Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant Christopher Pernell of several charges, including burglary, kidnapping, and sexual assault. The prosecution alleged that Pernell showed up at his ex-wife’s house uninvited; forced his way into her home; threatened her and her boyfriend at gunpoint; forced her to have sexual intercourse; and prevented her from fleeing. At trial, the prosecution presented multiple witnesses, including the ex-wife, the boyfriend, and a police officer who investigated the incident, as well as corroborating physical evidence. Pernell did not testify or present evidence at trial. His theory of defense was that the ex-wife and the boyfriend fabricated the story of the incident. Consistent with this theory, defense counsel told the jury during opening statements that the incident, as described by the ex-wife and the boyfriend, “didn’t happen” and that the ex-wife and the boyfriend “concoct[ed] their story to get [Pernell] out of their lives.” An officer who testified at trial recounted the ex-wife’s description of the incident to him. Pernell objected to this testimony, arguing that the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements to the officer constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial court admitted these statements as excited utterances. On appeal, Pernell argued, among other things, that the trial court had reversibly erred in admitting the ex-wife’s statements. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that defense counsel’s opening statement that the ex-wife fabricated her story opened the door for the admission of her out-of-court statements. However, upon review of the trial record, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded any error in the admission of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of these statements contributed to Pernell’s conviction. The Court declined to address whether defense counsel’s opening statement opened the door to the admission of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements, affirming on difference grounds as the appellate court. View "Pernell v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Oakwood Holdings, LLC and respondent Mortgage Investments Enterprises LLC each claimed a right to the deed on a piece of foreclosed property. In 2014, Mortgage Investments purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. On or around the date of the foreclosure sale, Oakwood purchased junior liens on the property and then attempted to redeem pursuant to section 38-38-302, C.R.S. (2017). Mortgage Investments, however, did not provide redemption figures and instead, acting under a limited power of attorney granted by the prior property owner, attempted to pay off the amount due to Oakwood under the junior liens. Oakwood, however, refused the payment. Mortgage Investments then filed for a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that its payoffs were valid and that Oakwood was not entitled to redeem the property. The parties ultimately filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment for Oakwood, Mortgage Investments appealed, and in a unanimous, published opinion, a division of the court of appeals reversed. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, concluding that under the plain language of the applicable redemption statutes, a junior lienor who complied with its obligations under section 38-38-302 by timely filing its notice of intent to redeem is entitled to redeem, and at that point, it has no duty to accept a tendered lien payoff from a certificate of purchase holder. Although a debtor-owner is sometimes entitled to cure, the statute is clear that he or she must do so before the foreclosure sale is complete, and Mortgage Investments gained no additional rights by obtaining the limited power of attorney from the debtor-prior owner after the sale in this case. Accordingly, once Oakwood complied with the statutory requirements to redeem, it was permitted to do so and had no obligation to accept what amounted to cure funds tendered by Mortgage Investments on behalf of the debtor-prior owner. View "Oakwood Holdings, LLC v. Mortgage Investments Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

Caroline Burton and Brenda Olivar submitted claims for long-term disability benefits to insurance companies under employee-benefits plans set up by their employers (“the Plans”). The insurance companies denied Burton’s and Olivar’s claims. Burton and Olivar sued the Plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) for benefits due to them under the insurance policies. But neither served the Plans. Rather, they each served complaints on the United States Department of Labor Secretary, relying on an ERISA provision allowing such service when a plan hasn’t designated “an individual” as an agent for service of process. In both cases, the Labor Secretary never forwarded the complaint to the Plans’ designated agents for service of process, the Plans failed to answer, and Burton and Olivar obtained default judgments in their favor. Eventually, the Plans moved to set aside the default judgments for improper service, which the trial courts granted in both cases. Later, the Plans moved for summary judgment, arguing the insurers, which were obligated to make all eligibility determinations and payments under the Plans’ terms, were the only proper party defendants. The trial courts agreed, granting the Plans summary judgment. A division of the court of appeals affirmed. The issue presented to the Colorado Supreme Court for resolution centered on whether ERISA’s use of the term “individual” provided that service on the Labor Secretary was sufficient when a plan designates a corporation (instead of a natural person) as its administrator and agent for service of process. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burton v. Colorado Access & No." on Justia Law

