Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, petitioner Claire E. Miller and respondent Jesse A. Amos were involved in a dispute related to eviction proceedings. Miller was a tenant who lived in a home owned and occupied by Amos. Their arrangement was an oral tenancy agreement where Miller agreed to provide pet care and light housekeeping services instead of paying rent. After six months, Amos served Miller with a notice to quit, alleging breach of their oral agreement. Miller refused to move out, and Amos filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) complaint seeking eviction. Miller contended that her eviction was due to her refusal to engage in sexual acts with Amos, which she stated was a form of sex discrimination and retaliation under the Colorado Fair Housing Act (CFHA).The county court ruled in favor of Amos, stating that a landlord can serve a notice to quit for “no reason or any reason,” dismissing the CFHA violation claim as an affirmative defense for eviction. The district court affirmed this decision.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the lower court's ruling. The court held that a tenant can assert a landlord’s alleged violation of the CFHA as an affirmative defense to an FED eviction. The court noted that the purpose of the CFHA is to prevent discriminatory practices, and therefore, a tenant must be able to use it as a shield against a discriminatory eviction. The court also emphasized that a tenant's right to due process must be preserved even in eviction proceedings, which are intended to be expedited. This decision allows tenants in Colorado to assert discrimination or retaliation under the CFHA as a defense in eviction cases. View "Miller v. Amos" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, the defendant, Sir Mario Owens, appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, witness intimidation, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and accessory to a crime. The convictions stemmed from two separate incidents: the Lowry Park shootings, in which Owens was involved, and the subsequent Dayton Street shootings, for which Owens was convicted. The defendant argued that the trial was unfair due to the court's rulings on several issues, including the admission of evidence related to the Lowry Park shootings, the denial of Owens's motions for mistrial, and the limitation on cross-examination and impeachment of the prosecution's key witness. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's rulings were proper and did not constitute reversible error. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "People v. Owens" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was called upon to decide a matter related to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). The case involved a wrongful death action brought by the family and estate representatives of two brothers, Walter and Samuel Giron, who died when Officer Justin Hice accidentally collided with their van while pursuing a suspected speeder. Officer Hice and his employer, the Town of Olathe, claimed immunity under the CGIA. The Plaintiffs countered that the Defendants were not entitled to immunity because Officer Hice failed to use his emergency lights or siren continuously while speeding before the accident.The court had to interpret the CGIA and related traffic code provisions to determine the relevant time period for an officer’s failure to use emergency alerts. The court concluded that the CGIA requires a minimal causal connection between a plaintiff’s injuries and the fact that an officer did not use emergency signals while speeding. This means that an officer has access to immunity while speeding only during those times when the officer is using alerts.The court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation that an officer who fails to use his alerts at any point during the pursuit waives immunity for the entire pursuit. Instead, the court held that under section 24-10-106(1)(a) an emergency driver waives immunity only if the plaintiff’s injuries could have resulted from the emergency driver’s failure to use alerts.The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for the court of appeals to determine if Officer Hice’s failure to use his lights or siren until the final five to ten seconds of his pursuit could have contributed to the accident. View "Hice v. Giron" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado ruled in favor of the petitioners, GHP Horwath, P.C.; Nadine Pietrowski; Bohn Aguilar, LLC; Michael G. Bohn; and Armando Y. Aguilar, in their request to permanently enjoin respondent Nina H. Kazazian from proceeding without legal representation (pro se) in Colorado state courts. The court found that Kazazian, a disbarred attorney, had consistently abused the legal system by pursuing numerous frivolous lawsuits and appeals, often targeting the attorneys involved in her cases. This behavior, the court held, caused unnecessary strain on judicial resources and was often aimed at harassing the opposing parties. Therefore, while Kazazian retained the right to access the courts, she could only do so through an attorney. View "Horwath v. Kazazian" on Justia Law

In this case, Beverly Stickle sued Jefferson County after sustaining an injury from a fall in a parking structure adjacent to a county building. She claimed that a poorly marked curb, which created an optical illusion and made the walkway and parking area appear as a single flat surface, was a dangerous condition that caused her injury. The county argued for dismissal on the grounds of immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), asserting that the parking structure was not a "building" and that the condition causing the injury was solely due to the parking lot's design. