Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rachel Ann Niemeyer was questioned by police after her husband suffered a gunshot wound to the head. During the interrogation at the police station, Niemeyer made incriminating statements. She was charged with murdering her husband and moved to suppress these statements, arguing they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. The trial court denied her motion, concluding she was not in custody when she made the statements. A jury convicted her of second-degree murder and other offenses.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The majority held that a reasonable person in Niemeyer's position would not have considered herself in custody, as her freedom of action was not curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest. The court reasoned that the hand-bagging procedure did not convert the situation into a custodial one. However, a dissenting judge argued that the police's actions and statements indicated that Niemeyer was in custody, as they would not consider taking her to the hospital until completing unspecified tasks.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that Niemeyer was in custody for Miranda purposes during the interrogation. The court found that a reasonable person in her position would have believed they were deprived of their freedom of action to a degree associated with a formal arrest. The court noted that Niemeyer was alone in an interrogation room late at night, repeatedly asked to go to the hospital, and was physically restrained with zip-tied bags on her hands. The court concluded that the trial court's error in admitting her statements was not harmless and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, remanding for further proceedings. View "Niemeyer v. People" on Justia Law

Police officers questioned Terrence Kenneth Eugene about his involvement in a road-rage incident without informing him of his Miranda rights. During the encounter, Eugene admitted to pushing the other driver but denied using a weapon. His statements were used at trial, leading to his conviction for second and third-degree assault.The trial court denied Eugene's motion to suppress his statements, finding he was not in custody for Miranda purposes. The court noted that Eugene's movement was not restricted, the officers did not use coercive tactics, and Eugene was not formally arrested. A jury subsequently convicted Eugene.On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, concluding that Eugene was in custody during the interrogation and that the trial court erred in not suppressing his statements. The appellate court found that the circumstances of the interrogation, including the officers' tone and the duration of the encounter, indicated a custodial situation.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that Eugene was not in custody for Miranda purposes, emphasizing the public and non-coercive nature of the encounter. The court noted that Eugene was questioned outside his apartment in broad daylight, was not physically restrained, and the officers did not use force or threats. Consequently, the court reinstated the trial court's suppression ruling and remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "People v. Eugene" on Justia Law

The defendant, Phillip Romero, was charged with multiple offenses, including assault and false imprisonment, after threatening and attacking his romantic partner. During jury selection, the prosecution used a peremptory strike to excuse Prospective Juror F, one of two Hispanic jurors in the pool. Romero raised a Batson challenge, arguing that the strike was racially motivated. The prosecution explained that the juror appeared disinterested and unfocused. The trial court denied the Batson challenge, finding the prosecution's reason credible and race-neutral.The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that the trial court had clearly erred in denying the Batson challenge. The appellate court held that the prosecution's reason lacked specific factual justification and objective evidence, and thus, the trial court should not have credited it. The appellate court ordered a new trial for Romero.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court misapplied the clear error standard of review by not deferring to the trial court's credibility determinations. The Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court is in the best position to assess demeanor and credibility. It found that the trial court had implicitly found the prosecution's reason credible and that the record supported this finding. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for consideration of other issues raised by Romero on appeal. View "People v. Romero" on Justia Law

