Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case and its companion, Langer v. Board of Larimer County Commissioners, 2020 CO 31, __ P.3d __, arose out of a contentious zoning dispute involving the propriety of constructing a gravity-based mountain roller coaster in a part of the Estes Valley, Colorado in which “significant view sheds, woodlands, rock outcroppings, ridgelines, other sensitive environmental areas and low-density residential development comprise the predominant land use pattern.” The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the local authorities tasked with making and reviewing zoning determinations abused their discretion in interpreting and applying the Estes Valley Development Code (the “Code”) when they determined that the proposed mountain coaster could be constructed. Applying a deferential standard of review for an action brought pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), the Court concluded that they did not. Furthermore, the Court determined the constitutionality of the Code could not be appropriately raised or considered in a suit brought exclusively as a Rule 106 claim: "Rule 106 proceedings are reserved for challenges to the judicial and quasi-judicial actions of government actors. In other words, these claims challenge the application of a law in a particular instance, not the law itself." View "Yakutat Land Corp. v. Langer" on Justia Law

This case and its companion, Yakutat Land Corp. v. Langer, 2020 CO 30, __ P.3d __, arose out of a contentious zoning dispute involving the propriety of constructing a gravity-based mountain roller coaster in a part of the Estes Valley, Colorado in which “significant view sheds, woodlands, rock outcroppings, ridgelines, other sensitive environmental areas and low-density residential development comprise the predominant land use pattern.” The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Larimer County Board of County Commissioners (the “BOCC”) misconstrued applicable law and abused its discretion in finding that defendant Yakutat Land Corporation’s mountain coaster project was properly classified as a Park and Recreation Facility, rather than as an Outdoor Commercial Recreation or Entertainment Establishment. The Supreme Court concluded the BOCC correctly construed the applicable code provisions, and, applying the deferential standard of review mandated here, it further concluded that the BOCC did not abuse its discretion in classifying the mountain coaster project as a Park and Recreation Facility. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Langer v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Defendant Pamela Coke was charged with sexual assault on a child. The prosecution filed this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order suppressing: (1) evidence obtained from Coke’s cell phone; and (2) certain statements she made to the police before her formal arrest. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence from Coke’s cell phone, but reversed the portion suppressing her statements. The Court determined the warrant at issue in this case contained no particularity as to the alleged victim or to the time period during which the assault allegedly occurred. "Rather, it permitted the officers to search all texts, videos, pictures, contact lists, phone records, and any data that showed ownership or possession. We conclude that such broad authorization violates the particularity demanded by the Fourth Amendment." Because the warrant authorized a general search of Coke's phone, it was also unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Coke v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The certified question arose from a dispute in which plaintiff Amica Life Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment that it was not required to pay defendant Michael Wertz benefits under a life insurance policy naming Wertz as the beneficiary. The policy, which was issued in compliance with a standard enacted by the Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Commission (the “Commission”), contained a two-year suicide exclusion, and the insured committed suicide more than one year but less than two years after Amica had issued the life insurance policy to him. Wertz contended that the policy’s two-year suicide exclusion was unenforceable because it conflicted with Colorado statute, section 10-7-109, C.R.S. (2019). Wertz asserted that the Colorado General Assembly could not properly delegate to the Commission the authority to enact a standard that would effectively override this statute. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed with Wertz, and accordingly, answered the certified question narrowly: the General Assembly did not have the authority to delegate to the Commission the power to issue a standard authorizing the sale of life insurance policies in Colorado containing a two-year suicide exclusion when a Colorado statute prohibited insurers doing business in Colorado from asserting suicide as a defense against payment on a life insurance policy after the first year of that policy. View "Amica Life Insurance Company v. Wertz" on Justia Law

