Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Eddie Johnson died of natural causes before completing the direct appeal of his criminal convictions in this case. A division of the court of appeals applied the doctrine of abatement ab initio to vacate Johnson’s underlying convictions and a large restitution order associated with them. The prosecution claimed that certain statutory changes and policy considerations should have allowed the district court’s restitution order to survive Johnson’s death. The Colorado Supreme Court found that because the General Assembly did not clearly abrogate the doctrine as to restitution, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision in Colorado v. Johnson, 487 P.3d 1262, vacating the district court’s restitution order. View "Colorado v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2005, Alexander Rudnicki suffered serious injuries when OB-GYN Peter Bianco, D.O., negligently performed an operative vaginal delivery using a vacuum extractor to assist in the delivery. Alexander suffered injuries to his brain as a result of the trauma to his scalp and skull caused by the vacuum extraction. Alexander required ongoing physical, occupational, and speech therapy; he was intellectually disabled and enrolled in special education at school; and he was not likely to be able to live independently in the future. In 2014, Alexander’s parents, Francis and Pamela Rudnicki, in both their individual capacities and as parents, filed a complaint against Dr. Bianco and the hospital where Alexander was born, alleging, among other things, professional negligence by Dr. Bianco. Dr. Bianco moved to dismiss, asserting that Alexander’s parents did not bring their individual claims against him within the applicable statute of limitations. The district court agreed and dismissed the parents' individual claims, and the case proceeded to trial with Alexander as the sole plaintiff. A jury ultimately found Dr. Bianco had acted negligently and awarded Alexander damages, including, among other things, sums for past and future medical expenses until Alexander reached the age of twenty-two. Dr. Bianco filed a post-trial motion to reduce this verdict, arguing that under Colorado common law, only Alexander’s parents could recover Alexander’s pre-majority medical expenses and, therefore, the court was required to deduct from the verdict the medical expenses incurred prior to Alexander’s eighteenth birthday. The district court ultimately agreed with Dr. Bianco and vacated the entirety of the jury’s award for past medical expenses, as well as sixty percent of the award for future medical expenses, concluding that the claim for pre-majority medical expenses belonged solely to Alexander’s parents, but their claim for such expenses had been dismissed as time-barred. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether to adhere to a common law rule under which only a minor plaintiff’s parents may recover tort damages for medical expenses incurred by their unemancipated minor child. The Supreme Court concluded the traditional rationales for the common law rule no longer applied, and that "the realities of today’s health care economy compel us to abandon that rule. Accordingly, we conclude that in cases involving an unemancipated minor child, either the child or their parents may recover the child’s pre-majority medical expenses, but double recovery is not permitted." View "Rudnicki v. Bianco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Canuto Martinez successfully sued a car dealership, Defendant Larry H. Miller Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram 104th (“LHM”), for violating section 6-1-708(1)(a), C.R.S. (2021), of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”). The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the judgment was final for purposes of appeal when the district court determined that Martinez, as the prevailing plaintiff, was entitled to an award of attorney fees under the CCPA, but the court had not yet determined the amount of those fees. The Supreme Court resolved the tension between Baldwin v. Bright Mortgage Co., 757 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Colo. 1988) and Ferrell v. Glenwood Brokers, Ltd., 848 P.2d 936, 940–42 (Colo. 1993) by reaffirming the bright-line rule established in Baldwin: a judgment on the merits is final for purposes of appeal notwithstanding an unresolved issue of attorney fees. To the extent the Court's opinion in Ferrell deviated from Baldwin, "its approach lacks justification and generates uncertainty, thus undermining the purpose of Baldwin’s bright-line rule." The Court concluded that both litigants and courts were best served by the bright-line rule adopted in Baldwin. The Court therefore overruled Ferrell and the cases that followed it to the extent those cases deviated from Baldwin’s rule concerning the finality of a judgment for purposes of appeal. Applying the Baldwin rule here, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing LHM’s appeal in part as untimely, though under different reasoning. View "LHM Corp v. Martinez" on Justia Law

