Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a ski lift accident that left a minor, Annalea Jane Miller, a quadriplegic. The plaintiff, Michael D. Miller, acting as the parent and guardian of Annalea, sued the defendant, Crested Butte Mountain Resort, alleging negligence per se based on violations of the Ski Safety Act of 1979 and the Passenger Tramway Safety Act, as well as a claim for negligence-highest duty of care. The plaintiff argued that the defendant could not absolve itself of statutory duties through private release agreements that purported to release negligence claims against it.The district court dismissed the negligence per se claim, ruling that the defendant could absolve itself of liability through private release agreements. It also dismissed the negligence-highest duty of care claim, finding that the release agreements signed by the plaintiff were enforceable and barred the claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the district court's dismissal of the negligence per se claim. It held that the defendant could not absolve itself of liability for violations of statutory and regulatory duties through private release agreements. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the negligence per se claim.However, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court's dismissal of the negligence-highest duty of care claim. It found that the district court correctly applied the factors set forth in Jones v. Dressel, determining that the release agreements signed by the plaintiff were enforceable and barred the claim. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the negligence-highest duty of care claim.The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to reinstate the plaintiff’s negligence per se claim and for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Miller v. Crested Butte, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the question of whether a board of cooperative education services (BOCES) can locate a school within the geographic boundaries of a nonmember school district without the district's consent. The petitioner, Education reEnvisioned BOCES (ERBOCES), had entered into an agreement with the Colorado Literacy and Learning Center’s School for Dyslexic Learners (CLLC) to operate a school within the boundaries of respondent Colorado Springs School District 11 (District 11), which is not a member of ERBOCES. Neither ERBOCES nor CLLC sought or obtained District 11’s permission to do so.The district court initially ruled in favor of ERBOCES and CLLC, interpreting the language of section 22-5-111(2) of the Boards of Cooperative Services Act of 1965 (the BOCES Act) to permit ERBOCES to operate a school at any appropriate location, whether inside or outside of a district providing funding for the facilities. District 11 appealed this decision.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the district court's ruling, concluding that section 22-5-111(2) does not allow a BOCES to open and operate schools within the geographic boundaries of nonmember school districts that do not consent. The court of appeals found that the district court’s interpretation did not give effect to the qualifying language 'within or without a school district providing the money for the facilities.' The court of appeals also noted that the BOCES Act’s statutory framework did not grant a BOCES unrestricted extraterritoriality.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of section 22-5-111(2), when read in context, does not permit a BOCES to locate a contract school within a nonmember school district without that district’s consent. The court did not need to decide whether article IX, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, which pertains to local control of education, prohibits a BOCES from doing so. View "Education reEnvisioned BOCES v. Colorado Springs School District 11" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the ownership of mineral rights beneath a dedicated street in Greeley, Colorado. The dispute arose between Great Northern Properties, LLLP (GNP) and Extraction Oil and Gas, Inc., Richmark Energy Partners, LLC, and Richmark Royalties, LLC (collectively, Extraction) over who is entitled to receive certain oil and gas royalty payments. The issue at hand was how to determine who holds title to the mineral estate under a dedicated right-of-way when a grantor, who has an interest in the mineral rights under that right-of-way, executes a conveyance of the land abutting the right-of-way that is silent as to those rights.The district court agreed with Extraction, concluding that the centerline presumption could be applied to a conveyance of the mineral estate beneath a right-of-way. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s determination of law. However, the court of appeals also concluded that the centerline presumption should not apply if the grantor retains ownership of any property abutting the right-of-way.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the court of appeals' decision that a conveyance of land abutting a right-of-way is presumed to carry title to the centerline of both the surface and mineral estates beneath a dedicated right-of-way to the owners of land abutting that right-of-way. However, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' conclusion that the centerline presumption cannot apply if a grantor retains ownership of any property abutting the subject right-of-way. The Supreme Court held that the centerline presumption applies if the party claiming ownership to land abutting a dedicated right-of-way establishes that the grantor conveyed ownership of land abutting a right-of-way, the grantor owned the fee to both the surface estate and the mineral rights underlying the right-of-way at the time of conveyance, and no contrary intent appears on the face of the conveyance document. View "Great Northern Properties v. Extraction Oil and Gas" on Justia Law

