Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In March 2016, Catholic Health Initiatives Colorado (d/b/a Centural Health – St. Anthony North Hospital) filed suit against architectural firm Earl Swensson Associates (“ESA”) after ESA designed Catholic Health’s new hospital, Saint Anthony North Health Campus (“Saint Anthony”). Catholic Health alleged that ESA breached its contract and was professionally negligent by failing to design Saint Anthony such that it could have a separately licensed and certified Ambulatory Surgery Center (“ASC”). In December 2016, Catholic Health filed its first expert disclosures, endorsing Bruce LePage and two others. Catholic Health described LePage as an expert with extensive experience in all aspects of preconstruction services such as cost modeling, systems studies, constructability, cost studies, subcontractor solicitation, detailed planning, client relations, and communications in hospital and other large construction projects. Catholic Health endorsed LePage to testify about the cost of adding an ASC to Saint Anthony. At a hearing, ESA argued that the lack of detail in LePage’s report prevented ESA from being able to effectively cross-examine him. ESA further argued that striking LePage as an expert was the proper remedy because Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(I) limits expert testimony to opinions that comply with the Rule, and LePage offered no opinions in compliance. In 2015, the Colorado Supreme Court amended Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) to provide that expert testimony “shall be limited to matters disclosed in detail in the [expert] report.” In this case, the trial court concluded that this amendment mandated the exclusion of expert testimony as a sanction when the underlying report fails to meet the requirements of Rule 26. The Supreme Court concluded the amendment created no such rule of automatic exclusion. Instead, the Court held that the harm and proportionality analysis under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) remained the proper framework for determining sanctions for discovery violations. Because the trial court here did not apply Rule 37(c), the Court remanded for further development of the record. View "Catholic Health v. Swensson" on Justia Law

Defendant Hung Van Nguyen, who only spoke Vietnamese, waived his Miranda rights after they were translated to him by a chaplain for the Denver Police Department. The trial court ruled that the defendant’s waiver was voluntary, but not knowing and intelligent, because the translation could be considered “confusing.” The court therefore suppressed Nguyen’s statements. The question presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review was whether the translation “reasonably convey[ed]” to Nguyen his rights under Miranda. The Court concluded that the translation was sufficient, and reversed the trial court’s suppression order. View "Colorado v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

In 2012, Khalil Laleh brought a forcible entry and detainer action against his brother, Ali Laleh. The litigation later grew so unwieldy that the trial court appointed Gary Johnson as an accounting expert (and later as a special master) to resolve the feuding brothers’ complex accounting claims. The Laleh brothers signed an engagement agreement with Gary C. Johnson and Associates, LLC, setting forth the scope of Johnson’s services and payment. Johnson commenced work, but before he completed his accounting reports for the trial court, the brothers settled their case and the court dismissed the suit. Johnson later informed the trial court that Khalil and Ali refused to pay both his outstanding fees and his costs incurred post-settlement in attempting to collect the outstanding fees. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order ruling that Johnson’s fees were reasonable, and that he was entitled to the post-settlement costs he incurred in trying to collect his outstanding fees. In reaching the latter conclusion, the trial court relied on language in the engagement agreement stating that the Lalehs “are jointly and severally responsible for the timely and complete payment of all fees and expenses” to Johnson. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a separate provision of the engagement agreement authorized the award of the disputed post-settlement collection costs. View "Laleh v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a trial court abuses its discretion when it denies a continuance that defense counsel requested seeking more time to prepare for trial. At the time defense counsel moved for the continuance, the trial court was confronted with (and considered): (1) that defense counsel would have three weeks to prepare for a two- or three-day trial involving eight witnesses and no physical evidence, but defense counsel refused to make specific arguments on why the additional time was needed; (2) that the trial court would have had to rearrange its docket and possibly hand off the case to a different judge; (3) priority was given to cases involving the sexual assault of a child; and (4) the victim’s family wanted to resolve the case promptly. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, under these circumstances, the trial court’s decision to deny a continuance was not so manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair to constitute an abuse of discretion. The Court reversed the contrary holding of the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Ahuero" on Justia Law

Amber Torrez was confined in Denver County on two unrelated warrants: a Jefferson County warrant for assault and other charges (the case giving rise to this appeal) and a Denver County warrant for two murder charges. With regard to the Denver County charges, Torrez was held without bond until a jury eventually found her not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), at which time she was committed to Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo (CMHIP). While confined after the NGRI verdict, Torrez pled guilty to the Jefferson County assault. Torrez asked the trial court to award her presentence confinement credit (PSCC) toward her Jefferson County sentence for both the time that she spent confined during the pendency of the Denver proceedings, as well as the time she spent at CMHIP after the Denver NGRI verdict. The trial court gave her credit for neither period. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that because Torrez would have remained confined prior to and after the NGRI verdict even had the charges in Jefferson County not existed, her presentence confinement for those periods was not attributable to this case, and credit was therefore not warranted for either period. View "Colorado v. Torrez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jamey Robert Page entered the home of an eighty-six-year-old woman late at night and sexually assaulted her. During the assault, the victim bit Page’s tongue, causing him to bleed on her clothing. A DNA analysis of the victim’s blood-stained clothing revealed that a mixture of DNA was present and that Page’s DNA was the source of a major component. The People charged Page with several crimes related to the assault. As relevant here, the jury found Page guilty of both sexual assault involving an at-risk adult and unlawful sexual contact involving an at-risk adult. The trial court sentenced Page to twenty-four years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections on the sexual assault charge and eighteen months concurrently on the unlawful sexual contact charge. The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether a conviction for unlawful sexual contact involving an at-risk adult merged with a conviction for sexual assault involving an at-risk adult. The Court concluded that it did. Hence, it reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded this case to the court of appeals with instructions to return the case to the trial court to vacate the defendant’s conviction for unlawful sexual contact. View "Page v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this case, the supreme court considers whether a prospective juror’s silence in response to rehabilitative questioning constitutes evidence sufficient to support a trial court’s conclusion that the juror has been rehabilitated. Defendant Bradley Clemens chased his girlfriend out of their home and attacked her with a golf club on the street. He also attacked a bystander who attempted to intervene and stop the assault. The State charged Clemens with second-degree assault, felony menacing, and third-degree assault. Clemens pleaded not guilty, and the matter was tried before a jury. During Clemens’s portion of voir dire, defense counsel questioned the venire members, asking for their thoughts on relevant legal principles. Juror 25 commented that there are “always two sides to the story” and that he would need to hear both sides before making a judgment call. Defense counsel followed up by asking, “if you don’t hear from [Clemens] you have some real concerns as to whether or not you can find him not guilty?” Juror 25 said that was correct. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a juror has been rehabilitated when, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the context of the silence indicates that the juror will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial. Applying this test, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s challenges for cause. View "Colorado v. Clemens" on Justia Law

