Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

For nearly a year and a half, Edward DeGreat sat in prison awaiting a new trial after his earlier convictions were reversed. Colorado’s speedy trial statute, required that retrial after reversal take place within six months of the trial court’s receipt of the mandate after appeal. This six-month period could be tolled when the delay is attributable to the defendant; here, respondents argued the delay was attributable to DeGreat because defense counsel did not reach out to schedule a status conference. The Colorado Supreme Court found Colorado law reflected the long-standing principle that a defendant had no duty to bring himself to trial. The Court granted DeGreat’s petition and held the charges against DeGreat had to be dismissed with prejudice. View "In re Colorado v. DeGreat" on Justia Law

The Colorado General Assembly unanimously adopted legislative rules that set the number of days to a legislative session to 120 days consecutively from the start of the regular session. The rules had one, single, narrow exception: when the Governor declares a state of disaster emergency and has activated the state’s emergency operations plan due to a public health emergency “infecting or exposing a great number of people to disease, agents, toxins, or other such threats.” The General Assembly agreed that in such circumstances, it would count only “working calendar days” toward the 120-day limit. Before the spring of 2020, this narrow exception had never been triggered. On March 14, 2020, recognizing the danger to the public and legislators posed by continuing to congregate at the State Capitol in light of the novel coronavirus spreading throughout the country, the General Assembly adjourned until March 30, 2020. Both chambers extended their adjournments. This suspension of the regular session was without precedent in state history; moreover, because the situation continued to escalate, the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility that the legislature might not be able to convene safely before the originally scheduled adjournment sine die on May 6, 2020. Some have questioned whether the legislative rule counting only “working calendar days” during a declared public health disaster emergency ran afoul of article V, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, such that legislation passed after May 6 in reliance on the rule could be challenged as void. Thus, the General Assembly petitioned the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction under article VI, section 3 to settle the issue raised. The Supreme Court determined the limitation on the regular legislative in article V, section to "one hundred twenty calendar days" was ambiguous as to whether those calendar days had to be counted consecutively. The Court further answered that the General Assembly reasonably resolved this ambiguity through its unanimous adoption of Joint Rules 23(d) and 44(g). "Together, these rules interpret article V, section 7 to count the 120 calendar days of a regular session consecutively, except in the extraordinary circumstance of a declared public health disaster emergency that disrupts the regular session, in which case only 'working calendar days' (i.e., calendar days when at least one chamber is in session) count toward the 120-day limit." The Court concluded that such an interpretation did not run afoul of either the text or underlying purposes of article V, section 7 and was therefore valid. View "In re Interrogatory on House Joint Resolution 20-1006" on Justia Law

Based on an incident that occurred between January 3 and 4, 2018, the State of Colorado charged Paul Rosas with two counts of second degree assault on a peace officer (class 4 felonies), two counts of attempted second degree assault on a peace officer (class 5 felonies), and one count of obstructing a peace officer (a class 2 misdemeanor). Rosas filed a notice of the affirmative defense of “impaired mental condition” pursuant to section 16-8-103.5, C.R.S. (2019), asserting that at the time of the offenses he was suffering from a mental disease or defect that made him incapable of forming the requisite culpable mental state. But this affirmative defense hadn't existed in Colorado "for a quarter of a century." The State objected to Rosas’s notice of the defense of impaired mental condition, but only on the ground that it was untimely. After a hearing, the district court overruled the State's objection and “allow[ed] [Rosas] to enter an affirmative defense of impaired mental condition.” It then ordered an examination “for impaired mental condition.” The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defendant charged with specific intent crimes had to plead not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) in order to introduce evidence that, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he was incapable of forming the requisite culpable mental state on the dates of the offenses charged. The district court said “no.” The Supreme Court ruled the answer was “yes.” "Evidence that a mental disease or defect prevented a defendant from forming the culpable mental state required by an offense charged is evidence relevant to the issue of insanity. And a defendant—even one charged with specific intent crimes—cannot introduce evidence relevant to the issue of insanity without first pleading NGRI." View "In re Colorado v. Rosas" on Justia Law

