Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Abel Lujan was charged with first-degree murder for the death of his girlfriend after she was found beaten and strangled behind a friend’s house. At trial, two women testified for the State about Lujan’s prior violent behavior towards them. Prior to admitting this evidence, the trial court read a limiting instruction, telling the jury that it could only consider the evidence for the purposes of establishing Lujan’s motive, intent, or common plan. A copy of this instruction was not given to the jury for deliberations; however, the jury did receive an instruction at the close of the evidence explaining that certain evidence could only be considered for the limited purposes for which it was admitted. While deliberating, the jury submitted a question seeking clarification about the limiting instruction. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court cleared the courtroom of the public and parties, leaving only the judge, bailiff, and court reporter; the judge then brought in the jury and reread the limiting instruction that it had previously read twice in open court. The jury ultimately found Lujan guilty of second-degree murder. Lujan appealed, arguing that the court’s actions when rereading the jury instruction constituted a courtroom closure that violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. A division of the court of appeals agreed and reversed Lujan’s conviction. The State argued on certiorari review that the Colorado Supreme Court adopt a triviality standard, under which a defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial was not violated when the closure at issue was trivial. In so doing, the State argued that the brief courtroom closure here was trivial and therefore did not violate Lujan’s public trial right. The Court concurred with the State, adopted the standard and reversed the appellate court's decision. View "Colorado v. Lujan" on Justia Law

Santa Maria Reservoir Company (“SMRC” or the “Company”) was a mutual reservoir company responsible for storing and releasing water to its shareholders, who owned the right to use that water. SMRC’s water was stored in its two reservoirs: the Santa Maria Reservoir and the Continental Reservoir. SMRC was contacted about leasing water from SMRC’s shareholders to replace depletions to the Rio Grande. In May 2013, the Division Engineer submitted a written report in which he recommended “that th[e] requested change of water right be granted” with one condition: “that such change . . . not expand the consumption of the water right beyond that which has been the historical practice for agricultural purposes.” SMRC met with various opposers to explore what terms and conditions might assuage their concerns. Based on their input, it drafted a proposed decree in which it agreed to replicate accretions (including return flows) to the Rio Grande to prevent injury to other water rights diverting from the Rio Grande. By April 2016, all opposers except appellant Jim Warner had stipulated to the entry of SMRC’s proposed decree. Warner’s opposition was premised on his concern that SMRC’s application, if granted, would interfere with his downstream surface and groundwater rights. Warner, a rancher, owned two parcels of land on which he grew hay for his livestock using flood irrigation. His properties were located in the Closed Basin, generally east and north of land that received the water SMRC delivered through the Rio Grande Canal. Because he flood irrigated, Warner needed the groundwater beneath his lands to stay at a level close enough to the surface to reduce ditch losses and allow water to carry further across his crop land. After review of the water rights at issue and proposed uses, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded Warner was not injured by the water court’s approval of the change-of-use application submitted by SMRC with respect to the water it diverted from the Rio Grande into the Closed Basin. "Because that water is imported water, SMRC is entitled to fully consume all of it. The water would not be in the Closed Basin, much less available for use by Warner and other water users in the Closed Basin, without its importation by SMRC. Thus, rather than cause an injury to Warner, the approval of SMRC’s application simply revealed to him that his past use of return flows from SMRC’s imported water in the Closed Basin was a benefit to which he had no enforceable right; Warner just didn’t know what he had ‘til it was gone." View "Santa Maria Reservoir Co. v. Warner" on Justia Law

After Laron Donald was arrested and charged with a felony, the district court set bond and announced the next court date. Donald subsequently posted bond and was released from jail. The one-page bond provided that as a condition of his release, Donald was prohibited from leaving the state of Colorado without approval of the court and the surety. Donald failed to appear at his next scheduled court date, and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Five weeks later, Donald was pulled over for a traffic violation in Mississippi; the officer discovered Donald had outstanding Colorado warrants and arrested him. Donald was subsequently extradited to Colorado and charged with several counts of violation of bail bond conditions under section 18-8-212(1), C.R.S. (2019). The issue his case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on: (1) what role, if any, the prohibition on inference stacking set out in Tate v. Colorado, 247 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1952), should play in sufficiency of the evidence challenges in criminal cases; and (2) whether sufficient evidence supported Donald’s conviction for violation of bail bond conditions. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the presence of stacked inferences was not alone dispositive of a sufficiency of the evidence claim (it is one factor that a court may consider in determining whether the evidence presented satisfied the prevailing substantial evidence test for evidence sufficiency); and (2) the prosecution here presented sufficient evidence to support Donald’s conviction for violating the bail bond condition prohibiting him from leaving the state without permission. Accordingly, judgment of the division below was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Donald" on Justia Law

