Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Colorado Supreme Court revisited a question left open in Castillo v. Colorado, 421 P.3d 1141 (2018): When a trial court instructs the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense, what quantum of proof is required to instruct the jury about an exception to that defense? The State urged the Supreme Court to adopt “some evidence” as the controlling standard. Defendant Jose L. Galvan, Sr. sought a heightened standard—substantial and sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that there were facts establishing the exception beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that when a trial court instructs the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense, it should instruct the jury on an exception to that defense if there is some evidence to support the exception. In determining whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the provocation exception here, a division of the court of appeals correctly found that there was some evidence to support the exception. "the trial court’s provocation instruction, in addition to prudently tracking the governing statute and the Colorado Model Criminal Jury Instructions, made clear to the jury that for Galvan to forfeit the affirmative defense of self-defense, he had to have provoked the same person as to whom he was asserting self-defense. View "Galvan v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from an application for a conditional water storage right filed by United Water and Sanitation District, a special water district formed in Elbert County, Colorado, acting through the United Water Acquisition Project Water Activity Enterprise (“United”). United sought to secure various water rights in Weld County. United’s original applications were consolidated in a set of four cases. In response to a motion for determination of questions of law from opposer Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company (“FRICO”) in the consolidated cases, the District Court for Water Division 1 (“water court”) concluded that United’s applications failed to demonstrate non-speculative intent to appropriate water. In response to this ruling, United withdrew its applications in the consolidated cases and, a week later, filed a new application in Case No. 16CW3053 for a conditional water storage right that was the subject of this appeal. Pertinent here, United sought to appropriate water for use in a proposed residential development in another county. In support of its new application for a conditional storage right, United offered a new, purportedly binding contract with the landowners of the proposed development. United also claimed for the first time that its status as a special district qualified it for the governmental planning exception to the anti-speculation doctrine. FRICO opposed United's application, and the water court determined United's new application likewise failed to demonstrated non-speculative intent to appropriate water. The water court found that United was acting as a water broker to sell to third parties for their use, and not as a governmental agency seeking to procure water to serve its own municipal customers. Consequently, the water court held, United did not qualify for the governmental planning exception to the anti-speculation doctrine. United appealed. But concurring with the water court's judgment, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed: United was ineligible for the governmental planning exception to the anti-speculation doctrine. View "United Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co." on Justia Law

The State of Colorado petitioned for review of a court of appeals' judgment reversing Barnett Williams' conviction for distributing a schedule II controlled substance. At trial, the district court admitted evidence pursuant to CRE 404(b) of a prior incident in which Williams pled guilty to selling cocaine. The court of appeals found that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence for the limited purposes of demonstrating “modus operandi and common plan, scheme, or design,” largely on the grounds that the evidence in question did not meet the strictures imposed by prior case law for admitting uncharged misconduct evidence pursuant to CRE 404(b) for these particular purposes, and because the error was not harmless. The Colorado Supreme Court determined that because the incremental probative value of the evidence relative to any material issue in the case was substantially outweighed by the danger that it would be unfairly prejudicial, the district court abused its discretion in admitting it. Although for different reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals was therefore affirmed. View "Colorado v. Williams" on Justia Law

In March 2016, law enforcement contacted Charles Linnebur after receiving a call that he had crashed his vehicle into a fence and might have been driving under the influence of alcohol. Although he initially denied that he had been drinking, Linnebur eventually admitted that he had consumed whiskey that day. He was arrested, and a blood test revealed that his blood alcohol level was well above the legal limit. The State charged Linnebur with DUI and DUI per se, seeking felony convictions under sections 42-4-1301(1)(a) and (2)(a), which provided that DUI and DUI per se were felonies if they “occurred after three or more prior convictions” for, among other things, DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI. Prior to trial, Linnebur filed a motion in limine arguing that the fact of his prior convictions was a substantive element of felony DUI that had to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the motion, concluding instead that Linnebur’s prior convictions were “merely sentence enhancers or aggravating factors” and could be proved to the court by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury found Linnebur guilty of the lesser included offense of DUI, DWAI, and DUI per se. The State submitted certified copies of Linnebur’s three prior impaired driving convictions and his state driving record. Rather than applying a preponderance of the evidence standard (as it had earlier indicated it would), the trial court instead concluded that these exhibits proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Linnebur had three prior convictions, and entered judgment for felony DWAI, merged the DUI per se conviction, and sentenced Linnebur to four years in community corrections. The Colorado Supreme Court held, contrary to the trial court, the statutory provisions that defined and provided penalties for felony DUI treated the fact of prior convictions as an element of the crime, which had be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, not as a sentence enhancer, which a judge could find by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the court of appeals erred in arriving at the opposite conclusion, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for sentencing on the misdemeanor DUI charges that were properly proved to the jury in this case. View "Linnebur v. Colorado" on Justia Law

