Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Detective Billy Todis saw defendant Daniel Fitzgerald driving erratically with a headlight out, so he pulled him over and asked him to produce his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. While Fitzgerald struggled to find these documents, Detective Todis smelled alcohol in the car and noticed Fitzgerald had watery eyes. He asked Fitzgerald whether he had been drinking. Fitzgerald said he had consumed one beer. The detective asked Fitzgerald to perform voluntary roadside sobriety maneuvers. Fitzgerald declined. Colorado law provided that if a driver is suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol and refuses to take a test to determine the alcohol concentration of his blood or breath, then that refusal can be used as evidence against him at trial. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the use of this “refusal evidence” violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The Court concluded it did not. View "Fitzgerald v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case centered on a contract dispute between Clean Energy Collective LLC (CEC) and two defendants, Borrego Solar Systems, Inc. (Borrego) and 1115 Solar Development, LLC (1115 Solar). CEC was a Colorado limited liability company; Borrego was a California corporation headquartered in San Diego, and 1115 Solar was a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in California. Borrego was 1115 Solar’s parent company and owned the latter in its entirety. CEC’s claims against Borrego and 1115 Solar arose from an asset purchase agreement (“APA”) to construct several solar photovoltaic projects. The APA specified that CEC would pay defendants to construct three power-generation projects in Massachusetts and allowed for additional projects pursuant to separate contracts governed by the APA’s terms. After the parties were unable to resolve disagreements regarding pricing and payments for projects subject to the APA (all of which were to be completed outside Colorado) CEC sued the defendants in Colorado, asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of warranty. The issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred in concluding Borrego was subject to general personal jurisdiction in Colorado. Because the trial court did not assess whether Borrego was essentially at home in Colorado, the Court concluded it did not fully apply the test announced in "Magill v. Ford Motor Co.," (379 P.3d 1033), and therefore erred in exercising general personal jurisdiction over Borrego. Applying the complete test itself, the Court concluded Borrego was not subject to general jurisdiction in Colorado. View "In re Clean Energy Collective LLC v. Borrego Solar Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerned the relative priority of competing charging orders filed by 15 multiple judgment creditors against a foreign judgment debtor’s membership interests 16 in several Colorado limited liability companies. In July 2013, Chase Bank obtained an Arizona judgment of over $20 million against several defendants, including Reginald Fowler, an Arizona resident. As part of its postjudgment collection efforts, Chase obtained Arizona orders charging Fowler’s membership interests in three Colorado limited liability companies. In March 2014, respondents Douglas McClure, Nancy McClure, and Spiral Broadcasting, L.L.C. (collectively, “the McClures”), obtained a stipulated judgment for $1.5 million against Fowler, among others, in the Arizona Superior Court. In April 2014, the McClures domesticated their Arizona judgment in Colorado, and between May and July 2014, they obtained and served Colorado orders charging Fowler’s membership interests in the LLCs. Now confronted with facially competing charging orders, the LLCs paid Fowler’s then-due distributions into the Colorado District Court registry. That same day, the McClures moved for release of the distribution funds to them, and several days later, Chase sought and obtained leave to intervene and opposed the McClures’ motion. The district court ultimately ordered the distribution funds released to the McClures. Chase then domesticated its Arizona charging orders with a different Colorado District Court, and moved for reconsideration of the release order, arguing that its newly-domesticated charging orders should be deemed effective as of the date they were issued in Arizona and entitled to priority over the McClures’ charging orders. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded first that for purposes of determining the enforceability of a charging order, a membership interest of a non-Colorado citizen in a Colorado limited liability company is located in Colorado. We further conclude that when, as here, a judgment creditor obtains a foreign charging order that compels certain action by a Colorado limited liability company, the charging order is ineffective as against the limited liability company until the creditor has taken sufficient steps to obligate the company to comply with that order. Although the authorities are not uniform as to the steps to be taken, under any of the applicable scenarios, the charging orders obtained by Chase did not become effective until after the respondents had obtained and served competing charging orders. The Court thus concluded that the McClures’ charging orders were entitled to priority over Chase’s competing charging orders. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. v. McClure" on Justia Law

