Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After finding himself in custody on an arrest warrant, defendant Shaun Davis wanted someone to contact his girlfriend about retrieving the car he had with him. He invited a police officer to use Davis’s cell phone to call her, and he gave his cell phone’s passcode to the officer. Following a station house interview, Davis repeated his request. Again, he asked the police to contact his girlfriend. And again, he offered up his passcode. The police later obtained a warrant to search the contents of Davis’s cell phone. Without seeking Davis’s or the court’s specific consent, the police used the previously provided passcode to execute the search warrant. Davis asked the trial court to suppress his statements about the passcode and any evidence from the phone, arguing his statements about the passcode were involuntary and that they were taken in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 456 (1966). He also contended that the search warrant was overbroad and lacked probable cause. The trial court rejected Davis’s arguments. The court found that Davis gave “very limited” consent for the police to use the passcode to search his phone for his girlfriend’s phone number, not general consent to search everything in his phone. Because the trial court concluded that the search exceeded the scope of Davis’s consent, it suppressed any evidence recovered from the phone. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed: on the facts presented here, the Supreme Court concluded the search of the phone was not a consent search, but rather a search pursuant to a valid warrant, and Davis did not manifest a legitimate expectation of privacy as to his passcode. Accordingly, law enforcement was at liberty to use the passcode to execute the search warrant. View "Colorado v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Ray sought review of the court of appeals’ affirming his convictions for attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, and accessory to first degree murder. The appellate court rejected Ray’s claim that one of the self-defense-related instructions given by the district court implicitly shifted the burden of proof to him by improperly imposing conditions on the availability of that affirmative defense; and in the absence of any record indication that the jury later watched a recorded witness interview admitted as an exhibit at trial, the appellate court declined to address his claim that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the jury unrestricted access to that recording. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. Because the language of the instruction in question did not permit the jury to reconsider the court’s determination, based on the evidence at trial, that the affirmative defense of person was available to Ray, and because the jury was properly instructed concerning the State’s burden to disprove that, and any, affirmative defense, the district court did not err in instructing the jury as to his assertion that he acted in defense of himself and a third person. Although error resulted from the district court’s reliance on later-overruled case law permitting the jury to have unrestricted access to the exhibit in question, when the content of that exhibit is compared with the other evidence admitted at trial, the error was harmless. View "Ray v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Respondents were four Ranch owners who, with notice of the Lake Fork Hunting and Fishing Club’s (the Club) restrictive covenants and bylaws, purchased deeds conferring record title to their respective Ranches. In 2015, the Hinsdale County Assessor conducted valuations of the Respondents’ Ranches and assessed property taxes to their parcels. Respondents protested these valuations and assessments to the Hinsdale County Board of Equalization (the BOE), which denied their petitions. Respondents then appealed the BOE’s determination to the Board of Assessment Appeals (the BAA), arguing that because of the Club’s restrictive covenants and bylaws, the Club was the true owner of those parcels and should have been held responsible for real property taxes. The BAA denied the Respondents’ appeal and affirmed the Assessor’s valuation of the Ranch parcels. The Ranch owners then appealed the BAA’s decision to the court of appeals, which reversed the BAA’s order. Given the extent of the Club’s control over the property, the court of appeals concluded that the Club was the true owner of the parcels for purposes of property taxation and viewed the Ranch owners’ interests as akin to mere licenses to conduct certain activities on the Club’s property. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, finding Colorado’s property tax scheme reflected the legislative intent to assess property taxes to the record fee owners of real property. “Because Respondents voluntarily agreed to the restrictive covenants and bylaws that facilitate the collective use of their property for recreational purposes, we hold that they cannot rely on these same restrictive covenants and bylaws to avoid property tax liability that flows from their record title ownership.” Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in relying on the Club’s restrictive covenants and bylaws to conclude that the Club is the “owner” of the Ranch parcels and that the Ranch owners hold mere licenses to use Club grounds. The court further erred in holding that the Assessor therefore improperly valued the Respondents’ parcels. View "Hinsdale County v. HDH Partnership" on Justia Law

