be tried in a single day. In denying the motion, the court also observed, quoting from Colorado v. Coria, 937 P.2d 386 (Colo. 1997), that the “substitution of one public defender with another does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, absent evidence of prejudice.” The court explained that it perceived no prejudice because it would not take an attorney “of any competence any time to prepare,” and therefore denied Davis’s motion. On the morning of trial, Davis, through newly substituted counsel, again moved for a continuance. The court denied the motion, and trial proceeded. The jury convicted Davis of vehicular eluding, reckless driving, and driving under restraint. The appellate court adopted the holding from Colorado v. Rainey, 2021 COA 35, 491 P.3d 531, that indigent defendants had a constitutional right to continued representation by appointed counsel and district courts had to apply the factors announced in Colorado v. Brown, 322 P.3d 214 when considering a continuance to enable continued representation by appointed counsel. The conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding the trial court correctly considered whether defendant would have been prejudiced if his appointed counsel was replaced by a different public defender, and concluded that he would not be. View "Colorado v. Davis" on Justia Law

Robert Rainey was charged with nine criminal counts related to domestic violence in July 2016. The trial court appointed a public defender as Rainey’s counsel and set trial for January 9, 2017. The night before trial, a storm damaged the courthouse, and the trial was reset to the following day. The State was granted a number of continuances Rainey’s objection because witnesses were unavailable. Trial was ultimately continued to March 6, 2017—the day before the expiration of the speedy-trial deadline. The public defender confirmed that the date would work for trial and agreed to appear for the pretrial readiness conference set for March 3. At the conference, defense counsel raised for the first time that he would not in fact be available on March 6 for trial because of pre-existing vacation plans. Counsel's request for a continuance was denied, with the trial court observing that Rainey’s case was factually simple, and counsel would not need a substantial amount of time to prepare. Counsel conceded that he could not think of any reason why another public defender could not adequately prepare for the trial over the weekend. Trial took place on March 6 after Rainey’s two new attorneys announced that they were ready to proceed. The jury convicted Rainey on two of the nine counts—second degree kidnapping and criminal mischief—with a further finding that both crimes constituted acts of domestic violence. Rainey appealed his convictions, arguing the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to continued representation of appointed counsel when it denied his request for a continuance and forced him to proceed with the public defenders who had a weekend to prepare his case. The Colorado Supreme Court determined a defendant did not have a right to continued representation by a particular appointed lawyer: the right to continued representation by a particular attorney flows from the right to choose that attorney, which does not apply when counsel is appointed. "Still, if a defendant represented by an appointed attorney can show that denying a continuance and replacing that appointed attorney would prejudice their case, due process requires that the defendant be given a continuance so the attorney can continue the representation." View "Colorado v. Rainey" on Justia Law

This matter arose out of disputes between Antero Resources Corporation (“Antero”) and Airport Land Partners, Ltd (“Airport Land”) and other royalty owners (collectively, “Royalty Owners”) over whether Antero could deduct certain post-production costs from royalty payments under the applicable leases’ royalty clauses. Royalty Owners alleged that Antero has underpaid royalties in violation of their respective lease contracts. Royalty Owners filed individual breach-of-contract suits against Antero for dates between December 2016 and April 2017. Antero moved to dismiss the suits, arguing that the claims should have been brought before the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (“COGCC” or “the Commission”) in the first instance. Statutorily, COGCC lacked jurisdiction under section 34-60-118.5(5), C.R.S. (2022), to engage in contract interpretation to resolve a bona fide dispute between parties under an oil and gas lease. But in 2017, without any intervening change to explain the shift, two district courts changed course, asserting that COGCC had responsibility for resolving contract disputes on the theory either that the contract terms were unambiguous or that settled law compelled a certain interpretation. The Colorado Supreme Court returned to the longstanding statutory mandate that COGCC lacked jurisdiction to resolve bona fide disputes of contract interpretation and held that such a dispute exists where the parties disagree in good faith about the meaning or application of a relevant contract term. View "Antero Resources v. Airport Land Partners" on Justia Law