Abel Lujan was charged with first-degree murder for the death of his girlfriend after she was found beaten and strangled behind a friend’s house. At trial, two women testified for the State about Lujan’s prior violent behavior towards them. Prior to admitting this evidence, the trial court read a limiting instruction, telling the jury that it could only consider the evidence for the purposes of establishing Lujan’s motive, intent, or common plan. A copy of this instruction was not given to the jury for deliberations; however, the jury did receive an instruction at the close of the evidence explaining that certain evidence could only be considered for the limited purposes for which it was admitted. While deliberating, the jury submitted a question seeking clarification about the limiting instruction. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court cleared the courtroom of the public and parties, leaving only the judge, bailiff, and court reporter; the judge then brought in the jury and reread the limiting instruction that it had previously read twice in open court. The jury ultimately found Lujan guilty of second-degree murder. Lujan appealed, arguing that the court’s actions when rereading the jury instruction constituted a courtroom closure that violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. A division of the court of appeals agreed and reversed Lujan’s conviction. The State argued on certiorari review that the Colorado Supreme Court adopt a triviality standard, under which a defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial was not violated when the closure at issue was trivial. In so doing, the State argued that the brief courtroom closure here was trivial and therefore did not violate Lujan’s public trial right. The Court concurred with the State, adopted the standard and reversed the appellate court's decision. View "Colorado v. Lujan" on Justia Law

Santa Maria Reservoir Company (“SMRC” or the “Company”) was a mutual reservoir company responsible for storing and releasing water to its shareholders, who owned the right to use that water. SMRC’s water was stored in its two reservoirs: the Santa Maria Reservoir and the Continental Reservoir. SMRC was contacted about leasing water from SMRC’s shareholders to replace depletions to the Rio Grande. In May 2013, the Division Engineer submitted a written report in which he recommended “that th[e] requested change of water right be granted” with one condition: “that such change . . . not expand the consumption of the water right beyond that which has been the historical practice for agricultural purposes.” SMRC met with various opposers to explore what terms and conditions might assuage their concerns. Based on their input, it drafted a proposed decree in which it agreed to replicate accretions (including return flows) to the Rio Grande to prevent injury to other water rights diverting from the Rio Grande. By April 2016, all opposers except appellant Jim Warner had stipulated to the entry of SMRC’s proposed decree. Warner’s opposition was premised on his concern that SMRC’s application, if granted, would interfere with his downstream surface and groundwater rights. Warner, a rancher, owned two parcels of land on which he grew hay for his livestock using flood irrigation. His properties were located in the Closed Basin, generally east and north of land that received the water SMRC delivered through the Rio Grande Canal. Because he flood irrigated, Warner needed the groundwater beneath his lands to stay at a level close enough to the surface to reduce ditch losses and allow water to carry further across his crop land. After review of the water rights at issue and proposed uses, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded Warner was not injured by the water court’s approval of the change-of-use application submitted by SMRC with respect to the water it diverted from the Rio Grande into the Closed Basin. "Because that water is imported water, SMRC is entitled to fully consume all of it. The water would not be in the Closed Basin, much less available for use by Warner and other water users in the Closed Basin, without its importation by SMRC. Thus, rather than cause an injury to Warner, the approval of SMRC’s application simply revealed to him that his past use of return flows from SMRC’s imported water in the Closed Basin was a benefit to which he had no enforceable right; Warner just didn’t know what he had ‘til it was gone." View "Santa Maria Reservoir Co. v. Warner" on Justia Law

After Laron Donald was arrested and charged with a felony, the district court set bond and announced the next court date. Donald subsequently posted bond and was released from jail. The one-page bond provided that as a condition of his release, Donald was prohibited from leaving the state of Colorado without approval of the court and the surety. Donald failed to appear at his next scheduled court date, and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Five weeks later, Donald was pulled over for a traffic violation in Mississippi; the officer discovered Donald had outstanding Colorado warrants and arrested him. Donald was subsequently extradited to Colorado and charged with several counts of violation of bail bond conditions under section 18-8-212(1), C.R.S. (2019). The issue his case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on: (1) what role, if any, the prohibition on inference stacking set out in Tate v. Colorado, 247 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1952), should play in sufficiency of the evidence challenges in criminal cases; and (2) whether sufficient evidence supported Donald’s conviction for violation of bail bond conditions. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the presence of stacked inferences was not alone dispositive of a sufficiency of the evidence claim (it is one factor that a court may consider in determining whether the evidence presented satisfied the prevailing substantial evidence test for evidence sufficiency); and (2) the prosecution here presented sufficient evidence to support Donald’s conviction for violating the bail bond condition prohibiting him from leaving the state without permission. Accordingly, judgment of the division below was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Donald" on Justia Law

