Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reviewed a case involving an insurance dispute over uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UM/UIM") benefits in a specialty antique/classic-car policy. The plaintiff, Beverly Hughes, was injured while driving a vehicle owned by her employer. Hughes was insured by two automobile insurance policies: one standard policy issued by Travelers Insurance covering her regular-use vehicles and a specialty policy issued by Essentia Insurance Company covering her antique/classic cars. She sought to recover underinsured motorist benefits from both policies.The court held that a specialty antique/classic-car policy that requires an insured to have a regular-use vehicle and to insure it through a standard policy that provides UM/UIM coverage may properly limit its own UM/UIM coverage to the use of any antique/classic car covered under the specialty policy. The court reasoned that an adjunctive antique/classic-car policy, which excludes UM/UIM benefits with respect to situations involving a regular-use vehicle but works in tandem with a standard regular-use-vehicle policy that provides UM/UIM coverage, satisfies both the language of section 10-4-609, C.R.S. (2023), and the public policy goals underpinning the statute. Thus, the court concluded that the regular-use-vehicle exclusion in the UM/UIM provision of Essentia's specialty policy is valid and enforceable under Colorado law. As a result, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Essentia. View "Essentia Insurance Company, v. Hughes" on Justia Law

A high school student, identified as J.G., was required to undergo daily searches for weapons as part of a safety plan after committing firearm-related offenses. However, when J.G. returned to school for his tenth-grade year, he was not searched on the first two days. On his third day, school administrators discovered a loaded handgun in his backpack and he was arrested and charged with weapons-related offenses. J.G. moved to suppress evidence of the handgun, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights as the safety plan was no longer in effect at the time of the search. His motion was denied by the juvenile court which found that the safety plan, with its requirement for daily searches, was still in place when the handgun was found.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that a search of a student conducted on school grounds in accordance with an individualized, weapons-related safety plan is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that J.G.'s behavior did not create individualized reasonable suspicion on the day he was searched. However, the presence or absence of individualized suspicion is not the full extent of the inception prong of the reasonableness test. The court held that the search of J.G.’s backpack was reasonable at its inception because it was carried out in conformity with a formal safety plan and it was appropriately limited in its scope. The court also found that J.G. had sufficient notice of the search requirement to diminish his expectation of privacy in his backpack. View "People In re J.G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Colorado examined the case of Carlos Ray Maes, who was charged with six felony counts. A magistrate presided over the preliminary hearing and found that probable cause existed for each of the eligible counts. The case was then bound over to the district court. Nearly three months later, Maes petitioned the district court for a review of the magistrate's probable-cause determination, but the district court declined, arguing that it did not have jurisdiction to review such a determination and that Maes's petition was not timely.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that a magistrate's finding of probable cause after a preliminary hearing is a "final order or judgment" under the Colorado Rules for Magistrates and is therefore reviewable by a district court. Further, the court held that the time limit for petitioning for district court review of a magistrate's final order or judgment begins when the magistrate memorializes that determination in writing. Consequently, the court concluded that Maes's petition was timely filed. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Maes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado has ruled that the notice-prejudice rule applies to occurrence-based, first-party homeowners’ property insurance policies. This rule allows insurance companies to deny coverage based on late notice of a claim only if they can prove they were prejudiced by the delay. The court reached this conclusion after exploring the differences between occurrence policies and claims-made policies, asserting that applying the rule to the former was consistent with precedent. The court's decision was based on three policy considerations: the adhesive nature of insurance contracts, the public policy of compensating victims, and the unfairness of granting the insurer a windfall due to a technicality. This case involved two homeowners, Karyn Gregory and Lisa and Sylvan Runkel, who had filed claims for hail damage to their homes. The insurance companies denied their claims on the grounds that they were filed too late. The court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the cases for further proceedings, with instructions to allow the insurers an opportunity to establish prejudice from the late notice. View "Gregory v. Safeco Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law

This case involves the interpretation of a provision in the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA) that dictates the factors parole boards must consider when deciding whether to release a convicted sex offender on parole. The Supreme Court of Colorado was asked by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether SOLSA requires, permits, or prohibits parole boards from considering maturity and rehabilitation of an offender.The case arose from the sentencing of Omar Ricardo Godinez, who was convicted of several serious offenses committed when he was fifteen years old. Godinez argued that SOLSA violated the Eighth Amendment as applied to him, claiming that the Act does not allow parole boards to consider an offender's maturity and rehabilitation. This, he contended, renders the Act unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Florida, which mandates that young offenders must be given "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."The Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that although SOLSA does not expressly require parole boards to consider an offender's maturity, it does not prevent them from doing