Gerardo Delacruz was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, and prohibited use of a weapon arising from an altercation that took place at a bar in Denver. Delacruz’s convictions were reversed on appeal and, pursuant to section 18-1-405(2), the deadline for his second trial was set for six months from the date the trial court received the court of appeals’ mandate. Four days before trial, and fourteen days before the speedy trial deadline was set to expire, the prosecution learned of a potential conflict of interest involving Delacruz’s defense counsel. The prosecution notified the court, which held a hearing on the matter the following day. The trial court concluded that a continuance was necessary for an independent investigation that would allow Delacruz to make an informed decision with respect to the potential conflict. The trial court also concluded that the prosecution was entitled to a continuance under subsection (6)(g)(I) and (II) of the speedy trial statute to allow the prosecution additional time to secure the presence of the witness who brought this potential conflict to the prosecution’s attention. Delacruz objected to the continuance as a speedy trial violation and moved to dismiss his charges on the same grounds at a later hearing. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the speedy trial deadline. Delacruz petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for relief, arguing that because subsection (6) stated that its exclusions apply “[i]n computing the time within which a defendant shall be brought to trial as provided in subsection (1) of [the speedy trial statute],” these exclusions did not apply to the speedy trial calculation for a new trial following reversal of a defendant’s convictions on appeal. Delacruz further contended that the trial court erred in concluding that the potential conflict constituted an exceptional circumstance under subsection (6)(g)(II) justifying a continuance for further investigation because Delacruz could have waived his right to conflict-free counsel at the hearing without an investigation. Finally, Delacruz argued the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution was entitled to a continuance under subsection (6)(g)(I) because the witness was not “unavailable” nor was her testimony “material,” as required for a continuance under subsection (6)(g)(I). Finding no reversible error in the Court of Appeals’ judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Delacruz v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Victor Mosley of sexually assaulting his youngest daughter. The court of appeals later reversed his convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. Mosley argued on appeal that the trial court violated his statutory speedy trial right on retrial when it granted the prosecution’s request for a continuance. Consequently, he argued, the charges against him should have been dismissed. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review was whether the exclusions listed in subsection (6) of the applicable statute applied to the six-month speedy trial calculation for a new trial following reversal of a defendant’s convictions on appeal. Subsection (6) listed circumstances that were excluded from the speedy trial calculation, including delay resulting from a continuance granted because material evidence is unavailable despite the prosecutor’s diligent efforts to obtain such evidence. Moseley contended that his speedy trial right was violated because his new trial was held beyond the six-month deadline in subsection (2), and therefore, the charges against him had to be dismissed. In the alternative, Mosley contended that, even assuming the exclusions in subsection (6) applied to the speedy trial calculation for a new trial under subsection (2), the continuance in this case was unjustified because the prosecution failed to act with due diligence to locate the complaining witness, as required by subsection (6)(g)(I). The Court of Appeals rejected Mosely’s arguments on appeal, and finding no error in the Court of Appeals’ judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mosley v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case concerned the design and construction of a single-family residence in Pitkin County, Colorado. Heritage Builders, Inc. (“Heritage”) was retained as the general contractor by the original owners of the property, Karen and Courtney Lord. Pitkin County issued a certificate of occupancy for the home in September 2006. In November 2011, Richard Goodman purchased the property from the Lords. Then, sometime between March and June 2012, Goodman discovered the alleged construction defects in the home. Goodman gave Heritage informal notice of his construction defect claims in July 2013. In this original proceeding, the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review was whether the statute of repose in section 13-80-104(1)(a), C.R.S. (2016), barred a general contractor’s third-party claims brought in response to a homeowner’s claim for construction defects discovered in the fifth or sixth year following substantial completion of an improvement to real property. The Court held that such claims are timely, irrespective of both the two-year statute of limitations in section 13-80-102, C.R.S. (2016), and the six-year statute of repose in section 13-80-104(1)(a), so long as they are brought at any time before the ninety-day timeframe outlined in section 13-80-104(1)(b)(II). View "In re Goodman v. Heritage Builders" on Justia Law

