Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case case, which stemmed from a late-night argument on Twitter among several high school students, presented to the Colorado Supreme Court centered on the applicable framework for distinguishing a true threat from constitutionally protected speech in the "cyber arena." R.D., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for harassment by communication based on those tweets directed at another student that took place in the wake of a local school shooting. Put differently, the question was whether R.D.'s statements were "true threats." The Supreme Court held a true threat is a statement that, considered in context and under the totality of the circumstances, an intended or foreseeable recipient would reasonably perceive as a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. In determining whether a statement is a true threat, a reviewing court must examine the words used, but it must also consider the context in which the statement was made. Particularly where the alleged threat is communicated online, the contextual factors courts should consider include, but are not limited to: (1) the statement’s role in a broader exchange, if any, including surrounding events; (2) the medium or platform through which the statement was communicated, including any distinctive conventions or architectural features; (3) the manner in which the statement was conveyed (e.g., anonymously or not, privately or publicly); (4) the relationship between the speaker and recipient(s); and (5) the subjective reaction of the statement’s intended or foreseeable recipient(s). Because neither the juvenile court nor the court of appeals had the benefit of the framework announced by this case, the Supreme Court reversed judgment and remanded for reconsideration. View "Colorado in Interest of R.D." on Justia Law

The State petitioned for review the court of appeals' judgment reversing a trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences for respondent Martin Espinoza's ten convictions of attempted first degree murder of ten different people. Espinoza was charged with first degree arson, third degree assault, and attempted first degree murder (extreme indifference), with corresponding crime-of-violence counts, arising out of an incident in which a fire raged through his mother’s apartment. Respondent started a fire on the balcony of his mother’s apartment, which spread throughout the apartment building and to a neighboring building. The ten people who were named victims of the attempted murder counts were inside the defendant’s mother’s apartment building during the fire but were able to escape and survive. Reasoning that Espinoza’s ten attempted murder convictions were separate crimes of violence, the trial court considered itself bound by statute to impose consecutive sentences. The intermediate appellate court, however, found that because the ten convictions were premised on a “single act of fire-setting,” they were supported by identical evidence, notwithstanding the fact that each conviction required proof that the defendant attempted to kill a different person. Further concluding that convictions for multiple crimes of violence that were supported by identical evidence did not fall within the statutory mandate to sentence consecutively, the intermediate appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing. The Colorado Supreme Court found that because offenses defined in terms of their victimization of another and committed against different victims were not capable of being proved by identical evidence within the contemplation of section 18-1-408(3), C.R.S. (2019), and because even according to the appellate court’s understanding of the term “separate crimes of violence,” Espinoza’s convictions therefore required consecutive sentences pursuant to section 18-1.3-406(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019), the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Colorado v. Espinoza" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court has previously held a defendant was entitled to a preliminary hearing if charged with driving under the influence (DUI), a class four felony, where the defendant is held in custody on that charge. The issue this case presented for the Court's review centered on whether such a defendant entitled to demand and receive a preliminary hearing if not placed in custody, but the offense requires "mandatory sentencing." The Court concluded that indeed a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing whenever he is charged with a class four, five, or six felony and the charge requires the imposition of mandatory sentencing. Further, by its plain meaning, “mandatory sentencing” involved any period of incarceration required by law. Applying these principles to this case, the Court held Donald Huckabay was entitled to a preliminary hearing because he was charged with felony DUI - a class four felony that carried mandatory sentencing. View "In re Colorado v. Huckabay" on Justia Law