When Louis Rabin died, he left everything to his widow, Claudine. She was also named as the personal representative to manage his estate in probate. Louis’s former wife, Suyue Rabin, made a claim against the estate based on a couple of promissory notes. These notes totaled $200,000 and were made payable to Suyue upon Louis’s death, and were executed while Louis was married to Claudine. Claudine didn’t know the notes existed until Suyue made the claim. Claudine asked Louis’s longtime attorney, Mark Freirich, for all of Louis’s legal files, most of which had nothing to do with the notes. He refused, citing confidentiality concerns. She then subpoenaed the files. When Freirich refused, a lawsuit was filed, reaching the Colorado Supreme Court. After review, the Court held: (1) Colorado’s Probate Code did not grant a personal representative a general right to take possession of all of a decedent’s legal files as “property” of the estate; (2) a decedent’s lawyer was ordinarily prohibited from disclosing a decedent’s legal files, even to the personal representative; but (3) a decedent’s lawyer could provide the personal representative with otherwise privileged or confidential documents if such disclosure was necessary to settle the decedent’s estate. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's order quashing the subpoena. That portion of the appellate court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Freirich v. Rabin" on Justia Law

Michael Struckmeyer was convicted by jury of class 3 felony child abuse (knowingly or recklessly), and class 4 child abuse (criminal negligence). A division of the court of appeals concluded that the verdicts were logically and legally inconsistent and could not be sustained because the class 3 felony child abuse conviction required the jury to determine that Struckmeyer was aware of the risk of serious bodily injury to the child victim, while the class 4 felony child abuse conviction required the jury to find that Struckmeyer was unaware of the risk of serious bodily injury to the child victim. Because the division believed that the trial court had accepted mutually exclusive guilty verdicts, it found plain error, reversed the judgment of conviction, and remanded for a new trial. The State appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. Following Colorado v. Rigsby, 471 P.3d 1068, the guilty verdict for child abuse (knowingly or recklessly) and the guilty verdict for child abuse (criminal negligence), even if logically inconsistent, are not legally inconsistent. "By proving that Struckmeyer acted knowingly or recklessly, the People necessarily established that he acted with criminal negligence. It follows that by returning a guilty verdict on child abuse (knowingly or recklessly), the jury, as a matter of law, necessarily found that he acted with criminal negligence. Therefore, even if there is a logical inconsistency between acting knowingly and acting with criminal negligence, and between acting recklessly and acting with criminal negligence, no legal inconsistency exists in either scenario based on section 18-1-503(3) [C.R.S. 2019]. After all, inasmuch as criminal negligence is subsumed within knowingly and within recklessly, acting with criminal negligence cannot be legally inconsistent with acting knowingly or acting recklessly. And guilty verdicts that are legally consistent are not mutually exclusive and do not require a new trial." View "Colorado v. Struckmeyer" on Justia Law