William Lindsey persuaded six investors to advance roughly $3 million toward a new technology that he claimed would harness the energy of bioluminescent algae to light signs and panels. In soliciting these funds, Lindsey told his investors that he had already secured contracts to sell his lighting products to several large clients. As it turned out, neither the technology nor the contracts existed; Lindsey diverted the funds he collected to his own personal use. Trial setting was continued at least seven times in three years. David Tyler was Lindsey’s fourth attorney in this case, and judges had admonished Tyler and Lindsey there would be no more continuances. A month before trial, Tyler moved to withdraw from the case, but his motion was denied after a hearing in front of a different judge who found no irreconcilable conflict. On the eve of trial, Tyler filed another motion, this one challenging Lindsey’s competency. The factual assertions in this motion were the same factual assertions on which Tyler relied during the hearing on the motion to withdraw ten days earlier: Lindsey had failed to be completely forthright with him, to keep promises to furnish information and funds for an effective defense, and to diligently work and communicate with him. In all the years the case had been pending, this was the first time anyone had ever raised a question about Lindsey’s competency. During the hearing on the competency motion, just as during previous hearings, Lindsey was lucid and coherent, showing no signs of incompetency. Tyler believed that Colorado's competency statutes required the trial court to either make a preliminary finding regarding competency or indicate that there was insufficient evidence to do so. But the trial judge found the motion’s factual assertions had nothing to do with competency and did not support a good-faith doubt about Lindsey’s competency. Accordingly, the judge refused to postpone the trial. The case thus proceeded to a jury trial, where Lindsey was convicted of securities fraud and theft. Lindsey then appealed, and a division of the court of appeals vacated his convictions. Because the Colorado Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court, it reversed the appeals court's judgment. View "Colorado v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

Osmundo Cali was charged with one count of theft of a thing of value of one thousand dollars or more but less than twenty thousand dollars, then a class four felony. In addition, he was charged with one count of theft by receiving and two habitual criminal counts. The charges stemmed from allegations that Cali took metal storm grates from a construction site and sold them to a scrap metal processing company. The evidence established that the stolen grates were worth approximately $2,616, based on the price paid for them by the construction company. Cali’s case proceeded to trial, a jury convicted him of the two substantive offenses, and the trial court adjudicated him a habitual criminal. The court then sentenced Cali to eighteen years on each of the substantive counts, to be served concurrently in the Department of Corrections. Cali appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed that Cali could not be convicted of both theft and theft by receiving of the same property and vacated his conviction for theft, allowing the theft by receiving conviction to stand. The Colorado Supreme Court subsequently denied Cali’s petition for a writ of certiorari, and the mandate issued on May 11, 2015. On June 5, 2013, while Cali’s appeal was pending, an amendment to the theft statute became effective. Pertinent here, the amended statute eliminated the separate crime of theft by receiving and incorporated that offense into the general theft provision. It also modified the classifications for theft. Although these amendments took effect prior to the date on which Cali’s appellate counsel filed the opening brief in Cali’s direct appeal, Cali did not address in his appeal the applicability of these provisions to his case. After the court of appeals issued its mandate in Cali’s case, Cali filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c). In this petition, Cali raised, as pertinent here, a claim for relief based on a “Substantial Change In The Law.” The Supreme Court concluded Cali was not entitled to the benefit of the statutory amendment because he did not seek relief based on that amendatory legislation until after his or her conviction became final. View "Colorado v. Cali" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether defendant Vernon Vanness had a right to demand and receive a preliminary hearing in light of: (1) he was charged with a level 4 drug felony not eligible for a preliminary hearing; (2) he was separately charged with a special offender count; and (3) he would stand convicted of a level 1 drug felony eligible for a preliminary hearing if the State proved both counts beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. The Court following Colorado v. Tafoya, 434 P.3d 1193 (2019) and held that he did have such right. View "Colorado v. Vanness" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Colorado law to the state Supreme Court. Plaintiff Franklin Gale was terminated from his job as a deputy sheriff with the Denver Sheriff’s Department. At the time of his termination, he was serving as chief of the Downtown Detention Center, and the Denver Department of Safety had concluded that he had violated several internal regulations and certain Career Service Rules. Gale sought review of his termination before the Denver Career Service Board. After a hearing officer and then the full Board affirmed Gale’s termination, he filed a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim for judicial review in the Denver District Court, naming the City and County of Denver (the “City”), among others, as defendants. In addition, Gale filed a separate action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against the City, among others, in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (the “federal action”). In the federal action, Gale sought money damages for the City’s alleged violations of his First Amendment rights to free speech and free association. The Denver District Court ultimately affirmed the Career Service Board’s order upholding Gale’s termination, and the City thereafter sought and obtained leave to amend its answer in the federal action to assert a defense of claim preclusion. The City then moved for summary judgment in the federal action based on this defense. As asked by the federal appeals court, the issue presented questioned whether Colorado crafted an exception to the doctrine of res judicata such that a prior action under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 106(a)(4) could not preclude 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims brought in federal court, even through such claims could have been brought in the prior state action. The Supreme Court answered the question "no." View "Gale v. City & County of Denver" on Justia Law

