Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ashley Hushen and Alexandra Weary, along with their mothers, reported allegations of sexual harassment by a classmate, Benjamin Gonzales, to their high school administrators. The school conducted a Title IX investigation, resulting in Benjamin's three-day suspension and subsequent juvenile charges for unlawful sexual contact. Benjamin was acquitted of all charges, and the school reopened the investigation, ultimately concluding that Benjamin had not violated school policies. The students involved felt traumatized by the process, and by the time the proceedings concluded, they had graduated.Benjamin later sued Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on statements made during the Title IX investigations. The defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their statements were absolutely privileged as they were made during a quasi-judicial proceeding. Both the trial court and the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that the Title IX proceedings were not quasi-judicial due to procedural shortcomings, allowing Benjamin's lawsuit to proceed.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and clarified that the determination of whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial is separate from whether it offers sufficient due process. The court held that a proceeding is quasi-judicial if it involves determining the interests, rights, or duties of specific individuals and applying current law or policy to past or present facts. The court concluded that the Title IX investigation met these criteria and was therefore quasi-judicial. Consequently, the statements made during the investigation were protected by absolute privilege, and the lawsuit against Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers could not proceed. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hushen v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

A child, B.C.B., was born in a car where his parents were living. After being transported to a hospital, both B.C.B. and his mother tested positive for methamphetamine. The El Paso County Department of Human Services conducted a safety assessment and took temporary custody of B.C.B. due to the positive drug test. The Department filed a petition alleging that B.C.B. was dependent or neglected under Colorado law.The El Paso County District Court held an adjudicatory trial, where evidence was presented that B.C.B. had difficulty latching to breastfeed and exhibited symptoms potentially related to methamphetamine exposure. Three pediatricians testified about the potential long-term risks of methamphetamine exposure, although they could not definitively link the symptoms to the drug exposure. The jury found that B.C.B. was born affected by substance exposure and that his health or welfare was threatened by substance use. The trial court adjudicated B.C.B. as dependent or neglected and ordered continued custody with the Department.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's adjudication, concluding that the Department had not provided sufficient evidence to show that B.C.B. was adversely affected by substance exposure at birth. The majority held that a positive drug test alone was insufficient to establish dependency or neglect under the amended statute.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that a positive drug test at birth satisfies the first prong of the statute, indicating that the child was affected by substance exposure. The Court also found that the Department provided sufficient evidence to show that B.C.B.'s health or welfare was threatened by substance use, either directly or due to the mother's inability to care for the child properly. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and upheld the jury's finding that B.C.B. was dependent or neglected. View "People ex rel. B.C.B. v. A.B." on Justia Law

Shaun Jeff Snow was charged with multiple offenses, including first-degree murder and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and a stipulated sentencing range of sixteen to twenty-four years. The plea agreement did not mention restitution. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a twenty-year prison sentence and deferred the issue of restitution for sixty days. Seventy-eight days later, the prosecution filed a motion for restitution, and 108 days after sentencing, the court entered a post-sentencing restitution order for $13,852.60.Snow did not appeal his conviction or sentence but later filed a motion to waive restitution, which the district court denied. Snow then appealed, arguing that his sentence was illegal under the precedent set by People v. Weeks. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the post-sentencing restitution order, concluding that Snow's Crim. P. 35(a) claim was an illegal manner claim and thus time-barred.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the district court's deferral of the restitution issue in its entirety at sentencing was not authorized by law, making Snow's sentence illegal. The court concluded that the post-sentencing restitution order must be vacated. The court remanded the case with instructions to the district court to enter an order reflecting that Snow owes no restitution. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory requirements for restitution orders and ensuring timely and effective assessment of restitution. View "Snow v. People" on Justia Law