After years of unsuccessful negotiation and several years of contentious litigation, this case came before the Colorado Supreme Court to resolve a dispute over the placement of an irrigation ditch and maintenance obligations related to that ditch. Instead of proceeding as a straightforward determination of these issues under the standards established in Roaring Fork Club v. St. Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2001), the case was made complex by plaintiffs’ repeated assertions of unsubstantiated factual allegations and multiple legal claims lacking substantial justification. In the end, after ruling against plaintiffs on the merits, the water court took the rare step of awarding attorney fees to defendants because of the “frivolous, vexatious, and litigious” nature of many of the plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the water court lacked jurisdiction over the case, notwithstanding their vigorous assertion the court did have jurisdiction throughout proceedings at the trial level. Further, plaintiffs argued the water court made numerous errors on the merits of the case. Reviewing these arguments, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the water court did have jurisdiction to hear this case; (2) the court’s conclusions on the merits of the various claims were correct; and (3) the court’s decision to award attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court. View "Glover v. Resource Land Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding filed to the Colorado Supreme Court, at issue were the final legislative redistricting plans for the Colorado Senate and House of Representatives, adopted and submitted to the Court by the Colorado Independent Legislative Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”). Under article V, section 48.3, the Court's jurisdiction was limited to whether the Plans complied with the criteria listed in section 48.1 of article V, and the Court had to approve those Plans unless the it concluded the Commission abused its discretion in applying or failing to apply those criteria in light of the record before it. Finding no such abuse of discretion here, the Colorado Court approved the Plans and ordered the Commission to file those Plans with the Colorado Secretary of State as required by article V, section 48.3(5). View "In re Colo. Indep. Legis. Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Roddy and his ex-wife have been embroiled in post-decree domestic-relations litigation for more than a decade. In exchange for dismissal of the original criminal charges, Roddy pled guilty to first degree criminal trespass, a crime that he committed in his ex-wife’s home. He received a deferred judgment and sentence, and the court ordered him to pay restitution to his ex-wife as the victim. Roddy contended that the district court erred when it: (1) entered the restitution order beyond the ninety-one-day time limit prescribed by statute; and (2) included losses proximately caused by conduct related to the dismissed charges as well as the charge to which he pled guilty. A division of the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to enter the order after the ninety-one-day limit had expired. But the division also limited restitution to only “the losses caused by the conduct to which [Roddy] pleaded guilty.” The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that though the trial court exceeded the statutory ninety-one-day period for ordering restitution, the trial court made a good cause finding, albeit, well after the ninety-one-day window had closed. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for findings on whether the trial court’s late good cause finding was adequate in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Colorado v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, __ P.3d __. View "Colorado v. Roddy" on Justia Law

A jury found Benjamin Weeks guilty of aggravated robbery and felony menacing. At his sentencing hearing, which was held approximately a month later, the prosecutor asked that the issue of restitution “remain open.” Notably, the prosecutor informed the court that he’d determined he would be seeking restitution but hadn’t filed a motion yet. He promised to follow up with a written motion within ninety-one days. Defense counsel indicated that he would address restitution “when there’s a motion filed.” The court granted the prosecutor’s request, reserved the issue of restitution for ninety-one days, and set a briefing schedule. The prosecutor filed a motion for restitution for the amount stolen in the robbery, plus prejudgment interest. The prosecutor informed the court he was still investigating whether there were grounds to seek additional restitution. Twenty-three days later, Weeks filed a response in which he argued the actual losses were less than was proposed by the prosecution, and that the issue of restitution should not remain open indefinitely. At a restitution hearing eight months later, Weeks countered the prosecution’s restitution request by contending the court no longer had jurisdiction to require him to pay since the ninety-one day deadline in C.R.S. 18-1.3-603(1)(b). The trial court ultimately rejected Weeks’ contention and ordered restitution. The Colorado Supreme Court determined the trial court issued its order without making an express and timely finding of good cause for extending the deadline. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that by the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution, it lacked authority to do so. View "Colorado v. Weeks" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the state's final congressional redistricting plan adopted by the Colorado Independent Congressional Redistricting Commission pursuant to article V, section 44.5 of the Colorado Constitution. The Court concluded the Commission did not abuse its discretion in applying the criteria in article V, section 44.3 in adopting the Plan on the record before it. The Court therefore approved the Plan for Colorado’s congressional districts for the ensuing decade, and ordered the Commission to file the Plan with the Colorado Secretary of State no later than December 15, 2021, as required by article V, section 44.5(5). View "In re Colo. Indep. Cong. Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a warrant, Denver police officers searched defendant Scott McKay’s home and car. During the search, police allegedly found more than four pounds of methamphetamine and a handgun. The State charged McKay with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of a weapon by a previous offender. In an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order granting McKay's motion to suppress evidence gathered during the execution of that warrant, the State argued the trial court erred in finding the issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination lacked a substantial basis. The Colorado Supreme Court found the magistrate had a substantial basis to find probable cause existed. "Put simply, a fair probability existed that a search of McKay’s car and home would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime." Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. McKay" on Justia Law

In a split decision from a division of the court of appeals, the majority concluded the trial court deprived defendant Levi Hall of his right to a fair trial because the trial court "crossed the line from impartial judge to partisan advocate" when it requested additional argument after closing arguments. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a trial court presiding over a bench trial acts within its discretion and does not abandon its role as a neutral arbiter when it asks both parties for additional argument about properly admitted evidence before rendering a verdict. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to reinstate the defendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence. View "Colorado v. Hall" on Justia Law