Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal presented three issues for the Colorado Supreme Court's review: (1) At what point was defendant Weston Thomas under arrest for purposes of the crime of resisting arrest?; (2) was bodily injury to an at-risk person (a class 6 felony) a lesser included offense of third degree assault (a class 1 misdemeanor)?; and (3) was it error for the trial court to adjudicate Thomas a habitual criminal and sentence him accordingly when two of his three prior felony convictions had been reclassified from class 4 and 6 felonies to level 4 drug felonies? Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals’ analysis of each question, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In August 2016, Plaintiff Maribel Ronquillo was in an automobile collision. According to her complaint, Ronquillo was rear-ended by defendant Jesse Williams, who was operating a vehicle owned by an EcoClean employee and towing an EcoClean trailer. Ronquillo suffered serious physical injuries and incurred around $250,000 in medical expenses. At the time of the accident, Ronquillo did not have health insurance, so she entered into a medical finance lien agreement with Injury Finance. Under the terms of that agreement, Injury Finance purchased Ronquillo’s accounts receivable from her healthcare providers at a predetermined, discounted contractual rate, which allowed Ronquillo to receive prompt medical care. Ronquillo remained contractually obligated to repay Injury Finance for “all charges billed by the [medical] [p]roviders” regardless of the result of any litigation. Ronquillo and her husband filed suit alleging negligence and loss of consortium against Williams and asserting a respondeat superior claim against EcoClean. As part of discovery, Defendants subpoenaed Injury Finance, seeking information and documents pertaining to Injury Finance’s accounts receivable purchase rates, provider contracts, and business operations and methodologies. When Injury Finance did not respond to the subpoena, Defendants filed a motion to compel production, which the district court granted. Defendants also filed a “motion for determination of a question of law pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h) that Injury Finance . . . is not a collateral source[]” subject to the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule. This interlocutory appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court raised the narrow question of whether a medical finance company was a collateral source for purposes of the pre-verdict evidentiary component of Colorado’s collateral source rule. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Injury Finance was not a collateral source, "Collateral sources must confer a 'benefit,' as defined in section 10-1-135(2)(a), C.R.S. (2021), onto the injured party. ... Ronquillo has not received a benefit from Injury Finance for purposes of the collateral source rule because her arrangement with Injury Finance does not reduce her financial obligations." The Court expressed no opinion on whether the disputed evidence could be excluded under other evidentiary rules such as CRE 401 and 403. View "Ronquillo v. EcoClean" on Justia Law

Defendant William Hunsaker, Jr. missed the deadline for filing his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. However, his original sentence was illegal, and the district court corrected it. The Colorado Supreme Court found his late filing of a collateral attack related to the illegality in his sentence, and was justifiably excused. The Court affirmed the court of appeals’ conclusion that one of Hunsaker’s Crim. P. 35(c) arguments was related to the illegality in his sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hunsaker v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State charged Kevin Viburg with driving under the influence with three or more prior alcohol-related traffic offenses (i.e., felony DUI). Prior to trial, Viburg moved to treat his prior convictions as an element of the crime, which would require the jury to find them beyond a reasonable doubt. The court denied the motion, ruling that Viburg’s prior convictions were a sentence enhancer that need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence at a hearing after a trial on the merits. As a result, evidence of his prior convictions was not introduced to the jury; instead, at trial, the court instructed the jury only on the elements of misdemeanor DUI. The jury then found Viburg guilty of misdemeanor DUI. Subsequently, at a post-conviction hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Viburg had three prior alcohol-related traffic offenses, and it entered a conviction for felony DUI. On direct appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed, holding that prior convictions were an element of felony DUI (meaning they must be presented to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). The appeals court further stated that if the prosecution sought retrial and Viburg raised a double jeopardy defense, the trial court had to rule on the defense; it declined to express an opinion on the merits of the defense. The Colorado Supreme Court held double jeopardy did not bar retrial because the defendant was not previously acquitted of felony DUI. View "In re Viburg v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Eddie Johnson died of natural causes before completing the direct appeal of his criminal convictions in this case. A division of the court of appeals applied the doctrine of abatement ab initio to vacate Johnson’s underlying convictions and a large restitution order associated with them. The prosecution claimed that certain statutory changes and policy considerations should have allowed the district court’s restitution order to survive Johnson’s death. The Colorado Supreme Court found that because the General Assembly did not clearly abrogate the doctrine as to restitution, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision in Colorado v. Johnson, 487 P.3d 1262, vacating the district court’s restitution order. View "Colorado v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2005, Alexander Rudnicki suffered serious injuries when OB-GYN Peter Bianco, D.O., negligently performed an operative vaginal delivery using a vacuum extractor to assist in the delivery. Alexander suffered injuries to his brain as a result of the trauma to his scalp and skull caused by the vacuum extraction. Alexander required ongoing physical, occupational, and speech therapy; he was intellectually disabled and enrolled in special education at school; and he was not likely to be able to live independently in the future. In 2014, Alexander’s parents, Francis and Pamela Rudnicki, in both their individual capacities and as parents, filed a complaint against Dr. Bianco and the hospital where Alexander was born, alleging, among other things, professional negligence by Dr. Bianco. Dr. Bianco moved to dismiss, asserting that Alexander’s parents did not bring their individual claims against him within the applicable statute of limitations. The district court agreed and dismissed the parents' individual claims, and the case proceeded to trial with Alexander as the sole plaintiff. A jury ultimately found Dr. Bianco had acted negligently and awarded Alexander damages, including, among other things, sums for past and future medical expenses until Alexander reached the age of twenty-two. Dr. Bianco filed a post-trial motion to reduce this verdict, arguing that under Colorado common law, only Alexander’s parents could recover Alexander’s pre-majority medical expenses and, therefore, the court was required to deduct from the verdict the medical expenses incurred prior to Alexander’s eighteenth birthday. The district court ultimately agreed with Dr. Bianco and vacated the entirety of the jury’s award for past medical expenses, as well as sixty percent of the award for future medical expenses, concluding that the claim for pre-majority medical expenses belonged solely to Alexander’s parents, but their claim for such expenses had been dismissed as time-barred. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether to adhere to a common law rule under which only a minor plaintiff’s parents may recover tort damages for medical expenses incurred by their unemancipated minor child. The Supreme Court concluded the traditional rationales for the common law rule no longer applied, and that "the realities of today’s health care economy compel us to abandon that rule. Accordingly, we conclude that in cases involving an unemancipated minor child, either the child or their parents may recover the child’s pre-majority medical expenses, but double recovery is not permitted." View "Rudnicki v. Bianco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Canuto Martinez successfully sued a car dealership, Defendant Larry H. Miller Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram 104th (“LHM”), for violating section 6-1-708(1)(a), C.R.S. (2021), of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”). The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the judgment was final for purposes of appeal when the district court determined that Martinez, as the prevailing plaintiff, was entitled to an award of attorney fees under the CCPA, but the court had not yet determined the amount of those fees. The Supreme Court resolved the tension between Baldwin v. Bright Mortgage Co., 757 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Colo. 1988) and Ferrell v. Glenwood Brokers, Ltd., 848 P.2d 936, 940–42 (Colo. 1993) by reaffirming the bright-line rule established in Baldwin: a judgment on the merits is final for purposes of appeal notwithstanding an unresolved issue of attorney fees. To the extent the Court's opinion in Ferrell deviated from Baldwin, "its approach lacks justification and generates uncertainty, thus undermining the purpose of Baldwin’s bright-line rule." The Court concluded that both litigants and courts were best served by the bright-line rule adopted in Baldwin. The Court therefore overruled Ferrell and the cases that followed it to the extent those cases deviated from Baldwin’s rule concerning the finality of a judgment for purposes of appeal. Applying the Baldwin rule here, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing LHM’s appeal in part as untimely, though under different reasoning. View "LHM Corp v. Martinez" on Justia Law

After years of unsuccessful negotiation and several years of contentious litigation, this case came before the Colorado Supreme Court to resolve a dispute over the placement of an irrigation ditch and maintenance obligations related to that ditch. Instead of proceeding as a straightforward determination of these issues under the standards established in Roaring Fork Club v. St. Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2001), the case was made complex by plaintiffs’ repeated assertions of unsubstantiated factual allegations and multiple legal claims lacking substantial justification. In the end, after ruling against plaintiffs on the merits, the water court took the rare step of awarding attorney fees to defendants because of the “frivolous, vexatious, and litigious” nature of many of the plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the water court lacked jurisdiction over the case, notwithstanding their vigorous assertion the court did have jurisdiction throughout proceedings at the trial level. Further, plaintiffs argued the water court made numerous errors on the merits of the case. Reviewing these arguments, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the water court did have jurisdiction to hear this case; (2) the court’s conclusions on the merits of the various claims were correct; and (3) the court’s decision to award attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court. View "Glover v. Resource Land Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding filed to the Colorado Supreme Court, at issue were the final legislative redistricting plans for the Colorado Senate and House of Representatives, adopted and submitted to the Court by the Colorado Independent Legislative Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”). Under article V, section 48.3, the Court's jurisdiction was limited to whether the Plans complied with the criteria listed in section 48.1 of article V, and the Court had to approve those Plans unless the it concluded the Commission abused its discretion in applying or failing to apply those criteria in light of the record before it. Finding no such abuse of discretion here, the Colorado Court approved the Plans and ordered the Commission to file those Plans with the Colorado Secretary of State as required by article V, section 48.3(5). View "In re Colo. Indep. Legis. Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Roddy and his ex-wife have been embroiled in post-decree domestic-relations litigation for more than a decade. In exchange for dismissal of the original criminal charges, Roddy pled guilty to first degree criminal trespass, a crime that he committed in his ex-wife’s home. He received a deferred judgment and sentence, and the court ordered him to pay restitution to his ex-wife as the victim. Roddy contended that the district court erred when it: (1) entered the restitution order beyond the ninety-one-day time limit prescribed by statute; and (2) included losses proximately caused by conduct related to the dismissed charges as well as the charge to which he pled guilty. A division of the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to enter the order after the ninety-one-day limit had expired. But the division also limited restitution to only “the losses caused by the conduct to which [Roddy] pleaded guilty.” The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that though the trial court exceeded the statutory ninety-one-day period for ordering restitution, the trial court made a good cause finding, albeit, well after the ninety-one-day window had closed. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for findings on whether the trial court’s late good cause finding was adequate in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Colorado v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, __ P.3d __. View "Colorado v. Roddy" on Justia Law