Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury found Benjamin Weeks guilty of aggravated robbery and felony menacing. At his sentencing hearing, which was held approximately a month later, the prosecutor asked that the issue of restitution “remain open.” Notably, the prosecutor informed the court that he’d determined he would be seeking restitution but hadn’t filed a motion yet. He promised to follow up with a written motion within ninety-one days. Defense counsel indicated that he would address restitution “when there’s a motion filed.” The court granted the prosecutor’s request, reserved the issue of restitution for ninety-one days, and set a briefing schedule. The prosecutor filed a motion for restitution for the amount stolen in the robbery, plus prejudgment interest. The prosecutor informed the court he was still investigating whether there were grounds to seek additional restitution. Twenty-three days later, Weeks filed a response in which he argued the actual losses were less than was proposed by the prosecution, and that the issue of restitution should not remain open indefinitely. At a restitution hearing eight months later, Weeks countered the prosecution’s restitution request by contending the court no longer had jurisdiction to require him to pay since the ninety-one day deadline in C.R.S. 18-1.3-603(1)(b). The trial court ultimately rejected Weeks’ contention and ordered restitution. The Colorado Supreme Court determined the trial court issued its order without making an express and timely finding of good cause for extending the deadline. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that by the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution, it lacked authority to do so. View "Colorado v. Weeks" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the state's final congressional redistricting plan adopted by the Colorado Independent Congressional Redistricting Commission pursuant to article V, section 44.5 of the Colorado Constitution. The Court concluded the Commission did not abuse its discretion in applying the criteria in article V, section 44.3 in adopting the Plan on the record before it. The Court therefore approved the Plan for Colorado’s congressional districts for the ensuing decade, and ordered the Commission to file the Plan with the Colorado Secretary of State no later than December 15, 2021, as required by article V, section 44.5(5). View "In re Colo. Indep. Cong. Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a warrant, Denver police officers searched defendant Scott McKay’s home and car. During the search, police allegedly found more than four pounds of methamphetamine and a handgun. The State charged McKay with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of a weapon by a previous offender. In an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order granting McKay's motion to suppress evidence gathered during the execution of that warrant, the State argued the trial court erred in finding the issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination lacked a substantial basis. The Colorado Supreme Court found the magistrate had a substantial basis to find probable cause existed. "Put simply, a fair probability existed that a search of McKay’s car and home would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime." Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. McKay" on Justia Law

In a split decision from a division of the court of appeals, the majority concluded the trial court deprived defendant Levi Hall of his right to a fair trial because the trial court "crossed the line from impartial judge to partisan advocate" when it requested additional argument after closing arguments. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a trial court presiding over a bench trial acts within its discretion and does not abandon its role as a neutral arbiter when it asks both parties for additional argument about properly admitted evidence before rendering a verdict. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to reinstate the defendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence. View "Colorado v. Hall" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case restricted the generalized expert testimony offered by the State regarding the dynamics of domestic violence. After considering the victim’s testimony, the proposed expert opinions, and the reasons why the State sought to educate the jury, the trial court allowed only those opinions which it viewed as having a sufficient logical relation to the facts to be helpful to the jury without violating CRE 403. "Since generalized expert testimony, by definition, seeks to inform the jury about generic concepts or principles without knowledge of the facts, it is almost inevitable that parts of such testimony will not be logically connected to the case. For that reason, the fit inquiry must be flexible. A trial court should certainly not be expected to parse the proposed testimony and determine whether each statement the expert intends to utter is logically connected to a fact in the case. If the generalized expert testimony’s logical connection to the factual issues is sufficient to be helpful to the jury without running afoul of CRE 403, the testimony fits the case." Because the trial court properly exercised its discretion in carrying out its gatekeeping function, and because the standard of review pertaining to the admission of expert testimony is highly deferential, the court of appeals erred in reversing the judgment of conviction of defendant Kerry Cooper. View "Colorado v. Cooper" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case admitted the generalized expert testimony offered by the State on the dynamics of domestic violence, ruling that it would be helpful to the jury and impliedly finding that it passed muster under CRE 403. A jury then returned guilty verdicts against the defendant Dylan Coons, for sexual assault, extortion (involving an unlawful act), extortion (involving a third party), and assault in the third degree. But a division of the court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that some of the State's generalized expert testimony did not fit the case. More specifically, the division ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony about some aspects of the Power and Control Wheel (a tool adopted by social scientists to explain the common dynamics of domestic violence), including “certain of the examples of abusive acts that abusers may commit.” According to the division, since this testimony had no logical relation to the facts of the case, it should have been excluded and the trial court’s failure to do so was reversible error. The Colorado Supreme Court held that generalized expert testimony fits a case if it has a sufficient logical connection to the factual issues to be helpful to the jury while still clearing the ever-present CRE 403 admissibility bar. "In evaluating the fit of generalized expert testimony, a trial court must be mindful of the purposes for which such testimony is offered—that is, the reasons why the proponent of the evidence has asked the expert to educate the jury about certain concepts or principles." Because the court of appeals employed a fit standard "inflexible and overly exacting," and because the trial court's decision to admit the challenged evidence was entitled to deference, the division erred. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Coons" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the “McHaffie Rule” applied even where the plaintiff chooses not to assert vicarious liability for an employee’s negligence and, instead, asserts only direct negligence claims against the employer. Here, Erica Murphy Brown and Steven Brown (collectively, “Brown”) sued Denver Center for Birth and Wellness (“DCBW”) for negligence and negligent hiring. Brown also sued Shari Long Romero, a DCBW employee and certified nurse-midwife, for wrongful death. The suit arose from the death of Brown’s child during labor at DCBW. After acknowledging vicarious liability for Long Romero’s negligence - by admitting, in its Answer, that Long Romero’s alleged acts and omissions occurred within the course and scope of her employment - DCBW moved for partial judgment on the pleadings under C.R.C.P. 12(c) on Brown’s negligent hiring claim. The trial court, citing the McHaffie Rule, granted DCBW’s motion and dismissed Brown’s negligent hiring claim—even though Brown had chosen not to assert vicarious liability for Long Romero’s negligence. The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s direct negligence claims against an employer are not barred where the plaintiff does not assert vicarious liability for an employee’s negligence. Thus, the trial court erred in granting DCBW’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and dismissing Brown’s negligent hiring claim. The Court vacated the trial court's grant of partial judgment on the pleadings, and remanded with directions to reinstate Brown's negligent hiring claim. View "Brown v. Long Romero" on Justia Law