Petitioners Smokebrush Foundation, Katherine Tudor, and Donald Herbert Goede, III (collectively, “Smokebrush”) owned property on which the non-profit foundation operated a wellness center in the City of Colorado Springs. Smokebrush sued the City, contending that Smokebrush’s property had been contaminated by pollutants from an adjacent property owned by the City. The City moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming governmental immunity from suit under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”). Smokebrush responded that the City had waived immunity under the Act, section 24-10-106(1)(c) and section 24-10-106(1)(f). The district court agreed with Smokebrush and denied the City’s motion to dismiss. In a unanimous, published opinion, however, a division of the court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the City’s motion. The Colorado Supreme Court granted Smokebrush’s petition for certiorari and affirmed in part and reversed in part the division’s judgment. With respect to Smokebrush’s claims regarding airborne asbestos released during the 2013 demolition activities, the Supreme Court concluded the City did not waive immunity under section 24-10-106(1)(c)’s dangerous condition of a public building exception. With respect to Smokebrush’s claims regarding the coal tar contamination, the Supreme Court concluded that under the plain language of section 24-10-106(1)(f), the City waived its immunity for such claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Smokebrush Foundation v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

This case arose from a grand jury investigation of petitioner M.W. and his company, I.I. The State suspected that I.I. was manufacturing and distributing a cigarette product illegally sprayed with synthetic cannabinoids. As part of the grand jury investigation, the State issued a subpoena duces tecum to I.I’s attorney Amy Brimah, ordering her to produce all materials related to any representation by her of I.I. and M.W. The State also requested a hearing, outside the presence of the grand jury and before a judge. Brimah and M.W. moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the materials were protected by the attorney–client privilege. The State asserted that the crime–fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege applied. The district court denied Brimah’s and M.W.’s motions, declining to review the documents individually, and ordered Brimah to produce the requested materials. Brimah and M.W. petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court held that a two-step process applies when a party seeks disclosure of attorney–client-privileged documents under the crime–fraud exception: (1) before a court may review the privileged documents in camera, it must “require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that wrongful conduct sufficient to invoke the crime or fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege has occurred;” and (2) the court may strip a communication of privilege only upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the client was committing, or attempting to commit, a crime or fraud and the communication was made in furtherance of the putative crime or fraud. Because the State failed to make such a showing here, the district court abused its discretion in stripping the documents of privilege. Brimah and M.W. also argued the district court should have required the State to disclose the applications and authorizations for the intercepts on which it premised its subpoena under Colorado’s wiretap statute, specifically section 16-15-102(9), C.R.S. (2017). On the facts of this case the Supreme Court agreed. The district court was reversed on this point too. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re 2015-2016 Jefferson County Grand Jury" on Justia Law

In this dependency and neglect case, respondents were foster parents who intervened in the trial court proceedings and participated in a hearing on the guardian ad litem’s (“GAL”) motion to terminate the parent-child legal relationship between the mother and the child. The trial court denied the motion. Neither the Department nor the GAL appealed the trial court’s ruling. Instead, the foster parents appealed, seeking to reverse the trial court’s order. The narrow question before the Colorado Supreme Court was whether the foster parents had standing to appeal the trial court’s ruling. The court of appeals concluded they did. The Supreme Court granted the GAL’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision and reversed: “although section 19-3-507(5)(a) permits foster parents to intervene in dependency and neglect proceedings following adjudication, foster parents here do not have a legally protected interest in the outcome of termination proceedings, and section 19-3-507(5)(a) does not automatically confer standing to them to appeal the juvenile court’s order denying the termination motion at issue, where neither the Department nor the GAL sought review of the trial court’s ruling.” View "Colorado in Interest of C.W.B., Jr." on Justia Law

Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills bought ads and social-media coverage in an election. Campaign Integrity Watchdog filed a complaint with the Colorado Secretary of State against Alliance, alleging that Alliance failed to comply with Colorado’s campaign-finance laws requiring political committees to report contributions and expenditures. An Administrative Law Judge, or ALJ, ultimately ordered Alliance to pay fines and register as a political committee. Alliance appealed the campaign-finance decision and defended itself in a related defamation suit, racking up hundreds of dollars in court costs and thousands in legal fees. Alliance didn’t report those legal expenses. Watchdog filed another campaign-finance complaint; the ALJ concluded that the legal expenses were not reportable as expenditures but were reportable as contributions. Nonetheless, it ruled that the contribution-reporting requirement was unconstitutional as applied to Alliance for its post-election legal expenses. Watchdog appealed the ALJ’s determinations regarding the reporting requirements, and the court of appeals asked the Colorado Supreme Court to take the appeal directly under C.A.R. 50. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision that the legal expenses were not expenditures but were contributions under Colorado law. However, the Court reversed the ALJ’s determination that the reporting requirement was unconstitutional as applied to Alliance for its legal expenses: “The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently upheld disclosure and reporting requirements for political committees that exist primarily to influence elections. It makes no difference here that the contributions were not used to directly influence an election - any contribution to a political committee that has the major purpose of influencing an election is deemed to be campaign related and thus justifies the burden of disclosure and reporting.” Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision in part and reversed in part. View "Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Alliance for a Safe and Independent" on Justia Law

Jonathan Anderson, a lawyer, filed a termination report for Coloradans for a Better Future without requiring payment for his legal work, and “Better Future” didn’t report his service as a contribution. Campaign Integrity Watchdog complained to Colorado’s Secretary of State that Better Future should have done so. An Administrative Law Judge, or ALJ, dismissed Watchdog’s complaint on the merits. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that Anderson’s service counted as a “contribution” to Better Future as the term was defined in section 1-45-103(6), C.R.S. (2017), of the Fair Campaign Practices Act (“FCPA”). The court reasoned that if the service was donated, it was a “gift” under section 1-45-103(6)(c)(I). If it was billed but not paid, it was an undercompensated service under section 1-45-103(6)(b). Either way, the service constituted a reportable contribution under the FCPA. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the uncompensated legal services at issue here were not “contributions” to a political organization under Colorado’s campaign-finance laws. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in holding that Better Future was required to report Anderson’s donated legal services. View "Coloradans for a Better Future v. Campaign Integrity Watchdog" on Justia Law

Respondent Isidore Griego was charged with attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault arising out of two incidents in which Griego drove drunk, but due to traffic conditions at the time of the incidents, did not ultimately put any particular persons at risk. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the requirement in the attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault statutes that a defendant place “another person” at risk of death or serious bodily injury necessitates that an actual, discernible person be placed at risk, or if “another person” can refer to the public at large. The Court concluded the statutes at issue required a showing of a risk to an actual, discernible person and that a risk to the public at large was insufficient. “Holding otherwise would leave the statutes without a clear limiting principle and would raise equal protection concerns.” Accordingly, the Court held the court of appeals correctly determined that the evidence did not support Griego’s convictions for attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault. View "Colorado v. Griego" on Justia Law

A jury found state-prison inmate David Bueno guilty of first-degree murder and conspiracy in a case concerning a white inmate’s death. The case took more than two months to try, involved hundreds of motions, and generated tens of thousands of pages of discovery. Fifteen months after Bueno’s conviction (but before he was sentenced) the prosecution disclosed two reports that had been in its possession since the first days of the investigation. Arguing that this belated disclosure violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Bueno moved for a new trial under Crim. P. 33(c). The trial court, which had presided over the entirety of this case, found a discovery violation and determined that a new trial was warranted. A division of the court of appeals affirmed in a split opinion. The two issues this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review were: (1) whether Bueno’s Rule 33(c) motion was time-barred because he filed it more than a year after his conviction, and thus arguably more than a year after “entry of judgment;” and (2) whether the trial court erred in concluding that the prosecution violated Brady’s disclosure requirement, and specifically, whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the evidence at issue was material and that the prosecution violated Crim. P. 16. As to the first issue, the Supreme Court held that “entry of judgment” for purposes of Rule 33 occurs after delivery of a verdict of guilt and imposition of a sentence, as applied here, Bueno’s motion was not time-barred. As to the second issue, the Court found “no clear error” in the trial court’s factual findings, and therefore did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial. View "Colorado v. Bueno" on Justia Law