Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Marcus Robinson was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault at a gathering of co-workers and friends at one of the victims' apartment. The issue his case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the court of appeals erred by concluding a prosecutor's race-based comments in her opening statement at trial constituted reversible plain error. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded they did: comments on the contrasting skin tones of Robinson and the victim were improper because any probative value they might have had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Robinson. Furthermore, on the facts presented, the prosecutor’s comments did not rise to the level of reversible plain error because even if obvious, the error did not "so undermine the fundamental fairness of Robinson’s trial as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of his judgment of conviction." The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Ruth Williams allegedly stole $10,000 from her employer. She pled guilty to felony theft in exchange for a four-year deferred judgment and sentence. The district court placed her on probation for the deferral period and required that she pay $10,000 in restitution. Roughly three years into her deferred sentence, Williams had only paid about $500. Based on that failure to pay, the district attorney moved to impose judgment and sentence. The district court concluded that Williams had violated the restitution order, so it revoked the deferred judgment and entered a conviction for felony theft. Williams appealed, contending that the prosecution failed to meet its burden to prove that she had the financial ability to pay restitution. Applying Colorado Supreme Court precedent, a division of the court of appeals concluded that the prosecution had no such burden. Instead, if Williams wanted to avoid becoming a convicted felon, she had to prove that she couldn’t pay. The Supreme Court reversed: when a defendant introduces some evidence of an inability to pay restitution. A district court must make ability-to-pay findings pursuant to 18-1.3-702(3)(c), C.R.S. (2019), before revoking a deferred judgment for failure to pay. Furthermore, the Court held the prosecution bore the burden of proving by a preponderance the defendant had an ability to comply with the restitution order without undue hardship to the defendant or the defendant's dependents; and defendant had not made a goof-faith effort to comply. Because Williams introduced some evidence of an inability to pay, the Supreme Court remanded for a new deferred judgment revocation hearing. View "Williams v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant Paul Rail guilty of sexual assault on a child. In response to a special interrogatory, the jury also found, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, that Rail committed the offense as part of a pattern of abuse and that the State had proved each of the listed incidents of sexual contact, including “[a]ll of the alleged incidents of sexual contact” testified to by the victim. However, in response to a separate unanimity interrogatory, the jury indicated that these same incidents of sexual contact (excluding one that appeared only on the pattern of abuse interrogatory) were “[n]ot [p]roved.” Rail argued on appeal of his conviction that, under Sanchez v. Colorado, 325 P.3d 553 (2014), this inconsistency required reversal of his conviction for sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse. After its review, the Colorado Supreme Court disagreed: "Unlike in Sanchez, the jury here returned a unanimous verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, any ambiguity in this verdict created by the jury’s response on the unanimity interrogatory was resolved by individual polling of the jurors, each of whom confirmed their intent to find the defendant guilty of sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse, and their express findings that the People had proved all the alleged incidents of sexual contact beyond a reasonable doubt." View "Rail v. Colorado" on Justia Law

While in a friend’s apartment, Lance Margerum made sexual advances towards E.S. When she rebuffed him, he pushed her onto a bed and groped her. E.S. fought back and promised that she would not tell anyone, and Margerum allowed her to leave. Margerum then invited his sister, T.M., to the apartment to pick up some clothes. When she arrived, Margerum grabbed her, choked her, and punched her. A jury found Margerum guilty of unlawful sexual contact with respect to E.S. and both third-degree assault and felony menacing with respect to T.M. The court of appeals affirmed Margerum’s convictions. E.S. testified at Margerum’s trial while she was on probation for an unrelated offense. The trial court refused to allow Margerum to impeach E.S.’s credibility based on her probationary status. Margerum argued the trial court’s refusal to allow defense counsel to impeach E.S.’s credibility based on her probationary status required reversal. He also argued he could not be convicted of both assault and menacing based on the same conduct. This case those presented two issues for the Colorado Supreme Court's review: (1) whether a witness’s credibility could be impeached based on her probationary status at the time she testifies; and (2) whether Margerum could be convicted of both assault and menacing based on the same conduct. The Court answered both questions yes, but because it concluded the trial court’s error in not allowing defense counsel to impeach E.S. based on