Petitioner Austin Veith pleaded guilty to theft and securities fraud. He asked the trial court to sentence him to probation instead of a term of incarceration. The trial court rejected his request for probation with no incarceration and sentenced Veith to ten years of incarceration on the theft count, and twenty-five years of probation on the securities fraud count. Veith did not object when the judge announced his sentence.  But, he did not sign the probation order acknowledging and accepting the terms and conditions of his sentence of probation. Instead, he filed a motion to correct his sentence pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a), arguing that the probationary portion of his sentence must be vacated because he did not consent to it. The trial court denied the motion, and Veith appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that Veith had consented to the terms and conditions of the sentence of probation by requesting probation prior to the hearing, but that his consent did not include certain terms of probation added by the court. As a result, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to remove the terms of probation from his sentence that Veith had not requested before sentencing.I t did not order any modification of the prison sentence. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the legality of Veith’s sentence of probation, and reversed the appellate court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that a trial court cannot impose a sentence of probation without the defendant’s consent. In this case, Veith consented to probation in lieu of incarceration; therefore, the trial court exceeded the scope of Veith’s consent when it imposed a ten-year sentence of incarceration in addition to probation. The trial court lacked authority to impose the sentence of probation.  Accordingly, the Court vacated Veith’s sentence in its entirety, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the case to that court to return the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with Veith’s plea agreement. View "Veith v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this case, the issues presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review implicated: (1) whether a defendant may raise his or her unpreserved double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal and, if so, what standard of review applies; and (2) whether driving under revocation (“DUR”) is a lesser included offense of aggravated driving after revocation prohibited (“aggravated DARP”). The Colorado Supreme Court addressed similar issues in four cases at the same time as this case, captioned as “Reyna-Abarca v. Colorado,” (2017 CO 15, ___ P.3d ___). In “Reyna-Abarca,” the Court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims could be raised for the first time on appeal and that appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. Applying those rulings here, the Court concluded that the appellate court in “Zubiate v. Colorado,” (2013 COA 69, ___ P.3d ___), correctly (1) conducted plain error review of Vanessa Zubiate’s unpreserved double jeopardy claim and (2) determined that DUR was not a lesser included offense of aggravated DARP (although the Supreme Court’s analysis differed somewhat). View "Zubiate v. Colorado" on Justia Law

These cases presented issues of whether double jeopardy claims could be raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if so, what standard of review applied. The Colorado Supreme Court addressed these same issues in four cases at the same time as these, captioned as “Reyna-Abarca v. Colorado,” (2017 CO 15, ___ P.3d ___). In “Reyna-Abarca,” the Court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims could be raised for the first time on appeal and that appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. Applying that ruling here, the Court concluded that the divisions in “Colorado v. Zadra,” (2013 COA 140, ___ P.3d ___), and “Colorado v. Adams,” (No. 12CA339 (Colo. App. Mar. 12, 2015)), correctly conducted plain error review of the defendants’ unpreserved double jeopardy claims and merged certain of the defendants’ convictions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgments in both cases. View "Colorado v. Zadra" on Justia Law

A jury convicted petitioner Anthony Marsh of sexually assaulting three of his granddaughters and possessing more than twenty images depicting child pornography. Marsh appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the presence of temporary internet cache files stored on a person’s hard drive could constitute evidence of “knowing possession” as used in Colorado’s child pornography statute, 18-6-403, C.R.S. (2016). The Court held: when a computer user seeks out and views child pornography on the internet, he possesses the images he views. Here, since the evidence presented at trial established that Marsh’s cache contained images that a computer user had previously viewed on the web browser, the Court concluded that the internet cache images qualified as relevant evidence that Marsh had previously viewed, and thus possessed, those images. Therefore, when considered as a whole and in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Marsh possessed more than twenty images depicting child pornography. In addition, the Court held that even if the trial court improperly admitted the forensic interviewers’ testimony as lay opinion, the error was harmless. View "Marsh v. Colorado" on Justia Law