Ryan Frazier ran as a Republican candidate for United States Senate. After the Colorado Secretary of State determined that Frazier had not gathered enough sufficient signatures to appear on the ballot, Frazier challenged the Secretary’s determination under section 1-1-113, C.R.S. (2017), arguing that the Secretary improperly invalidated hundreds of signatures that substantially complied with the Colorado Election Code. Frazier also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2012) arguing that certain Colorado statutes prohibiting non-resident circulators from gathering signatures violated the First Amendment. Frazier filed an accompanying request for attorney’s fees as authorized by 42 U.S.C. 1988 (2012). The district court ruled that the Secretary had properly invalidated certain signatures such that Frazier could not appear on the primary ballot. Frazier then appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, which remanded for reconsideration of a number of signatures under the appropriate standard. On remand, the district court found that additional signatures substantially complied with the code, providing Frazier with sufficient signatures to appear on the Republican primary ballot for United States Senate. No ruling was made on Frazier’s section 1983 claim. Frazier then sought attorney’s fees pursuant to section 1988. The Secretary opposed the fee request, arguing that federal claims such as section 1983 may not be brought in summary proceedings under section 1-1-113. The district court disagreed, finding Frazier was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. The Colorado Supreme Court held that where the language of section 1-1-113 allows a claim to be brought against an election official who has allegedly committed a "breach or neglect of duty or other wrongful act" under the Colorado Election Code, it refers to a breach of duty or other wrongful action under the Colorado Election Code, not a section 1983 claim. "Colorado courts remain entirely open for the adjudication of section 1983 claims, including on an expedited basis if a preliminary injunction is sought, and that therefore section 1-1-113 does not run afoul of the Supremacy Clause." View "Frazier v. Williams" on Justia Law

Gordon Roy Butt sought to run for Colorado senate for the Libertarian Party in a 2013 recall election. The Secretary of State denied his request to circulate a petition because his request came after the deadline as then set by section 1-12-117(1). Butt and the Libertarian Party (collectively, “the Party”) sued the Secretary under section 1-1-113, C.R.S. (2017), alleging that the statutory deadline conflicted with the Colorado Constitution. Within the section 1-1-113 proceeding, the Party also raised a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2012), and an accompanying request for an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 (2012), alleging, inter alia, a First Amendment violation. The district court found for the Party on the state constitutional claim, and did not address the section 1983 claim. After the Colorado Supreme Court denied appellate review on a split vote, further proceedings occurred before the district court. The case was appealed once again, and the Supreme Court denied review again. Nine months later, the Party returned to district court seeking summary judgment on its section 1983 claim and, in the alternative, an attorney’s fee award under section 1988 on the ground that the Party had been successful on its state constitutional claim. The district court denied the Party’s request for attorney’s fees, finding that it had not pursued fees in a timely manner. It also dismissed the section 1983 claim as moot due to the General Assembly’s 2014 amendment of section 1-12-117(1). The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that although the Party’s section 1983 claim was moot, the request for attorney’s fees under section 1988 was appropriate so long as the section 1983 claim was substantial, stemmed from the same nucleus of operative facts as the state constitutional claim, and was reasonably related to the plaintiff’s ultimate success. The court remanded the case to the district court to apply this test to determine whether the Party was entitled to fees. The Colorado Secretary of State appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed: a section 1983 claim may not be brought in a section 1-1-113 proceeding. The language of that section repeatedly refers to "this code," meaning the Colorado Election Code. Therefore, a section 1-1-113 proceeding is limited to allegations of a “breach or neglect of duty or other wrongful act” under the election code itself. § 1-1-113(1). We emphasize that Colorado courts remain entirely open for adjudication of section 1983 claims, including on an expedited basis if a preliminary injunction is sought, and that therefore section 1-1-113 does not run afoul of the Supremacy Clause. View "Williams v. Libertarian Party" on Justia Law

Gilbert Naranjo was charged with two counts of felony menacing for pointing a handgun from his vehicle toward the two occupants of another vehicle during a road-rage incident. Naranjo admitted at trial that he handled the gun during the incident but testified that he merely moved the weapon from the front passenger seat to the glove compartment to prevent it from sliding onto the floor and accidentally discharging. At the close of evidence, Naranjo tendered a jury instruction for the lesser non-included offense of disorderly conduct, which, in relevant part, prohibited the intentional, knowing, or reckless display of a deadly weapon in a public place "in a manner calculated to alarm." The trial court refused, and the jury convicted Naranjo of both counts of felony menacing. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that Naranjo was entitled to the instruction, and reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded there was no rational basis for the jury to simultaneously acquit Naranjo of felony menacing and convict him of disorderly conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals. View "Colorado v. Naranjo" on Justia Law