While searching Tony Ashford for weapons in the course of an investigatory stop, a police officer felt a pill bottle in Ashford’s pocket and asked him, “I know this is a pill bottle, what is it?” Ashford took the bottle out of his pocket, and the officer could see that it contained baggies of methamphetamine. Ashford was arrested, and after a more thorough search, he was charged with several drug-related offenses, as well as six habitual offender counts. Ashford moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop. The district court granted Ashford’s motion, finding that the officer’s question about the pill bottle exceeded the scope of the stop. The State appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the officer’s question did not measurably extend the stop of Ashford, thus holding that the question about the pill bottle did not exceed the scope of the investigatory stop. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the district court’s suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Ashford" on Justia Law

Nevik Howard, when sixteen years old, was convicted of first-degree assault (a crime of violence) and first-degree criminal trespass after his case was transferred from juvenile court to district court. During the sentencing hearing, Howard argued that he was subject to a more severe penalty for a crime of violence conviction under the transfer statute than he would be if this were a direct-file case because direct-filed juveniles were exempted “from the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in [the crime of violence statute],” whereas transferred juveniles were not. To address that equal protection concern, the district court determined that the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute would not apply in this transfer proceeding, just as they would not have applied in a direct-file proceeding. The court further determined, however, that this ruling did not make Howard eligible for probation. Instead, the court concluded that the statutory scheme only allowed either: (1) a youth offender services (“YOS”) sentence with a suspended Department of Corrections (“DOC”) sentence; or (2) a DOC sentence. The court ultimately sentenced Howard to six years in YOS with a suspended fifteen-year DOC sentence. Howard, appealed, arguing the district court erred in its reasoning. The court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court granted review, affirming the court of appeals, but on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that under the facts of this case, there was no equal protection violation because neither direct-filed juveniles nor transferred juveniles convicted of crimes of violence were eligible for probation, and the district court did not apply the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute. Hence, Howard was treated the same as a direct-filed juvenile would have been with regard to probation and the applicable sentencing range. View "Howard v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In 2014, William Berry, who was at the time a deputy of the Lake County Sheriff’s Office, obtained several firearms from the office evidence locker, gave one away, attempted to sell another, and kept two for himself. For this, Berry was convicted of embezzlement of public property in violation of section 18-8-407, C.R.S. (2019), and first-degree official misconduct in violation of section 18-8-404, C.R.S. (2019). The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was one of first impression for each of these statutory provisions: (1) does “public property” include property that is in the government’s possession but not owned by the government?; and (2) what is an act “relating to [an official’s] office” for purposes of the crime of official misconduct? The Supreme Court held the statute prohibiting embezzlement of public property criminalized only the embezzlement of property that was owned by the government. Furthermore, the Court concluded the prohibition on official misconduct should be broadly construed to include circumstances, like those in this case, in which an official used the opportunities presented by his or her office to engage in improper conduct. View "Colorado v. Berry" on Justia Law