Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Michael Garcia was convicted of violating a protection order. On appeal, the district court concluded the county court violated Garcia’s confrontation right by admitting a notarized return of service into evidence at trial without the process server testifying. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the return of service wasn’t testimonial hearsay, and therefore its admission didn’t violate Garcia’s constitutional right to confrontation. The district court’s judgment was reversed. View "Colorado v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The water court that issued the decision at the heart of this appeal conducted a four-day trial with thousands of pages of exhibits and testimony of experts to decide the meaning of a decree finalized in April 1933. The court "seized" upon a 1936 photograph to declare the decree ambiguous. To cure the ambiguity, the court consulted additional evidence extrinsic to the original proceedings. Ultimately, the court found the water was decreed to a ditch at issue in the appeal. The parties challenged the water court's reliance on the 1936 photograph and extrinsic evidence. After review of the water court's order, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, finding that there existed a conflict in Colorado case law as to which materials a court could rely on to decide whether a decree of water rights was ambiguous. "While future litigation may require us to reconcile these cases . . . [e]ach method leads to the same result here: The creek water at issue is not decreed to the ditch." Since the photograph was extrinsic to the proceedings that birthed the decree, the water court erred by relying on it to characterize the decree as ambiguous. "Under any of the three interpretive approaches, evidence extrinsic to the underlying proceedings is admissible only after a finding of ambiguity, not to create the ambiguity." View "Mike & Jim Kruse P'ship v. Cotten" on Justia Law

As Marcus Perez was being arrested after a lengthy foot pursuit, the arresting officer found two live shotgun shells in Perez’s pocket. Without giving Perez Miranda warnings, the officer asked him, “Where’s the gun?” Perez answered that he had thrown the gun away. At a suppression hearing, Perez argued that his answer should have been suppressed because he was not Mirandized before the officer questioned him. The trial court disagreed, finding that the public safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applied. A jury convicted Perez of second-degree assault on a peace officer and four counts of possession of a dangerous weapon by a previous offender (“POWPO”). Perez appealed, contending that the public safety exception did not apply. The court of appeals agreed but deemed the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the convictions. Under the facts of this case, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the public safety exception applied, and the arresting officer was not required to give Miranda warnings before inquiring about the gun's location. View "Perez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Plaintiff DIA Brewing Co., LLC contended that after the district court entered an order dismissing this action pursuant to C.R.C.P.12(b)(1), C.R.C.P. 15(a) gave DIA Brewing the right to amend its complaint as a matter of course and without leave of the court or the consent of defendants because no responsive pleading had been filed. Defendants MCE-DIA, LLC and Richard Schaden (collectively, “MCE-DIA”), in contrast, contended that the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) dismissal resulted in a final judgment that cut off DIA Brewing’s right to amend as a matter of course under C.R.C.P. 15(a). Thus: if DIA Brewing wanted to amend, it was required to seek leave of the court or to obtain MCE-DIA’s written consent. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this dispute, and concluded a final judgment cuts off a plaintiff’s right to file an amended complaint as a matter of course under C.R.C.P. 15(a), and the dismissal order here was a final judgment. Therefore, DIA Brewing did not have the right to amend its complaint as a matter of course, but obligated to request the trial court for leave to amend, or indicate MCE-DIA had consented in writing to the filing of an amended complaint. In this case, the Supreme Court determined the amended pleading was not futile, stating viable claims for relief. The Court thus affirmed the appellate court, though on different grounds, and remanded this case with directions that this case be returned to the district court to accept DIA Brewing’s amended complaint for filing, after which MCE-DIA could respond in the ordinary course. View "Schaden v. DIA Brewing Co., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2018, Respondent Timothy Pyfer filed a dissolution of marriage petition, alleging that he had entered into a common law marriage with his same-sex partner, Petitioner Dean LaFleur, when they held a ceremony before family and friends in 2003, and exchanged vows and rings. LaFleur countered that Pyfer’s claim was legally impossible because at the time of the 2003 ceremony, Colorado did not recognize same-sex marriages. In the interim, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that same-sex couples could exercise the fundamental right to marry and struck down state laws that excluded same-sex couples from civil marriage as unconstitutional. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review to address whether, in light of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), a same-sex couple could prove a common law marriage entered in Colorado before the state recognized same-sex couples’ fundamental right to marry. The Court indeed held a court could recognize a common law same-sex marriage entered in Colorado before the state recognized same-sex couples’ fundamental right to marry, "state law restrictions held unconstitutional in Obergefell cannot serve as an impediment to the recognition of a same-sex marriage predating that decision." The Colorado Court held that to the extent Obergefell did not merely recognize an existing fundamental right to marry but announced a new rule of federal law, that decision applied retroactively to marriages (including common law marriages) predating that decision. View "In re Marriage of LaFleur & Pyfer" on Justia Law