Petitioner Benjamin Roina was charged with harassment and assault on an at-risk adult. At his preliminary hearing, Roina’s defense counsel filed a sealed motion with the trial court contesting his competency and requested that the court order a competency evaluation. Defense counsel provided notice of the motion to the prosecution but did not provide the prosecution with a copy of the motion. The trial court refused to review the sealed motion unless defense counsel provided the prosecution with a copy. In its written order, the trial court explained that engaging in an ex parte communication with the defense would contravene Rule 2.9(A) of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibited communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers unless, as relevant here, expressly authorized by law. The court further concluded that section 16-8.5-102(2)(b) was ambiguous as to whether ex parte review of defense counsel’s motion would be permitted. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the trial court erred by declining to review the defense’s sealed motion. The Court ruled that it did: “Although Rule 2.9(A) of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct generally prohibits judges from considering communications that are shared with only one party in a pending matter, this type of ex parte communication is permitted when expressly authorized by law. Because section 16-8.5-102(2)(b), C.R.S. (2018), requires the trial court to consider defense counsel’s motion raising competency without disclosing that motion to the prosecution.” The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re Colorado v. Roina" on Justia Law

The State of Colorado charged James Garner for a shooting at a bar that injured three brothers. The State’s case depended on the brothers’ live identifications of Garner at trial, almost three years later. None of them could identify Garner in a photo array at the police station. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether, in the circumstances of this case, Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 199 (1972) required the trial court to assess the reliability of the brothers’ first-time in-court identifications before allowing them in front of the jury. The Colorado Court held that where an in-court identification is not preceded by an impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure arranged by law enforcement, and where nothing beyond the inherent suggestiveness of the ordinary courtroom setting made the in-court identification itself constitutionally suspect, due process did not require the trial court to assess the identification for reliability under Biggers. Because Garner alleged no impropriety regarding the pretrial photographic arrays, and the record revealed nothing unusually suggestive about the circumstances of the brothers’ in-court identifications, the in-court identifications did not violate due process. Furthermore, the Court held Garner’s evidentiary arguments were unpreserved and that the trial court’s admission of the identifications was not plain error under CRE 403, 602, or 701. View "Garner v. Colorado" on Justia Law

As part of an extensive narcotics investigation that spanned almost all of 2017, law enforcement obtained arrest warrants for defendant Amber Threlkel and her significant other, Robert Allen, based on their alleged distribution of controlled substances. On the evening of December 7, 2017, deputies observed a truck owned by Allen leave the residence he shared with Threlkel; they suspected that Allen and Threlkel were both in the truck. As the deputies attempted to perform a traffic stop, the truck evaded them, causing them to momentarily lose sight of it. But they eventually spotted the truck again, stopped it, and apprehended the driver, Allen, within a mile of the home. Although there was no passenger in the truck, Threlkel was located a couple of hundred yards from it, attempting to hitch a ride. It was a frigid and snowy night, the roads were slippery, and there was no easy access on foot between the home and the location of the stop. A deputy who recognized Threlkel detained her. Threlkel was later arrested pursuant to her outstanding warrant. Threlkel was charged with multiple drug-related offenses. Before trial, she filed several motions to suppress. The trial court granted one of them, finding that the deputies lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop her. The court thus suppressed all evidence and observations derived from Threlkel’s stop, specifically the deputies’ observations and investigation before they contacted Threlkel. Practically speaking, the prosecution would not have been allowed to mention at trial that Threlkel was even at the location where she was detained. Upon the State’s request for review, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, finding the deputies had reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Threlkel. “[E]ven if the trial court’s contrary ruling had been correct, there is no authority to suppress the deputies’ observations and investigation before they contacted Threlkel.” The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Threlkel" on Justia Law