A division of the Colorado Court of Appeals, purporting to apply Colorado v. Morehead, 442 P.3d 413 (2019) announced a new two-step, multifactor test that trial courts would be required to apply when exercising discretion to entertain new arguments and evidence from either party in resolving any remaining suppression-related issues not foreclosed by appeal. In 2007, respondent Tallent spontaneously ran when he saw nearby police officers, eluded the officers in a chase through several backyards, and hid on a covered porch. After the arrest, police discovered an outstanding felony warrant for Tallent. Before trial, Tallent moved to suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of his arrest, his interactions with police, and the various searches they had conducted. The trial court issued an oral ruling that the police lacked probable cause for the arrest. At that hearing, the court acknowledged that “perhaps [the State] would want to make additional comments in light of the actual ruling as to the arrest.” The State indicated that it might want to take an interlocutory appeal of the ruling. On July 20, 2007, however, the court, “upon further analysis,” issued a written order concluding that Tallent’s arrest was in fact constitutional. The court thus admitted the evidence at trial. Tallent was convicted as charged. On direct appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed Tallent’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that “[b]ecause Tallent was arrested without probable cause, evidence obtained as a result of that arrest should not have been admitted at trial.” Because the trial court relied on new arguments without explicitly applying that novel test, the division reversed Tallent’s conviction and remanded for the trial court to apply the test retroactively. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the appellate division’s approach, which the Court found strayed from its decision in Morehead and imposed unnecessary constraints on trial courts. "Further, based on the existing record in Tallent’s case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in considering the State's new arguments on remand. We therefore reverse the division’s judgment and remand for consideration of Tallent’s remaining arguments on appeal." View "Colorado v. Tallent" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court enjoined Robert Francis, whether acting individually or on behalf of a trust or some other entity, from ever again proceeding pro se as a proponent of a claim (i.e., as a plaintiff, third-party claimant, cross-claimant, or counter-claimant) in any present or future litigation in the state courts of Colorado. "While the Colorado Constitution confers upon every person an undisputed right of access to our state courts, that right isn’t absolute. A party’s constitutional right of access to the courts must sometimes yield to the constitutional right of other litigants and the public to have justice administered without denial or delay. Such is the case when courts are called upon to curb the deleterious impact that duplicative and baseless pro se litigation has on finite judicial resources." Francis abused the judicial process for the purpose of harassing his adversaries "for the better part of a decade." State courts warned, reprimanded, and sanctioned Francis. Even the suspension of his law license failed to deter his "appalling conduct." Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded "the extraordinary injunction requested is amply justified. Of course, Francis may still obtain access to judicial relief—he just may not do so without legal representation." View "In re Francis v. Wegener" on Justia Law

Peggy Harvey and Eileen Manzanares were injured in separate car accidents when their cars were struck by other drivers. Each was then taken to a Centura-affiliated hospital (along with Centura Health Corporation, “Centura”) for treatment. At the time they were treated by Centura, both women’s health insurance was solely through Medicare and Medicaid. And both women’s injuries resulted in hospital stays. In addition to Medicare and Medicaid, both women had automobile insurance whose policies included medical payment ("Med Pay") coverage for medical bills incurred as a result of a motor vehicle accident. In addition, the third-party tortfeasors who caused Harvey’s and Manzanares’s injuries also had automobile insurance. Both Harvey and Manzanares advised Centura of all of the available health and automobile insurance policies. Centura then assigned the women’s accounts to a collection agency, Avectus Healthcare Solutions, for processing; Avectus submitted Centura’s medical expenses to each of the automobile insurers involved, including the automobile insurers for Harvey, Manzanares, and the third-party tortfeasors. Within two weeks after submitting these charges to the various automobile insurers (and within two months of the women’s respective discharges from their hospital stays), Centura filed hospital liens against both of the women. Centura conceded it did not bill either Medicare or Medicaid before filing their respective liens. Both Harvey and Manzanares subsequently brought suit, alleging that Centura had violated the Lien Statute by not billing Medicare for the services provided to the women prior to filing the liens. The parties disputed whether when, as here, Medicare was a person’s principal source of health coverage, Medicare could be considered a “primary medical payer of benefits” under the Lien Statute (such that a hospital must bill Medicare before asserting a lien), or if such an interpretation was barred by the Medicare Secondary Payer statute, which designated Medicare as a “secondary payer.” The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that when Medicare was a patient’s primary health insurer, the Lien Statute required a hospital to bill Medicare for the medical services provided to the patient before asserting a lien against that patient. "Hospital liens are governed by state, not federal, law, and merely enforcing our Lien Statute does not make Medicare a primary payer of medical benefits in violation of the MSP Statute." View "Harvey v. Centura, No." on Justia Law