In 2000, as part of a plea agreement, Brian Keith McCulley pled guilty to one count of second degree sexual assault under section 18-3-403(1)(a), C.R.S. (2000) (a class 4 felony), pursuant to a four-year deferred judgment and sentence. Under the agreement, McCulley also pled guilty to one count of third degree sexual assault in violation of section 18-3-404(1)(c), C.R.S. (2000) (a class 1 misdemeanor). Accepting the plea agreement, the district court entered a judgment of conviction on the misdemeanor and sentenced McCulley to sixty days in jail and two years probation. The only condition of probation was that McCulley comply with the terms of the deferred judgment. As a condition of his deferred judgment, McCulley was required to register as a sex offender, which he did. In 2004, McCulley successfully completed the terms of his deferred judgment and sentence. The district court ordered McCulley’s guilty plea withdrawn and dismissed the felony charge. Thus, only a single judgment of conviction ultimately entered in McCulley’s case—on the misdemeanor. McCulley continued to register as a sex offender. The question in this case is whether a defendant who has successfully completed a deferred judgment nonetheless still “has [a] conviction” for purposes of the bar in section 16-22-113(3)(c), C.R.S. (2019). The Colorado Supreme Court concluded we conclude that a “conviction” for purposes of the bar in section 16-22-113(3)(c) did not include a successfully completed deferred judgment. Because the defendant in this case successfully completed his deferred judgment, he no longer “has more than one conviction” for purposes of section 16-22-113(3)(c) and was therefore eligible to petition the court to discontinue his duty to register. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent. View "McCulley v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Susan Burren was injured at work, and she received temporary workers’ compensation benefits after her employer admitted liability. Many months passed, with many efforts to treat her injuries, but none of her authorized treating physicians (“ATPs”) placed her at “Maximum medical improvement” (“MMI”). Her employer and her employer’s insurer sought a second opinion regarding Burren’s MMI status, and Burren subsequently underwent a Division Independent Medical Examination (“DIME”). The DIME doctor who examined Burren also declined to place her at MMI. The employer and insurer then challenged the DIME doctor’s opinion under section 8-42-107(8)(b)(III), C.R.S. (2019), of the Workers’ Compensation Act (“Act”). An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) concluded that the employer and insurer had overcome the DIME doctor’s finding. The ALJ then placed Burren at MMI with a finding of no permanent impairment, making Burren ineligible to receive permanent disability benefits. An administrative panel agreed with the ALJ. Burren appealed. A division of the court of appeals concluded that the ALJ had no authority to place Burren at MMI. Instead, Burren should have been allowed to resume treatment with her ATPs until either an ATP or a DIME doctor placed her at MMI. The employer and its insurer petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for review, and the Supreme Court reversed: once an ALJ concludes that an employer or an employer’s insurer has overcome a DIME doctor’s MMI opinion under section 8-42-107(8)(b)(III), the ALJ may determine the claimant’s MMI status and permanent impairment rating as questions of fact. View "Destination Maternity v. Burren" on Justia Law

Derrick Russell was sentenced to six years in community corrections for an offense in Douglas County, Colorado to be served concurrently with a three-year sentence incurred in Jefferson County. Before completing his concurrent sentences, Russell was unsuccessfully terminated from community corrections in both cases and immediately confined in the Denver County Jail. Less than a week later, the Jefferson County District Court resentenced Russell to serve the remainder of his three-year sentence in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Four months later, the Douglas County District Court also resentenced Russell to the Department of Corrections to serve the remainder of his six-year Douglas County sentence, again to be served concurrently with the Jefferson County sentence. The Douglas County District Court, however, did not award Russell any PSCC for the time he was confined between his Jefferson County resentencing on June 1 and his Douglas County resentencing on October 13. The issue his case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court was whether Russell was entitled to presentence confinement credit (“PSCC”) in Douglas County. A division of the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision not to award PSCC. The Supreme Court concluded there was a substantial nexus between the period that Russell was confined while he awaited resentencing in Douglas County and his Douglas County sentence. And because an award of PSCC for this period was not duplicative, he was entitled to additional PSCC. View "Russell v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Gerald Yeadon was convicted by jury of several charges, including possession of less than two grams of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a class 6 felony at the time. At his sentencing hearing, the trial court failed to impose the drug offender surcharge as a component of the sentence on the class 6 felony drug conviction. After the sentencing hearing, however, the court added the $1,250 drug offender surcharge on Yeadon’s mittimus. Relevant here, Yeadon argued on appeal of his conviction and sentence that the late imposition of the drug offender surcharge violated his federal and state constitutional rights against double jeopardy. In a unanimous, published decision, a division of the court of appeals disagreed, finding that the surcharge was statutorily mandated, and not illegal when the trial court corrected the sentence pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a). Thus it was not a double jeopardy violation when the court subsequently imposed the surcharge by including it on the mittimus. The Colorado Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court's reasoning; the Court did remand to the trial court to allow Yeadon an opportunity to request a waiver of the surcharge assessed. View "Yeadon v. Colorado" on Justia Law