For nearly a year and a half, Edward DeGreat sat in prison awaiting a new trial after his earlier convictions were reversed. Colorado’s speedy trial statute, required that retrial after reversal take place within six months of the trial court’s receipt of the mandate after appeal. This six-month period could be tolled when the delay is attributable to the defendant; here, respondents argued the delay was attributable to DeGreat because defense counsel did not reach out to schedule a status conference. The Colorado Supreme Court found Colorado law reflected the long-standing principle that a defendant had no duty to bring himself to trial. The Court granted DeGreat’s petition and held the charges against DeGreat had to be dismissed with prejudice. View "In re Colorado v. DeGreat" on Justia Law

The Colorado General Assembly unanimously adopted legislative rules that set the number of days to a legislative session to 120 days consecutively from the start of the regular session. The rules had one, single, narrow exception: when the Governor declares a state of disaster emergency and has activated the state’s emergency operations plan due to a public health emergency “infecting or exposing a great number of people to disease, agents, toxins, or other such threats.” The General Assembly agreed that in such circumstances, it would count only “working calendar days” toward the 120-day limit. Before the spring of 2020, this narrow exception had never been triggered. On March 14, 2020, recognizing the danger to the public and legislators posed by continuing to congregate at the State Capitol in light of the novel coronavirus spreading throughout the country, the General Assembly adjourned until March 30, 2020. Both chambers extended their adjournments. This suspension of the regular session was without precedent in state history; moreover, because the situation continued to escalate, the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility that the legislature might not be able to convene safely before the originally scheduled adjournment sine die on May 6, 2020. Some have questioned whether the legislative rule counting only “working calendar days” during a declared public health disaster emergency ran afoul of article V, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, such that legislation passed after May 6 in reliance on the rule could be challenged as void. Thus, the General Assembly petitioned the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction under article VI, section 3 to settle the issue raised. The Supreme Court determined the limitation on the regular legislative in article V, section to "one hundred twenty calendar days" was ambiguous as to whether those calendar days had to be counted consecutively. The Court further answered that the General Assembly reasonably resolved this ambiguity through its unanimous adoption of Joint Rules 23(d) and 44(g). "Together, these rules interpret article V, section 7 to count the 120 calendar days of a regular session consecutively, except in the extraordinary circumstance of a declared public health disaster emergency that disrupts the regular session, in which case only 'working calendar days' (i.e., calendar days when at least one chamber is in session) count toward the 120-day limit." The Court concluded that such an interpretation did not run afoul of either the text or underlying purposes of article V, section 7 and was therefore valid. View "In re Interrogatory on House Joint Resolution 20-1006" on Justia Law

Based on an incident that occurred between January 3 and 4, 2018, the State of Colorado charged Paul Rosas with two counts of second degree assault on a peace officer (class 4 felonies), two counts of attempted second degree assault on a peace officer (class 5 felonies), and one count of obstructing a peace officer (a class 2 misdemeanor). Rosas filed a notice of the affirmative defense of “impaired mental condition” pursuant to section 16-8-103.5, C.R.S. (2019), asserting that at the time of the offenses he was suffering from a mental disease or defect that made him incapable of forming the requisite culpable mental state. But this affirmative defense hadn't existed in Colorado "for a quarter of a century." The State objected to Rosas’s notice of the defense of impaired mental condition, but only on the ground that it was untimely. After a hearing, the district court overruled the State's objection and “allow[ed] [Rosas] to enter an affirmative defense of impaired mental condition.” It then ordered an examination “for impaired mental condition.” The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defendant charged with specific intent crimes had to plead not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) in order to introduce evidence that, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he was incapable of forming the requisite culpable mental state on the dates of the offenses charged. The district court said “no.” The Supreme Court ruled the answer was “yes.” "Evidence that a mental disease or defect prevented a defendant from forming the culpable mental state required by an offense charged is evidence relevant to the issue of insanity. And a defendant—even one charged with specific intent crimes—cannot introduce evidence relevant to the issue of insanity without first pleading NGRI." View "In re Colorado v. Rosas" on Justia Law