In a judicial disciplinary proceeding, the Colorado Supreme Court considered the exceptions of now-former Colorado Court of Appeals Judge Laurie Booras to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline’s (the “Commission’s”) recommendation that Judge Booras be removed from office and that she be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the Commission in this matter. The Commission’s recommendation was based on the factual findings and conclusions of law set forth in the December 12, 2018 Report of the Special Masters in this case. That report concluded that Judge Booras had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.2, Canon 3, Rule 3.1, and Canon 3, Rule 3.5 of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct by (1) disclosing confidential information belonging to the court of appeals (namely, the vote of a court of appeals division on a case prior to the issuance of the decision in that case) to an intimate, non-spousal partner and (2) using inappropriate racial epithets in communications with that intimate partner, including a racially derogatory reference to a court of appeals colleague. Judge Booras filed exceptions to the Commission’s recommendation, contending that her communications with her then-intimate partner were protected by the First Amendment and that the recommendation that she be removed from office was too severe under the circumstances of this case. In addition, by letter dated January 2, 2019, Judge Booras advised the Chief Justice that she was resigning her position as a Colorado Court of Appeals Judge, effective as of the close of business on January 31, 2019, although no party contended Judge Booras’s resignation rendered this matter moot. Having now considered the record and the briefs of the parties, the Supreme Court concluded the Commission properly found Judge Booras’s communications with her then-intimate partner were not protected by the First Amendment. Furthermore, given Judge Booras’ resignation, which she tendered and which became effective after the Commission made its recommendation, the Court did not decide whether Judge Booras’s removal from office was an appropriate sanction. Rather, the Court concluded the appropriate sanction in this case was acceptance of Judge Booras’s resignation, the imposition of a public censure, and an order requiring Judge Booras to pay the Commission’s costs in this matter. View "In the Matter of Laurie A. Booras" on Justia Law

After observing Crystal Johnson conduct an apparent drug transaction, police officers followed her vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. Officers searched Johnson’s vehicle and seized methamphetamine and a digital scale. Her four-year-old daughter was in the car at the time. Johnson was then arrested and charged with possession of more than two grams of methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia, and child abuse. During jury selection, the court read several instructions, which it framed as six “bedrock” principles of the American criminal justice system. One of those instructions was the pattern instruction for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the court stated that a reasonable doubt is “a doubt that is not vague, speculative, or imaginary, but such a doubt as would cause reasonable people to hesitate to act in matters of importance to themselves.” Then, the court elaborated on what the phrase “hesitate to act” meant. In this appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether the court of appeals erred when it held that the trial court’s extraneous jury instruction concerning reasonable doubt did not unconstitutionally lower the prosecution’s burden of proof. While the Supreme Court considered the trial court’s extraneous “hesitate to act” instruction as improper, there was not a reasonable likelihood that it prejudiced the defendant. “The instruction was nonsensical, given only once during voir dire, not referenced by either party at any time, and flanked by the proper instruction regarding the burden of proof at the beginning and end of the trial.” Therefore, the Court held the instruction did not lower the prosecution’s burden of proof in violation of due process, and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Johnson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

On the day her trial was set to begin, April Travis told the court that she was hoping she could have more time “to look for and pay for an attorney.” The trial court denied the request to continue the case, noting that the trial had previously been continued and Travis was already being represented by a public defender. Travis appealed that decision, arguing that her request to look for a lawyer was an invocation of her Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel of her choice. A division of the court of appeals agreed, concluding that because Travis had invoked that right, the trial court was required to make a record that it had reviewed each of the factors elaborated in Colorado v. Brown, 322 P.3d 214. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the right to be represented by counsel of the defendant’s choosing was not implicated by a bare request to “look for and pay for” a new lawyer. The trial court was therefore not obligated to review the Brown factors, and its decision to deny Travis’s trial-day continuance request was not an abuse of discretion. View "Colorado v. Travis" on Justia Law

The question presented by this appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court was a 1909 water rights decree adjudicated an enforceable water right for the Campbell Ditch in nine springs. Yamasaki Ring, LLC, which owned some of the Campbell Ditch’s water rights, asked the Court to answer the question in the affirmative. The Dills and the Pearces, who owned properties where water from the springs had been put to beneficial use since as early as 1903, urged the Court to answer the question in the negative. In two orders issued in 2016, the water court agreed with the Dills/Pearces and determined that the 1909 decree did not adjudicate a water right in the springs’ water because it did not set forth “the necessary information” for adjudication, including an appropriation date, a priority number, or quantification details. Therefore, the water court concluded the Campbell Ditch’s unquantifiable entitlement to “receive and conduct water” from the springs could not be enforced or administered against any adjudicated water rights. The Supreme Court agreed and therefore affirmed the water court’s judgment. View "Concerning the Application for Water Rights of Donald E. Dill, Cathie G. Dill, Jerry R. Pearce, and Frances M. Pearce in Fremont County" on Justia Law