Ryan Wallace Bonde was sentenced to two concurrent, four-year community corrections sentences as part of a plea agreement. After successfully completing the residential portion, he was transferred to nonresidential status. However, following his arrest for new offenses, his nonresidential status was terminated, and he was resentenced to the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC). Bonde requested presentence confinement credit (PSCC) for the 355 days served during the nonresidential portion of his community corrections sentences, which the district court denied based on the precedent set in People v. Hoecher.The district court ruled that Bonde was not entitled to PSCC for time served on nonresidential status but could qualify for good time and earned time credit. Bonde was resentenced to two concurrent, four-year sentences in the CDOC, receiving PSCC for time served in jail and during the residential portion of his community corrections sentences, along with 153 days of earned time credit. Bonde appealed, arguing that the reasoning in Hoecher had been undermined by subsequent legislative amendments, which now support granting PSCC for time served on nonresidential status.The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that it was bound by the express holding in Hoecher, which denies PSCC for time served during nonresidential community corrections sentences. The court noted that Bonde did not demonstrate that nonresidential offenders face liberty restraints that constitute "confinement" under the PSCC statute.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, reaffirming the holding in Hoecher. The court concluded that nonresidential community corrections sentences do not qualify for PSCC, as the freedoms associated with nonresidential status are inconsistent with the notion of confinement under section 18-1.3-405. The court emphasized that any policy-based changes to grant PSCC for nonresidential community corrections sentences should be directed to the legislature. View "Bonde v. People" on Justia Law

The police were conducting an operation to arrest Anthony Veloz at a motel when they encountered Oscar Jonas Ganaway walking toward the motel. An officer asked Ganaway where he was going, and Ganaway pointed to Veloz's room. A detective then asked Ganaway if he could pat him down for weapons, and Ganaway consented. During the patdown, the detective found methamphetamine and arrested Ganaway. Ganaway moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the initial encounter was a seizure and the evidence should be suppressed.The Arapahoe County District Court granted Ganaway's motion to suppress, finding that the initial encounter was a seizure and that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from the search must be suppressed. The People appealed the trial court's order.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the initial encounter between the police and Ganaway was not a seizure, meaning it did not trigger Fourth Amendment protections. The court further held that Ganaway voluntarily consented to the patdown. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Ganaway" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a railroad company and La Plata County over land use changes made by the railroad at its Rockwood Station. The railroad made several modifications to accommodate increased passenger traffic, including enlarging a parking lot and adding portable toilets and tents. The County claimed these changes violated its land use code and demanded compliance or corrective action.The railroad initially sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction in La Plata County District Court, arguing that the County lacked jurisdiction over its operations. While this case was pending, the County petitioned the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a declaratory ruling that the changes required compliance with the County's land use code. The PUC accepted the petition, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" under the relevant statute, thus requiring compliance with the County's code. The PUC upheld the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed the PUC's ruling.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed several issues raised by the railroad. The court concluded that the PUC had jurisdiction to interpret the relevant land use statute, the County had standing to petition the PUC, and the PUC did not violate the railroad's due process rights. The court also found that the PUC's determination that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" was just and reasonable and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the PUC's decision. View "Am. Heritage Ry.s v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Audrey Lee Tennyson committed a series of robberies in 2007 and was charged with fifty counts. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery in exchange for a sentencing range of ten to thirty-two years in the Department of Corrections, to be served concurrently with sentences in three other felony cases. The plea agreement included a stipulation that Tennyson was liable for restitution, with the amount to be determined within ninety days of sentencing.The district court sentenced Tennyson to twenty-six years for each count of aggravated robbery, to run concurrently, and deferred the determination of the restitution amount. The prosecution submitted a proposed restitution order within the ninety-day period, which the court approved 136 days after sentencing. Tennyson did not object to the restitution amount within the given timeframe. Approximately ten years later, Tennyson filed a Crim. P. 35(a) claim, arguing that his sentence was illegal due to the untimely determination of the restitution amount.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Tennyson's claim was an illegal manner claim, not an illegal sentence claim, and was therefore time-barred as it was not filed within 120 days after sentencing.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the district court's failure to set the restitution amount within the statutory deadline did not render Tennyson's sentence illegal. Instead, it constituted an illegal manner claim, which must be brought within 120 days after sentencing. Since Tennyson did not file his claim within this period, it was time-barred. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Tennyson v. People" on Justia Law