Richard Lewis was convicted of four misdemeanors, including two counts of unlawful sexual contact and two counts of unlawful sexual contact on a client by a psychotherapist. Initially, he was on a personal recognizance bond, but after his conviction, the county court revoked this bond, citing the seriousness of the case and Lewis's potential danger to the community. The court set a new cash bond of $5,000, which Lewis posted. At sentencing, the court denied Lewis's request for an appeal bond, finding that he posed a danger to the community.The County Court, City and County of Denver, denied Lewis's request for an appeal bond under section 16-4-201.5(2)(a), which requires denial of bail if the defendant poses a danger to the community. Lewis argued that his appeal should be governed by section 16-2-114(6), which mandates a stay of execution and an appeal bond. The county court disagreed, finding that Lewis posed a danger to the community and thus denied the appeal bond.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and upheld the county court's decision. The court clarified that section 16-2-114(6) requires a stay of execution but does not mandate the granting of an appeal bond. The court found no conflict between section 16-2-114(6) and section 16-4-201.5(2), which prohibits bail if the defendant is deemed a danger to the community. The Supreme Court concluded that the county court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appeal bond and discharged the order to show cause. The case was remanded to the county court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "People v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Jamie Edward Bock was charged with nine counts of theft for actions occurring between November 2014 and November 2016. He was accused of taking initial payments from homeowners for construction work, some of which he started but did not complete, and others he did not begin at all. Bock requested and received additional funds for four projects but failed to complete any of them or return the money.The trial court joined five cases into a single trial and instructed the jury that Bock could not be convicted of four counts unless the prosecution proved multiple acts of theft within six months of each other. Bock argued that this instruction constructively amended his charges, which were originally under a statute punishing single acts of theft, and claimed this amendment was a structural error requiring reversal. The jury convicted Bock on all counts, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the jury instructions constituted a constructive amendment but held that it did not require reversal, applying plain error review.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and agreed that the jury instructions constructively amended the charges. However, the court held that such an amendment is not a structural error and should be reviewed for plain error. The court concluded that Bock did not demonstrate plain error because he had sufficient notice to mount a defense, and the prosecution's burden of proof was not materially lessened. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals and upheld Bock's convictions. View "Bock v. People" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a traffic stop that led to the discovery of drug paraphernalia and illegal substances. The defendant, Sean Terrance Johnson, was pulled over by police officers for two traffic violations. During the stop, officers noticed an empty shell casing in Johnson's vehicle and a bag frequently used to carry concealed weapons. Johnson admitted to having a shotgun in the trunk. The officers also found a pipe in Johnson's pocket, which he admitted to using the previous night. Based on these findings, the officers arrested Johnson.The district court initially suppressed the evidence found in Johnson's vehicle, ruling that the officers had unlawfully prolonged their investigatory stop by waiting for a drug-detection dog to arrive. The court reasoned that once the officers had found the pipe and confirmed there were no outstanding warrants for Johnson's arrest, the investigation had effectively concluded. Therefore, the officers needed additional reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for the dog's sniff.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Johnson for possession of drug paraphernalia, and thus, his continued detention was justified as an arrest, not an investigatory stop. The court concluded that the officers did not unlawfully prolong their investigatory stop of Johnson. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order suppressing the evidence discovered in Johnson's vehicle and remanded the case for the court to consider whether that evidence was lawfully discovered following Johnson's arrest. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was asked to review a case involving a dispute between the City of Aspen and the Burlingame Ranch II Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The dispute centered around alleged construction defects in an affordable housing project overseen by the City of Aspen. The Association claimed that Aspen had breached express and implied warranties, and Aspen argued that the claims were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), which provides immunity to public entities from claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort.The lower court agreed with Aspen, ruling that the Association's claims sounded in tort, or could sound in tort, and were thus barred by the CGIA. The Association appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court reasoned that the Association's claims could only sound in contract, and thus were not barred by the CGIA. The court relied on the economic loss rule, which generally provides that a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of a contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that the economic loss rule has no bearing on whether the CGIA bars a plaintiff’s claims. The court clarified that the CGIA bars claims that could arise in both tort and contract, and that the economic loss rule cannot rescue an otherwise CGIA-barred claim. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings. View "City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the question of whether a search for internet-related evidence that extended to a previously unknown basement apartment was reasonable, even though the apartment was not specified in the warrant. The police had obtained a warrant to search a property after receiving information that child pornography had been downloaded to a particular IP address associated with that address. The property appeared to be a single-family home. However, during the execution of the warrant, the police encountered Kevin Matthew Dhyne, who lived in a basement apartment on the property and used the same internet access as the rest of the house. The police searched Dhyne’s apartment and found sexually explicit material involving children on his laptop.The trial court agreed with Dhyne's argument that the search violated the U.S. and Colorado constitutions because the warrant was not specific to his basement apartment. However, the court denied Dhyne’s motion to suppress the evidence, reasoning that even if the officers had not searched his apartment in conjunction with the original warrant, they would have executed the same search later that day under a warrant specific to the basement apartment, and the evidence would therefore have inevitably been discovered. Dhyne was convicted of two counts of sexual exploitation of a child.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion, though it did so by upholding the search rather than by applying the inevitable discovery exception. The court of appeals agreed that for a multi-dwelling unit, separate dwellings normally require separate, specific warrants. However, the court justified the search of Dhyne’s apartment based on the shared use of the IP address.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the outcome, holding that the warrant's reference to the property's "[h]ouse, garage, and any outbuildings" was sufficiently specific because there were no outward indicators that the basement apartment existed. The court also held that the execution of the warrant was reasonable in this specific scenario, where the warrant was for all buildings on the property and the defendant told the police that he lived in the basement and used the IP address that provided grounds for the search. View "Dhyne v. People" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between ex-spouses Amanda Wynell Conners and Andrew Brian Conners over child support payments. The mother filed a motion for contempt of court, alleging that the father had not made the required payments. The district court issued a citation to show cause, and after unsuccessful attempts to personally serve the father, the mother requested permission to serve the contempt materials via email.The district court allowed the email service, which the father contested, arguing that it was inconsistent with the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, which governs contempt proceedings in civil cases. The father then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, challenging the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, as amended in 1995, does not permit a party to serve process for indirect contempt by email. The court further held that substituted service under Rule 4(f) is not permitted in contempt proceedings. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court clarified that Rule 107 governs all contempt proceedings, whether punitive or remedial, that arise out of an underlying case that is civil in nature. The court also held that email service does not satisfy Rule 107(c)’s requirements for physical service directly on the specific individual accused of contempt without any intermediate intervention. View "In Re the Marriage of Conners" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over water rights associated with the Green Mountain Reservoir in Colorado. The City of Golden (Golden) opposed the implementation of an administrative protocol (the Protocol) developed by the United States and other parties, arguing that it would injure its rights upstream of the reservoir. The water court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree, a series of decrees and stipulations governing water rights in the area. Golden appealed this decision.Previously, the water court had ruled that an assessment of injury was not required in this case, as the United States was merely requesting confirmation that the Protocol was consistent with the existing Blue River Decree. The court also rejected Golden's claims that the Protocol contradicted language in the Blue River Decree requiring the "fair" and "equitable" treatment of all parties with interests in the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (CBT), a complex water diversion project.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the water court's ruling. It held that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree and does not violate the prior appropriation doctrine, a principle of water law that gives priority to those who first used the water. The court also rejected Golden's procedural arguments regarding the water court's denial of its motion for reconsideration. View "City of Golden v. City of Aurora" on Justia Law