When Viacheslav Yudkin died intestate, his ex-wife, Petitioner Svetlana Shtutman, was appointed personal representative of his estate. Respondent Tatsiana Dareuskaya sought Shtutman’s removal, asserting that she (Dareuskaya) should have had priority for that appointment as Yudkin’s common law wife. A probate court magistrate found that although Yudkin and Dareuskaya cohabitated and held themselves out to their community as married, other factors weighed against a finding of common law marriage, including that the couple did not file joint tax returns, own joint property or accounts, or share a last name. The court of appeals reversed the magistrate’s order, concluding that the magistrate abused his discretion by misapplying the test for a common law marriage set out in Colorado v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1987). Shtutman petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for certiorari review. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court was unclear whether the magistrate found Yudkin and Dareuskaya mutually agreed to enter into a marital relationship. Further, the magistrate’s treatment of certain evidence, such as the fact that the parties maintained separate finances and property, and that Dareuskaya never took Yudkin’s name, may have been appropriate under Lucero, but did not necessarily account for the legal and social changes to marriage acknowledged in In re Marriage of Hogsett & Neale, 2021 CO 1 __ P.3d ___. The Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed and the matter ordered remanded to the probate court to reconsider whether the parties entered into a common law marriage under Hogsett. View "In re Estate of Yudkin" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court has previously held that a couple could establish a common law marriage “by the mutual consent or agreement of the parties to be husband and wife, followed by a mutual and open assumption of a marital relationship.” The Court advised that evidence of such agreement and conduct could be found in: a couple’s cohabitation; reputation in the community as husband and wife; maintenance of joint banking and credit accounts; purchase and joint ownership of property; filing of joint tax returns; and use of the man’s surname by the woman or by children born to the parties. In this case, a dispute arose over a common law marriage claim. Notably in this case, because same-sex couples could lawfully marry, the gender-differentiated terms and heteronormative assumptions found in the case law were "ill-suited" for same-sex couples. "The lower court decisions in these cases reflect the challenges of applying Lucero to these changed circumstances." The Supreme Court refined the Lucero test to hold that a common law marriage may be established by the mutual consent or agreement of the couple to enter the legal and social institution of marriage, followed by conduct manifesting that mutual agreement. The core query is whether the parties intended to enter a marital relationship—that is, to share a life together as spouses in a committed, intimate relationship of mutual support and obligation. In assessing whether a common law marriage has been established, courts should accord weight to evidence reflecting a couple’s express agreement to marry. In the absence of such evidence, the parties’ agreement to enter a marital relationship may be inferred from their conduct. When examining the parties’ conduct, the factors identified previously in Colorado case law can still be relevant to the inquiry, but they must be assessed in context; the inferences to be drawn from the parties’ conduct may vary depending on the circumstances. Finally, the manifestation of the parties’ agreement to marry need not take a particular form. Applying these factors to the parties' case here, the Supreme Court determined no common law marriage existed here. View "In re Marriage of Hogsett & Neale" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Denver Health and Hospital Authority hired Brent Houchin as an Employee Relations Specialist and promoted him to Employee Relations Manager. Throughout Houchin’s time at Denver Health, his supervisor consistently rated his performance as “successful” and “exceptional.” In an employee relations matter concerning the suspected diversion of controlled substances, a former in-house lawyer for Denver Health advised that using an employee’s medical records from off-duty medical care in connection with an internal investigation would violate the privacy requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). Houchin objected to this interpretation of HIPAA because he (1) felt that it prevented him from investigating suspected employee diversions of controlled substances and (2) believed that HIPAA permitted the use of such employee information to detect health care fraud and abuse. This disagreement in interpretation would come into play when Houchin's employment was terminated, based on two alleged HIPAA violations relating to an investigation. Following his termination, Houchin appeared to have commenced Denver Health’s “Concern Resolution” process to address what he believed to be the discriminatory circumstances of his termination. Houchin then filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, alleging discrimination based on his sexual orientation and retaliation for using Denver Health’s “Concern Resolution” process to address such discrimination. The Civil Rights Division ultimately issued a Notice of Right to Sue, and Houchin filed a complaint against Denver Health. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the interplay between the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act ("CADA") and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA"). Denver Health moved to dismiss Houchin’s complaint, arguing, among other things, that Houchin’s discrimination and retaliation claims under CADA lie in tort and were therefore barred by the CGIA. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) claims for compensatory relief under CADA were not claims for “injuries which lie in tort or could lie in tort” for purposes of the CGIA and therefore public entities were not immune from CADA claims under the CGIA; (2) “the state,” as used in subsection 24-34-405(8)(g), included political subdivisions of the state. The appellate court's judgment dismissing Houchin's claims was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Denver Health v. Houchin" on Justia Law

Between the date he was hired and June 2015, Mark Stiles had some difficulties with punctuality and managing his paid leave balance, but he was never subject to corrective or disciplinary action and his evaluations consistently rated him as a competent Department of Corrections ("DOC") employee. Stiles was fired by the DOC for using marijuana outside of work hours. After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) acting on behalf of the Colorado State Personnel Board issued an initial decision reinstating Stiles and imposing a less severe sanction. The Board then adopted that initial decision, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed the Board’s ruling. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed to take DOC’s appeal in the hopes of shedding light on the standard of review that governed an appeal to the Board by a certified state employee following an appointing authority’s disciplinary action. The Supreme Court held that, while an ALJ conducting a hearing on behalf of the Board must afford the disciplined employee an opportunity to present evidence and must then make findings of fact, the ALJ’s review of the appointing authority’s disciplinary action was governed by the statutorily mandated “arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to rule or law” standard, not de novo review. Because the appellate division misapprehended the standard of review that controlled hearings held by or on behalf of the Board, and because the Supreme Court couldn't discern whether the ALJ applied the arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to rule or law standard or de novo review, the Court reversed the division’s judgment and remand with instructions to return the case to the ALJ for further proceedings. View "DOC v. Stiles" on Justia Law

Timothy Williams began working at the El Paso County, Colorado Sheriff’s Office in 2002 and, after multiple promotions over the course of his career, reached the rank of lieutenant. In March 2016, Sheriff Bill Elder ordered a mandatory survey requesting, among other things, retirement eligibility dates from all employees. Williams, who then would have been eligible for full retirement benefits June 1, 2018, completed this survey and reported that he expected to retire within the next five years. Thereafter, Williams was assigned to a team that conducted investigations into alleged misconduct by personnel in his office. Apparently, Sheriff Elder was unhappy with Williams’s investigation and the sanctions that Williams recommended, and he confronted Williams in a meeting about it. This lead to a demotion to senior deputy, which carried a significant change in rank, pay, and duties that resulted in substantial adverse retirement benefit consequences for Williams. To avoid these consequences, Williams retired the following day, ultimately to be replaced by a younger and purportedly less qualified employee. Williams thereafter filed age discrimination and retaliation charges El Paso County Sheriff’s Office with the Colorado Civil Rights Division and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the interplay between the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act ("CADA") and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA"). As applied to this case, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) claims for compensatory relief under CADA were not claims for “injuries which lie in tort or could lie in tort” for purposes of the CGIA and therefore public entities were not immune from CADA claims under the CGIA; (2) “the state,” as used in subsection 24-34-405(8)(g), included political subdivisions of the state and thus political subdivisions were not immune from claims for compensatory damages based on intentional unfair or discriminatory employment practices; and (3) front pay was equitable and not compensatory in nature under CADA, and age discrimination and retaliation claims seeking front pay did not lie and could not lie in tort for CGIA purposes. View "Elder v. Williams" on Justia Law