For nearly a year and a half, Edward DeGreat sat in prison awaiting a new trial after his earlier convictions were reversed. Colorado’s speedy trial statute, required that retrial after reversal take place within six months of the trial court’s receipt of the mandate after appeal. This six-month period could be tolled when the delay is attributable to the defendant; here, respondents argued the delay was attributable to DeGreat because defense counsel did not reach out to schedule a status conference. The Colorado Supreme Court found Colorado law reflected the long-standing principle that a defendant had no duty to bring himself to trial. The Court granted DeGreat’s petition and held the charges against DeGreat had to be dismissed with prejudice. View "In re Colorado v. DeGreat" on Justia Law

The Colorado General Assembly unanimously adopted legislative rules that set the number of days to a legislative session to 120 days consecutively from the start of the regular session. The rules had one, single, narrow exception: when the Governor declares a state of disaster emergency and has activated the state’s emergency operations plan due to a public health emergency “infecting or exposing a great number of people to disease, agents, toxins, or other such threats.” The General Assembly agreed that in such circumstances, it would count only “working calendar days” toward the 120-day limit. Before the spring of 2020, this narrow exception had never been triggered. On March 14, 2020, recognizing the danger to the public and legislators posed by continuing to congregate at the State Capitol in light of the novel coronavirus spreading throughout the country, the General Assembly adjourned until March 30, 2020. Both chambers extended their adjournments. This suspension of the regular session was without precedent in state history; moreover, because the situation continued to escalate, the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility that the legislature might not be able to convene safely before the originally scheduled adjournment sine die on May 6, 2020. Some have questioned whether the legislative rule counting only “working calendar days” during a declared public health disaster emergency ran afoul of article V, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, such that legislation passed after May 6 in reliance on the rule could be challenged as void. Thus, the General Assembly petitioned the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction under article VI, section 3 to settle the issue raised. The Supreme Court determined the limitation on the regular legislative in article V, section to "one hundred twenty calendar days" was ambiguous as to whether those calendar days had to be counted consecutively. The Court further answered that the General Assembly reasonably resolved this ambiguity through its unanimous adoption of Joint Rules 23(d) and 44(g). "Together, these rules interpret article V, section 7 to count the 120 calendar days of a regular session consecutively, except in the extraordinary circumstance of a declared public health disaster emergency that disrupts the regular session, in which case only 'working calendar days' (i.e., calendar days when at least one chamber is in session) count toward the 120-day limit." The Court concluded that such an interpretation did not run afoul of either the text or underlying purposes of article V, section 7 and was therefore valid. View "In re Interrogatory on House Joint Resolution 20-1006" on Justia Law

Based on an incident that occurred between January 3 and 4, 2018, the State of Colorado charged Paul Rosas with two counts of second degree assault on a peace officer (class 4 felonies), two counts of attempted second degree assault on a peace officer (class 5 felonies), and one count of obstructing a peace officer (a class 2 misdemeanor). Rosas filed a notice of the affirmative defense of “impaired mental condition” pursuant to section 16-8-103.5, C.R.S. (2019), asserting that at the time of the offenses he was suffering from a mental disease or defect that made him incapable of forming the requisite culpable mental state. But this affirmative defense hadn't existed in Colorado "for a quarter of a century." The State objected to Rosas’s notice of the defense of impaired mental condition, but only on the ground that it was untimely. After a hearing, the district court overruled the State's objection and “allow[ed] [Rosas] to enter an affirmative defense of impaired mental condition.” It then ordered an examination “for impaired mental condition.” The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defendant charged with specific intent crimes had to plead not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) in order to introduce evidence that, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he was incapable of forming the requisite culpable mental state on the dates of the offenses charged. The district court said “no.” The Supreme Court ruled the answer was “yes.” "Evidence that a mental disease or defect prevented a defendant from forming the culpable mental state required by an offense charged is evidence relevant to the issue of insanity. And a defendant—even one charged with specific intent crimes—cannot introduce evidence relevant to the issue of insanity without first pleading NGRI." View "In re Colorado v. Rosas" on Justia Law