David Waddell pled guilty to: possession of a controlled substance, a level 1 drug felony; attempted aggravated robbery, a class 4 felony; and vehicular eluding, a class 5 felony. At Waddell’s combined sentencing hearing, the trial court failed to impose the following surcharges: drug offender; rural alcohol and substance abuse; restorative justice; offender identification fund (“genetic testing"); victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund (“victims assistance”); and crime victim compensation fund (“victim compensation”). After the sentencing hearing, however, the court included these surcharges on Waddell’s mittimuses. Waddell appealed his sentences. As relevant here, he argued that the late imposition of the surcharges violated his federal and state constitutional rights against double jeopardy. In an unpublished decision, a unanimous division of the court of appeals disagreed. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held the drug offender surcharge, which was long ago declared a form of punishment, was statutorily mandated and, thus, the trial court’s failure to order it in open court rendered Waddell’s sentence on his level 1 drug felony conviction illegal and subject to correction at any time pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a). Therefore, the trial court’s imposition of that surcharge after the sentencing hearing did not violate Waddell’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. The trial court's imposition of the other five surcharges after the sentencing hearing also did not infringe Waddell's constitutional rights: they were statutorily mandated and subject to correction at any time pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a). The Supreme Court remanded this case to give Waddell an opportunity to request a waiver of the surcharges assessed. View "Waddell v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State sought interlocutory review of a trial court decision finding Bradley Clark was in custody so as to trigger "Miranda" when he made statements to law enforcement during the execution of a search warrant prior to his formal arrest. The trial court granted Clark's motion to suppress the statements. Firefighters were dispatched to a grocery store in Durango, Colorado to address a fire inside the store. They determined the fire had been set intentionally, and requested police department assistance. Based on review of security camera footage, police pinpointed the suspect who walked from the area of the fire to the self-checkout lines. At his residence, detectives in plain clothes, and one officer in uniform, discussed Clark's whereabouts through the door. They asked Clark if he would be willing to discuss his whereabouts outside; Clark acquiesced, wishing to avoid alarming his wife and children. Notwithstanding prior statements that he knew nothing about the incident, Clark said that he knew about the fire because he had read about it on the internet and that he and his wife had “joked about it.” Having heard Clark contradict himself a number of times, Detective Newman told Clark that there were video cameras in the store and that based on the footage, Clark was the suspect. While Detective Newman spoke with Clark outside, the other officers searched the home. Detective Newman testified that he did not place Clark in handcuffs while the two were talking, nor did he put any other kind of restraints on Clark or otherwise limit Clark's movement. The detective further testified he did not give Clark a Miranda advisement, stating that once Clark was under arrest, he did not question Clark further. Clark pleaded not guilty, resulting in the motion to suppress at issue here. The Colorado Supreme Court determined Clark was not in custody for Miranda purposes when the detective questioned him outside his home regarding the fire that occurred at the grocery store. The trial court erred in suppressing statements Clark made at the time. View "Colorado v. Clark" on Justia Law

John Halaseh petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for review of a court of appeals' remand order which directed the trial court to enter four convictions for class 4 felony theft in place of the single conviction of class 3 felony theft reflected in the charge and jury verdict. The intermediate appellate court reversed the conviction for class 3 felony theft on the grounds that when the statutory authorization for aggregating separate acts of theft was properly applied, there was insufficient evidence to support a single conviction for theft of $20,000 or more. It also found, however, that there was sufficient evidence to support four separate convictions for aggregated thefts with values qualifying as class 4 felonies, and that substituting these four class 4 felony convictions for the vacated class 3 felony conviction was necessary to fulfill what it understood to be its obligation to maximize the effect of the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court disapproved of the appellate court's revision to Halaseh's sentence, finding that no such offense was implicitly found by the jury, and therefore none could be entered in lieu of the reversed conviction without depriving defendant of his right to a jury trial. The matter was remanded with directions to simply reverse the conviction for a class 3 felony theft. View "Halaseh v. Colorado" on Justia Law