The Town of Firestone applied for conditional groundwater rights and an augmentation plan to support its growing water needs. The application included five well fields, but Firestone did not provide specific well locations for three of these fields, instead proposing to use the water court's retained jurisdiction to provide more specific details later. St. Vrain Sanitation District opposed the application, arguing that Firestone's lack of specific well locations made its depletion calculations unreliable and that relying on retained jurisdiction to prove non-injury later was legally impermissible.The District Court for Water Division 1 partially granted St. Vrain's motion to dismiss, finding that Firestone's evidence was insufficient to establish that the proposed well fields would not injure senior water rights holders. The court dismissed without prejudice the claims for the three well fields with unspecified locations and declined to retain jurisdiction, as it could not make a threshold finding of non-injury. The court also allowed St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue at trial, despite a prior conditional stipulation.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the water court's decision, holding that the water court correctly evaluated the application on a case-by-case basis and did not create a new bright-line rule requiring completed wells for conditional groundwater rights. The court also upheld the water court's refusal to retain jurisdiction without a non-injury finding and found no abuse of discretion in allowing St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue. The Supreme Court concluded that the water court's factual findings were supported by the trial record and were not clearly erroneous. View "Town of Firestone v. BCL Colo., LP" on Justia Law

David Samuel Crawford and A.L. ended their four-year relationship in 2018. Despite A.L.'s firm decision to end the relationship, Crawford persistently contacted, surveilled, and approached her for over four years. His actions included calling, emailing, texting, messaging on social media, contacting her friends and family, sending letters and gifts to her workplace, and showing up uninvited at her home. A.L. reported serious emotional distress due to Crawford's conduct, but law enforcement determined there was no imminent threat of harm as Crawford's actions did not include true threats.The Jefferson County District Court charged Crawford with two counts of stalking under section 18-3-602(1)(c), C.R.S. (2024). The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Crawford's repeated contacts with A.L. Crawford challenged the charges, arguing they violated the First Amendment based on the precedent set in Counterman v. Colorado. The district court concluded that the prosecution needed to prove Crawford had recklessly disregarded that his repeated contacts would cause A.L. serious emotional distress.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that stalking charges based on repeated actions, including contacts but not their contents, do not require proof of a reckless state of mind. The court reversed the district court's order expanding Counterman's holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court clarified that Counterman's recklessness mens rea requirement applies only to true-threats cases based on the content of speech, not to cases involving repeated, unwelcome, and content-neutral conduct. View "People v. Crawford" on Justia Law

Late one afternoon, Eugene Jennings was driving a tractor-trailer truck for his employer, All State Enterprise, Inc., in Custer County. As he negotiated a curve on Highway 69, his truck flipped over and crushed the vehicle in the oncoming lane driven by Timothy Trenshaw, killing him instantly. Jennings reported injuries and was transported to Parkview Hospital, where he discussed how he was injured with an emergency department physician. The physician documented these statements in Jennings's medical records.The district attorney's office for the Eleventh Judicial District charged Jennings with vehicular homicide and careless driving resulting in injury. Trenshaw's sister and son sued Jennings and All State in a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs obtained a police report containing a screenshot of Jennings's medical records, which included his description of the collision. Jennings filed a motion for a protective order, which the district court granted, prohibiting Plaintiffs from possessing or further disclosing Jennings's medical records. However, the district court later reviewed the screenshot in camera and ruled that five sentences describing the collision were not privileged, dissolving the protective order and requiring Jennings to disclose those sentences.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that medical records containing information provided by a patient to a physician during treatment are protected by the physician-patient privilege. The court concluded that the district court erred in reviewing the screenshot and conducting a sentence-by-sentence analysis. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause, emphasizing that the proper method for Plaintiffs to learn about the facts of the collision is through discovery directed at Jennings, not by accessing his privileged medical records. View "Gardne v. Jennings" on Justia Law