Brandon Jackson was convicted, as a complicitor, of both first degree murder and attempted first degree murder after his codefendant aimed at, shot, and killed Y.M. under the mistaken belief that Y.M. was E.O. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state constitutions dictated that Jackson could not stand convicted of both first degree murder and attempted first degree murder because elements of attempted first degree murder were a subset of the elements of first degree murder, and this particular attempted first degree murder was not factually distinct from this particular first degree murder. Contrary to the State's assertion, the shooter did not attempt to kill E.O. when he aimed at and shot Y.M. Rather, in aiming at and shooting Y.M., the shooter intended and attempted to kill Y.M., the same person he actually killed. "That the shooter wanted to kill E.O. and mistakenly believed Y.M. was E.O. is of no moment." Therefore, Jackson’s convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder were based on the same criminal conduct and relate to the same victim (Y.M.). The Court held the trial court plainly erred in entering convictions and imposing sentences for both offenses at issue here. The matter was remanded to the trial court to vacate Jackson's conviction and sentence for attempted first degree murder. View "Colorado v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In 2015, the owners of a 13,000-acre tract of land known as 70 Ranch successfully petitioned to include their tract in a special district. After 70 Ranch was incorporated into the district, the district began taxing the leaseholders of subsurface mineral rights, Bill Barrett Corporation, Bonanza Creek Energy, Inc., and Noble Energy, Inc. for the oil and gas they produced at wellheads located on 70 Ranch. The Lessees, however, objected to being taxed, arguing the mineral interests they leased could not be included in the special district because neither they nor the owners of the mineral estates consented to inclusion, which they asserted was required by section 32-1-401(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019), of the Special District Act. The Colorado Supreme Court determined that section 401(1)(a) permitted the inclusion of real property covered by the statute into a special taxing district when (1) the inclusion occurred without notice to or consent by the property’s owners and (2) that property was not capable of being served by the district. The Court answered "no," however, 32-1-401(1)(a) required the assent of all of the surface property owners to an inclusion under that provision, and inclusion was only appropriate if the surface property could be served by the district. "Section 32-1-401(1)(a) does not require assent from owners of subsurface mineral estates because those mineral estates, while they are real property, are not territory. Thus, Lessees’ consent was not required for the inclusion of 70 Ranch in the special district." The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals on alternate grounds. View "Barrett Corp. v. Lembke" on Justia Law

Derek Rigsby was charged with three counts of second degree assault for smashing a glass into someone’s face during a bar fight. The three charges represented alternative methods of committing the same crime. The jury found Rigsby guilty as charged on the first two counts: (1) second degree assault (acting with intent to cause bodily injury and causing serious bodily injury); and (2) second degree assault (acting recklessly and causing serious bodily injury with a deadly weapon). On the third count, second degree assault (acting with intent to cause bodily injury and causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon), the jury returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense of third degree assault (acting with criminal negligence and causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon), a misdemeanor; in so doing, the jury effectively acquitted Rigsby of the charged offense on that count. Concluding that the guilty verdicts for second degree assault, and the guilty verdict for third degree assault, were mutually exclusive, a division of the Colorado court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial. On appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, the state conceded the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court was defective, but argued the error was one of multiplicity, not mutually exclusive verdicts, and that it should have been corrected by merging the three guilty verdicts. To this, the Supreme Court agreed. The matter was remanded to the court of appeals with instructions to return the case to the trial court to merge all of the convictions into a single conviction for second degree assault and to leave in place only one sentence (one of the two concurrent five-year prison sentences imposed). View "Colorado v. Rigsby" on Justia Law

After the victim’s murder in this case, his sister-in-law discovered a peculiar microcassette among his belongings. On that cassette was a recording of a potentially incriminating voicemail message. A police detective later testified at trial that the message featured a voice like that of defendant Daniel Gonzales, whom the detective had interviewed while investigating the murder. Over Gonzales’s objection, the court admitted the recorded message into evidence at Gonzales’s trial. The detective was not present when the recorded statements were made, and neither he nor anyone else testified about the reliability of the recording process. Even so, after considering the recording and other evidence, a jury found Gonzales guilty of, among other things, first degree murder. After review of Gonzales' arguments on appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court held that in the absence of evidence suggesting that a proffered voice recording has been altered or fabricated, a proponent may authenticate a recording by presenting evidence sufficient to support a finding that it is what the proponent claims. "Once this prima facie burden is met, authenticity becomes a question for the factfinder, in this instance, the jury." The Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the voicemail, and therefore affirmed the court of appeals. View "Gonzales v. Colorado" on Justia Law