In 2011, Respondent Theodore Madrid was charged with one count of first degree murder and two counts of child abuse resulting in death. During jury selection, the prosecution excused prospective juror J.T., a Black man who indicated on his juror questionnaire that he was sixty-eight years old, married with children, and a retired customer-service specialist. The court gave each side a total of five minutes to question the prospective jurors, including J.T. The prosecution asked J.T. if he had any concerns about potentially having to look at autopsy pictures in the case, to which J.T. responded, "no." The prosecution then asked J.T., "Do you have a good joke?" J.T. responded, "I'm the joke." Thereafter, the prosecution used its ninth peremptory challenge to excuse J.T. Madrid raised a Batson challenge to this, arguing the excuse was race-neutral: "the real problem is we don’t know very much about him. He has a hearing issue it appears and he’s sort of completely nonresponsive. We have very little information on him from the questionnaire and no time to really have a very detailed conversation with him." The trial court accepted this reason and excused the juror. After a nine-day trial, the jury convicted Madrid on all counts. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review on whether a party could, on remand, raise a new race-neutral reason to justify a peremptory strike made at trial. The Supreme Court responded in the negative: when a party has been provided with an adequate opportunity to present its race-neutral justifications at trial, it is barred from introducing new race-neutral justifications on remand. The Court's application of that holding to the facts here prompted the Court to affirm the court of appeals' judgment, which meant that Madrid was entitled to a new trial. View "Colorado v. Madrid" on Justia Law

Police officers interrogated defendant-appellee Brent Willoughby at his home about domestic violence allegations. After the State charged Willoughby with several offenses, he moved to suppress the statements he made during this interrogation, arguing that the officers obtained them in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The trial court granted the motion, finding that Willoughby had been subjected to a custodial interrogation without first receiving Miranda warnings. The State filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging the trial court’s suppression order. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Willoughby was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he made the statements at issue. Therefore, it reversed the portion of the trial court’s order suppressing the statements and remand the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Willougby" on Justia Law

In 2019, plaintiff John Dewey Institute, Inc. (“JDI”) submitted a charter school application to the Douglas County Colorado School Board. Section 22-30.5-108 (“section 108”) of the Charter Schools Act created a four-step procedure in which a charter school applicant may potentially twice appeal an adverse decision of a local board of education to the State Board. The parties agreed that section 108 precluded judicial review of State Board decisions rendered after a second appeal under section 108(3)(d). They disagreed, however, as to whether this appeal-preclusion language also barred judicial review of final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal under section 108(3)(a)—a scenario in which the State Board has affirmed the local board’s decision to deny a charter school application, thus rendering a second appeal unnecessary. Applying the plain language of section 108 and the statutory scheme as a whole, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that section 108(3)(d)’s appeal-preclusion language applied to all final decisions of the State Board rendered under section 108, including when, as here, the State Board affirmed the local board’s denial of a charter school application during an initial appeal, thereby ending the matter and rendering a second appeal unnecessary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling declaring that final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal were subject to judicial review. This matter was remanded with instructions that the case be returned to the district court for the dismissal of JDI’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Colorado State Board of Education v. Brannberg" on Justia Law

Defendant James Justice was charged with multiple offenses in four felony cases. The State extended him a global plea bargain offer, but he rejected it. Unhappy that the State would not sweeten the offer, Justice filed a motion asking the district court to compel mediation. The court granted the motion and ordered mediation over the State's objection. As part of its order, the court required good-faith participation and threatened to impose sanctions for lack of compliance. The State then brought petitions invoking the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in two of the cases, and the Supreme Court issued rules to show cause. The Supreme Court determined the district court lacked the authority to require the parties to mediate in these criminal cases, and because the mediation order arguably involved the court in the plea bargaining process, the district court erred. View "Colorado v. Justice" on Justia Law

CO2 Committee, Inc. (“CO2”) was a nonprofit corporation whose membership was comprised of nonoperating owners of fractional interests in the McElmo Dome unit, a consolidation of working interests in a large deposit of pure carbon dioxide in Montezuma County and Dolores County, near the Four Corners area of Colorado. Kinder Morgan CO2 Company, L.P. (“Kinder Morgan”) was the operator of the unit. Following an audit for the 2008 tax year, Montezuma County determined that Kinder Morgan had underreported the value of gas produced at the unit’s leaseholds by improperly deducting certain costs that it, as the unit operator, was not entitled to deduct. The county ultimately increased its valuation of the entire unit by approximately $57 million. The Montezuma County assessor then imposed a retroactive tax assessment on the unit totaling more than $2 million based on that increased value. That prompted Kinder Morgan to challenge—ultimately unsuccessfully—the county’s authority to impose the retroactive tax. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether CO2 had standing to independently challenge the county's retroactive property tax increase. Finding that it did not, the Court dismissed its appeal. View "Colorado Property Tax Administrator v. CO2 Committee, Inc." on Justia Law