William Lindsey persuaded six investors to advance roughly $3 million toward a new technology that he claimed would harness the energy of bioluminescent algae to light signs and panels. In soliciting these funds, Lindsey told his investors that he had already secured contracts to sell his lighting products to several large clients. As it turned out, neither the technology nor the contracts existed; Lindsey diverted the funds he collected to his own personal use. Trial setting was continued at least seven times in three years. David Tyler was Lindsey’s fourth attorney in this case, and judges had admonished Tyler and Lindsey there would be no more continuances. A month before trial, Tyler moved to withdraw from the case, but his motion was denied after a hearing in front of a different judge who found no irreconcilable conflict. On the eve of trial, Tyler filed another motion, this one challenging Lindsey’s competency. The factual assertions in this motion were the same factual assertions on which Tyler relied during the hearing on the motion to withdraw ten days earlier: Lindsey had failed to be completely forthright with him, to keep promises to furnish information and funds for an effective defense, and to diligently work and communicate with him. In all the years the case had been pending, this was the first time anyone had ever raised a question about Lindsey’s competency. During the hearing on the competency motion, just as during previous hearings, Lindsey was lucid and coherent, showing no signs of incompetency. Tyler believed that Colorado's competency statutes required the trial court to either make a preliminary finding regarding competency or indicate that there was insufficient evidence to do so. But the trial judge found the motion’s factual assertions had nothing to do with competency and did not support a good-faith doubt about Lindsey’s competency. Accordingly, the judge refused to postpone the trial. The case thus proceeded to a jury trial, where Lindsey was convicted of securities fraud and theft. Lindsey then appealed, and a division of the court of appeals vacated his convictions. Because the Colorado Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court, it reversed the appeals court's judgment. View "Colorado v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

Osmundo Cali was charged with one count of theft of a thing of value of one thousand dollars or more but less than twenty thousand dollars, then a class four felony. In addition, he was charged with one count of theft by receiving and two habitual criminal counts. The charges stemmed from allegations that Cali took metal storm grates from a construction site and sold them to a scrap metal processing company. The evidence established that the stolen grates were worth approximately $2,616, based on the price paid for them by the construction company. Cali’s case proceeded to trial, a jury convicted him of the two substantive offenses, and the trial court adjudicated him a habitual criminal. The court then sentenced Cali to eighteen years on each of the substantive counts, to be served concurrently in the Department of Corrections. Cali appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed that Cali could not be convicted of both theft and theft by receiving of the same property and vacated his conviction for theft, allowing the theft by receiving conviction to stand. The Colorado Supreme Court subsequently denied Cali’s petition for a writ of certiorari, and the mandate issued on May 11, 2015. On June 5, 2013, while Cali’s appeal was pending, an amendment to the theft statute became effective. Pertinent here, the amended statute eliminated the separate crime of theft by receiving and incorporated that offense into the general theft provision. It also modified the classifications for theft. Although these amendments took effect prior to the date on which Cali’s appellate counsel filed the opening brief in Cali’s direct appeal, Cali did not address in his appeal the applicability of these provisions to his case. After the court of appeals issued its mandate in Cali’s case, Cali filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c). In this petition, Cali raised, as pertinent here, a claim for relief based on a “Substantial Change In The Law.” The Supreme Court concluded Cali was not entitled to the benefit of the statutory amendment because he did not seek relief based on that amendatory legislation until after his or her conviction became final. View "Colorado v. Cali" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether defendant Vernon Vanness had a right to demand and receive a preliminary hearing in light of: (1) he was charged with a level 4 drug felony not eligible for a preliminary hearing; (2) he was separately charged with a special offender count; and (3) he would stand convicted of a level 1 drug felony eligible for a preliminary hearing if the State proved both counts beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. The Court following Colorado v. Tafoya, 434 P.3d 1193 (2019) and held that he did have such right. View "Colorado v. Vanness" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Colorado law to the state Supreme Court. Plaintiff Franklin Gale was terminated from his job as a deputy sheriff with the Denver Sheriff’s Department. At the time of his termination, he was serving as chief of the Downtown Detention Center, and the Denver Department of Safety had concluded that he had violated several internal regulations and certain Career Service Rules. Gale sought review of his termination before the Denver Career Service Board. After a hearing officer and then the full Board affirmed Gale’s termination, he filed a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim for judicial review in the Denver District Court, naming the City and County of Denver (the “City”), among others, as defendants. In addition, Gale filed a separate action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against the City, among others, in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (the “federal action”). In the federal action, Gale sought money damages for the City’s alleged violations of his First Amendment rights to free speech and free association. The Denver District Court ultimately affirmed the Career Service Board’s order upholding Gale’s termination, and the City thereafter sought and obtained leave to amend its answer in the federal action to assert a defense of claim preclusion. The City then moved for summary judgment in the federal action based on this defense. As asked by the federal appeals court, the issue presented questioned whether Colorado crafted an exception to the doctrine of res judicata such that a prior action under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 106(a)(4) could not preclude 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims brought in federal court, even through such claims could have been brought in the prior state action. The Supreme Court answered the question "no." View "Gale v. City & County of Denver" on Justia Law