her probationary status was harmless, the Supreme Court concluded reversal was not required. View "Margerum v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (“the Commission”) recommended approval of a Stipulation for Public Censure and Suspension against Judge Lance P. Timbreza. In June 2019, Judge Timbreza was arrested and charged with Driving Under the Influence and Careless Driving. As he drove home from a party, Judge Timbreza crashed his vehicle into roadside trees and bushes while avoiding a collision with another vehicle. Judge Timbreza contacted the Commission by phone to report his arrest and the charges against him. Judge Timbreza pled guilty to Driving While Ability Impaired and was sentenced to one year of probation, alcohol monitoring, a $200 fine, useful public service, and two days of suspended jail time. By driving while his ability was impaired by alcohol, the Commission determined Judge Timbreza failed to maintain the high standards of judicial conduct required of a judge. The Commission found Judge Timbreza’s conduct violated Canon Rules 1.1 and 1.2 of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct. Consistent with the Stipulation, the Commission recommends the Colorado Supreme Court issue a public censure and a twenty-eight-day suspension of Judge Timbreza's judicial duties without pay. The Supreme Court adopted the Commission’s recommendation. View "In the Matter of: Judge Lance P. Timbreza" on Justia Law

Two separate criminal cases gave rise to the questions presented in this case. (1) In October 2013, Michael Fransua was arrested after he unlawfully entered his former girlfriend’s house and assaulted her. Fransua was charged with second-degree burglary, third-degree assault, and harassment; two months later, he posted bond and was released from jail. (2) While out on bond, in March 2014, Fransua was arrested after he again entered his former girlfriend’s house and refused to leave. This time, Fransua was charged with first-degree trespass, violation of bail bond conditions, and violation of a protection order. Although Fransua posted bond in the first case, and thus was released from jail pending trial in that case, he was unable to post bond in the second case. As a result, Fransua was confined from the date he was arrested in the second case, to the date he was sentenced in the first case. During this 108-day period of confinement, however, Fransua’s bond in the first case was never revoked or modified. In exchange for a complete dismissal of the second case, as well as all original charges in the first case, Fransua pled guilty to a single count of attempted second-degree burglary in the first case. He was sentenced to a term of five years in community corrections as part of that plea agreement. Three months later, Fransua escaped from community corrections. Consequently, he was resentenced to a term of five years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. During Fransua’s resentencing hearing, he requested 245 days of PSCC. The district court, however, awarded him only 162 days. His case presented a question of whether he was entitled to presentence confinement credit ("PSCC") for time spent in jail because he was unable to post bond in his second case. Further, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether defendant was entitled to credit for both the first and last days of his presentence confinement. The Court concluded Fransua was not entitled to credit in his first case from his confinement in the second case. Fransua was entitled to credit for both the first and last days of his presentence confinement. View "Fransua v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In 2011, Douglas Baker was arrested on a then-outstanding 2009 warrant for sexual assault on a child, pattern of abuse, a class three felony. When Baker learned that he was facing arrest, he fled to Florida. He was extradited to Colorado, and booked into jail where he remained in custody for the duration of the case. Baker pled guilty to one count of sexual assault on a child, position of trust, a class three felony, and, in 2012, he was sentenced to a term of ten years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The court awarded Baker 364 days of credit for time served and designated him a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”). At the sentencing hearing, Baker objected to the SVP finding and told the court that he would file a motion objecting to it. Baker, however, failed to file a motion objecting to his SVP status for over three years, and, in the interim, he never filed a direct appeal. The issue his case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defendant’s claim that he was entitled to more presentence confinement credit (“PSCC”) than he originally received was properly understood as a challenge to a sentence “not authorized by law” under Crim. P. 35(a). The Court concluded that it was not: "PSCC is not a component of a sentence; instead, it is time served before a sentence is imposed, which is later credited against the defendant’s sentence. This conclusion does not mean that defendants have no avenue to seek correction of an improper calculation of PSCC." Here, all parties agreed that both the parties and the court overlooked Baker’s eighteen missing days of PSCC. Rule 36 would have been the appropriate route to correct the calculation error. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case with directions to return it to the district court. View "Colorado v. Baker" on Justia Law