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the parking structure qualified as a "building" under the CGIA. The court also held that the optical illusion was not solely attributable to the parking lot's design but was also, at least in part, a result of the maintenance of the facility. As such, the county was not immune from the lawsuit under the CGIA, and Stickle's claim could proceed. View "County of Jefferson v. Stickle" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, Arnold Roman Martinez stole a bicycle from the garage of C.T. Pursuing Martinez in his car, C.T. pulled in front of Martinez, leading to a collision that damaged C.T.’s vehicle. Martinez was subsequently ordered to pay restitution for the damage to the car as part of a plea agreement in a criminal case. Martinez contested the restitution order, arguing that he did not proximately cause the car damage.The Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard of review for evaluating a district court’s determination of proximate cause for restitution is clear error, not abuse of discretion as had been applied by the lower courts. The court reasoned that the proximate cause inquiry is primarily a fact-based determination, and that trial courts are better situated to resolve such disputes. It also noted that the statutory language and structure suggest that the standard of review should allow for expedient resolution of restitution decisions.Applying this standard, the Supreme Court found no clear error in the district court’s determination that Martinez had proximately caused the car damage. The court determined that C.T.’s actions were foreseeable and not grossly negligent, and that Martinez had participated in the events leading to the collision. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that Martinez was obligated to pay restitution. View "Martinez v. People" on Justia Law

In a dispute between Adams County and the City and County of Denver over the use of a noise-modeling system instead of a noise-monitoring system at Denver International Airport, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that Adams County's breach-of-contract claim, brought in 2018, was barred by the statute of limitations. The court found that the claim accrued no later than 1995, when Adams County became aware of Denver's breach of their contract by using a noise-modeling system. The court concluded that under Colorado law, a breach-of-contract claim accrues at the time the breach is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The court dismissed the argument that the claim only accrued when Adams County became aware of the full extent of its damages and had certainty of harm and incentive to sue in 2014. View "City & County of Denver v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reviewed a case involving a dispute over the methodology for implementing Tax Increment Financing (TIF) under Colorado's Urban Renewal Law (URL). The respondents, collectively known as AURA, argued that the methodology applied by the Colorado State Property Tax Administrator and the Arapahoe County Assessor was in violation of the URL because it differentiated between direct and indirect benefits when adjusting the base and increment values of blighted property in urban renewal areas. They contended that this methodology deprived urban renewal authorities of property tax revenues they should receive due to enhanced market perceptions of properties located in a TIF plan. The court of appeals agreed with AURA and reversed the district court's summary judgment favoring the Assessor. However, the Supreme Court held that the Administrator's methodology does not violate the URL. The URL does not prescribe a specific methodology but gives the Administrator broad authority to determine how to calculate and proportionately adjust the base and increment values. The court concluded that the Administrator's differentiation between direct and indirect benefits does not conflict with the URL, and therefore, reversed the portion of the division’s judgment concerning the Administrator’s methodology and affirmed that the district court correctly entered summary judgment. View "Kaiser v. Aurora Urban Renewal Authority" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, the court had to decide whether Anthony Robert Smith had waived some of the claims he had raised in a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion by not pursuing certain claims in later briefings and at a postconviction hearing. The court also had to consider whether counsel could abandon some of a defendant’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) claims without first obtaining the defendant’s informed consent, and whether abandonment of individual postconviction claims requires a showing of intent to do so.Smith was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault on a child and promotion of obscenity to a minor. After his conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals, Smith filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion, asserting several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. After appointed counsel filed a Supplemental Motion for Post-Conviction Relief that did not include some of Smith's pro se claims, the postconviction court found that Smith had waived those omitted claims.On appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed the postconviction court’s decision, concluding that Smith’s claims were preserved because they were not superseded by counsel’s motion. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that Smith abandoned the claims he stopped pursuing. The court also decided that counsel, as the “captain of the ship,” has the authority to make strategic decisions, including which claims to pursue. Therefore, counsel may abandon some of a defendant’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) claims without the client’s informed consent. The court did not rule on whether abandonment of individual postconviction claims requires a showing of intent to abandon such claims. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, James Herman Dye was charged with murdering a woman over forty years ago. During pretrial hearings, Dye indicated that he might present evidence suggesting another person, an alternate suspect, committed the crime. The Supreme Court of Colorado clarified that the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Discovery and Procedure Before Trial”) Rule 16(II)(c) requires a defendant to disclose the nature of any defense, including an alternate suspect defense, prior to trial. The Court also clarified that the requirement to disclose the nature of a defense includes identifying any alternate suspects, along with their addresses if they are to be called to testify at trial. However, the Court found that the lower court's order for Dye to disclose "all evidence" related to the alternate suspect defense was overbroad. The Court ruled that the prosecution should conduct its own investigation into any alternate suspect identified. The Court also held that disputes over the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence should be resolved prior to trial. The Court therefore vacated the lower court’s discovery order and directed the lower court to follow the procedures outlined in its opinion. View "People v. Dye" on Justia Law