John Doe sued the University of Denver (DU) after he was expelled for allegedly engaging in nonconsensual sexual contact with another student, Jane Roe. Doe claimed that DU breached its contract with him by failing to conduct a "thorough, impartial and fair" investigation into Roe's accusation, as promised in DU's Office of Equal Opportunity Procedures (OEO Procedures). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DU, and Doe appealed. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the lower courts that the promise in DU's OEO Procedures of a "thorough, impartial and fair" investigation, when considered with the specific investigation requirements listed in those procedures, is enforceable under contract law. The court also agreed that the record does not permit the entry of summary judgment for DU on Doe’s general contract claim or on Doe’s contract claim premised on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, the court disagreed with the lower courts on Doe’s tort claim, holding that DU does not owe its students an extra-contractual duty to exercise reasonable care in adopting and implementing fair procedures related to the investigation and adjudication of sexual-misconduct claims. Therefore, DU is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Doe’s tort claim. View "University of Denver v. Doe" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joseph Wayne Washington, who was charged with multiple crimes including murder, drug possession, witness tampering, violation of a protection order, and solicitation of murder. Washington argued that these charges should not have been tried together, citing a previous case, Norman v. People, which he believed established a rule of automatic reversal for improper joinder of charges.The case was first tried in a lower court where Washington's motion to sever the charges into four separate cases was denied. The court ruled that all seventeen charges were interconnected and part of the same incident. The case proceeded to trial, and Washington was found guilty of second degree murder, ten drug possession counts, violation of a protection order, and witness tampering. He was acquitted of first degree murder, one of the drug possession counts, and the murder solicitation charges.Washington appealed, arguing that his convictions should be reversed due to prejudicial misjoinder under Rule 8(a)(2). The court of appeals affirmed Washington’s conviction, concluding that misjoinder is not a structural error and requires the same harmless-error review that applies to other trial errors.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court clarified that the previous case, Norman v. People, did not create a rule of automatic reversal for improper joinder of charges. Instead, the court held that harmless-error review applies to misjoinder. The court concluded that if there was any error in joining the various charges in Washington’s case, that error was harmless. View "Washington v. People" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Taunia Marie Whiteaker, who was convicted of second degree burglary, first degree criminal trespass, third degree assault, and harassment following a physical altercation at her mother-in-law's house. Whiteaker appealed her conviction, arguing that the district court erred by failing to merge her conviction for first degree criminal trespass into her conviction for second degree burglary.The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected Whiteaker's argument, relying on a previous ruling that first degree criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense of second degree burglary. The court reasoned that even though subsequent opinions cast doubt on the previous ruling, it was the prerogative of the Supreme Court alone to overrule its cases. One judge disagreed, believing that a recent opinion had abrogated the previous ruling, but agreed that both convictions should survive because the district court's error in failing to merge the two offenses was not plain.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court agreed with Whiteaker that first degree criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of second degree burglary, and that her overlapping convictions violated the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The court held that double jeopardy sentencing errors require automatic reversal even when the error isn't obvious to the district court. Therefore, Whiteaker's convictions for trespass and burglary merge. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to instruct the district court to amend the mittimus to reflect the merger of Whiteaker's conviction for first degree criminal trespass into her conviction for second degree burglary. View "Whiteaker v. People" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the dissolution of a marriage between Barbara Henderson Green and Jeffry Howard Green. The couple was married in Connecticut in 1982 and lived in Nebraska for most of their marriage. In 2018, Mrs. Green moved to Colorado to assist their pregnant daughter, while Mr. Green remained in Nebraska. The Greens purchased two houses in Denver, one for themselves and one for their daughter. Mr. Green financially supported Mrs. Green from Nebraska and listed one of the Denver houses as an asset on his personal financial statements. In 2021, Mr. Green took out a loan secured by a mortgage on their Denver house, stating that his Nebraska home was his former residence and the Denver house was his primary residence. However, he continued to live in Nebraska. In 2022, both Mr. and Mrs. Green filed for divorce in separate jurisdictions—Mrs. Green in Colorado and Mr. Green in Nebraska.The Colorado trial court found that Mr. Green had the requisite minimum contacts to be subject to general personal jurisdiction in Colorado. This decision was largely based on Mr. Green's assertion that the Denver house was his primary residence when he applied for a loan. The court concluded that Mr. Green's continuing financial obligations in Colorado meant that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there, and thus it denied his motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reviewed the case and held that for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over an individual, the individual must be domiciled within the state. The court found that Mr. Green was not domiciled in Colorado and therefore was not subject to general personal jurisdiction there. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re the Marriage of Green" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff, Susan Ann Scholle, acting as the personal representative for the Estate of Daniel B. Scholle, sued the defendants, Edward Ehrichs, M.D.; Michael Rauzzino, M.D.; and HCA-HealthONE, LLC. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' negligence during a back surgery led to severe complications, including cardiac arrest, infection, kidney injuries, stroke, and the need for multiple additional surgeries. The jury found the defendants negligent and awarded the plaintiff over $9 million in economic damages.The defendants argued that the damages should be capped at $1 million, as per the Health Care Availability Act (HCAA). The trial court, however, found good cause to exceed the cap, citing the severity of the plaintiff's injuries, the financial burden on his family, and the unfairness of limiting the damages due to the catastrophic outcome of the surgery.On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred by not considering the plaintiff's insurance contract liabilities in its good cause analysis. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's insurers had waived their subrogation rights, meaning the plaintiff was not responsible for repaying the $4.1 million billed by the hospital.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that the contract exception to the collateral source statute prohibits a trial court from considering a plaintiff's insurance contract liabilities in determining whether good cause exists to exceed the HCAA's damages cap. The court remanded the case for the trial court to recalculate interest and enter judgment accordingly. View "Scholle v. Ehrichs" on Justia Law

The case involves Glen Gary Montoya, who was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI). After initially agreeing to a blood test, Montoya later refused. However, after the nurse left, he changed his mind and requested to take the test. The test was not conducted. At trial, the prosecution sought to use Montoya’s refusal as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Montoya was found guilty of DUI and careless driving.The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that if a criminal court determines that a driver refused testing, that determination must be based on the law of refusal that has developed in the administrative, license-revocation context. The court also concluded that if the prosecutor seeks to use as evidence a defendant’s refusal of a chemical test, but the defendant disputes refusal, the entire circumstances surrounding the defendant’s test-taking must be submitted for the jury’s consideration. The court reversed Montoya’s DUI conviction and remanded for a new trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the law of refusal. The Supreme Court held that criminal DUI trials are governed by the same evidentiary rules as any other criminal trial. Therefore, criminal courts are not bound by the law of refusal that governs administrative, license-revocation hearings. The court also concluded that the district court erred by admitting evidence of Montoya's refusal to submit to testing and excluding evidence of his subsequent request for testing. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the lower court, remanding the case for a new trial. View "People v. Montoya" on Justia Law

In November 2015, Mark Kinslow hit Daniala Mohammadi with his car while she was riding her bicycle. Mohammadi, who was a minor at the time of the accident, sued Kinslow in December 2019, more than two years but less than three years after she turned eighteen. Kinslow moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired two years after Mohammadi’s eighteenth birthday. Mohammadi countered that the usual three-year statute of limitations for motor vehicle accidents had not started to run until her eighteenth birthday.The trial court granted Kinslow’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Mohammadi was required to bring her claim either within three years of the incident, or within two years after she turned eighteen. The court of appeals reversed this decision, agreeing with Mohammadi and concluding that it was bound by decisions of the Supreme Court of Colorado providing that statutes of limitations are “tolled” for claims by a minor plaintiff until the minor turns eighteen.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the court of appeals' decision. The court concluded that the plain language of section 13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. (2023), gives a plaintiff who turns eighteen within the three-year limitation period for a motor vehicle accident a statute of limitations that is the longer of (1) the full three years normally accorded an accident victim, or (2) two years from their eighteenth birthday. For Mohammadi, this meant that she was required to bring her claim by January 1, 2019—two years after she turned eighteen. Because her suit was filed after that date, it was untimely. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. View "Kinslow v. Mohammadi" on Justia Law