Alysha Walton pled guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”), and the county court sentenced her to twelve months of unsupervised probation. Because Walton did not provide a medical professional to testify regarding her authorization to use medical marijuana, the court, as a condition of probation, prohibited Walton from using medical marijuana. Walton appealed, and the district court affirmed the county court’s decision. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the plain language of section 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(VIII), C.R.S. (2019) created a presumption that a defendant could use medical marijuana while serving a sentence to probation unless a statutory exception applied. The relevant exception here applied if the sentencing court found, based on material evidence, that prohibiting this defendant’s otherwise-authorized medical marijuana use was necessary and appropriate to promote statutory sentencing goals. Because the county court made no such findings here, the district court's judgment affirming the county court was reversed. Because defendant completed her sentence, reversing and remanding was deemed moot. View "Walton v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case was companion to Colorado Medical Board v. McLaughlin, 2019 CO 93, __ P.3d __, wherein the Colorado Supreme Court was asked to determine whether an investigative subpoena issued by the Colorado Medical Board (the “Board”) could have a lawfully authorized purpose if the investigation was prompted by a complaint made by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the “CDPHE”) pursuant to a policy that violated the Open Meetings Law (the “OML”) or the State Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”). Petitioner James Boland, M.D. was a physician licensed to practice medicine in Colorado. He primarily examined patients to determine if they would benefit from the use of medical marijuana. Information related to medical marijuana in Colorado is maintained by the CDPHE in a confidential registry that includes the names of all patients who have applied for and are entitled to receive a marijuana registry identification card, as well as the names and contact information for the patients’ physicians and, if applicable, their primary caregivers. In June 2014, the CDPHE referred Boland to the Board for investigation based on his “[h]igh plant count recommendations and high percent of patients under age of 30 [sic] for medical marijuana referrals.” Boland refused to comply with the subpoena, and he and several other physicians whom the CDPHE had referred to the Board and who had received subpoenas from the Board filed suit in the Denver District Court, seeking, among other things, to enjoin the Board from enforcing its subpoenas. The Supreme Court concluded that because neither the CDPHE’s adoption of the Referral Policy nor its referral of Boland to the Board violated the OML or the APA, Boland’s contention that the subpoena to him was void because the Policy and referral were void was based on a flawed premise and was therefore unpersuasive. Even if the adoption of the Referral Policy and the referral itself violated the OML or the APA, however, we still conclude that the Board’s subpoena to Boland had a lawfully authorized purpose because it was issued pursuant to the Board’s statutory authority to investigate allegations of unprofessional conduct and was properly tailored to that purpose. View "Boland v. Colorado Medical Board" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether an investigative subpoena issued by the Colorado Medical Board (the “Board”) can have a lawfully authorized purpose if the investigation was prompted by a complaint made by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the “CDPHE”) pursuant to a policy that violated the Open Meetings Law (the “OML”) or the State Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”). Scott McLaughlin, M.D. was a physician licensed to practice medicine in Colorado. As part of his practice, he evaluated patients to see if they had a qualifying condition that would benefit from the use of medical marijuana. Information related to medical marijuana in Colorado is maintained by the CDPHE in a confidential registry that includes the names of all patients who have applied for and are entitled to receive a marijuana registry identification card, as well as the names and contact information for the patients’ physicians and, if applicable, their primary caregivers. In May 2014, the CDPHE referred McLaughlin to the Board for investigation based on a high caseload of patients for whom marijuana was recommended. McLaughlin refused to comply with the subpoena, and he and several other physicians whom the CDPHE had referred to the Board and who had received subpoenas from the Board filed suit in the Denver District Court, seeking, among other things, to enjoin the Board from enforcing its subpoenas. The Supreme Court concluded that because neither the CDPHE’s adoption of the Referral Policy nor its referral of Boland to the Board violated the OML or the APA, Boland’s contention that the subpoena to him was void because the Policy and referral were void was based on a flawed premise and was therefore unpersuasive. Even if the adoption of the Referral Policy and the referral itself violated the OML or the APA, however, we still conclude that the Board’s subpoena to Boland had a lawfully authorized purpose because it was issued pursuant to the Board’s statutory authority to investigate allegations of unprofessional conduct and was properly tailored to that purpose. View "Colorado Medical Board v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law