Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Alfred Sandoval was charged with first degree assault (a class three felony), and possession of a weapon by a previous offender (a class five felony). Sandoval entered into a plea agreement to the reduced charge of felony menacing (a class five felony) in exchange for dismissal of the original charges. The plea agreement also provided that Sandoval would not be sentenced to the Department of Corrections (“DOC”). It did not include any stipulation to judicial fact-finding at sentencing. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the trial court plainly erred when it sentenced Sandoval to an aggravated community corrections sentence based on judicial fact-finding to which Sandoval did not stipulate. The Supreme Court found that it did: in affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), applied to a direct sentence to community corrections. Furthermore, the Court held it was plain error for the trial court to sentence the defendant to an aggravated sentence to community corrections without meeting Blakely’s requirements. View "Colorado v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

Carol Bishop and Mark Klosky (“Klosky”), and Shannon and Keith Love (the Loves) owned adjacent parcels of land in a residential neighborhood. Klosky wanted to remove a large tree sitting primarily on their property, but part of the tree sat on the Loves’ property. The Loves wanted to keep the tree. The controlling Colorado case law holds that when a tree encroaches onto a neighbor’s land, the tree remains the sole property of the owner of the land where the tree first grew, unless the tree was jointly planted, jointly cared for, or treated as a partition between the properties. Any such joint activity implied a shared property interest. Here, the trial court and appellate courts concurred the Loves failed to prove any such shared property interest, and the Colorado Supreme Court declined to overturn the prevailing case law. Thus, finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed rulings in Klosky’s favor. View "Love v. Klosky" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant James Washam, III was charged by information with twelve counts of sexual assault on a child. A portion of the charged date range fell outside of the applicable statute of limitations. After trial began, the prosecution successfully moved to amend the information, narrowing the date range so that it fell completely within the statute. Ultimately, Washam was convicted on all twelve counts. He appealed, arguing that under Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(e), the amendment to the date rate was a substantive amendment, and thus the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the change once trial began. A majority of the Court of Appeals agreed and vacated the convictions, further ordering the charges be dismissed with prejudice. The State appealed. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that because the amendment simply narrowed the date range in the information (and did not add an essential element to the offense or raise issues of inadequate notice), the amendment to the information was one of form and not substance. Furthermore, the Court found Washam’s substantial rights were not prejudiced, nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing the amendment after trial began. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Washam" on Justia Law

Teachers who worked for Denver Public Schools (“DPS”), and Denver Classroom Teachers Association (collectively, “the teachers”), filed this suit, alleging that DPS invoked Senate Bill 10-191, which under certain circumstances allowed a school district to place a nonprobationary teacher on unpaid leave, to remove hundreds of teachers from their positions in violation of both due process of law and the contracts clause of the Colorado Constitution. School District No. 1 and members of the Colorado Board of Education (collectively, “the District”) moved to dismiss the suit, and the trial court granted that motion. A division of the court of appeals reversed, relying on the Colorado Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting predecessor statutes to the relevant (codified as the Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act of 1990 (“TECDA”)) and concluded due process violations occurred under those predecessor statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the TECDA did not create a contractual relationship or vest nonprobationary teachers who were placed on unpaid leave with a property interest in salary and benefits. View "Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Masters" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The questions stemmed from an action brought by teacher Linda Johnson against Denver School District No. 1 (“the District”) and the District’s Board of Education, in which Johnson argued that by placing her on unpaid leave, the District breached her contract and violated her due process rights. The federal district court concluded that because Johnson was placed on unpaid leave, rather than terminated, she was not deprived of a property interest. Johnson appealed that decision to the Tenth Circuit. After analyzing the statutory history and the current statutory language, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 22-63-202(2)(c.5) (CRS 2015) applied to all displaced nonprobationary teachers, not just nonprobationary teachers who were displaced because of a reduction in enrollment or an administrative decision to eliminate certain programs (the reasons stated in subparagraph (VII)). Furthermore, the Court held that nonprobationary teachers who placed on unpaid leave had no vested property interest in salary and benefits, meaning a nonprobationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under subparagraph (IV) is not deprived of a state property interest. View "Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nathan Ybanez petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming his conviction of first degree murder and directing that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole be modified only to the extent of permitting the possibility of parole after forty years. The appellate court rejected Ybanez’s assertions: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by failing to sua sponte appoint a guardian ad litem; (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel both because his counsel’s performance was adversely affected by a non-waivable conflict of interest under which that counsel labored and because he was prejudiced by a deficient performance by his counsel; and (3) that he was entitled to an individualized determination regarding the length of his sentence rather than merely the possibility of parole after forty years. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded: (1) Ybanez lacked any constitutional right to a guardian ad litem and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing one as permitted by statute; (2) Ybanez failed to demonstrate either an adverse effect resulting from an actual conflict of interest, even if his counsel actually labored under a conflict, or that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance, even if it actually fell below the required standard of competent representation; and (3) because Ybanez was constitutionally and statutorily entitled only to an individualized determination whether life without the possibility of parole or life with the possibility of parole after forty years was the appropriate sentence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals is affirmed, and the case remanded with directions to return it to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. View "Ybanez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendants sought ex parte interviews with a number of non-party medical providers in this medical malpractice action. Because of this, an issue arose regarding the scope of the physician–patient privilege in medical-malpractice actions. Section 13-90-107(1)(d), C.R.S. (2017), prohibited certain medical providers from revealing, in testimony or otherwise, information about a patient gathered in the course of treating that patient. That prohibition, however, was not unlimited. The dispute, as presented to the Colorado Supreme Court, did not implicate the physician–patient relationship between Kelley Bailey (“Bailey”) and Defendants, meaning section 107(1)(d)(I) was inapplicable. Instead, the issue here was whether the non-party medical providers were “in consultation with” Defendants such that section 107(1)(d)(II) removed that typically privileged information from the protection of the physician–patient privilege. The Supreme Court held the non-party medical providers were not in consultation with Defendants for the purposes of section 107(1)(d)(II). However, the Court remanded this case to the trial court for consideration of whether the Baileys impliedly waived the physician–patient privilege for the non-party medical providers. On remand, if the trial court concluded that the Baileys did waive that privilege, it should reconsider whether there is any risk that: (1) ex parte interviews with the non-party medical providers would inadvertently reveal residually privileged information; or (2) Defendants would exert undue influence on the non-party medical providers in the course of any ex parte interviews. View "In re Bailey v. Hermacinski" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado certified a question of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. Defendant Ray Domenico Farms, Inc. grew organic vegetables. Plaintiffs were three year-round and four seasonal migrant workers who had been previously employed by Domenico Farms from as far back as 1992. All Plaintiffs were paid by the hour, and alleged they never received overtime pay during their employment with Domenico Farms. While agricultural workers were generally exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) overtime requirements, Plaintiffs alleged they performed nonagricultural tasks in weeks in which they worked more than forty hours, thus entitling them to overtime wages under FLSA for those weeks. The certified question from the federal court pertained to how far back in time a terminated employee’s unpaid wage claims could reach under the Colorado Wage Claim Act, sections 8-4-101 to -123, C.R.S. (2017). Specifically, the certified question asked whether the statute permitted a terminated employee to sue for wages or compensation that went unpaid at any time during the employee’s employment, even when the statute of limitations had run on the cause of action the employee could have brought for those unpaid wages under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-103(1)(a). The Supreme Court held that under the plain language of section 109, an employee could seek any wages or compensation that were unpaid at the time of termination; however, the right to seek such wages or compensation was subject to the statute of limitations. That statute of limitations begins to run when the wages or compensation first become due and payable and thus limits a terminated employee to claims for the two (or three) years immediately preceding termination. Thus, the Court answered the certified question in the negative. View "Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Christopher Pernell of several charges, including burglary, kidnapping, and sexual assault. The prosecution alleged that Pernell showed up at his ex-wife’s house uninvited; forced his way into her home; threatened her and her boyfriend at gunpoint; forced her to have sexual intercourse; and prevented her from fleeing. At trial, the prosecution presented multiple witnesses, including the ex-wife, the boyfriend, and a police officer who investigated the incident, as well as corroborating physical evidence. Pernell did not testify or present evidence at trial. His theory of defense was that the ex-wife and the boyfriend fabricated the story of the incident. Consistent with this theory, defense counsel told the jury during opening statements that the incident, as described by the ex-wife and the boyfriend, “didn’t happen” and that the ex-wife and the boyfriend “concoct[ed] their story to get [Pernell] out of their lives.” An officer who testified at trial recounted the ex-wife’s description of the incident to him. Pernell objected to this testimony, arguing that the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements to the officer constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial court admitted these statements as excited utterances. On appeal, Pernell argued, among other things, that the trial court had reversibly erred in admitting the ex-wife’s statements. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that defense counsel’s opening statement that the ex-wife fabricated her story opened the door for the admission of her out-of-court statements. However, upon review of the trial record, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded any error in the admission of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of these statements contributed to Pernell’s conviction. The Court declined to address whether defense counsel’s opening statement opened the door to the admission of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements, affirming on difference grounds as the appellate court. View "Pernell v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Oakwood Holdings, LLC and respondent Mortgage Investments Enterprises LLC each claimed a right to the deed on a piece of foreclosed property. In 2014, Mortgage Investments purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. On or around the date of the foreclosure sale, Oakwood purchased junior liens on the property and then attempted to redeem pursuant to section 38-38-302, C.R.S. (2017). Mortgage Investments, however, did not provide redemption figures and instead, acting under a limited power of attorney granted by the prior property owner, attempted to pay off the amount due to Oakwood under the junior liens. Oakwood, however, refused the payment. Mortgage Investments then filed for a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that its payoffs were valid and that Oakwood was not entitled to redeem the property. The parties ultimately filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment for Oakwood, Mortgage Investments appealed, and in a unanimous, published opinion, a division of the court of appeals reversed. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, concluding that under the plain language of the applicable redemption statutes, a junior lienor who complied with its obligations under section 38-38-302 by timely filing its notice of intent to redeem is entitled to redeem, and at that point, it has no duty to accept a tendered lien payoff from a certificate of purchase holder. Although a debtor-owner is sometimes entitled to cure, the statute is clear that he or she must do so before the foreclosure sale is complete, and Mortgage Investments gained no additional rights by obtaining the limited power of attorney from the debtor-prior owner after the sale in this case. Accordingly, once Oakwood complied with the statutory requirements to redeem, it was permitted to do so and had no obligation to accept what amounted to cure funds tendered by Mortgage Investments on behalf of the debtor-prior owner. View "Oakwood Holdings, LLC v. Mortgage Investments Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law