so. Hence, SOLSA permits consideration of maturity. As for rehabilitation, the Court held that it is a necessary part of the factors the parole board is required to consider under SOLSA. Thus, the Court concluded that SOLSA requires consideration of rehabilitation. Therefore, the Court held that SOLSA permits consideration of maturity and requires consideration of rehabilitation. View "Godinez v. Williams" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Colorado considered a petition from GHP Horwath, P.C., Nadine Pietrowski, Bohn Aguilar, LLC, Michael G. Bohn, and Armando Y. Aguilar, asking the court to permanently enjoin Nina H. Kazazian from proceeding pro se in Colorado state courts. Over the past eleven years, Kazazian, a pro se litigant and former attorney, had initiated at least ten lawsuits and twice as many appeals, most of which were found to be duplicative, meritless, or frivolous. Her actions led to her disbarment and multiple sanctions. The court noted that while every person has the right to access Colorado courts, this right is not absolute and may be curtailed when a pro se party persistently disrupts judicial administration by filing meritless and duplicative claims. The court found that Kazazian's actions placed a strain on judicial resources and were harmful to the public interest. Therefore, the court granted the petitioners' requested relief and ordered that Kazazian be permanently enjoined from proceeding pro se in Colorado state courts. View "GHP Horwath, P.C. v. Kazazian" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, petitioner Claire E. Miller and respondent Jesse A. Amos were involved in a dispute related to eviction proceedings. Miller was a tenant who lived in a home owned and occupied by Amos. Their arrangement was an oral tenancy agreement where Miller agreed to provide pet care and light housekeeping services instead of paying rent. After six months, Amos served Miller with a notice to quit, alleging breach of their oral agreement. Miller refused to move out, and Amos filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) complaint seeking eviction. Miller contended that her eviction was due to her refusal to engage in sexual acts with Amos, which she stated was a form of sex discrimination and retaliation under the Colorado Fair Housing Act (CFHA).The county court ruled in favor of Amos, stating that a landlord can serve a notice to quit for “no reason or any reason,” dismissing the CFHA violation claim as an affirmative defense for eviction. The district court affirmed this decision.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the lower court's ruling. The court held that a tenant can assert a landlord’s alleged violation of the CFHA as an affirmative defense to an FED eviction. The court noted that the purpose of the CFHA is to prevent discriminatory practices, and therefore, a tenant must be able to use it as a shield against a discriminatory eviction. The court also emphasized that a tenant's right to due process must be preserved even in eviction proceedings, which are intended to be expedited. This decision allows tenants in Colorado to assert discrimination or retaliation under the CFHA as a defense in eviction cases. View "Miller v. Amos" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, the defendant, Sir Mario Owens, appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, witness intimidation, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and accessory to a crime. The convictions stemmed from two separate incidents: the Lowry Park shootings, in which Owens was involved, and the subsequent Dayton Street shootings, for which Owens was convicted. The defendant argued that the trial was unfair due to the court's rulings on several issues, including the admission of evidence related to the Lowry Park shootings, the denial of Owens's motions for mistrial, and the limitation on cross-examination and impeachment of the prosecution's key witness. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's rulings were proper and did not constitute reversible error. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "People v. Owens" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was called upon to decide a matter related to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). The case involved a wrongful death action brought by the family and estate representatives of two brothers, Walter and Samuel Giron, who died when Officer Justin Hice accidentally collided with their van while pursuing a suspected speeder. Officer Hice and his employer, the Town of Olathe, claimed immunity under the CGIA. The Plaintiffs countered that the Defendants were not entitled to immunity because Officer Hice failed to use his emergency lights or siren continuously while speeding before the accident.The court had to interpret the CGIA and related traffic code provisions to determine the relevant time period for an officer’s failure to use emergency alerts. The court concluded that the CGIA requires a minimal causal connection between a plaintiff’s injuries and the fact that an officer did not use emergency signals while speeding. This means that an officer has access to immunity while speeding only during those times when the officer is using alerts.The court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation that an officer who fails to use his alerts at any point during the pursuit waives immunity for the entire pursuit. Instead, the court held that under section 24-10-106(1)(a) an emergency driver waives immunity only if the plaintiff’s injuries could have resulted from the emergency driver’s failure to use alerts.The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for the court of appeals to determine if Officer Hice’s failure to use his lights or siren until the final five to ten seconds of his pursuit could have contributed to the accident. View "Hice v. Giron" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado ruled in favor of the petitioners, GHP Horwath, P.C.; Nadine Pietrowski; Bohn Aguilar, LLC; Michael G. Bohn; and Armando Y. Aguilar, in their request to permanently enjoin respondent Nina H. Kazazian from proceeding without legal representation (pro se) in Colorado state courts. The court found that Kazazian, a disbarred attorney, had consistently abused the legal system by pursuing numerous frivolous lawsuits and appeals, often targeting the attorneys involved in her cases. This behavior, the court held, caused unnecessary strain on judicial resources and was often aimed at harassing the opposing parties. Therefore, while Kazazian retained the right to access the courts, she could only do so through an attorney. View "Horwath v. Kazazian" on Justia Law